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RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0716/01 1561550
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 051550Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4442
INFO RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4170
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7825
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9619
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0154
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000716 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG KNNP IAEA ETTC EINV IR BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: CONGRESSIONAL HEARING ON WEAKNESSES IN MONITORING 
AND CONTROL OF BRAZIL'S NUCLEAR FACILITIES 
 
REF:  A) BRASILIA 702, B) RIO 131 
 
(U)  THIS CABLE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AND NOT FOR INTERNET 
DISTRIBUTION. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  At May 14 hearings before the Brazilian Chambers 
of Deputies expert witnesses disagreed over the seriousness and 
accuracy of the criticisms contained in a recent report by the 
Brazilian government accountability office (Tribunal de Contas da 
Uniao) finding faults and irregularities in the monitoring and 
control over Brazil's 2,350 nuclear facilities and institutions. 
According to experts, Brazil's two nuclear reactors are more secure 
and better supervised than many of the other entities using nuclear 
materials, the majority of which have been operating without the 
necessary permits and licensing.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) At the end of March, the Brazilian government 
accountability office (Tribunal de Contas da Uniao or TCU) released 
a report identifying weaknesses in the government's oversight of 
entities handling nuclear materials.  It found that 54% of Brazil's 
2,350 institutions handling nuclear materials had been operating 
without the necessary permits and licensing.  Further, 45% of these 
entities had not received proper inspections by Brazilian 
authorities.  The report also indicated that numerous radiotherapy 
clinics had no record of ever having been inspected.  It concluded 
that Brazil's two nuclear reactors at Angra dos Reis were lacking 
proper inspection facilities, properly trained personnel, and that 
their emergency plans lacked sufficient guidelines and safeguards 
for the plants' operators and the people living nearby.  (NOTE: 
Since the TCU released its report, one of Brazil's reactors - Angra 
II - had a minor incident, without any serious injuries or 
contamination of property.  The authorities reviewed the incident 
and determined that current policies and practices are satisfactory. 
 REFTELS.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In response to the TCU's critical report, the Chamber of 
Deputies' Committee on the Environment and Sustainable Development 
held a public hearing on May 14.  Three prominent figures involved 
in nuclear matters testified:  Othon Luiz Pinheiro da Silva, the 
President of the Brazilian nuclear energy company Eletronuclear - 
Eletrobras Thermonuclear S.A. (which runs Brazil's two nuclear 
energy reactors); Odair Dias Goncalves, the President of the 
National Commission on Nuclear Energy (CNEN), which regulates and 
oversees nuclear energy in Brazil; and, Rogerio dos Santos Gomes, 
the President of the Radio-protection and Nuclear Security 
Inspectors Association (AFEN). 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Both Electronuclear President Pinheiro and CNEN President 
Goncalves stressed that nuclear facilities in Brazil, especially 
Brazil's nuclear energy plant at Angra, have extensive emergency 
plans in place to mitigate the hazards of a potential nuclear 
accident.  Although both men argued that plans are currently in 
place which meet today's standards, neither man explained what the 
plans entailed or what they are intended to prevent or mitigate.  In 
his remarks, Goncalves expressed concern regarding some of Brazil's 
2,500 nuclear institutions with expired authorization permits (such 
as research facilities, factories and medical institutions), but 
indicated that only 9% of those reported by the TCU merited 
immediate concern.  Goncalves added, however, that these entities 
had been notified and would be inspected and reauthorized soon. 
During his presentation, Pinheiro emphasized that Brazil's growth 
will require an increase in nuclear energy.  He also underscored the 
need for Brazil to have up to date operation and safety procedures 
in all of its nuclear facilities in order to prevent problems.  Both 
Pinheiro and Goncalves were optimistic about Brazil's nuclear 
program, and they skipped over potential weaknesses. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In contrast, AFEN President Gomes was critical of the 
current state of Brazil's nuclear program.  He questioned many of 
the positive claims made by Pinheiro and Goncalves.  Gomes asserted 
that Brazil's regulatory laws regarding nuclear materials are 
conflicting and contradictory.  According to Gomes, there is no 
concrete law stating who is in charge of regulating nuclear 
materials in Brazil.  He opined that oftentimes regulation is left 
up to the nuclear companies themselves.  This, he said, creates an 
ethical dilemma for the company.  One specific area lacking 
regulation, according to Gomes, is the transportation of nuclear 
materials in and out of Brazil.  Gomes argued that there is no 
established regulatory or inspection body in Brazil that monitors 
the transport of nuclear materials in Brazil.  He feared that this 
lack of regulation could result in a tragic accident.  Gomes cited 
several instances in which radioactive material passed through 
Brazilian ports without any type of monitoring or inspection.  Gomes 
referred back to the 1987 nuclear accident in Goiania, Brazil, as an 
example of the potential threats posed by poor regulation and 
oversight.  In that case, discarded nuclear material from a 
 
BRASILIA 00000716  002 OF 002 
 
 
dentist's office, which was salvaged from a junkyard and turned into 
jewelry, killed several people. Gomes also accused Pinheiro and his 
associates of being motivated by money and, thus, compromising the 
security and regulation of Brazil's nuclear program.  Pinheiro 
strongly denied that accusation. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Several deputies voiced their concerns about the safety of 
Brazil's nuclear program.  A number of them voiced support for 
Gomes' calls for tighter regulation of the transportation of nuclear 
material, and for institutionalizing an outside entity to monitor 
and inspect sites, rather than rely on self-inspection.  Goncalves 
responded that there was not a problem with the separation of 
regulatory duties, and that the media and people like Gomes were 
exaggerating the problem.  He also asserted that some regulatory and 
inspection duties must be retained by the industry itself in order 
to effectively protect its facilities from outside threats (such as 
terrorist attacks). 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Gomes warned that poor transport regulation could allow 
someone to get a hold of nuclear material and use it to make a 
"dirty bomb."  Several of the deputies voiced alarm over this risk. 
Pinheiro and Goncalves replied that such a risk was very low. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Also, Deputy Paulo Teixeira (Sao Paulo) declared that he 
was adamantly opposed to any development of nuclear technology for 
non-pacific means.  The other deputies present, as well as the 
witnesses, concurred.  Goncalves noted that the Ministry of Defense 
has been involved in the process of enriching uranium in Brazil. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) COMMENT.  It is positive development to see the Chamber of 
Deputies holding a hearing about the inspection and oversight of 
Brazil's nuclear reactors and entities possessing nuclear materials. 
 This attention from the legislative branch should increase the 
pressure on the government to put in place a good, reliable regime 
for nuclear security and safety.   END COMMENT. 
 
SOBEL