VZCZCXRO0693
RR RUEHDH RUEHHM RUEHPB RUEHTM RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBR #0697/01 1551455
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 041455Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4425
INFO RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4146
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7812
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9606
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000697 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PASS TO SPECIAL ENVOY TODD STERN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2019 
TAGS: SENV ENRG KGHG EFIN ECON BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: OPPORTUNITY TO POSITIVELY INFLUENCE CLIMATE CHANGE 
NEGOTIATING POSITION 
 
REF: A) 2008 BRASILIA 1462, 
B) 2008 BRASILIA 1159, C) BRASILIA 143, 
D) BRASILIA 157, E) BRASILIA 202, 
F) BRASILIA 265, G) 2007 BRASILIA 2020), 
H) SCHNIER-DRISCOLL E-MAIL 12 MAY 2009 
 
BRASILIA 00000697  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified by: Deputy Chief of Mission Lisa Kubiske, Reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  There are signs that within the Brazilian 
government there is increasing pressure to take a more pro-active 
role in the ongoing international climate change negotiations.  To 
make progress in this area, Vice Minister for the Environment 
Izabella Teixeira in recent meetings with the Ambassador and the 
Deputy Chief of Mission urged that senior USG officials dealing with 
climate change come to Brazil to pursue a dialogue with Minister 
Dilma Rousseff in the Presidency and other key officials.  We have a 
good opportunity to nudge the development of Brazil's negotiating 
position in a more positive direction.  Post strongly concurs with 
her analysis and suggestion.  END SUMMARY. 
 
OBTAINING BRAZIL'S HELP WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
¶2.  (C) Post has highlighted (REFTELS) the internal division within 
the Brazilian government over how to deal with climate change in the 
ongoing negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC).  The Ministry of Exterior Relations (MRE) has had 
the lead in these negotiations.  Although the MRE has replaced 
veteran environmental negotiator Everton Vargas with Vera Machado as 
Under Secretary for Policy and head of the climate change negotiating 
team (REFTEL E), there have been only modest signs of positive 
evolution in the MRE's views.  In late 2007, Vargas adamantly 
rejected the idea put forth by National Economic Council Director Al 
Hubbard and Deputy National Security Advisor Dan Price that Brazil 
and other developing countries should make commitments to help reduce 
global climate change.  Vargas repeatedly stressed that developing 
countries had no obligations under the UNFCCCC except to provide 
reports (REFTEL B).  In May, Vera Machado echoed that view to the 
Ambassador, namely, that only Annex I countries in the UNFCCC needed 
to take on targets.  There may be some modest movement in MRE's 
stance based on the discussion in March between Luis Alberto 
Figueiredo Machado, Vera Machado's deputy (no relation) and the MRE's 
Director of the Environment Department, and Special Envoy Todd Stern. 
 Figueiredo said that Brazil might be willing to support the creation 
of a registry mechanism to measure and verify actions of non-Kyoto 
parties, non-Annex I countries. (REF H) 
 
¶3.  (C) In contrast to the incremental evolution of the MRE's 
thinking, the Ministry of the Environment (MMA) has been bursting 
forth with new energy and ideas since Minister Carlos Minc and Vice 
Minister Izabella Teixeira took office in May 2008.  The MMA is 
advocating positions that are more supportive of those of the U.S. 
Government (USG).  In February 2009, Environment Minister Carlos Minc 
in Nairobi publicly underscored the necessity of developing countries 
to do more, citing the case of Brazil where the government has 
committed to reducing deforestation - the primary source of its 
emissions - by 70% by 2017.  In return for developing countries 
taking stronger measures to reduce emissions, Minc said, the 
developed countries would need to provide them with greater financial 
assistance and transfer of technology.  Minc has consistently sought 
a more pro-active role for Brazil in the UNFCCC negotiations, acting 
as a bridge between the developed and the developing countries. 
 
¶4.  (C) At a working lunch with the Ambassador on May 7 and later at 
a meeting with the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) on May 20, Vice 
Minister Teixeira (with her advisors Suzana Kahn and Branca 
Americano) reiterated the MMA's thinking that Brazil could serve as a 
bridge between developed and developing countries.  She emphasized 
that a partnership with the United States early on would make a major 
difference in the negotiations.  She acknowledged to the Ambassador 
that there were differences between the MMA's approach and that of 
the MRE.  She stated that fortunately the Presidency (referred to as 
Casa Civil) has the ability to weigh in decisively.  She considered 
the Casa Civil as an ally, noting that Casa Civil's Minister Dilma 
Rousseff sided with the MMA in a dispute with the MRE in December 
2008 over whether or not to include in the domestic national climate 
change plan targets for reductions in the deforestation rate.  For 
Brazil, deforestation accounts for the vast majority of its 
greenhouse gas emissions (REFTEL A).  COMMENT.  While Rousseff 
appears to be a friend and political ally of Minc, she has 
infrequently intervened to help Minc in his various struggles on 
environmental issues with the MRE, the Agriculture Ministry, and 
other agencies.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶5.  (C) For their part, MRE officials in discussions with Post have 
sought to minimize the role of the MMA in these negotiations.  MRE's 
 
BRASILIA 00000697  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Special Envoy for Climate Change Sergio Serra regularly emphasizes to 
the Post's Environment, Science & Technology, and Health (ESTH) 
Counselor that the MRE leads the Brazilian negotiating team and that 
Minc is speaking just his own personal views.  On May 19, a key MRE 
director once (but no longer) involved in climate change issues 
privately told the DCM that Minc was not a good interlocutor on 
climate change because he wasn't realistic enough.  Rather than 
focusing on what this director views as unattainable goals, he 
suggested that the United States focus on what is attainable, at one 
point using the formulation that "developed countries will have to 
cut emissions, developing countries will have to cut the rate of 
growth of emissions."  In his view, there is a strategic effort being 
planned by the Europeans to put the United States, China, India, and 
Brazil on the defensive at Copenhagen.  To counter this, he advocated 
that the United States and Brazil should focus on the principles we 
can agree on to take together to Copenhagen for the UNFCC talks.  In 
this regard, he steered us back to the MRE negotiators.  The MRE went 
so far as to contemplate sending a negotiating team to the first 
meeting of the Major Economies Forum without a representative from 
the MMA, though it later backed down and dropped out one of its 
officials (Serra) to allow an MMA official (Americano) to attend. 
 
¶6.  (C) COMMENT.  To date, the MRE has been generally successful in 
keeping to a minimum the MMA's role in setting the negotiating team's 
positions in the UNFCCC negotiations.  There are several reasons that 
undergird this split with the MMA.  There is an institutional turf 
battle, with the MRE not wanting to cede its well-established 
authority to another ministry in these high-profile international 
negotiations.  Further, the MRE is probably more sensitive to 
repercussions from China, India and other developing countries if it 
is seen to be breaking ranks with them by agreeing that developing 
countries should take on more responsibility for solving the global 
warming problem.  The MMA, being primarily domestic oriented, is more 
shielded from such repercussions.  Another factor is that the MMA 
seems to be much more concerned about solving the problem, while the 
MRE views the matter in the context of Brazil's broader foreign 
policy concerns and goals (for example, defending Brazilian 
sovereignty and enhancing Brazil's leader-of-the-Third World 
credentials), rather than primarily as a significant, imminent threat 
to Brazil.  Thus, for the MRE there is limited value in Brazil making 
commitments and sacrifices to address this challenge.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶7.  (C) Another important difference between the MRE and the MMA is 
over granting of credits or offsets for conserving standing forests. 
The MRE succeeded in keeping forests out of the UNFCCC's clean 
development mechanism (CDM) and to this day opposes this concept. 
Minc is open to ideas with regard to standing forests, and in April 
spoke at a conference regarding Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and forest Degradation (REDD).  The MRE's opposition is not limited 
to REDD; Vera Machado told the Ambassador that, although Brazil now 
does not oppose the use of a "cap-and-trade" mechanism, Brazil sees 
it as only a stop-gap measure, as it will only maintain current 
emission levels, not reduce them.  The MRE wants to see deep cuts by 
those countries responsible for historic emissions. 
 
¶8.  (C) The MMA and the MRE agree on two key points in the UNFCCC 
negotiations.  First, they both see a need for greater technology 
transfer and financial assistance to developing countries to help 
them mitigate and adapt to climate change.  Second, they both have 
highlighted the pivotal role the United States plays in the 
negotiations.  Vera Machado and Teixeira have said the United States 
is key to the success or failure in these negotiations. 
 
HOW TO POSITIVELY INFLUENCE BRAZIL'S POSITION 
 
¶9.  (C) Teixeira discussed with the Ambassador and the DCM means to 
encourage the Brazilian negotiating team position to evolve in a 
positive manner.  She suggested to the Ambassador that senior USG 
officials come to Brazil and meet with the key MMA (Minc and 
Teixeira) and MRE officials (Machado and Figueiredo) and that they 
should reach out to Casa Civil Minister Rousseff and Ministry of 
Science and Technology (MCT) Vice Minister Luiz Antonio Rodrigues 
Elias.  While in Brazil, visiting USG officials should also meet with 
other important Brazilian leaders from the national government, the 
congress, the state governments, non-governmental organizations, and 
the private sector. 
 
¶10. (C) At the later meeting with the DCM, Teixeira and her staff 
elaborated on the idea of a partnership with the United States.  This 
would include a political dialogue and also concrete technical 
projects on climate change.  Teixeira also suggested that while these 
dialogues would initially be focused on climate change issues, they 
could also be used as a vehicle for fostering a conversation on other 
related environmental issues, such as forest management, 
biodiversity, or access and benefit sharing.  In addition, she said 
the United States could send a strong signal about its new commitment 
 
BRASILIA 00000697  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
to climate change by making a significant contribution to the Amazon 
Fund (REFTEL B). 
 
¶11.  (C) COMMENT.  The USG has a clear opportunity to nudge the 
development of Brazil's negotiating position in a more positive 
direction.  The arrival of the new team at the Environment Ministry 
(Minc, Teixeira, Kahn and Americano) has built up internal support 
for such a change.  Visits from senior USG officials who can meet 
with Casa Civil Minister Rousseff and other influential Brazilians 
could be very fruitful.  Rousseff, whose influence on these issues 
and with President Lula makes her a key player, is not likely to 
travel much to the United States this year as a result of health 
issues.  If we want to reach her with input from Washington, USG 
officials will need to come here.  END COMMENT. 
 
SOBEL