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RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4144

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000694 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2019 
TAGS: PREL ETRD ENRG BR KN
SUBJECT: NORTH KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER MAKES "GENERIC" 
VISIT TO BRAZIL, MAY 9-13 
 
REF: A. BSB 667 
     ¶B. BSB 657 
     ¶C. BSB 453 
     ¶D. 08 BSB 1559 
     ¶E. 08 BSB 1486 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen Liston, reasons 1.4 B and D. 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary and comment.  Brazilian diplomatic sources 
assert that the May 9-13 visit of the North Korean Foreign 
Minister to Brazil had only a "generic political 
significance," the Koreans were not well prepared to discuss 
energy, one of their top priorities, and there was little 
substance to the visit.  Sources said the DPRK FM asked for 
Brazil's views of President Obama and said the United States 
is "testing" North Korea in a way that produces only negative 
responses.  Brazil reacted strongly to North Korea's latest 
nuclear test on May 25 by postponing the opening of its 
embassy in Pyongyang (ref A) and issuing an 
uncharacteristically strong statement of condemnation. 
Brazil is now taking stock of what others have done with 
regard to the DPRK,and its relationship with the DPRK may be 
essentially frozen for now.  Even for conflict-avoidant 
Brazil, North Korea went too far and its nuclear test 
seriously set back the relationship with Brazil, undoing what 
little was done by FM Pak's visit last month.  End summary 
and comment. 
 
¶2.  (C) North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Ui Chun visited 
Brazil May 9-13 for talks on trade, energy, and political 
affairs.  Poloff discussed the visit with First Secretary 
Ricardo Portugal, ROK and DPRK desk officer at Brazil's 
Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE) on May 19.  Portugal said 
the DPRK delegation arrived in Brasilia after visiting Cuba 
and Peru and seemed tired.  It was the first visit of a DPRK 
FM to Brazil, and the delegation included four other DPRK 
Foreign Ministry officials (see below).  The itinerary 
included a one-hour meeting with Brazilian FM Celso Amorim; a 
lunch given by Under Secretary Roberto Jaguaribe; a meeting 
with Carlos Figueiredo, the Brasilia representative of 
Petrobras; and a meeting with three federal deputies, 
including the chairman of the Foreign Relations and National 
Defense Committee and the leader of the Congressional 
Brazil-DPRK friendship group. 
 
Brazil Wants to Sell Chicken and Pork 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (C) Portugal said Brazil's bilateral agenda with North 
Korea is above all to sell Brazilian chicken, pork, and farm 
machinery, and to get support for Rio de Janeiro's candidacy 
to host the Olympic Games in 2016.  (Note: this is a more 
focused agenda than Portugal related to us last November, per 
ref E.  End note.)  Portugal said Amorim and Pak discussed a 
few proposals for bilateral cooperation - all originating on 
the Korean side ) but Brazil had little interest in them, 
except for a sports agreement since it is relevant to the 
Olympic Games candidacy.  He said the DPRK proposed an 
agreement of a maritime nature (NFI) but Brazil was not 
interested and would probably counter with a different 
proposal. 
 
¶4.  (C) Portugal said North Korea requested the Foreign 
Minister's visit in February 2009 but following the April 5 
Taepo-Dong 2 launch, Brazil wanted to downplay it.  As a 
result, when the North Koreans requested meetings with 
President Lula and former president and current Senate 
president Jose Sarney, the MRE refused them and the highest 
Brazilian they saw was Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, but he 
did not host the lunch in their honor. 
 
DPRK Wants Deep-Water Oil Technology 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (C) The North Korean delegation included one person at 
the Under Secretary level, who was their chief interlocutor 
with Petrobras.  (Note:  Portugal did not name the person, 
who may have been Pak Kun Gwang ) see delegation roster 
below.  End note.)  Their chief interest was in deep water 
oil exploration and drilling, in which Brazil has much 
experience.  But Brazil is not able to take on new 
 
BRASILIA 00000694  002 OF 002 
 
 
commitments in this area, and has even postponed standing 
commitments to other countries such as Vietnam, Portugal 
said.   Moreover, the DPRK delegation was poorly prepared for 
this discussion and was unable to get into any specifics of 
the matter, and Brazil refused their request, Portugal 
explained. 
 
Missile Launch 
- - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) FM Pak repeated his country's claim that the April 5 
Taepo-Dong 2 missile launch had put a satellite into orbit. 
According to Portugal, FM Amorim told Pak that Brazilian 
foreign policy is non-interventionist but certain subjects 
are by their nature international such as human rights and 
arms control, and Brazil will follow UN sanctions.  He asked 
the DPRK to abstain from any actions that might raise 
tensions in the region. 
 
DPRK: "The United States is Testing Us" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7.  (C) Pak asked Amorim for his "read" of President Obama 
and the new administration.  Amorim said Brazil is "betting 
on it" and has noted many positive changes already such as 
change in Cuba policy.  Pak replied that the United States is 
"testing" the DPRK and getting only negative responses, but 
Amorim countered that the DPRK should not close off channels 
of communication and urged the DPRK to return to the Six 
Party Talks.  He offered Brazil's help (NFI), and urged the 
North Koreans "not to continue deepening a wrong policy of 
isolation," Portugal said.  Pak thanked Brazil for abstaining 
on the latest country resolution on the DPRK in the UN.  Desk 
officer Portugal noted that, in Brazil's view, such 
abstentions keep channels of communication open and allow 
Brazil to try to change the behavior of countries such as the 
DPRK.  (Note: Portugal did not mention human rights as an 
issue raised with the DPRK delegation.  End note.) 
 
Delegation Composition 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Members of the North Korean delegation, as provided 
by MRE: 
 
- Pak Ui Chun, Foreign Minister and head of delegation 
- Pak Kun Gwang, Ambassador-at-large, DPRK Foreign Ministry 
- Ho Yong Bok, Director-General for Latin America, Africa and 
Middle East, DPRK Foreign Ministry 
- Kim Hak Chol, investigator from the Latin America 
Department, DPRK Foreign Ministry 
- Ji Su Gwan, employee responsible for management of the 
Protocol Office of the DPRK Foreign Ministry 
 
Post-Nuclear Test 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (C) Brazil is taking stock of what others have done with 
regard to the DPRK: Koreas desk officer Ricardo Portugal 
called us on June 1 to ask for a complete list of United 
States sanctions against the DPRK and asked whether we had a 
head count of any countries that had recalled their 
ambassadors from Pyongyang.  He said he was also gathering 
information from other embassies about their sanctions 
against the DPRK. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶10.  (C) Brazil reacted strongly to North Korea's latest 
nuclear test on May 25 by postponing the opening of its 
embassy in Pyongyang (ref A) and issuing an 
uncharacteristically strong statement of condemnation.  We 
believe Brazil's relationship with the DPRK may be 
essentially frozen for now and forward movement in trade, 
sports agreements, or other diplomatic initiatives is 
unlikely.  Even for conflict-avoidant Brazil, North Korea 
went too far and its nuclear test seriously set back the 
relationship with Brazil, undoing what little was done by FM 
Pak's visit last month. 
SOBEL