VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBW #0507/01 1631457
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121457Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1364
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNS/NSC WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

UNCLAS BELGRADE 000507 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SCE (PETERSON AND COFFIN) 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL KIRF KV SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA: PRESEVO VALLEY ISLAMIC COMMUNITY RETAINS KOSOVO 
TIES 
 
REF: 07 Belgrade 1392 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Despite strained relations between Belgrade and Pristina 
following Kosovo's February 2008 declaration of independence, the 
Islamic community in the South Serbian region of the Presevo Valley 
has been able to maintain its historically strong ties with the 
Kosovo Islamic Community.  According to top South Serbian religious 
leaders, Serbian government officials do not interfere in this 
relationship, which contrasts sharply with the government's concerns 
about ties between the Novi Pazar-based Islamic Community in Serbia 
and the Islamic community in Bosnia.  Although there are two Islamic 
communities in the Presevo Valley, mirroring the situation in the 
rest of the country, the potential for conflict in South Serbia is 
low because religion and politics remain firmly separated.  There is 
a small Wahhabi presence, but local religious leaders do not view it 
as a threat.  End Summary. 
 
Basic Facts and Figures 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) The South Serbian Islamic community, which includes Presevo, 
Medvedja, and Bujanovac municipalities in the Presevo Valley that 
borders Kosovo, consists primarily of ethnic Albanians, although 
there also are some Roma and Slavic Muslims.  Due to the Ottoman 
influence, South Serbian Muslims, like most Balkan Muslims, adhere 
to Hanafi Sunni Islam, which Adnan Ahmedi, President of the Council 
of the Islamic Community in Presevo, characterizes as one of the 
more liberal schools within Islam.  According to sociologist and 
religion expert Milan Vukomanovic, there are also a limited number 
of adherents to Sufism in South Serbia. 
 
¶3.  (U) There are approximately 50 mosques in the Presevo Valley. 
The majority of imams, all of whom are native to the region, 
received religious training in Kosovo, Egypt, Syria, or the United 
Arab Emirates.  Students in primary and secondary schools are able 
to attend classes on Islam in line with a government program that 
offers religious instruction in the seven "traditional" religions. 
According to Ahmedi, 90% of Presevo Valley Albanians are 
"believers," but turnout at mosques during daily prayers is minimal. 
 
 
Presevo Valley Islamic Communities Peacefully Coexist 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶4.  (U) There are two Islamic communities in South Serbia.  The 
Council of the Islamic Community (CIC) in Presevo and Bujanovac 
falls under the Kosovo Islamic Community headed by Chief Mufti Naim 
Trnava.  The smaller, parallel Islamic Community of Presevo, 
Medvedja, and Bujanovac (ICPMB), created in 2003 by current National 
Democratic Party leader Nedzmedin Sacipi, is led by Xhemaledin 
Hasani.  The Serbian religion ministry has formal ties only with the 
CIC. 
 
¶5.  (U) Within Serbia, the CIC cooperates with Muamer Zukorlic's 
Novi Pazar-based Islamic Community in Serbia (ICiS), which is part 
of the Bosnian Islamic Community and supports Bosnian reis-ul-ulema 
(Chief Mufti) Mustafa Ceric.  The CIC is one of four regional 
Islamic communities in Serbia recognized by the ICiS through a 
system of decentralization, and it is represented on the ICiS board 
in Novi Pazar.  This arrangement provides the CIC considerable 
autonomy, which allows it, for example, to organize its hajj through 
Pristina. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The CIC does not acknowledge the legitimacy of the 
Belgrade-based Islamic Community of Serbia (ICoS), which does not 
recognize the supremacy of Sarajevo and has elected its own 
reis-ul-ulema, Adem Zilkic.  (The ICPMB has loose ties with the ICoS 
but no formal relationship.)  CIC mufti Mumin Tahiri told us in 
November 2008 that the CIC chose to side with the ICiS when the 
Serbian Islamic community split in 2007 (reftel) because this 
allowed the CIC to retain its ties with Kosovo. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Unlike in neighboring Sandzak where tensions between the 
ICiS and the ICoS frequently result in violent clashes, relations 
between the CIC and ICPMB are good due to personal and familial ties 
that bridge the two groups.  Ahmedi told us on May 5 that he would 
like to see the two groups united and that he had engaged with 
Hasani to this end.  President of the CIC in Bujanovac Sherifali 
Musliu pointed out that the cordial relations could be attributed to 
the lack of political patrons that caused religion and politics to 
become intertwined in Sandzak. (The ICiS is associated with the 
Sandzak Democratic Party of Labor Minister Rasim Ljajic, while the 
ICoS maintains close ties with the Party of Democratic Action of 
 
Sandzak of Minister-without-portfolio Sulejman Ugljanin.) In fact, 
CIC regulations prohibit imams from being members of a political 
party. Professor Darko Tanaskovic, a former Serbian Ambassador to 
Turkey and Azerbaijan who closely follows Islam in Serbia, commented 
to us on June 11 that playing the religious card represented too 
great a risk for South Serbian Albanian politicians. 
 
Belgrade Accepts Relations with Kosovo 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Ahmedi and Musliu, both personally appointed by Chief 
Mufti of Kosovo Trnava as his representatives in Presevo and 
Bujanovac, told us that the relationship with the Kosovo Islamic 
Community was based on a shared culture and common language.  Ahmedi 
stressed that Belgrade did not object to this relationship, through 
which the CIC reports through the religious hierarchy directly to 
Pristina, even after Kosovo's February 2008 declaration of 
independence.  In fact, Ahmedi told us, former Religion Minister 
Milan Radulovic from the nationalist Democratic Party of Serbia 
(DSS) of Vojislav Kostunica expressly supported the ties.  (Comment: 
 This stance contrasts markedly with the government's tacit support 
for the ICoS, alleged by some to be a Kostunica creation, vis-a-vis 
the ICiS, which retains considerable ties with Sarajevo.  It also is 
curious within the broader context of overall GOS policy toward 
Kosovo, which aims to limit or eliminate ties that would implicitly 
recognize Kosovo's independence.  End comment.) 
 
¶9. (SBU) Religion expert Vukomanovic told us on June 5 that there 
was little academic and government knowledge about Islam in South 
Serbia.  The absence of potentially explosive interplay between 
politics and religion was one explanation for this lack of interest 
and concern.  Vukomanovic, however, also pointed out that Belgrade 
viewed South Serbia almost exclusively through an ethnic prism, 
viewing local inhabitants as Albanians first and foremost and only 
then as Muslims. 
 
Wahhabi Influence Minimal 
------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) According to CIC representatives Ahmedi and Musliu, there 
are some individuals in the Presevo Valley who subscribe to 
Wahhabism.  Although Ahmedi characterized the Wahhabi presence as a 
potentially destabilizing factor, both leaders went to great lengths 
to stress that the Wahhabis were not an organized group and did not 
control any mosques.  There was one imam in Bujanovac who was 
Wahhabi, but he, like all imams, must sign a yearly "contract" with 
the CIC in which he pledged to abide by seven tenets of Hanafi 
faith.  This gave the CIC sufficient leverage in the event that he 
espoused radical or extremist positions.  Tanaskovic confirmed that 
in his opinion there was "little chance" that Wahhabism would take 
root in the Albanian community. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Ahmedi, who received his formal education in Pristina and 
at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, told us that he would like to build 
a proper madrassa, or religious school, in Presevo since most 
students now travel to Kosovo or Macedonia.  He stressed, however, 
that he was interested only in financial support from Turkey because 
assistance from Arab countries "comes with strings attached." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) In contrast to the political realm, where there are 
significant tensions between the central government and South 
Serbia, the Islamic community in the Presevo Valley seemingly has 
received Belgrade's blessing to pursue its own course.  The GOS' 
willingness to allow Muslims in Presevo and Bujanovac to retain ties 
with Kosovo, while discouraging similar contacts between the Islamic 
community in Sandzak and Bosnia, can be traced to the clear 
separation of religion and politics in South Serbia.  Belgrade's 
constructive approach, even if it stems from preoccupation with 
other matters, is a welcome respite from its hard-headed approach to 
relations with Pristina-based institutions.  End Comment. 
 
BRUSH