Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09BEIJING1538, COMPUTER INDUSTRY CONTEMPLATES RESPONSE TO

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BEIJING1538.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BEIJING1538 2009-06-08 12:15 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Beijing
VZCZCXRO3072
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #1538/01 1591215
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 081215Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4394
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 7284
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2644
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1272
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2501
RUEAHLC/DHS WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 001538 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
State for EAP/CM - SFlatt, JHabjan 
State for EEB/CIP - SFlynn, FSaeed 
USTR for Awinter, JMcHale, TWineland, AMain 
Commerce for MAC 
Commerce for ITA - IKasoff, NMelcher 
DOJ for CCIPS - MDubose and SChemtob 
FBI for LBryant 
State for White House OSTP Ambassador Richard 
Russell 
NSC for Melissa Hathaway 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD PGOV PHUM SOCI SCUL ECON CH
SUBJECT: COMPUTER INDUSTRY CONTEMPLATES RESPONSE TO 
CHINA'S GREEN DAM MANDATE 
 
Ref: Beijing 1520 
 
This cable is sensitive but unclassified.  Please 
handle accordingly. 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Emboffs met on June 8 with 
representatives of several trade associations to 
further discuss their reactions to the Chinese 
government's mandate that all computers sold in 
China after July 1 be preinstalled with "Green Dam" 
Internet filtering software (reftel).  Those present 
elaborated their technical, security, and political 
concerns with the program, and confirmed their top 
priority is to delay the July 1 deadline and seek 
consultations with responsible Chinese government 
ministries.  Industry thought the most successful 
tactical approach would be to emphasize security and 
technical threats posed by the software to Chinese 
users.  For now, though, they are building alliances 
and engaging Japanese and European colleagues as 
they await guidance from Washington-based parent 
organizations, which will meet with State and 
Commerce officials on June 9.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Embassy Economic, PAS and FCS officers met 
June 8 with members of the U.S. Information 
Technology Office (USITO), the U.S.-China Business 
Council (USCBC), and the American Chamber of 
Commerce (AmCham).  Industry further elaborated 
their member companies' technical, security, and 
political concerns over China's recent mandate to 
use "Green Dam" Internet filtering software on all 
computers sold in China after July 1 (see reftel). 
The groups also considered which tactical approach 
would be most effective in persuading the Chinese 
government to delay its proposed implementation 
deadline.  While attendees recognized that the 
censorship aspect would raise the profile of the 
issue in the foreign media and Congress, all agreed 
that technical and security concerns would be more 
persuasive to the Chinese. While there was broad 
agreement on how to proceed (see para 10), industry 
reps are waiting for guidance from home agencies 
prior to engaging the Chinese. 
 
Waiting for Guidance 
-------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) USITO representatives described their 
evolving position on the Green Dam project as 
"building alliances without deciding how to react". 
USITO, USCBC, and AmCham all agreed that they would 
need clear guidance from their Washington-based 
parent organizations on how to proceed, but they 
recognized the importance of preparing for a unified 
campaign.  Such a coordinated response to the MIIT 
mandate would include not only U.S. industry 
associations, they said, but also their European and 
Japanese counterparts, with whom preliminary 
discussions have already begun. 
 
Technical Shortcomings 
---------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) USITO reaffirmed reftel assessment that U.S. 
computer makers are concerned by the many unclear 
technical details surrounding the implementation of 
the Green Dam program.  Elaborating further, USITO 
said the stability of the untested software is 
uncertain, with the potential to create problems for 
users and networks, in turn requiring increased 
 
BEIJING 00001538  002 OF 003 
 
 
support from PC vendors.  They noted several Chinese 
blogs describe the program as unstable, causing 
computers to crash, and being deficient in its 
filtering capabilities. 
 
5. (SBU) The ambiguous language of the MIIT circular 
is also worrisome.  For example, it is unclear 
whether the software should be pre-installed on a 
computer's hard drive or simply included on a disc 
in the box, which an apparently well-sourced June 8 
Wall Street Journal Online article reported would be 
an option.  That article also reported that the 
software can be uninstalled by users, a feature 
USITO sources originally thought unavailable. 
 
6. (SBU) Industry observed that such technical 
issues must be clarified and the software 
extensively tested before PC makers would be willing 
to even consider pre-installing it or shipping their 
computers with the disc in the box.  However, they 
hastened to add that even flawless Green Dam 
software would not necessarily make the companies 
comfortable participating in the Green Dam program, 
given the separate concerns over security 
vulnerabilities and censorship. 
 
Security Vulnerabilities 
------------------------ 
 
7. (SBU) Industry representatives further elaborated 
their companies' concerns over the security 
vulnerabilities that MIIT's Green Dam mandate could 
create.  First, individual computers could be 
attacked by hackers via the Green Dam software. 
Since the software, according to a published user 
manual, enables parents to remotely access and 
monitor the activity on their children's computers, 
the same opportunity would exist for hackers to 
monitor and control remote computers with malicious 
intent.  Such activity could damage hardware and 
software and compromise personal information.  USITO 
cited reports online that, in one case, an early 
user of the software reported that his banking 
information had been compromised after installing 
the software. 
 
8. (SBU) Another major potential threat comes from 
the lack of diversity that this government-mandated 
solution creates in the software industry.  A common 
software application installed on all computers sold 
in China establishes a common platform for hackers 
to target, threatening China's underlying network. 
Software diversity reduces such risks. 
 
Political Questions 
------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Industry representatives agreed that the 
political concerns related to the Green Dam project 
are significant.  If they were to comply with MIIT's 
mandate to install the software, the political 
implications of appearing complicit with China's 
censorship regime could be very damaging.  They 
agreed that emphasizing publicly Green Dam's new 
limits on access to information could attract 
extensive foreign media and Congressional attention. 
However, from a negotiating perspective, industry 
representatives thought it would be difficult to 
appeal to the Chinese government on freedom of 
information grounds.  There was consensus that 
pursuing a delay in the July 1 deadline based on 
 
BEIJING 00001538  003 OF 003 
 
 
technical and security arguments might be more 
successful. 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
10. (SBU) All present recognized the urgency to act 
quickly given the proposed July 1 deadline.  USITO 
representatives noted that MIIT's May 22 circular 
did not outline any punitive measures for non- 
compliant companies.  While some speculated whether 
that meant non-compliance would actually have no 
consequences,  all acknowledged that U.S. companies 
must operate in observance of Chinese laws and 
regulations - and therefore cannot afford to do 
nothing and let the deadline pass.  They agreed 
their priority was to push back on the proposed July 
1 implementation deadline, and to do so with a 
unified front.  The industry groups proposed they 
draft a joint letter to relevant Chinese agencies, 
but will wait for guidance from parent companies. 
USITO board members reportedly have meetings 
scheduled on June 9 with EAP/CM Director John Norris 
and Commerce Acting Undersecretary for International 
Trade Michelle O'Neill. 
 
 
PICCUTA