R 030058Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4533
NVC PORTSMOUTH 0039
INFO AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 
AMCONSUL MUMBAI
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 
AIT TAIPEI 0141
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 
AMCONSUL SHENYANG 
AMCONSUL CHENGDU 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
AMEMBASSY MANILA 
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 
USCBP WASHINGTON DC
HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000122 
 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC 
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC SN
SUBJECT: COUNTRY FRAUD SUMMARY -- BRUNEI 
 
¶1. Summary:  Brunei has been a member of the Visa Waiver Program 
since its inception. On May 5, the Government of Brunei announced 
the production and issuance of fully ICAO compliant biometric 
passports. Prior to this announcement, the Government of Brunei had 
been issuing regular passports (red cover) to Brunei citizens and 
official and diplomatic passports (black cover) to government 
officials to support their official travel. These passports are high 
quality and contain a digitized photo, machine readable zone and a 
security laminate on the data page.  Citizens who wish to travel to 
the United States whose passports were issued on or after October 
26, 2006 must obtain a visa to travel. Annual visa workload for FY 
08 was 696 applications with an adjusted refusal rate of 11.78 
percent (11.78%). Workload has shown a steady increase in the 
current fiscal year, primarily due to the gap in issuing biometric 
passports that would allow visa waiver travel and also to an 
increase in commercial, business, and government linkages with the 
United States. Trade with the United States has increased at a 
steady rate for the past several years, but almost tripled in 2007 
due to a major sale of aircraft to the main oil and gas producing 
company. Students in the U.S. have surpassed pre-9/11 levels from a 
low of only 12 students just three years ago to a current 54 
students actively studying in the U.S. according to SEVIS data. Post 
expects continued growth of Brunei citizens studying in the U.S. 
with the opening of government scholarships for undergraduate study 
and the renewal of programs for government-funded, mid-career 
masters-level study which had fallen off in the late 1990s.  End 
Summary. 
 
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COUNTRY CONDITIONS 
------------------ 
 
¶2.  Brunei depends on large numbers of foreign guest workers from 
its neighbors, particularly Malaysia, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines. There are two very distinct categories of foreign 
workers: low skilled manual laborers, domestics or low skilled 
office and shop workers - mainly from Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Bangladesh, and Thailand; and management and highly 
skilled technical workers in every industry but with the largest 
concentrations in the IT and oil and gas industries. There is also a 
sizable population of third country national engineers and other 
professionals from oil-rich countries such as Nigeria and Venezuela. 
Many of the latter apply for visas either to conduct business or 
training in the United States or to transit on their way to 
Venezuela and other destinations. 
 
¶3.  Brunei prohibits permanent immigration for manual and 
low-skilled workers, many of whom live in Brunei for decades on work 
permits. Even more highly-skilled individuals find it difficult to 
meet Brunei's tough standards to qualify for permanent residence - a 
minimum of 15 years residency and strong Malay language skills. 
Citizenship is even more tightly controlled, requiring an additional 
15 years residency after obtaining permanent resident status. 
General ideological and cultural preferences for ethnic Malays and 
adherents to Islam means in practice that non-Muslims may have a 
more difficult time obtaining either permanent residency or 
citizenship. Generations of long-term residents, particularly ethnic 
Chinese, have made Brunei their home without access to the rights of 
citizenship. In many cases, these individuals give birth to children 
in Brunei but are unable to meet transmission requirements to pass 
any citizenship to their children. Brunei thus has a very large 
community of "stateless" permanent residents who do not have access 
to any country's citizenship either through their parents or through 
their birth in Brunei. Brunei issues these individuals "Certificate 
of Identity" and accords them permanent resident status. Post 
routinely issues non-immigrant visas (NIVs) to this category of 
de-facto Bruneians who, despite their lack of citizenship, have 
strong family and economic ties. 
 
¶4.  The range of nationalities and skills sets in Brunei is 
reflected in post's non-immigrant visa applicant pool. In FY 2008, 
sixty five percent (65%) of our NIV applicants were third country 
nationals (TCNs) holding citizenship in 32 countries. Bruneian 
applicants accounted for approximately one third, with Malaysia at 
seventeen percent (17%) and the Philippines at fifteen (15%). 
Philippine applicants accounted for nearly all visas refused. 
 
¶5.  Visa applications from TCNs are likely to increase at a modest 
rate, due to a growing multinational corporate presence; successes 
in the Embassy's outreach program to increase international 
academic, research, and cultural exchanges; a steady stream of TCN 
residents; and robust annual growth in trade with the United States. 
 
¶6.  While in general Brunei is a low-fraud environment, the range of 
nationalities as well as the small volume of applications presents a 
challenge for post to remain vigilant against fraudsters and visa 
shoppers from the region and to remain current on the ever-morphing 
methods of fraud that develop world-wide. 
 
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NIV FRAUD 
--------- 
 
¶7.  Post's vulnerability to fraud is at the individual cse level, 
not on an organized basis. The most liely candidates to engage in 
individual fraud are ork pass holders from the Philippines who are 
woking in low-level office jobs and being paid a lowwage (albeit 
higher than they would receive in te Philippines). 214(b) refusal 
rate tends to be igh for this category of applicant and, thus, Post 
is vigilant for the possibility of fraud. That sad, the most common 
proble among these applicants is not outright fraud but occasional 
"inflation" of credentials through the use of loaned funds to 
bolster bank accounts, exaggerated claims of employment status or 
responsibility, or the provision of incomplete information about 
family members in the United States. This type of credential 
inflation is conducted at the individual case level; Post has not 
detected any pattern to suggest any organized third party provision 
of false documents. 
 
¶8.  Another potential fraud area is for applicants in categories 
known to be high-fraud (H1B) that don't require residence abroad. 
These applicants target Bandar Seri Begawan as an "easy mark"; 
however, Posts works closely with consular officers in the 
applicants' country of nationality to ensure that visa shoppers do 
not subvert the integrity of the visa process. To address 
vulnerability to fraud all NIV issuances are reviewed by Manila 
Fraud Prevention Unit. 
 
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IV FRAUD 
-------- 
 
¶9.  Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan does not process immigrant visas, 
but does provide information and accept I-130 petitions from 
resident Americans. These petitions are forwarded to the Embassy in 
Singapore or in Kuala Lumpur for adjudication. Usually petitioners 
are long-term residents of Brunei known to Post and relationships 
appear to be genuine. 
 
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DV FRAUD 
-------- 
 
¶10.  Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan does not process diversity visas 
but occasionally provides basic information on this visa category. 
 
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ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD 
---------------------- 
 
¶11.  Post has not detected any fraud. In one instance, one American 
citizen provided insufficient evidence to allow for single-parent 
signature on a passport application of a minor child in a possible 
attempt to mislead the consular officer about his custodial rights. 
However, there was no outright fraud involved. 
 
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ADOPTION FRAUD 
-------------- 
 
¶12.  Post has not processed any adoption. 
 
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USE OF DNA TESTING 
------------------ 
 
¶13. Post has referred only one case for DNA testing in support of a 
citizenship claim. The DNA result was positive and no fraud was 
uncovered. 
 
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ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  Post has had no applications for asylum and has received no 
inquiries/requests from U.S. legal permanent residents or other 
applications for DHS benefits. 
 
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ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶15. Post has received occasional reports of mala fide travelers 
interdicted around the world attempting to use altered Bruneian 
passports for VWP travel to the United States. However, Post is 
unaware of any significant trends or high numbers of misuse of the 
Bruneian passport. Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan has been discussing 
with the Brunei Government to implement a biometric passport 
program. 
 
¶16. Three known cases last year highlighted that alien smugglers 
and/or human traffickers exploited some of Brunei's more vulnerable 
land border checkpoints and used Brunei as a transit point. None of 
the cases involved trafficking to the United States, but two did 
involve the apparent trafficking of young women (to Australia and to 
London) and two American citizens who traveled on the same routes 
were identified as potential facilitators. There is no indication 
that there was any nexus to terrorism. 
 
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DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶17. There have been no DS criminal fraud investigations in Brunei 
involving consular matters. 
 
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HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶18. All residents carry some type of identification card. Citizens 
carry a national identification card (yellow), issued at age 12; 
permanent resident cards are pink and work permit cards are green. 
All identity cards are of high quality and include machine readable 
zones, digitized photos, and some security features such as 
holograms. National identification cards also contain an encrypted 
chip which, in the future, will serve as a public key for bearers to 
gain access to banking and other services. Post has not detected any 
apparent fraud in identification cards, but would approach the host 
country to confirm a document if a suspicion arose. Post understands 
that the Government of Brunei collects two thumb prints from all 
identity document applicants and stores the prints in a national 
database. 
 
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COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶19.  The Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Forensics Documents 
Lab, in coordination with the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) 
West, provided document screening training last year for officers 
from Brunei's immigration, police, and customs organizations. The 
training was well-received and Brunei has expressed interest in 
additional training. Post is working with ICE for further training 
should funding become available. Note:Royal Brunei Airlines staff, 
but not Immigration officials, detected malaise travelers with 
fraudulent Malaysian passports in a possible person-smuggling ring 
that appeared to have exploited a weakness at a remote land border 
crossing point to facilitate travel to third countries. 
¶20. Brunei is considering signing an agreement with the United 
States to exchange unclassified information on known and suspected 
terrorists under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6. Brunei 
shares lost and stolen passport information with Interpol but does 
not share this data directly with the United States. Law enforcement 
cooperation with the United States is good, but typically 
incident-based and not proactive. Brunei's law enforcement 
capabilities are professionally sound, but uneven, and tend to be 
deployed only after a crime is detected. However, the Internal 
Security Department and religious authorities maintain a close watch 
on religious groups and Brunei's very limited political activity to 
head off any potential challenges to the authority of the royal 
family or the government. The Immigration Department vigorously and 
proactively enforces immigration law, frequently screening the 
foreign worker population for overstays and persons working without 
a work-permit. Post's RSO has worked closely with non-resident USG 
law enforcement attaches (FBI, DEA, and DHS) to build stronger 
relationships with host country law enforcement. 
 
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STAFFING AND TRAINING 
--------------------- 
 
¶28.  Post fraud prevention staff consists of a Foreign Service 
Officer who serves as a part-time Fraud Prevention Manager; a 
Consular Assistant who acts part-time as Fraud Prevention Unit; 
Attended the Fraud Prevention Workshop - PC542- last March 9-13, 
2009; also cross-trained to work on fraud issues; and taken the 
on-line training in detecting imposters through facial recognition. 
 
TODD