VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #1720/01 1781235
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 271235Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3685

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 001720 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DS, DS/DSS, DS/DSS/IP, DS/IP/NEA/I, NEA, A/QM, M, A/LM, 
NEA/SCA/EX 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC AMGT IZ
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE - PSC OVERSIGHT 
 
¶1. (U)  This is an action request - See paragraph 11. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Summary: Post remains strongly committed to taking 
actions necessary for meeting the mandates and intent of USG law, 
policies, and procedures for sound private security contractor (PSC) 
oversight.  To continue moving forward and based on actual 
experience, a number of issues have been identified requiring 
resolution and clarification including defining the roles and 
responsibilities of other DOS bureaus and offices in PSC oversight. 
The active participation of other Department stakeholders is 
essential and we urge their involvement in this effort. 
Consideration should also be given to shifting PSC oversight 
functions (other than WPPS security providers) to DOD.  Doing so 
realizes a number positive outcomes including diminishing the 
possibility of confrontations involving the use of force, and 
collectively meeting Congressional mandates in a cost effective 
manner.  Determining RSO resource requirements for PSC oversight, 
particularly in relation to its other core missions is another 
important factor for consideration.  In light of the above, Post 
requests clear guidance and direction concerning the following four 
key issues: 
 
-- The role, responsibility, and authorities RSO Baghdad has for the 
oversight of DOS/Chief of Mission (COM) affiliated PSCs. 
 
-- The scope of PSCs falling under DOS/COM oversight. 
 
-- The roles, responsibilities, and most importantly, authorities 
DOS bureaus and offices, and COM agencies have for carrying out PSC 
oversight. 
 
-- The assets and resources that are required by RSO Baghdad in 
order to establish and carry out a viable PSC oversight program. 
 
 
RSO is fully committed to providing a safe and secure environment, 
but an unstable security environment combined with other factors 
dictates continuing reliance on PSC assets.  Resolution of these 
issues, along with other key components, is essential for 
successfully implementing a viable PSC oversight regime.  End 
summary. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Background and Message Objective 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU)  PSCs are vital to providing security services and 
activities supporting USG efforts in Iraq.  With few exceptions, 
these services are delivered professionally under difficult and 
dangerous conditions.  However, since September 2007, PSCs, and 
their affiliated USG agencies, have come under intense government, 
public, and media scrutiny and review, a process which is still 
ongoing.  To strengthen oversight of PSCs, DOS, the Department of 
Defense (DOD), and Congress took action to propose and implement 
laws, regulations, directives, memorandums of agreement and 
understanding (MOAs & MOUs), and instructions, resulting in a 
collective body of policy and mandates for the oversight of private 
security contractors.  To meet these policy mandates Diplomatic 
Security (DS) established the position of Coordinator for Armed 
Contractor Oversight at RSO Baghdad, formed a Force Investigation 
Unit to investigate PSC related incidents, assigned DS Special 
Agents as agents in charge of Worldwide Personnel Protective Service 
(WPPS) Chief of Mission (COM) protective security details (PSDs), 
conducted quarterly meetings of the Regional Security Office (RSO) 
Baghdad - Multinational Forces Iraq (MNF-I) - USAID Joint Incident 
Review Board, and enhanced engagement with key Iraqi Ministry of 
Interior (MOI) officials concerning PSC operations and issues 
including conducting joint investigations of PSCs involving serious 
incidents. 
 
¶4. (U)  However, a number of issues have yet to be resolved, 
Q4. (U)  However, a number of issues have yet to be resolved, 
decisions made, and policy and guidance formulated with respect to 
oversight of DOS/COM affiliated PSCs.  The objectives of this Action 
Message are to identify and seek guidance on core issues, discuss 
leveraging DOD PSC oversight capabilities and capacity for oversight 
of DOS/COM affiliated PSCs, and request clear policy and direction 
on the role, responsibilities and authorities of the RSO and other 
Department of State stakeholders in the oversight of DOS/COM 
affiliated private security contractors. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
RSO Role in PSC Oversight and Other Stakeholders 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (U)  The collective body of policy governing PSC oversight 
identifies DS, and by extension RSO Baghdad, as having a major role 
in carrying out PSC oversight in the field.  What is now required 
are clearly defined objectives and responsibilities, along with the 
requisite authorities and resources necessary for implementing a PSC 
oversight program.  Determining programmatic responsibility for PSC 
oversight must also extend beyond DS and RSO Baghdad to other DOS 
offices and Bureaus having equities, responsibilities, and most 
importantly the inherent authorities and subject matter expertise 
necessary for leveraging PSC compliance with applicable policies, 
procedures, and standards for private security contractor operations 
outside of the United States.   The active participation of other 
Department stakeholders is essential and we urge their involvement. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Leveraging DOD Capabilities and Capacity for Oversight of 
 PSCs 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6. (SBU)  As the transition to greater Iraqi control and 
responsibility for governmental functions continues moving forward, 
DOD is reassessing its mission in Iraq, along with the tasks and 
functions it has been performing.  However, along with maintaining a 
presence in Iraq, DOD is expected to require some level of PSC 
provided security services.  At the same time, a number of DOS/COM 
affiliated agencies and activities in Iraq also will require private 
security contractor services necessary for sustaining a broad range 
of American efforts, initiatives, and programs in Iraq. 
 
¶7. (SBU)  The collective DOS - DOD need for PSC services, along with 
shared responsibilities for exercising appropriate PSC oversight, 
makes this an opportune time to raise the subject of shifting 
greater control for oversight of private security operations, other 
than private security providers working under WPPS contracts, to 
DOD.  By shifting the majority of PSC oversight to DOD, along with a 
commitment of requisite DOS resources, a number of mutually 
beneficial, cost effective, and positive outcomes are realized, 
including: 
 
-- Centralizing oversight, maintaining uniformity of standards and 
procedures, and combining resources reduces the possibility of 
future confrontations, including those involving the use of force, 
from occurring; 
 
-- Collectively (DOD - DOS) meeting Congressional mandates for PSC 
oversight; 
 
-- Serving as a force multiplier by which each agency is able to 
meet its PSC oversight responsibilities in a cost constructive, 
resource efficient and collaborative manner; 
 
-- Leveraging resources and subject matter expertise (e.g. DS 
investigative skills and capabilities, and depth of DOD contracting 
resources and expertise) in a mutually supportive manner; 
 
-- Sharing in the preservation of critical DOD PSC oversight 
infrastructure (e.g. the MNC-I Contractors Operations Cell - 
CONOC); 
 
-- Leveraging DOD access to Iraqi military leadership to deconflict 
issues involving PSCs and other GOI ministries; 
 
-- Meeting the intent of the December 2007 DOD - DOS MOA calling for 
unity of effort; 
 
-- Deconflicting DOS and DOD policies, procedures and instruction; 
 
-- Meeting the GOI preference for simplified and uniform operating 
procedures; 
 
 
-- Establishing uniform and theatre-wide PSC arming certification, 
authorization, and documentation procedures; 
 
-- Providing USG, GOI, and private security contractor stakeholders 
with a single source of authority and point of contact for PSC 
issues and operations; and 
 
-- Creating an exportable operational model for PSC oversight for 
utilization in areas requiring enhanced PSC services and 
operations. 
 
¶8. (SBU)  In the context of a DS initiative, the concept of placing 
DOS/COM affiliated PSCs (other than WPPS) under DOD oversight 
programs was raised at a working level meeting with DOD/MNF-I 
counterparts in Baghdad June 1.  The meeting was highly cordial and 
representative of the continued strong working relationship that 
Qrepresentative of the continued strong working relationship that 
exists between RSO and DOD counterparts concerning PSC matters. 
However, before any discussion concerning the transfer of PSC 
oversight functions can take place in Baghdad, executive engagement 
and buy-in at the Washington, DC level has to take place, and 
guidance and direction communicated to the respective DOS - DOD 
elements on the ground. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In a discussion with Multi-National Forces Iraq June 24 
regarding the text of this message, it was explained that the 
concept of DOD assuming a greater role in oversight of DOS/COM 
affiliated PSCs comes at a time when the U.S. Military is reducing 
its presence and moving to the formation of a combined U.S. Forces 
Iraq.  For these reasons, they are not prepared to take on a new and 
enduring mission, i.e.  oversight of DOS/COM affiliated PSCs. 
Looking to the future, the counterpart opined the concept will be 
for the Department of State, in conjunction with the Government of 
Iraq to take on a greater role in PSC oversight and that increasing 
GOI capacity in this area should be a focus of the effort.   For 
these reasons, the counterpart stated that they "non-concurred" with 
this cable, specifically with those areas suggesting DOD undertake 
greater responsibility for the oversight of the non-WPPS PSCs. 
Resources 
 
¶10. (SBU)  DOS/COM affiliated PSCs currently employ a collective 
force of over 6,000 armed personnel working for a number of private 
security contractors throughout Iraq.  The resource implications of 
undertaking oversight of a force of this size and scope have to be 
considered in the context of the mandated requirements for the 
oversight of USG private security contractors, including those 
having a DOS/COM affiliation.  Measured against scope and mandate, 
it becomes obvious that neither RSO nor Post have the resources, 
personnel, and infrastructure necessary for establishing and 
maintaining an effective PSC oversight program throughout Iraq, 
while still being able to effectively perform other critical 
missions. Based upon experience and knowledge of this subject gained 
over the past year, we believe that establishing and maintaining a 
viable PSC oversight program is achievable, particularly by taking a 
coordinated, multi-disciplined approach to this problem and drawing 
on the expertise, resources, and authorities of other stakeholders. 
But in relation to its other missions and core programs, RSO Baghdad 
at this time has neither the authorities nor the resources necessary 
for undertaking oversight of PSCs beyond the WPPS program.  Nor is 
it possible to identify resource requirements without first having 
the framework of a program to serve as a point of reference. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Issues for Decision and Action Request 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶11. (SBU)  Action Request.  Post requests clear guidance and 
direction on the following four issues: 
 
ISSUE FOR DECISION 1 - The role, responsibility, and authorities RSO 
Baghdad has for the oversight of DOS/COM affiliated private security 
contractors. 
 
Action Request: 
 
-- Develop and promulgate clear and unambiguous policy clearly 
defining the role, responsibilities, and authorities of RSO Baghdad 
for PSC oversight. 
 
 
ISSUE FOR DECISION 2 - The scope of PSCs falling under DOS/COM 
oversight. 
 
Action Request: 
 
-- Develop clear and unambiguous policy regarding which categories 
of PSCs come under DOS/COM oversight, i.e. prime contractors, 
subcontractors, PSCs providing security to grantees, implementing 
partners and other USG award recipients, and internal security 
components of non-PSC organizations and businesses. 
 
ISSUE FOR DECISION 3 - The roles, responsibilities, and most 
importantly, authorities DOS bureaus and offices, including RSO and 
DS, and COM agencies have for carrying out PSC oversight. 
 
Action Request: 
 
-- Identify DOS bureaus and offices (including RSO and DS), and COM 
agencies having PSC oversight responsibilities; 
-- Establish and promulgate policy clearly defining the scope, 
applicability and responsibilities of PSC oversight with respect to 
Qapplicability and responsibilities of PSC oversight with respect to 
DOS/COM entities; 
-- Clarify the authorities, roles, and responsibilities of these 
entities; 
-- Integrate these DOS/COM entities into PSC oversight; and 
-- Obtain commitments for theater and/or Washington based resources 
from these DOS/COM entities dedicated to PSC oversight. 
 
ISSUE FOR DECISION 4 - The assets and resources required by RSO 
Baghdad in order to establish and carry out a viable PSC oversight 
program. 
 
Action Request: 
 
-- In close collaboration with RSO Baghdad, determine the resources 
necessary for exercising oversight of COM affiliated PSCs in Iraq 
personnel; and 
-- Commit to putting in place the resources necessary for carrying 
out PSC oversight, both at RSO Baghdad and at the Washington level. 
 
--------------- 
Conclusion 
--------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU)  RSO is unwavering in its commitment to pursue its mission 
of providing a safe and secure environment for the conduct of 
diplomacy and advancement of American interests in Iraq.  In looking 
to the future, an unstable security environment, a reduction of U.S. 
Military forces in Iraq, and continuing global demands for DS 
personnel and resources will dictate continued reliance on PSCs for 
essential security services.  Providing the requisite oversight of 
these PSCs requires three key components: 
 
-- Clearly defined PSC oversight program objectives, authorities, 
roles, and responsibilities; 
 
-- Buy-in and active engagement by other DOS and USG partners and 
stakeholders; and 
 
-- Processes, mechanisms, and resources necessary for execution. 
All three of these components are critical, and mutually dependent 
upon one another for successfully implementing a viable PSC 
oversight regime. 
 
¶13.  (U)  POC is Regional Security Office Baghdad. 
 
HILL