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RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHGB #1654/01 1740911
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 230911Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
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INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001654 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL SOCI PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: PRT NAJAF: THE NAJAF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT IN 
SHI'A POLITICS AND SOCIETY 
 
This is a report from Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 
Najaf. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary and Comment: The Shi'a religious 
establishment plays an important and influential role in 
Iraqi politics and society.  Najaf is the seat of the four 
Shi'a grand ayatollahs, referred to as the marja'iyah 
("sources of emulation" to the faithful), location of the 
most important Iraqi religious seminary and theology center, 
called the Najaf hawza, and the geographic home of the Shrine 
of Imam Ali (the founding religious figure in Shi'a Islam), 
the largest cemetery in the Shia world, and the Kufa Mosque. 
Najaf's theological establishment  and the dichotomy in 
clerical circles between "quietist" and "activist" 
orientations affect Shi'a politics and society.  Grand 
Ayatollah Sistani is elderly,  and the next principal grand 
ayatollah will not have the same international name 
recognition and national influence.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
Historical and Theological Context 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Najaf was founded as the resting place of Ali, 
son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet Mohammed, after his 
assassination in Kufa, and over the centuries developed into 
an international city dedicated to Shi'a Islam.  Many Shi'a 
also believe Najaf to be the final resting place of Adam and 
Noah.  The cemetery, referred to as the Valley of Peace, 
became theologically important for Shi'a believers who wished 
to be closest to Imam Ali, Adam, and Noah for the messianic 
return of the Twelfth (Hidden) Imam to presage the end of 
time.  Najaf regained its status as the most important hawza 
(or Shi'a center of clerical study) roughly four hundred 
years ago and remained the center of Shi'a doctrine until the 
rise of the Qom hawza in Iran following the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution.  Hawza "graduation" is important in Shi'a Islam 
because of the strict study regime and rungs of theological 
advancement that must be achieved to gain rank.  The first 
rank of clerical leadership cleared to interpret Islamic 
theology is Hojjat al-Islam.  (NOTE: Muqtada al Sadr, 
currently studying in Qom, uses this title. END NOTE.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) The grand ayatollahs, known collectively as the 
marja'iyah ("sources of emulation"), are designated as such 
by years of extraordinary Islamic moral, practical, and 
spiritual interpretation of such high quality and relevancy 
that schools of clerics and regular Shi'a believers choose to 
follow them as their key spiritual guides.  Traditionally, 
one of the marja'iyah is regarded as the leading, or supreme, 
authority and maintains the largest base of spiritual 
followers.  Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani currently occupies 
this role. 
 
Shi'a Islam Divides into Two Camps 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Under Grand Ayatollah Abu Qasim al Khoei, who became 
the leading Shi'a cleric in 1974, two important religious 
clerics named Mohammad Bakr al Sadr and Ruhullah Khomeini 
developed a new blend of Shi'a Islam and politics calling for 
"activist" religious clerics to interpret and influence all 
parts of life, including government, on behalf of their 
people.  During the time of the Shah in Iran and the Baathist 
regime in Iraq, this type of theology inspired opposition and 
rebellion.  While Khomeini achieved political success in Iran 
in 1979 and became the supreme ayatollah, Mohammad Bakr al 
Sadr established the original Da'wa party as the Shi'a 
opposition against the Baathist regime and was later 
imprisoned and executed by Saddam Hussein at the beginning of 
the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. 
Qthe Iran-Iraq War in 1980. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Iran-Iraq War and the nature of Shi'a opposition 
to Saddam Hussein forced the Iraqi Shi'a religious 
establishment into two camps.  The first camp, represented by 
the sitting marja'iyah under Grand Ayatollah Abu Qasim al 
Khoei and later Sistani, did not believe in violent 
opposition or incorporation of the religious establishment 
into politics and government.  This camp represented 
peaceful, suffering opposition and the primacy of faith.  Led 
spiritually by Mohammad Bakr al Sadr's top students, many of 
whom became ayatollahs, the second camp believed in a 
different type of ayatollah closer to the activist religious 
leaders of Iran and not the spiritual and scholarly 
marja'iyah of Najaf. 
 
New Roles following Iraqi Liberation 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) Operation Iraqi Freedom led to a new period for the 
 
BAGHDAD 00001654  002 OF 003 
 
 
religious establishment and both camps commanded numerous 
followers and national importance.  New political 
opportunities inspired the Sadrist clerics, with slain 
Mohammad Sadiq al Sadr's youngest son Muqtada as figurehead, 
to flex their political muscles.  Upon return to post-Saddam 
Iraq, most Da'wa and Supreme Council for the Islamic 
Revolution (SCIRI, now known as ISCI) adherents reverted back 
to a natural allegiance to Sistani and the Najaf marja'iyah. 
From 2003 - 2005, Sistani filled an important authority 
vacuum by voicing  his recommendations and concerns in 
positive but vague terms.  Iraqi politicians, including 
non-Shi'a, began to inform Sistani of major political 
decisions before implementation to receive a general 
blessing.  The Shi'a alliance in the elections of 2005 used 
tacit approval by Sistani and the marja'iyah as the basis of 
their popular platform.  Sistani today is one of the most 
well-known and influential figures in the country; even 
Iranian clerics and political leaders visit Najaf regularly. 
 
The Four Marja'iyah Today 
------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Iranian-born Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani 
succeeded al Khoei in 1992 and has cemented his status in 
Shi'a hearts and minds as a central inspirational figure over 
the past seventeen turbulent years of repression, sanctions, 
and war.  Despite his place in the quietist tradition, 
Sistani has never disavowed a powerful political role. 
Sistani believes that clerics should not be politicians 
themselves but does assert that the religious establishment 
needs to communicate important messages to the politicians. 
Since Iraqi provincial elections in January 2009, Sistani has 
emphasized a message of comprehensive, non-sectarian 
political parties and the need for the Shi'a power players to 
reach out to non-Shi'a parties for a truly national open 
ticket.  Sistani rarely even mentions the words Shi'a or 
Shiites and exclusively refers to his followers as Iraqis. 
Sistani maintains a busy schedule receiving politicians, 
visiting dignitaries, and legions of scholars and pious 
believers at his residence within several hundr 
ed meters of the Imam Ali shrine.  The Shi'a population 
awaits any hint or rumor in the media associating Sistani's 
approval to a particular law and action. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Next to Sistani, Afghan-born Grand Ayatollah 
Muhammad Ishaq al Fayad is the next most senior in terms of 
breadth of scholarly knowledge and spiritual standing.  Najaf 
Governor Adnan al Zurfi told PRToffs that Ayatollah Sistani 
and his inner circle are very concerned about quality of life 
issues like electricity shortages, anti-corruption efforts, 
and the paucity of new Iraqi students entering the Najaf 
hawza at an early age.  Punjab-born Grand Ayatollah Bashier 
Hussein al Najafi came to Najaf only in 1965 and is the least 
regarded scholar of the marja'iyah.  He favors incorporation 
of religious schools into the national education system. 
Both Ishaq al Fayad and Bashier Najafi wear white turbans, 
indicating that they do not claim the revered blood relation 
to Muhammad and the line of Shi'a Imams. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Saeed al Hakim is the only 
Iraqi-born of the marja'iyah and is the grandson of the late 
Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al Hakim and the nephew to ISCI's 
Abdel Aziz al Hakim.  Al Hakim is deeply concerned with 
economic growth in Iraq and is the biggest marja'iyah 
supporter of the Najaf International Airport.  Al Hakim and 
his followers have a palpable dislike of Mohammad Sadiq al 
Sadr and his followers, resulting in anecdotal feuds in the 
QSadr and his followers, resulting in anecdotal feuds in the 
1990's.  Al Sadr's followers reportedly heaved shoes at al 
Hakim when he attempted to attend the former's funeral 
following his execution. 
 
¶10. (SBU) All four marja'iyah maintain extensive inner 
circles, follow issues of special concern, and inspire global 
followings.  Sistani receives most of the political and media 
attention but many visitors make sure they pay special calls 
on all of the marja'iyah.  They constantly express opinions, 
push for various reforms and laws, and exert influence when 
possible, especially through their sons and top students. 
All of the current marja'iyah studied under Grand Ayatollah 
al Khoei and are committed clerics of the quietist school. 
Many Sadrists of the activist school do not look to the 
marja'iyah for spiritual leadership and advocate for their 
clerics instead.  Most Iraqis, however, have incorporated 
some version of respect for the marja'iyah into their 
national identity. 
 
If Sistani Died Tomorrow 
------------------------ 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00001654  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶11. (SBU) If Sistani died tomorrow, many analysts of the 
religious establishment tell us that a seamless transfer of 
authority to the next most senior grand ayatollah, Ishaq al 
Fayad, would take place and the addition of the next most 
well-known and scholarly mujtihid would join the ranks of the 
grand ayatollahs.  Some Iraqi clerics would prefer to see 
Muhammad Saeed al Hakim reach the role instead because of his 
Iraqi heritage and status as a "sayyid" (direct descendant of 
the Prophet Mohammed)  but others claim that al Hakim is too 
close to ISCI politics and therefore too politicized to take 
on the role of supreme grand ayatollah.  While a successor 
would be selected, the unique status wielded by Sistani as a 
result of his role in the end of the Saddam Hussein regime 
and establishment of the new administration would not 
transfer as such.  The next grand ayatollahs will need to 
nurture and expand their own base of followers. 
FORD