VZCZCXYZ0016
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #0777/01 1531237
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 021237Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9798
INFO RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS ANKARA 000777 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
S/CT FOR HILLARY BETJER JOHNSON, PAUL SCHULTZ 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC KVPR PREL PGOV CVIS KHLS TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: UPDATED INFORMATION ON HOST GOVERNMENT 
PRACTICES: INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING AND SHARING 
 
REF: A. STATE 32287 
     ¶B. 07 ANKARA 2848 
 
¶1. This message is sensitive but unclassified.  Please handle 
accordingly.  Post's responses are keyed to Ref A questions. 
As instructed, only updates are provided.  Unless otherwise 
stated, information provided Ref B remains valid.  New 
information is provided in CAPITAL LETTERS. 
 
¶A. (SBU) Immigration Data Bases and Traveler Information 
Collection: 
 
-- What computerized immigration databases are used to track 
entries and exits?  See REF B.  A COMPUTERIZED IMMIGRATION 
DATABASE IS COLLECTED AND MAINTAINED BY THE TURKISH NATIONAL 
POLICE (TNP) FOREIGNERS' POLICE. 
 -- Is the computerized immigration database available at all 
ports of entry (POEs)? YES. 
If immigration databases are available at some POEs, but not 
all, how does the host government decide which POEs will 
receive the tool? 
-- What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the 
systems?  For example, limited training, power brownouts, 
budgetary restraints, corruption, etc.? THE DATA ENTRY SYSTEM 
APPEARS TO BE EFFECTIVE AND RELIABLE. 
-- How often are national immigration databases updated? 
DAILY.  NOTE:  THE TNP USED TO HOLD EXIT-ENTRY RECORDS ONLY 
FOR THE PREVIOUS TEN YEARS.  RECORDS ARE NOW KEPT 
INDEFINITELY, ALTHOUGH POST BELIEVES TNP BEGAN KEEPING 
RECORDS ONLY IN THE EARLY 1990S. 
ALSO, BOTH TURKISH CITIZENS AND FOREIGN TRAVELERS MAY NOW OPT 
NOT/NOT TO HAVE THEIR PASSPORTS STAMPED WITH ENTRY AND EXIT 
STAMPS.  NONETHELESS, AN ELECTRONIC RECORD IS KEPT OF THE 
EXIT OR ENTRY. 
-- What are the country's policies (legislation, mandates, 
etc.) on collecting information from travelers arriving in 
the country?  IT IS MANDATORY FOR THE TNP TO COLLECT EXIT AND 
ENTRY INFORMATION ON ALL TRAVELERS. (THE SOLE EXCEPTION IS 
THE POPE.) 
-- Are there different policies for entry and exit at air, 
sea, and land POEs and for domestic flights? NO. 
-- What agency oversees the collection of traveler 
information?  THE TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE, WHICH IS UNDER THE 
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. 
-- What are the policies of the collecting agency to share 
that information with foreign governments? TURKEY CURRENTLY 
DOES NOT HAVE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, 
BUT DOES HAVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH INTERPOL AND EUROPOL. 
-- Does the host government collect Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) data on incoming commercial flights or vessels?  NO. 
 Is this data used for intelligence or law enforcement 
purposes to screen travelers in a systematic way?  Does host 
government have any existing treaties to share PNR data? 
-- If applicable, have advance passenger information systems 
(APIS), interactive advanced passenger information systems 
(IAPIS), or electronic travel authority systems been 
effective at detecting other national security threats, such 
as wanted criminals? N/A 
 
¶B. (SBU) Watchlisting:    SEE REF B. 
 
Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen 
travelers at POEs? 
-- What domestic sources of information populate the 
name-based watchlist, i.e. names of deported persons, 
terrorist lookouts, criminal wants/warrants?  If host 
government maintains a watchlist, how many records does the 
watchlist contain, and how many are terrorist-related? 
-- Which ministry or office maintains the watchlist? 
-- What international watchlists do the host government use 
for screening individuals, e.g. Interpol or TSA No Fly lists, 
UN, etc.? 
-- What bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements exist 
between host government and its neighbors? 
 
¶C. (SBU) Biometrics:   SEE REF B. 
 
-- Are biometric systems in place at ports of entry (air, 
land, sea)?  If no, does host government have plans to 
install such a system?  If biometric systems are available at 
some POEs, but not all, how does the host government decide 
what POEs will receive the tool? 
-- What biometric technologies, if any, does the host 
government use, i.e. fingerprint identification, facial 
recognition, iris recognition, hand geometry, retinal 
identification, DNA-based identification, keystroke dynamics, 
gait analysis?  Are the systems ICAO compliant? 
 
 
IN JANUARY 2009, TURKEY BEGAN TO COLLECT BIOMETRIC DATA 
(FINGERPRINTS ONLY) ON TURKISH CITIZENS APPLYING FOR A NEW 
TURKISH PASSPORT.  SEE PASSPORT SECTION, BELOW. 
 
-- Are biometric systems integrated for all active POEs? 
What are the systems and models used?  Are all passengers 
screened for the biometric or does the host government target 
a specific population for collection (i.e., host country 
nationals)?  Do the biometric collection systems look for a 
one-to-one comparison (ensure the biometric presented matches 
the one stored on the e-Passport) or one to many comparisons 
(checking the biometric presented against a database of known 
biometrics)? 
-- If biometric systems are in place, does the host 
government know of any countermeasures that have been used or 
attempted to defeat biometric checkpoints? 
-- What are the host government's policies on collecting the 
fingerprints of travelers coming into the country? 
-- Which agency is responsible for the host government's 
fingerprint system? 
-- Are the fingerprint programs in place NIST, INT-I, EFTS, 
UK1 or RTID compliant? 
-- Are the fingerprints collected as flats or rolled? 
Which agency collects the fingerprints? 
 
¶D. (SBU) Border Control and Screening:  SEE REF B. 
 
-- Does the host government employ software to screen 
travelers of security interest? 
-- Are all travelers tracked electronically, or only 
non-host- country nationals?  What is the frequency of 
travelers being "waived through" because they hold up what 
appears to be an appropriate document, but whose information 
is not actually recorded electronically?  What is the 
estimated percentage of non-recorded crossings, entries and 
exits? 
-- Do host government border control officials have the 
authority to use other criminal data when making decisions on 
who can enter the country?  If so, please describe this 
authority (legislation, mandates, etc). 
-- What are the host government's policies on questioning, 
detaining and denying entry to individuals presenting 
themselves at a point of entry into the country?  Which 
agency would question, detain, or deny entry? 
-- How well does information sharing function within the host 
government, i.e., if there is a determination that someone 
with a valid host-government visa is later identified with 
terrorism, how is this communicated and resolved internally? 
 
¶E. (SBU) Passports:  SEE REF B. 
 
-- Does the host government issue a machine-readable passport 
containing biometric information?  If so, what biometric 
information is included on the document, i.e. fingerprint, 
iris, facial recognition, etc.?  If not, does host government 
plan to issue a biometric document in the future?  When?  THE 
TURKISH GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED PLANS IN 2007 TO ISSUE A MACHINE 
READABLE PASSPORT.  BY MAY 2009, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD 
BEGUN COLLECTING FINGERPRINTS BUT NO OTHER BIOMETRIC DATA. 
THE NEW MACHINE-READABLE PASSPORTS MAY BE ISSUED AS EARLY AS 
LATE 2009, BUT 2010 IS A MORE REALISTIC TIMEFRAME.  THERE ARE 
ALSO REPORTS THAT TURKEY WILL USE FACIAL RECOGNITION AS WELL. 
 
 
-- If the host government issues a machine-readable passport 
containing biometric information, does the host government 
share the public key required to read the biometric 
information with any other governments?  If so, which 
governments?  Does the host government issue replacement 
passports for full or limited validity (i.e. the time 
remaining on the original passports, fixed validity for a 
replacement, etc.)? 
-- Does the host government have special 
regulations/procedures for dealing with "habitual" losers of 
passports or bearers who have reported their passports stolen 
multiple times? 
-- Are replacement passports of the same or different 
appearance and page length as regular passports (do they have 
something along the lines of our emergency partial duration 
passports)? 
-- Do emergency replacement passports contain the same or 
fewer biometric fields as regular-issue passports? 
-- Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the 
number of replacement or "clean" (i.e. no evidence of prior 
travel) passports used to apply for U.S. visas? 
-- Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic number 
series or otherwise identified? 
 
 
¶F. (SBU) Fraud Detection:  SEE REF B. 
 
-- How robust is fraud detection and how actively are 
instances of fraud involving documents followed up? 
-- How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken 
out of circulation, or made harder to use? 
 
¶G. (SBU) Privacy and Data Security:  SEE REF B. 
 
-- What are the country's policies on records related to the 
questioning, detention or removal of individuals encountered 
at points of entry into the country?  How are those records 
stored, and for how long? 
-- What are the country's restrictions on the collection or 
use of sensitive data? 
-- What are the requirements to provide notice to the public 
on the implementation of new databases of records? 
-- Are there any laws relating to security features for 
government computer systems that hold personally identifying 
information? 
-- What are the rules on an individual's ability to access 
data that homeland security agencies hold about them? 
-- Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of 
birth, etc.) versus case files (for example, records about 
enforcement actions)? 
-- Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the 
government to obtain these types of data? 
 
¶H. (SBU) Identifying Appropriate Partners:  SEE REF B. 
 
Department would appreciate post's in-house assessment of 
whether host government would be an appropriate partner in 
data sharing.  Considerations include whether host government 
watchlists may include political dissidents (as opposed or in 
addition to terrorists), and whether host governments would 
share or use U.S. watchlist data inappropriately, etc. 
 
OVER THE PAST 18 MONTHS, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS PRESENTED 
THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY WITH OPPORTUNITIES TO PARTICIPATE IN 
SEVERAL DATA-SHARING INITIATIVES.  THESE INCLUDE AN FBI 
INITIATIVE TO SHARE BIOMETRICS; HSPD-6; API/PNR AND 
TIP/PISCES.  DESPITE REPEATED PRESENTATIONS IN ANKARA AND 
WASHINGTON, ANKARA REMAINS UNDECIDED.  WE BELIEVE HIGHER 
LEVEL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT ON BOTH SIDES WOULD HELP 
FACILITATE THE PROCESS. 
 
-- Are there political realities which would preclude a 
country from entering into a formal data-sharing agreement 
with the U.S.? 
-- Is the host country's legal system sufficiently developed 
to adequately provide safeguards for the protection and 
nondisclosure of information? 
-- How much information sharing does the host country do 
internally?  Is there a single consolidated database, for 
example?  If not, do different ministries share information 
amongst themselves? 
-- How does the country define terrorism? Are there legal 
statutes that do so? 
 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
SILLIMAN