VZCZCXYZ0011
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0768 1760938
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 250938Z JUN 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1831
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9265
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0699

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000768 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/P, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: NORTH KOREA 
 
Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused June 25 
news coverage on the aftermath of a recent Taiwan government 
decision to upgrade and merge several cities and counties; on the 
continuous probe into the legal cases involving former President 
Chen Shui-bian; on the Cabinet's order to decriminalize prostitution 
Wednesday; and on the Department of Health's plan to announce the 
opening of the Taiwan market to U.S. beef.  In terms of editorials 
and commentaries, an op-ed piece in the pro-independence, 
English-language "Taipei Times," written by a Taipei-based Western 
columnist, discussed China's role in the Six Party talks.  The 
article said Beijing is "exploiting its ambiguous relationship with 
Pyongyang" because "it helps bolster its image as a positive force 
in the region while it gains concessions from the U.S. and others on 
core issues such as human rights and, above all, Taiwan."  End 
summary. 
 
"Beijing Makes Itself Indispensable" 
 
¶J. Michael Cole, a writer based in Taipei, opined in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] (6/25): 
 
"Ever since the Agreed Framework signed in 1994 between the 
administration of former US president Bill Clinton and North Korea 
crumbled in 2002, Beijing -- Pyongyang's principal backer -- has 
successfully positioned itself as an indispensable ally in global 
efforts to denuclearize its neighbor.  Throughout the years, China 
has come to be seen as a convener of the Six Party talks and, given 
its relations with Pyongyang, as a lever to keep Kim Jong-il's 
regime from sparking war in the Korean Peninsula.  China's 
involvement in the Six Party talks has conveniently dovetailed with 
its attempts to reassure its neighbors - and the West - that it is 
rising peacefully, and that as an emerging power it is ready to act 
as a responsible stakeholder. At the same time, Beijing has also 
managed to serve as a buffer and to mitigate international responses 
to Pyongyang's long streak of seemingly irrational brinkmanship. 
For both sides in the conflict, therefore, China has increasingly 
become an indispensable moderator, a counterbalance reining in North 
Korea when it threatens to act out of bounds, and pacifying jittery 
South Korea, Japan and the US when Pyongyang conducts nuclear tests 
or launches ballistic missiles. 
 
"... Beijing is unlikely to have assumed its role as moderator out 
of altruism, and its position has been beneficial to its image. In 
the process it has managed to extract concessions in a way that is 
reminiscent of the gains it made when the administration of former 
US president Richard Nixon sought its help in the Cold War (to 
isolate the Soviet Union) and the Vietnam War (to stop supporting 
North Vietnamese), a precedent that should not escape our attention. 
 Washington, meanwhile, has helped to reinforce Beijing's image of 
itself as an indispensable ally and become unhealthily dependent on 
Chinese participation in the disarmament talks, often at the expense 
of regional allies. ... 
 
"Long used to a style of diplomacy in which political gifts come at 
a price, Beijing is fully aware of the West's growing dependence on 
it regarding North Korea and has used its position to soften 
Washington's support for Taiwan.  This could explain the George W. 
Bush administration's volte-face after 2001, drifting from strong 
support for Taiwan to nearly constant condemnation of the Chen 
Shui-bian administration. (The timing of Bush's change of heart on 
Taiwan and escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula could not be 
more apt.) ...  Many experts have drawn the conclusion that despite 
close diplomatic relations and economic ties, Beijing has been 
unable to influence the North's decisions on its nuclear program.  A 
less explored possibility is that Beijing is exploiting its 
ambiguous relationship with Pyongyang to create some sort of status 
quo in which the North Korea nuclear issue is never fully resolved, 
because an end to the conflict would severely diminish Beijing's 
ability to bargain with the international community. ... 
 
"It is evident, therefore, that the perpetuation of the status quo 
is in Beijing's advantage, as it helps bolster its image of a 
positive force in the region while it gains concessions from the US 
and others on core issues such as human rights and, above all, 
Taiwan.  This is not to say that China relishes a nuclear North 
Korea that could spark a destabilizing war in the Korean Peninsula. 
But if it manages its neighbor well - not allowing it to spark a war 
while preventing the international community from disarming it, 
effectively playing one camp against the other - Pyongyang can be 
used by Beijing as a precious instrument to buttress the foundations 
of its rise while achieving its political objectives.  Ironically, 
over-reliance on China by Japan, South Korea and the US on the North 
Korean nuclear issue could make it less likely that the problem will 
be resolved, and more probable that they will end up giving too much 
to ensure that China continues its 'indispensable' role." 
 
YOUNG