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Viewing cable 09AITTAIPEI682, MEDIA REACTION: NORTH KOREA, U.S.-CHINA-JAPAN RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09AITTAIPEI682 2009-06-10 09:36 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0682 1610936
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 100936Z JUN 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1716
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9237
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0670
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000682 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: NORTH KOREA, U.S.-CHINA-JAPAN RELATIONS 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage June 10 on President Ma Ying-jeou's decision to run for the 
KMT chairmanship in July; on Ma's suggestion that people across the 
Taiwan Strait be able to read traditional Chinese and write 
simplified Chinese characters; and on the Ministry of Education's 
plan to provide free lunches to elementary and junior high school 
students next year.  In terms of editorials and commentaries, a 
column in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" discussed the 
possible "assassin's mace" the Obama Administration will use to cope 
with North Korea.  The article also said the United States rarely 
has had a really consistent policy toward North Korea.  The same 
"China Times" column also discussed the possibility of establishing 
a so-called G3 -- the United States, Japan and China.  The article 
said that, because of mistrust among the three nations, the chances 
for the G3 are nil.  End summary. 
 
2. North Korea 
 
"The Assassin's Mace of Obama to Cope with North Korea" 
 
The "International Lookout" column in the centrist, KMT-leaning 
"China Times" [circulation: 130,000] wrote (6/10): 
 
"What will be the assassin's mace of the Obama Administration use 
against North Korea?  According to what was revealed in the 'New 
York Times,' it will be the eleventh and twelfth articles of the UN 
draft sanctions -- namely, to intercept suspicious North Korean 
ships and planes.  It remains to be seen whether such articles will 
be passed by the UN Security Council, but should it go over the 
limit, tremendous trouble will ensue. ...  Perhaps [U.S. President 
Barack] Obama is clear that such a move will not be easily accepted 
by the UN Security Council.  But he has expressed a tough attitude 
toward Pyongyang in the end after all.  What happens next will be 
discussed afterwards!  U.S. presidents have [usually] gone back and 
forth and changed their foreign policy all the time; it has been 
like that for the North Korean policy in particular -- they were 
angry for a while and then became happy for a while.  Never has 
there been a really fixed position. ...  Obama has just assumed his 
position and thus has yet to form a complete North Korean policy; 
all he can do is to keep a high profile.  The precedents of the 
previous few U.S. presidents show that they always started tough 
[toward Pyongyang] and turned soft afterwards, changing all the 
time.  What will Obama do?" 
 
3. U.S.-China-Japan Relations 
 
"Zero Chance for the so-called G3 of China, U.S. and Japan" 
 
The "International Lookout" column in the centrist, KMT-leaning 
"China Times" [circulation: 130,000] wrote (6/9): 
 
"... For the United States, the situation in which Washington used 
Tokyo to suppress Beijing is no longer viable.  The United States 
now needs Japan and also China.  But since there are some 
differences between China and Japan, China will surely feel 
suspicious and jealous if the United States puts the emphasis on 
Japan.  Should it be the other way around, Japan will surely feel 
upset.  As a result, it will be able to avoid conflict if a 
three-sided group of U.S. China and Japan are all included, and it 
will certainly benefit the United States in terms of economics, 
trade and Asian security. ... 
 
"Even though theoretically no side will be opposed to the 
establishment of a G3, there are actually various obstacles in 
practice. For starters, China and Japan do not trust each other. ... 
 Then there is the mistrust between China and the United States. 
With the Taiwan issue alone, Beijing already believes that 
Washington has encroached on China's core interests.  Washington, on 
the other hand, is afraid that, with China's rise, Beijing will 
compete with the United States for hegemony in Asia and in the 
world.  None of these problems will be solved by the [establishment 
of] a G3 alone.  Besides, will not Russia and South Korea have 
scruples against it as well?  Thus, there is no problem that the 
three sides cannot talk about with each other, but the chances of 
grouping [the three nations] are nil." 
 
WANG