VZCZCXRO5236
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #1348/01 1611203
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 101203Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5063
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEPADJ/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEWMFD/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001348 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM EAID EAGR PREL ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA'S EMERGENCY FOOD NEEDS - A PERMANENT STATE 
 
REF: ADDIS 1113 
 
INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
 
¶1. (SBU) Ethiopia is in a state of chronic food insecurity. 
Climatic changes with the lack of rain have reduced annual harvests 
from one instead of three harvests in many areas of Ethiopia.  Along 
with poor agricultural practices, Ethiopia faces another severe year 
of hunger with the government under reporting that 4.9 million 
people face severe food needs.  USAID and the donor community 
believe the actual number is 6.6 million people (reftel) -- less 
than last year's severe drought-induced food needs but still 
millions more than the government's figure.  The Ethiopian 
Government (GoE) is under-estimating the number of people facing 
emergency assistance needs, overestimating harvest yields, and not 
reporting full emergency food distribution figures.  GoE food stocks 
in, and en route, to country could avoid a pipeline break, but the 
GoE is unlikely to use its own emergency food stocks, currently at 
around 178,000 metric tons (MT), until the donor community pledges 
food to replace what may be disbursed.  Annual U.S. food donations 
far exceed the total amount of food donated by all other donors 
combined, yet such assistance is not reversing what has become a 
permanent state of chronic food shortages.  Focusing U.S. 
development strategy on agricultural development, which will see a 
significant increase this year with a modest US$ 20 million 
allotment, will be essential to reversing the trend.  More 
important, greater GoE transparency, land reform, and better 
distribution approaches are critical in reaching their intended 
beneficiaries. 
 
TRENDS ON THE GROUND 
-------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) On January 30, 2009, the GoE announced a humanitarian 
requirement for 591,000 MT of food assistance, worth US$ 511 
million, to respond to the emergency needs of 4.9 million people 
through June 2009. 
 
¶3. (U) The first months were covered by US$ 121 million in resources 
carried over from 2008, including US$ 111 million in new USG 
contributions.  Thus the starting balance of the appeal was US$ 389 
million. 
 
¶4. (U) To date, donors collectively have provided US$ 170 million 
towards that balance, which is just less than half of the total 
need.  The United States provided 63 percent of the US$ 170 million. 
 Donors note a lack of confidence that food is reaching end 
beneficiaries as a major justification for not contributing. 
 
¶5. (U) There is a remaining relief need of approximately 178,000 MT 
of food.  The GoE currently has over 118,000 MT of food in its 
Strategic Food Reserve, but is unwilling to draw down from that 
unless/until donors pledge new resources to backfill the amount. 
The GoE's Grain Trade Enterprise has over 260,000 MT of food 
scheduled to arrive in country over the coming six weeks, but the 
GoE is reserving that food to dump in urban markets to suppress 
urban food inflation. 
 
¶6. (U) While the GoE reports that 99% and 91% of food allocations 
from February and March respectively have been dispatched to their 
final distribution points, to date WFP cannot confirm that more than 
15% and 1% of these allocations, respectively, have actually reached 
end beneficiaries. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The short belg rains, which normally contribute roughly 
10-15% of Ethiopia's annual food output, have largely failed 
throughout the belg-dependent areas.  While the GoE has begun 
assessing the belg performance -- dispatching teams from June 8 -- 
the State Minister for Agriculture has told donors that the GoE will 
stand by the figure of 4.9 million people in need through October 
¶2009. 
 
¶8. (U) WFP has roughly 11,000 MT of food sitting in Port Djibouti, 
but the GoE is only allocating four (4) trucks (accommodating a 
total of roughly 100 MT) per day to transport that food into 
Ethiopia. 
 
¶9. (U) If the needs of 6.6 million people, as projected by USAID are 
realized, an additional 450,000 MT is needed for July thru October, 
and at the very least, if the 4.9 million people figure remains 
constant the need will be for an additional 333,000 MT. 
 
ACTUAL NEEDS 
------------ 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001348  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) Due to the lack of GoE reporting on emergency food 
distributions, we do not know how much food remains available or the 
magnitude of the actual shortfall.  With the failure of the belg 
rains, we can safely assume that well over 4.9 million, and possibly 
as many as 6.6 million people are now at risk, and will remain at 
risk until the early "green maize" harvest in September.  GoE food 
stocks in the Strategic Food Reserve and Grain Trade Enterprise are 
adequate to meet WFP's current declared shortfall, if the GoE were 
willing to use them for emergency relief.  If the GoE is not willing 
to do so, only donor contributions to fill the existing shortfall 
would be sufficient to move the GoE to "lend" its food for relief 
purposes to fill the imminent pipeline break. The USG has already 
provided significant resources to the 2009 emergency appeal, and 
would request additional donors to contribute to the outstanding 
need. 
 
THE LONG-TERM PICTURE 
--------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) We assess that with greatly improved agricultural 
techniques, and agricultural and economic reforms, Ethiopia can 
eventually meet most of its food needs.  Thus, the critical nature 
of agricultural development assistance.  Ethiopia's perennial 
emergency food dependence is, de facto, a permanent condition.  The 
U.S. participates with eight other donors and the GoE in the 
Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) which, coupled with other food 
security programs, intends to graduate 8 million people into food 
security by 2014.  In additional to continuing support to the GoE's 
multi-donor safety-net program, the USG must decide among the 
following options to address remaining long-term food insecurity in 
Ethiopia: 
 
  A) The USG could continue to provide massive food aid, which is 
unsustainable, in meeting Ethiopia's permanent state of emergency 
food need each year, 
 
  B) The USG could decide to provide significantly greater 
assistance for sustainable agricultural productivity, and the 
flexibility in its usage to operate within the constraints, and meet 
the needs, of Ethiopia's specific environment, or 
 
  C) The USG could engage the GoE robustly to push for a shift in 
economic and agricultural policies (regarding land tenure, 
agricultural technologies and practices, agricultural inputs, etc.) 
to increase domestic agricultural productivity. 
 
Ultimately, only a mix of these three approaches will prove 
effective.  As we prepare for senior level discussions between the 
U.S. and Ethiopia in the near future, we will need full interagency 
support on an approach to address what has become Ethiopia's 
permanent state of chronic food insecurity. 
 
YAMAMOTO