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Viewing cable 09USUNNEWYORK485, SRSG ADADA IN SHARP EXCHANGE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09USUNNEWYORK485 2009-05-12 01:20 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY USUN New York
VZCZCXRO1690
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0485/01 1320120
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 120120Z MAY 09 ZDK
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6524
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000485 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SU AF
SUBJECT: SRSG ADADA IN SHARP EXCHANGE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL 
ON UNAMID 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  On April 27, the Security Council held 
consultations on the Secretary General's April report on the 
hybrid United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID).  SRSG Adada characterized the situation in Darfur 
as a "low-intensity" conflict with a high-risk of escalation 
and said that the political process had been frozen by the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment of President 
Bashir.  Adada also discussed UNAMID's plans for a monitoring 
mechanism should cessation of hostilities occur, and he 
stressed that UNAMID was deeply concerned that the NGO 
expulsions could lead to a humanitarian catastrophe.  The 
U.S., UK, France and Croatia disputed Adada's 
characterization of the conflict as "low-intensity" and with 
his remarks about the ICC, while China and Russia voiced 
approval of Adada's remarks.  Members also discussed the NGO 
expulsions, ICC indictment, Chad/Sudan relations, the 
political process and UNAMID deployment.  End Summary. 
 
A Low-Intensity Conflict and Frozen Political Process 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
2.  (SBU) The Special Representative for the 
Secretary-General for UNAMID Rodolphe Adada briefed the 
Security Council on the SYG's UNAMID report on April 27.  He 
began his briefing by stating that the situation in Darfur 
had changed from the intense period in 2003 and 2004 when 
tens of thousands of people were killed.  Adada said that, in 
numeric terms, the Darfur conflict had become low-intensity, 
noting that between January 2008 and March 2009, fewer than 
2000 people were killed.  Adada also alleged that the ICC 
indictment of Bashir had frozen the political process in 
Sudan and polarized political discourse, weakening moderates 
and strengthening extremists.  Adada conveyed UNAMID's 
readiness to monitor a cessation of hostilities. 
 
3.  Adada emphasized the success of UNAMID's deployment, 
noting that two-thirds of military personnel have deployed. 
Adada also said that UNAMID's presence had made a difference, 
asserting that Muhajerija was a "disaster that did not 
happen," and that the August 2008 attack on Kalma camp could 
have resulted in far more deaths had UNAMID not been there. 
Adada acknowledged that UNAMID's primary responsibility is to 
protect civilians, and that UNAMID cannot be considered a 
success until the people of Darfur live in peace and security. 
 
4.  Adada expressed deep concern with the GOS decision to 
expel 13 non-governmental organizations on March 4 and 5, 
noting the complete alteration of the humanitarian situation 
and disruption of essential services to Darfuris.  Adada also 
said that, while UNAMID does not have a humanitarian mandate, 
the international community would look to UNAMID for 
assistance should a humanitarian crisis develop.  Adada 
emphasized strong support of his UNMIS colleagues' efforts to 
work with the GOS to manage the situation. 
 
Council Members Push Back on Adada 
---------------------------------- 
 
5.  Ambassador Rice disagreed that the conflict in Darfur is 
a low-intensity conflict, and stated that while thousands of 
Darfuris remain displaced in camps, the situation in Darfur 
remains a dangerous one.  French PR Ripert also expressed 
surprise at Adada's characterization and agreed with 
Ambassador Rice that with thousands of people in camps, the 
conflict in Darfur is "high-intensity."  UK Perm Rep Sawers 
disagreed with Adada's characterization of the ICC indictment 
as boosting the extremists' position and asserted that 
Adada's remarks conflicted with the Secretary General's 
report that called on the GOS to cooperate fully with the 
ICC.  Sawers said that he hoped that in the future Adada 
would represent the Council to the GOS rather than vice 
versa.  Ripert reiterated that Adada should take a clear 
message from the Council, which had referred the case to the 
ICC in UNSCR 1593. 
 
NGO Expulsions 
-------------- 
 
6.  Ambassadors Rice, Sawers, Ripert, and Okuda began their 
remarks by emphasizing that the GOS expulsions of NGOs on 
March 4 and 5 remain a primary concern.  Rice pointed to the 
tremendous effort that had been made to fill the humanitarian 
assistance gap and expressed hope that the GOS would fulfill 
its commitments.  Sawers stated that there was no 
justification for the GOS expulsions and that the Council had 
called on the GOS to reverse its decision.  Japanese DPR 
Okuda expressed concern about whether the assistance gap 
could be filled, and noted that no new NGOs have been able to 
register, despite GOS indications to the contrary. 
 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000485  002 OF 002 
 
 
7.  Libyan Perm Rep Shalgham claimed that the expelled NGOs 
had only provided 4.7 percent of the total amount of 
humanitarian assistance to Darfur.  He also noted that 15 
Arab NGOs would provide assistance.  Chinese Political 
Couselor La stated that the ICC issuance of an arrest warrant 
against Bashir had triggered the suspensions and expressed 
appreciation for the "effective" measures to ease the 
humanitarian situation.  Russian DPR Dolgov repeated that the 
expulsions were not justified and that the GOS must fully 
fulfill its obligations. 
 
UNAMID Deployment 
----------------- 
 
8.  Ambassador Rice acknowledged the progress that U/SYG 
Malcorra had made but stressed that the Council should not be 
satisfied with 90 percent deployment two and a half years 
after the UNAMID mandate was established.  She asked Adada 
what the UN's plans were for reaching 100 percent deployment 
and also what difference 90 percent deployment would make if 
key missing assets were not procured.  Turkish PR Ilkin 
stated that operational capacity is more important than troop 
numbers.  Croatia and Japan also expressed concern with the 
slow rate of UNAMID deployment. 
 
ICC 
--- 
 
9.  UK Perm Rep Sawers said there had been no progress with 
regard to the indictment against Bashir and that all member 
states, whether state parties to the Rome statute or not, had 
an obligation to enforce this warrant.  French Perm Rep 
Ripert stated that while France does not preclude application 
of Article 16 in principle, events on the ground in Darfur do 
not justify consideration of this option.  Ripert reiterated 
that impunity for actions taken in 2003 and 2004 is not a 
solution.  Japanese DPR Okuda agreed that Article 16 was not 
warranted at this time.  Austrian Perm Rep Mayt-Harting 
stated that the indictment should not be used by any party as 
an excuse for withdrawing from the peace process. 
 
10.  Chinese rep La stated that Adada's statement on the ICC 
was valid and the ICC warrant had adversely impacted the 
political process in Darfur.  Libya and Russia also agreed 
with Adada's characterization of the ICC  Vietnam, Burkina 
Faso and Uganda likewise indicated that the ICC indictment 
had adversely effected the humanitarian situation in Darfur 
and political process efforts.  Turkish Perm Rep Ilkin stated 
that the ICC indictment had no effect on the ground, 
observing that Bashir traveled throughout Africa and received 
"red carpet treatment."  Ilkin also said that rumors that 
Bashir would be replaced subsequent to the indictment were 
not proven true, and the exact opposite occurred:  Bashir's 
position was been strengthened. 
 
Adada Responds 
-------------- 
 
11.  Adada said that his briefing had not contradicted the 
SYG report and that it was unfortunately accurate that the 
Doha process was stagnant as a result of the indictment.  He 
reiterated that the situation in Darfur was no longer the 
situation that existed in 2003 and 2004 and that banditry was 
responsible for the majority of deaths that had taken place 
recently.  Regarding UNAMID deployment, Adada noted that the 
UN could not reach 100 percent until the UN had pledges for 
all the missing units, and that aviation assets were needed 
to increase capacity and provide mobility to the 36 UNAMID 
sites, many of which are not accessible by land during the 
rainy season.  Adada also said that the Friends of UNAMID had 
played a positive role in accelerating UNAMID's deployment. 
As to monitoring a ceasefire agreement, Adada noted that the 
USG had expressed interest in this and that as soon as 
hostilities ceased, UNAMID would be ready to implement a 
monitoring mechanism. 
Rice