VZCZCXRO6907
PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK
RUEHSR RUEHYG
DE RUEHVEN #0127/01 1381305
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181305Z MAY 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNOSC/ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY IN EUROPE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6386
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 0150

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000127 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR, EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OSCE PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: REDESIGNING EUROPE'S SECURITY ARCHITECTURE - IT'S ALL 
ABOUT MAKING RUSSIA FEEL COMFORTABLE AGAIN1. 
 
SUMMARY.  Most speakers agreed that the real value of 
the discussions on European security is in the process, not 
the outcome.  The emphasis is on restoring trust among the 
participating States rather than any specific outcome. END 
SUMMARY 
 
¶2.    In an effort to help frame the evolving discussion on 
European Security Architecture, the Austrian Foreign Ministry 
hosted an expert meeting May 8 to consider various notions of 
security and look at specific concepts that have worked 
effectively in the past.  The OSCE's Greek Chairmanship 
actively participated, seeing the meeting as an important 
step on the way to the June 27-28 Corfu informal Ministerial 
meeting.  They dampened expectations for Corfu, or even the 
Athens Ministerial, and cautioned that this is only the start 
of what will probably be a marathon process. 
 
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INDIVISIBILITY OF SECURITY 
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¶3.    The meeting's first session focused on the notion of 
"indivisibility of security", and how it relates to the 
discussions on European security.  Dmitry Suslov, Deputy 
Director of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy in 
Moscow, believes that the main challenge facing Europe today 
is Russia's role in the European security system.  Suslov 
stated that there are different types of indivisible 
security, depending on whether it refers to security within 
an alliance (citing NATO's Article V, and CSTO commitments) 
or between security systems, where mutual vulnerability 
creates interdependence.  This can be either negative, as 
during the Cold War, or positive, such as during the 1990s. 
The positive version doesn't just avoid confrontation, but 
actively seeks to increase security through cooperation. 
Power is shared equally, and none of the States makes a 
decision without first consulting the others.  Wolfgang 
Zellner, Director of the Center for OSCE Research in Hamburg, 
agreed and noted that this type of positive cooperation 
exemplifies the concept of indivisible security as created by 
the Helsinki process in the early 1970s and confirmed in the 
1990 Charter of Paris. 
 
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DIAGNOSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION 
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¶4.    Adam Rotfeld, former Foreign Minister, now with the 
Polish Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw, 
confirmed the inclusiveness of the 1990 Charter adopted by 
all participating States, and believes it is up to Russia to 
decide if it wants to play by these rules, or go its own way. 
 In his opinion, Russia is undermining the current system and 
also seeking changes.  The two preferred Russian 
"solutions" to the current crisis of European security - 
a return to the bipolar order of the late 20th century or the 
establishment of a new concert of power - are not viable 
and have no place in the 21st century.  Andrei Zagorski, 
Leading Researcher at the Center for War and Peace Studies 
and the Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 
painted a slightly different picture.  He explained that 
Russia has learned to hate many of the tremendous changes of 
the past 20 years, as they have meant a decrease in its 
strength and influence while that of the West has expanded. 
In Zagorski's opinion, the more NATO and the EU determine 
European security, the more marginalized Russia feels. 
Jacques AndrQani, President of the Association 
France-AmQriques in Paris, indirectly agreed with Zagorski's 
analysis.  He argued that the root of the problem is 
political, not ideological.  The current struggle is 
therefore about power and the ability to shape security. 
 
¶5.    Despite the political changes, speakers agreed on the 
continuing importance and validity of the OSCE's common 
values, principles and commitments.  The problem is in how 
these commitments are implemented or enforced.  The OSCE is 
not the cause of discord, but it feels the effects.  Key 
norms like democracy and territorial integrity are being 
neglected or even openly violated.  This has been accompanied 
by growing resentments on each side.  In Zellner's view, 
European security has in the past 10 years been dominated by 
unilateral decisions by a number of participating States. 
This has poisoned the atmosphere and led to a dramatic loss 
of confidence and good will that will take years to overcome. 
 Adding to the problem, there is currently a deadlock in 
international law, an irresolvable tension between various 
principles that has brought the participating States into 
 
USOSCE 00000127  002 OF 003 
 
 
conflict. 
 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
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¶6.    Panelists agreed there was a certain crisis of trust, 
due in part to failure to implement OSCE commitments. 
Michael Haltzel, Senior Fellow at the Center for 
Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, stated 
that although trust was not a precondition for entering into 
a dialogue on European security, it was certainly a 
precondition for its success.  In the absence of 
implementation of existing agreements, we have no confidence 
that future agreements will be respected.  A Georgian 
representative therefore recommended approaching 
implementation of existing commitments - including the 
6-point ceasefire and renewal of the OSCE mandate in Georgia 
- in parallel with discussions on European security in order 
to increase confidence and trust of the parties in the 
process. 
 
¶7.    The failure to implement commitments impacts not only 
on relations between States, but also on the situation within 
States.  Violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
lead to instability within States, which can cause regional 
security problems.  Many panelists noted the preeminent 
importance of arms control and conflict prevention and 
resolution for the future of European security.  Several 
stated that resolution of the impasse on CFE is key to 
progress on European security. 
 
¶8.    In regard to the protracted conflicts, Oksana 
Antonenko, Senior Fellow at the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies in London, urged participants to think how 
to manage conflict long-term and prepare the ground for a 
comprehensive solution.  She encouraged more focus on the 
hard security agenda to keep conflicts from escalating. 
Zagorski urged the OSCE participating States to look at what 
went wrong in Georgia and what we can do better.  In order to 
avoid a repeat of August 2008, we need to strengthen the OSCE 
and give it the means to take timely action to prevent 
conflict.  He made a very unorthodox suggestion - from the 
Russian point of view - that the participating States create 
an urgent action mechanism that would give the OSCE the 
authority to take such preventive action even before 
consensus has matured.  He acknowledged the difficulties 
inherent in agreeing upon such a mechanism derogating from 
the OSCE's strict consensus rule, but believes it would also 
be in Russia's long-term interest to have the OSCE - as 
opposed to NATO - be involved in conflict prevention in the 
wider European region. 
 
¶9.    What should the parameters of this process be?  There 
was across the board agreement among panelists that European 
security discussions should build on the achievements of the 
past.  Talks should include all three OSCE dimensions, and 
take the preservation of existing norms, principles and 
commitments as a point of departure.  The OSCE should be the 
locus as it can be a forum for discussion as well as a tool 
for implementation. The vast majority of participating States 
think the OSCE is sound, useful and should continue to play a 
major role in European security. 
 
¶10.   Most speakers did not see the need for new security 
architecture per se, but acknowledged that it bodes poorly 
for European security if Russia is unhappy with the current 
system.  There is a hope that through this process, States 
will be able to recreate a sense of trust, and that this 
increase in confidence will lead to improved cooperation and 
security in the region.  Zagorski spoke of the need to return 
a feeling of ownership without compromising our achievements. 
 The true value in the European security dialogue for the 
speakers seems therefore to lie in the process itself, rather 
than the outcome. 
 
¶11.   What does Russia want to gain from this process? 
According to Suslov, Russia wants the current discussions to 
lead to a restoration of bipolarity in Europe, with the U.S. 
and Russia as the poles.  The Russian representative, when 
given an opportunity to ask questions, chose to focus on what 
he characterized as the West's double standards on 
territorial integrity in Kosovo and Georgia. 
 
¶12.   Comment: The main problem facing European security is 
political, not structural.  Russia wants a seat at the table, 
to be bound into decision-making procedures and power-sharing 
 
USOSCE 00000127  003 OF 003 
 
 
in Europe.  The Russian representative's only comments 
during the whole meeting focused on the unfairness of the 
West and the current security system, and did not touch on 
either the parameters or the goals of the European security 
discussions. 
SCOTT