VZCZCXRO7912
PP RUEHSK
DE RUEHVEN #0118/01 1261458
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061458Z MAY 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6362
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5-DDPMA-IN/CAC/DDPMA-E//
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XONP//

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000118 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR NILSSON, HAYDEN 
JCS FOR J5 NORWOOD, COL SMITH 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: CFE/JCG: MAY 5 PLENARY - RUSSIA TRIES TO TURN 
TABLES; ALLIES FOCUS ON NON-COMPLIANCE; MOLDOVA IMPLIES 2+1 
NOT EQUAL TO CONSENT 
 
REF: STATE 43053 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified; please protect accordingly.  Not 
for Internet. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  During the U.S.-chaired May 5 JCG Plenary, 
Russia repeated MFA criticisms of the CFE text of the NATO 
Summit declaration and presented its Aide-Memoire to all CFE 
States Parties as Russia's official position on how to 
restore the viability of the CFE regime on the basis of the 
U.S.-Russian draft Parallel Actions Package.  Russia detailed 
the necessary elements for striking balance in the package 
and turned NATO's appeal to Russia around, stressing it is 
Russia that is urging NATO States Parties to work with Russia 
as well as all other States Parties to preserve CFE.  Belarus 
expressed support for Russia's ideas while the U.S. stressed 
the importance of the senior-level bilateral channel for 
achieving agreement, and noted that the package cannot be 
disaggregated. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On compliance issues, ten States Parties (even 
Iceland) with Turkey in the lead registered concerns with 
Russia's failure to meet its obligation to provide additional 
information on Kushchevskaya as of April 1, 2009. 
Additionally, Portugal, Turkey and the U.S. (supported by 
eight Allies) raised the issue of Russia's latest inspection 
refusals and called on Russia to resume its implementation of 
the CFE Treaty or risk continued degradation of its long-term 
viability.  Russian delegate Ulyanov remarked that Russia 
hoped to never have to provide flank information again.  He 
claimed that Russia is equally concerned about the state of 
affairs of CFE and stands ready to engage in all formats on 
the basis of the package, while alleging the U.S. and NATO 
remain frozen by "inertia" and would not engage in talks at a 
reasonable pace. 
 
¶3. (SBU) On other issues - in an unexpected intervention - 
the Moldovan Ambassador reiterated for the record that 
Moldova's position on the 1999 Istanbul commitments had not 
changed, implying that the 2 1 Joint Declaration of March 18 
did not satisfy host nation consent for the presence of 
foreign forces.  Hungary reported on the entry into service 
of two new look-alike vehicles.  At the JCG-T the day prior 
to the JCG Plenary, Allies debated new formats for the T and 
the TOI Chair noted that the deadline for submitting 
corrections to the Consolidated Matrix would be extended by a 
week. End Summary. 
 
 
JCG PLENARY 
 
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"IRRITATED" BY NATO APPEAL ) RUSSIA TOUTS AIDE MEMOIRE 
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¶4. (SBU) Germany (Schweizer) kicked off the U.S.-chaired 
(Neighbour) May 5 JCG Plenary by delivering a joint 
German-French statement on the April 3-4 Strasbourg-Kehl NATO 
Summit relating the CFE text of the Summit declaration. 
Noting that the statement was very familiar ) as in verbatim 
) and that the Russian MFA had already responded, Russian 
Chief Arms Control Delegate Ulyanov confined his reaction to 
two allegations: 
 
-- NATO enlargement was the clear priority for NATO with arms 
control ranking near the bottom.  Ulyanov suggested this was 
evidenced by the fact that the protocols for Albania and 
Croatia to join NATO took less than 9 months to approve while 
NATO CFE States Parties have stated it could take up to 2 
years for ratification of the adapted Treaty. 
 
-- The statement's "ironic, sarcastic and irritating" appeal 
to Russia to cooperate with NATO and others on the basis of 
the Parallel Actions Package to save CFE was clearly 
misdirected.  Ulyanov claimed that Russia had appealed to 
NATO two years ago; the lack of response forced Russia to 
 
USOSCE 00000118  002 OF 005 
 
 
"suspend" CFE. He noted talks did not begin until October 
2007 (have not been substantive since late November 2007) and 
have been infrequent.  The NATO-Russia Council has been "held 
up," and JCG work has been "stymied."  It appears both sides 
are talking past each other and NATO remains engaged in a 
Public Relations exercise. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ulyanov verbally presented an Aide-Memoire to the 
JCG as Russia's official position on how to restore the 
viability of the CFE regime, noting it would be annexed to 
the Journal of the Day (JCG/JOUR/693) along with Russia's 
statement.  He remarked it was in part a response to many 
delegations' voiced wishes for an official reaction, but also 
intended to serve as a catalyst to current talks.  Stressing 
that Russia still thinks there is time to save the Treaty and 
it would be "unforgiveable" to let the opportunity pass, 
Ulyanov stated the basis "could very well be" the U.S.-Russia 
package as long as there were substantial improvements. 
(Note: Ulyanov clarified later that this paper was the same 
one (reftel) that MFA Director Antonov presented to A/S 
Gottemoeller in Rome on the margins of April 24 START 
discussions.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) Ulyanov reiterated many of the standard Russian 
complaints about "Russian actions for vague NATO promises" 
and rattled off a list of "musts" to ensure balance in the 
package (maximum assurances for ratification, provisional 
application, reduced equipment ceilings for NATO SPs, 
conditions for accession for new NATO members including 
Croatia and Albania, and a definition of substantial combat 
forces.)  He then highlighted aspects which he noted were of 
concern to many delegations and would require progress to 
move forward: 
 
-- Flanks: First and foremost, the flanks must be abolished 
for the Russian Federation.  There should be "no illusions" - 
descriminatory territorial subceilings (legal restrictions) 
must be eliminated for Russia.  At the same time, Russia is 
ready to study reasonable, bilateral CSBMs on a reciprocal 
basis if any partners feel the need to negotiate such 
measures.  (Note. Ulyanov has repeatedly made clear on the 
margins that this is not/not a negotiating tactic.  The 
flanks must go.  End note.) 
 
-- Regional level: Russia is prepared to consider some 
measures of transparency with respect to both Moldova and the 
South Caucasus taking into account the "real" situation in 
those regions, and providing that the package is truly 
balanced. 
 
-- Resuming implementation: Russia will resume CFE 
implementation upon entry into force of A/CFE or its 
provisional application.  Once the package is agreed ) 
depending on its contents ) Russia would consider some 
reciprocal, bilateral transparency measures prior to 
provisional application as a good will gesture. 
 
-- Modalities for future talks: Russia is ready to step up 
efforts in bilateral talks with representatives from capitals 
as well as in the day-to-day work of delegations in Vienna, a 
must he said if we genuinely want progress.  Ulyanov called 
for "democratic principles" to be incorporated into the 
process by including all CFE States Parties. (He claimed that 
progress was achieved when U.S.-Russia talks were more 
intensive adding that this had not been the case since 
November 29, 2007 in Madrid and noting the package had not 
changed since December 2007.) 
 
-- Extraordinary Conference ) could serve as mechanism for 
approving the revised draft package. 
 
-- Lastly, it is Russia that urges the NATO States Parties to 
work with Russia as well as all other States Parties on the 
basis of the U.S.-Russia draft package in the interest of 
preserving the CFE regime. 
 
 
USOSCE 00000118  003 OF 005 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) Belarus and the U.S. were the only delegations to 
respond. Belarus (Krayushkin) characterized Russia's ideas as 
constructive especially regarding ratification of A/CFE, 
provisional application, and conditions for accession of new 
NATO members. Krayushkin added that the moratorium was not 
the cause of the current problem, rather the result, and 
stressed that the JCG should not be sidelined.  He called for 
the U.S. and Russia to provide regular updates to enable all 
CFE States Parties to consider important developments. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The U.S. (Silberberg) undertook to report to 
Washington on a paper that appeared very similar to one 
Russia had presented bilaterally on April 24 while noting the 
U.S. position of not disaggregating the package remained the 
same.  He also stressed the importance of the high-level 
bilateral channel for achieving agreement on the basis of the 
package (especially in light of MFA Director Antonov's 
expressed interest to intensify this channel) and took issue 
with Ulyanov's claim that our recent efforts lacked substance 
and intensity. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Ulyanov took the floor again to clarify the paper 
was word-for-word the same; Russia had provided it in advance 
to its "lead partner." He was pleased the U.S. was open to 
intensifying bilateral efforts, but still could not 
comprehend why Vienna did not have a role, one that would 
entail working out details of the whole package to support 
higher level talk, and not disaggregating it. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
MOLDOVA IMPLIES 2   1 NOT EQUAL TO HOST NATION CONSENT 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Moldovan Ambassador (Postolachi) noted that 
Moldova has presented its position on issues related to the 
CFE Treaty on many occasions - including the Third CFE Review 
Conference and the June 2007 Extraordinary Conference.  He 
reiterated for the record that the well-known Moldovan 
position "with regard to the package of commitments 
undertaken at the OSCE Istanbul Summit, including the 
withdrawal of foreign forces - has not changed."  A somewhat 
heated Russia-Moldova exchange ensued.  Russia sought 
clarification on what Moldova meant by withdrawal of foreign 
forces and by the 2 1 statement issued on March 18 by three 
"Heads of State."  Moldova stressed that withdrawal of 
foreign forces meant just that and took offense at the 
implication that Russia did not respect its territorial 
integrity, reminding Russia that Transnistria is not a 
republic but a part of Moldova. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
EVEN ICELAND BLASTS RUSSIA FOR NON-COMPLIANCE 
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¶11. (SBU) KUSHCHEVSKAYA DATA:  As coordinated by the U.S., 
Turkey (Begec) led the charge which included (U.S., Norway, 
the UK, Romania, Moldova, Bulgaria, France, Georgia, Germany 
and even Iceland (Bjarnadottin) - to Ulyanov's apparent 
amusement) to register for the record Russia's failure to 
provide additional information on Kushchevskaya, as of April 
1, 2009.  The main message expressed was the importance of 
transparency and the special importance of the flanks as well 
as concern with Russia's continued non-compliance which would 
lead to further degradation of the CFE regime thereby 
undermining its long-term viability.  Turkey (Begec) was 
strongest on the flank, clarifying for Russia that he had "no 
illusions" about the reality of the flank geography recalling 
the August 2008 "wake up call" of Russia's aggression in 
Georgia.  Begec was clear: stability in the Caucasus is far 
more important than the political concerns of one of our 
Treaty partners. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Ulyanov felt compelled to use the opportunity to 
comment on flank limitations, recalling for all that the CFE 
Treaty says nothing on Kushchevskaya.  He characterized the 
quarterly information requirement as part of a 
 
USOSCE 00000118  004 OF 005 
 
 
"discriminatory package" of additional measures for Russia 
and repeated standard Russian arguments about NATO's 
continued violation of flank limits as a result of NATO 
enlargement.  He hoped that the Parallel Actions Package 
would address this issue by achieving a balanced approach and 
that Russia would never be asked again for such information. 
 
¶13. (SBU) AUGUST 2008 DETOUR: Ulyanov also took issue with 
Turkey's remarks regarding the events of August 2008 noting 
it was Russia that had to repel aggression against its 
peacekeepers as well as civilians in South Ossetia.  He drew 
quite a different conclusion than Begec: these events proved 
just how debilitating the flanks are for Russia.  Georgia 
(Giorgadze) immediately countered with its perspective of the 
conflict.  Several rounds of accusations between Russia and 
Georgia followed ranging from "who started it?" to differing 
interpretations of how Chechnya applied.  In the last round, 
Ulyanov noted that the independence of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia was a reality all needed to face; Georgia countered 
that that was an "unacceptable" new reality and hoped no 
other delegation would support that view. 
 
¶14. (SBU) INSPECTION REFUSALS. Portugal (Teixeira), Turkey 
(Begec) and the U.S. (Silberberg) each noted Russia's refusal 
of respective CFE inspection notifications for April, calling 
for Russia's full compliance and expressing concern with the 
ongoing impasse over CFE.  Also as coordinated by the U.S. 
del -- Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Romania, Italy, the 
UK, Belgium, and the Czech Republic spoke in support of the 
refused parties, echoing concerns with Russia's continued 
inspection refusals and urging Russia to return to active 
participation. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Russia broke with its recent practice of not 
responding to the "slew" of inspection refusal complaints in 
order to emphasize concern with the current predicament of 
all.  Ulyanov noted the statements reflected genuine concern 
about the Treaty, a concern Moscow shares.  He called upon 
all States Parties to "cease the inertia" and "heed Russia's 
appeal" to cooperate on the basis of the draft package so 
that inspections could resume as soon as possible. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
HUNGARY NOTIFIES ENTRY INTO SERVICE OF NEW EQUIP 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶16. (SBU) Hungary (Haupt) reported on its recent notification 
(CFE/HU/09/7/F13/O) of the entry into service of two new 
Armored Personnel Carrier look-alikes.  One is a maintenance 
and recovery vehicle and the other is an NBC reconnaissance 
vehicle; both are on BTR-80 chassis.  Hungary informed all 
that hard copy photographs had been submitted to the 
Secretariat and that there would be a demonstration on May 27. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
TWO PLENARIES LIKELY TO BE CANCELED 
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¶17.  (SBU) The Chair (Neighbour) noted that there were 
out-of-town meetings scheduled in late May and early June on 
important CFE matters and suggested canceling JCG meetings on 
May 27 and June 9.  This proposal will likely be approved at 
the next JCG meeting as there are no known objections. 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Regarding administrative information on the June 
10 Berlin seminar, Germany (Schweizer) noted invitations had 
gone out to all capitals (including CFE States Parties/NATO 
Allies as well as all who could accede to CFE.)  The program 
of events should be distributed via Note Verbale this week ) 
delegations will include HOD   3; registration will be 
available on line; and information will be sent to capitals. 
 
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JCG-T PLUS 4 ) ENGAGES IN ADVANCED MATH 
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USOSCE 00000118  005 OF 005 
 
 
¶19. (SBU) The JCG-T plus 4, chaired by Canada (Linteau), met 
on May 4 for a read out of the April 28 HLTF meeting and to 
coordinate plans on Allied interventions for the May 5 JCG 
plenary and discuss intentions of the Russian delegation. 
The TOI Chair noted that the deadline for corrections to the 
Consolidated Matrix would be extended by a week. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Additionally, the JCG-T inconclusively considered 
whether the JCG-T plus 4 in adding Albania and Croatia to the 
mix should now be a JCG-T plus 6; JCG-T plus 4 plus 2 (those 
that have expressed readiness to join A/CFE and those who 
have not); or a Mini-Caucus that covers the full range of 
issues.  The German proposal that the JCG-T align its 
chairman rotation with the NATO Caucus monthly rotation also 
fed into the discussion.  Most favored this pragmatic 
approach, but Greece was the most hesitant mainly due to 
concerns with inconsistencies that could arise if the JCG-T 
was chaired by a non-CFE State Party.  Croatia and Latvia 
expressed appreciation for being included in discussions, but 
neither seemed to jump at the opportunity to chair meetings. 
Allies agreed with a UK proposal to reflect further on the 
issue and return to the discussion at a subsequent meeting. 
 
¶21. (U) The next JCG Plenary will take place on May 12, under 
U.S. chairmanship, and will be preceded by the JCG-T on May 
11, under Danish chairmanship. 
SCOTT