VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0240/01 1461625
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261625Z MAY 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9490
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000240 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA, ISN/NESS, ISN/RA 
NA-20 LOONEY, NA-20.1 KOONTZ 
NA-21 BIENIAWSKI/SHEELY/ILIOPULOS/STAPLES/CUMMINS, NA-25 
HUIZENGA/VOGLER, NA-24-WHITNEY/GOOREVICH/PERRY/O'CONNOR/LAMONT AGNE 
NRC FOR OIP - HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY
SUBJECT: IAEA Symposium on Nuclear Security Relates Terrorism Threat 
to Nuclear Power Expansion 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium, attended by 
over 500 participants representing over 90 countries, dealt with 
issues involved in protecting nuclear and other radioactive 
materials from the hands of criminals and provided a forum for 
discussions with nuclear security counterparts.  The Symposium took 
place against the backdrop of renewed interest in nuclear power, 
current efforts to develop a Nuclear Security Plan guiding the 
IAEA's interim nuclear security priorities, and increased concern 
regarding the need for greater nuclear and radiological security 
worldwide.  The Department of Energy National Nuclear Security 
Administration's Ken Baker, Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator 
for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, led the U.S. delegation to the 
Symposium and held meetings with counterparts from South Africa, 
Canada, and Jordan, as well as IAEA Deputy Directors General Waller, 
Heinonen, and Sokolov, and Office of Nuclear Security Director 
Nilsson, and with World Institute for Nuclear Security Executive 
Director Roger Howsley.  Ambassador used the opportunity to engage 
counterparts from over three dozen Vienna missions, in an official 
dinner and separate afternoon gathering, on mainstreaming nuclear 
security in the IAEA organization and budget.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) The Symposium on Nuclear Security was convened 30 March to 2 
April at IAEA headquarters in Vienna by the IAEA in cooperation with 
the European Police Office, INTERPOL, the Joint Research Centre, 
European Commission, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the UN Counter Terrorism 
Task Force, the United Nations - Office on Drugs and Crime, the 
World Customs Organization, the World Institute for Nuclear Security 
(WINS), the World Nuclear Transport Institute.  The following report 
focuses on USDEL interactions in the symposium and in bilateral side 
meetings, in the sequence they occurred. 
 
------------------------------------ 
South Africa Open to Pelindaba Visit 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) DoE/NNSA Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator Baker 
thanked South African IAEA Governor Abdul Minty for the successful 
recent cooperation in export controls/Commodity Identification 
Training.  Baker also noted his hope for expanded bilateral nuclear 
and radiological security cooperation, stating for example that the 
U.S. has converted several HEU-fueled research reactors to LEU fuel 
and would be interested in sharing our lessons learned in this area 
with South Africa.  Baker also offered to explore radiological 
physical protection cooperation, especially in light of the upcoming 
2010 World Cup, and mentioned recent domestic partnerships with the 
University of Pennsylvania and several other universities. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Minty noted the success in the area of export control with 
the NNSA and stated that he would like to continue to proceed 
trilaterally (with Argentina and the U.S.) in this area.  He 
responded by saying the South African Government was very interested 
in reactor conversion and would like to see more information on the 
topic.  (A February 2009 U.S. nonpaper on nuclear and radiological 
security assistance was presented to the South African Mission for 
Minty on the topic on April 1.)  Minty also said that an MOU with 
the U.S. was ready for signature in the area of nuclear energy 
collaboration; however, there seemed to be a delay now.  He noted 
that the South African resources are currently stretched due to work 
on the pebble bed reactor, but that cooperation remains a priority. 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Minty then turned to the issue of security at Pelindaba. 
Minty said that he and his staff have searched for a formal request 
from the U.S. regarding concerns the U.S. has about security at 
Pelindaba and have not been able to turn up any such request, 
although he stated that often such communications go directly to the 
concerned Departments, bypassing the MFA.  (NOTE: Later in the 
conversation Minty repeated that USG should send relevant 
communications directly to his attention in the MFA. End Note.) 
Minty stated that he was unaware the U.S. had documented such 
concerns.  He added that in his discussions with former Acting U/S 
John Rood, he was told that the U.S. had concerns initially but was 
satisfied with South Africa's efforts.  Minty said he set up two 
meetings with Ministers for Ambassador Schulte after inviting him to 
South Africa, however, the ambassador had been unable to travel due 
to conflicting commitments.  Minty stressed that he has no problem 
with U.S. officials coming to Pelindaba at any time, and that he was 
very eager to clear up any concerns that the U.S. may have about the 
facility and would ensure that he himself was present during any 
such visits.  Minty then went through a description of the break-in 
and pointed out that the only item taken, a notebook, was left at 
the gate.  He also stressed that the intruders were on the 
 
 
commercial side of the site and were nowhere near the site's 
"nuclear perimeter."  The one concern he did have was allowing the 
television crew film access and filming rights to so much of the 
facility during the "60 Minutes" segment; for security purposes he 
might have done that differently in hindsight. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Minty said he is very open with the U.S.  He recalled he 
had worked with us immediately on the AQ Khan network issue and 
reminded that his country got two successful convictions.  (He 
observed that Pakistan is very upset with South Arica for the 
prosecutions.)  Minty stated that he is not very happy with other 
countries' results, but he is satisfied with the U.S. interactions. 
He feels some "developed countries" that were involved with the 
investigation did not behave as well.  (Note: Minty regularly 
complains about Germany in this regard.)  Minty believes that the 
networks are out there and the only way they can be cracked is by 
working together.  He is happy that the IAEA is beginning to collect 
information on networks from public sources, but he feels the 
missing link is that the chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 
needs to set up a system so that when a country gets an export 
request and subsequently denies export, it should be reported both 
to the government and the IAEA.  (Note: the NNSA team did not 
comment on this reference to NSG denial sharing.)  He has pressed 
for the 1540 Committee to look at networks; however, he indicated 
that since South Africa is not on the Security Council anymore there 
is no movement.  (Interestingly, Ambassador Minty stated during this 
conversation that he has never said that "nonproliferation and 
disarmament must be balanced," because "nonproliferation is 
critical.") 
 
¶7. (SBU) On the topic of shipments from ports in South Africa, Minty 
said that there must be more advanced notice on ships coming in. 
Five days is not enough notice to get information through the 
internal system.  He said there is a cluster of ministries and 
interagency level meetings, and it takes several weeks to approve 
these types of shipments.  Minty went on to thank the U.S. for the 
cooperation. 
 
------------------------ 
Canada Emphasizes Global Partnership Agenda 
------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Baker thanked Troy Lulashnyk for Canada's close cooperation 
with NNSA on nuclear threat reduction initiatives.  Lulashnyk said 
that cooperation between the U.S. and Canada is incredible and very 
successful because we have similar visions.  Canada feels that NNSA 
is a leader in this business of international nonproliferation 
cooperative activities, with 1-2 billion dollars spent on these 
efforts through DOE/NNSA's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) 
and Second Line of Defense (SLD) programs alone; Lulashnyk feels we 
are winning most of the fights.  He stressed that Canada is excited 
about the new Administration's vision and is interested to see how 
this vision is developed and operationalized.  He indicated that 
Canada can help back up this vision with money; the challenge (per 
Lulashnyk) is to get other countries on board.  Lulashnyk noted that 
the G-8 pledged $20 billion in 2002 but there is a question in 
Canada's mind on how you get the Europeans and Japan to do more. 
Lulashnyk also emphasized his view that expanding G-8 efforts beyond 
Russia and the FSU is a priority, and that the new challenge for 
Russia was "training and sustainability." Lulashnyk closed by saying 
again that Canada is willing to help now and in the future with 
funding and it was important to have others step up and also 
contribute. 
 
----------------------------------- 
IAEA DDG Waller Defends PSC, Appeals for SAL 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Baker raised the issue of the IAEA's newly instituted 
Program Support Costs (PSC) with IAEA Deputy Director General (DDG) 
for Management David Waller.  Baker pointed out our disagreement 
over the application of PSC had held up NNSA's recent extrabudgetary 
contributions (Aprx 4M USD) to the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund. 
Specifically, Baker requested greater transparency regarding the use 
and application of the PSC.    Waller said that the 7 percent PSC is 
now necessary because the Agency is "cross subsidizing" due to the 
huge growth of extra-budgetary contributions; current administrative 
services were being squeezed in supporting extra-budgetary 
activities, which is not proper in his view because there are also 
regular budget activities that need to be addressed.  Waller pointed 
out that the IAEA is the last major international organization to 
introduce a PSC, and that most UN organizations have had them for 
years at an average of 13 percent, not 7 percent.  Waller said he 
 
understands that transparency is important and noted that, while it 
is impossible to account for "every dime," the Agency can generally 
explain what is done and stood ready to do so.  He stressed his hope 
that this issue not "bleed" into the Program and Budgeting Committee 
meeting in April. 
 
¶10. (U) Baker mentioned that a GTRI contribution ($1.5 million) was 
recently exempted from the PSC under a "grandfather" clause, and 
that NNSA was hopeful that a Second Line of Defense contribution 
($1.2 million) similarly could be exempted since the funding and 
scope of work was agreed to with the Agency prior to July 2008. 
Waller responded that if there is strong evidence that the money and 
scope of work was agreed to prior to July 2008, exemption should be 
possible.  When Baker inquired as to the PSC's application to Cost 
Free Experts (CFE), Waller confirmed that the PSC will be added to 
contributions unless the CFE is in a service area within management 
to support the administrative burden from extra-budgetary 
contributions.  He also said the one procurement manager that the 
U.S. does fund is priceless, however he currently only works on 
support programs.  (Comment: Mission is pursuing a separate 
clarification of PSC rates for CFE's.) 
 
¶11. (SBU) Waller then turned to the issue of the IAEA Safeguards 
Analytical Laboratory (SAL) and required funding for its operation. 
Waller noted that there is a 20 percent increase in operations at 
SAL and that there is an urgent need for funding for infrastructure 
and other upgrades.  He said that a total of 40 million Euros is 
needed for SAL.  Baker responded that NNSA (in concert with DOS) 
would look into this issue. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Making the Case to "Mainstream" Security 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (U) On March 30, to conclude day one of the symposium, 
Ambassador Schulte  hosted Ambassadors or DCMs from Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Romania, and Russia at dinner 
with NNSA's Baker, Andrew Bieniawski and Dave Huizenga, IAEA DDG 
Waller, and the Office of Nuclear Security's Anita Nilsson and Tim 
Andrews, plus UNVIE notetakers.  Ambassador Schulte opened with a 
few words on the IAEA 2010-2011 budget proposals, specifically the 
increase in regular budget support for the Office of Nuclear 
Security.  He acknowledged the impact of the global financial crisis 
that had occasioned the recent G-20 summit, but asked those around 
the table to imagine the global economic impact of terrorists 
detonating an improvised nuclear or radiological device.  Against 
that backdrop he emphasized the importance of mainstreaming nuclear 
security within the IAEA and how the 2010-2011 budget starts the 
process.  He then asked DDG Waller to comment further. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Waller noted that the Secretariat's 2010-2011 proposals 
are not just budgets, which refer only to price tags, but they 
reflect the program activities that the Secretariat believes Member 
States expect to be carried out.  Waller acknowledged a delicate 
political balance must be maintained among IAEA programs.  He said 
the nominal budget increase of about 20 percent aimed at (a) meeting 
statutory requirements on the Agency that have grown with the 
expanded use of nuclear energy in all forms around the globe and (b) 
correcting shortfalls in investment that resulted from years of 
"unrealistic" zero real growth treatment.  Getting a regular budget 
increase for nuclear security was also crucial, Waller said, as the 
program's activities related to the gravest threat we commonly face. 
 He argued the ONS was in an untenable position; relying on 
uncertain and irregular extra-budgetary funding resulted in 
cherry-picking for projects and, at times, too much funding for some 
and zero funding for others.  Waller pointed out that the current 
2010-2011 budget proposals would leave nuclear security reliant for 
66 percent of its resources from extra budgetary funding in 2010 and 
50 percent in 2011.  This is in contrast to the 95 percent extra 
budgetary portion of the budget in 2008.  Waller said the budget is 
the Agency's Secretariat giving its best advice on where money 
should be spent.  As a citizen and a tax payer, he said, he fully 
supports zero growth in other international organizations; however, 
no other international organization has regulations to implement or 
mandates to push forward like nuclear safeguards.  In his view, it 
is not possible to implement these activities responsibly with zero 
growth. 
 
¶14. (SBU) NNSA's Ken Baker echoed that we need to all together work 
to address the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism.  He 
emphasized the need for multilateral support and adequate support to 
the IAEA.  He also mentioned that it is difficult for the Agency to 
plan for the long term utilizing only voluntary contributions and 
 
that the Agency needs to focus on such an important issue as nuclear 
security and be able to sustain momentum over the long term. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Waller pointed out that the 2008 regular budget for 
nuclear security was only 1.1 million Euros; very little can be done 
in this important area with this regular budget.  Ambassador Schulte 
argued the need for nuclear security to be a core function and 
showed two charts that give perspective to the relative increase for 
nuclear security as compared to technical cooperation.  Bieniawski 
also said that it is important to put stability into the Agency's 
process of nuclear security. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Romanian Ambassador Feruta commented there were many valid 
arguments that nuclear security programmatic activities should be a 
core part of the regular budget.  He noted that nuclear programs are 
expanding due to the current nuclear energy renaissance, and any 
flaws or accidents could mean a disaster for all nuclear activities. 
 All countries need to match commitments made for nuclear energy 
development.  This is an activity where time is of the essence even 
though there is the financial crisis.  Romania agreed that this is 
an investment worth making and his Mission would advocate this view 
to Bucharest. 
 
¶17. (SBU) French DCM Gross said France shares similar objectives in 
nonproliferation and thanks the U.S for stepping forward with $10 
million for the Global Partnership.  France also wanted to thank 
Russia for all the work on upgrading their facilities.  However, it 
is clear in France's view that if $20 million was put into the 
Agency that they would not have the where-with-all to use the money 
effectively, and having Russia was essential in this process. 
France argued that the Agency must be able to absorb the proposed 
increase in funding in operations, and Paris did not think this is 
possible.  Gross noted the Agency had $120 million of Technical 
Cooperation Fund (TCF) resources invested in government bonds that 
in France's view could be borrowed against if there is a shortfall 
elsewhere.  (Comment: France underestimates the political resistance 
this would face from G-77.)  Waller countered that the Secretariat 
had no standing authority to borrow and that a specific Board 
decision would be required; borrowing from the TCF reserves was 
likely to be politically challenging, he observed. 
 
¶18. (SBU) German Ambassador Luedeking praised Anita Nilsson and her 
work in nuclear security and sustainability.  However, Germany has 
an issue with the 2010-2011 budget increase overall and with the 
optics of a 600 percent increase for nuclear security.  It is 
virtually impossible to agree with an increase of this magnitude, he 
said.  Germany favored that funds be sought elsewhere, for example 
as proposed by France (borrow against TCF money).  Germany agrees 
that nuclear security should be a core function and that 5 percent 
of the regular budget is not right, however, the program had to be 
increased  within an overall zero growth policy.  Anita Nilsson then 
mentioned that her office is currently in the red and there is no 
additional funding.  There are activities that are being cancelled 
due to the shortfall. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Japanese DCM Nakane stated that there are still 
contributions that have not been used for countries like Kazakhstan 
and should be considered as additional funding.  Japan also noted 
that 70 percent of the budget is spent on personnel and not 
implementing activities, and they understand that a major part of 
the regular budget increase in nuclear security will be used for 
personnel.  Japan also felt as though it was important to encourage 
the G-77 to support the increase; however all should realize that 
the increase is drastic.  Ultimately, Japan shared the opinion that 
nuclear security is an important activity for the Agency and they 
would think about the best way to achieve the goal of increasing the 
nuclear security budget. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte then asked the group to share their 
thoughts on how to get the G-77 to agree with the nuclear security 
increase, particularly since a majority of the Office of Nuclear 
Security missions benefit G-77 countries.  Germany responded that it 
is difficult because the feelings are so deep along ideological 
lines of what the IAEA should be focused on, i.e., the G-77 feel 
that TC is "theirs" and propagate the view that nuclear security is 
a preoccupation of the industrialized countries.  Nilsson then 
pointed out the 75 percent of the 22.9 million Euros spent in 2008 
went to low-income countries (including Central Asia and Eastern 
Europe).  Russian Ambassador Zmeyevskiy mentioned that the 
consequences of not implementing nuclear security have never really 
been realized.  In Russia's view, member countries do not feel as 
though there is a real threat; there is a need to make countries 
interested in getting assistance, but it may take years to persuade 
 
them.  It is also necessary for the Ministries of Finance to 
convince their countries it is important by funding nuclear security 
activities. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Canadian DCM Wood said that progress has been made in the 
area of nuclear security and we have been successful.  Canada 
supported the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) becoming part of the 
regular budget from the very beginning and that extra budgetary 
funds are used to focus on higher and more immediate threats. 
However, Canada expressed it is not realistic to try to fix all the 
problems in one biennium budget; it may take several biennia to fix 
the problem.  Also, it is not helpful to discuss the issue of 
nuclear security being balanced with other parts of the Agency; it 
should be thought of as a more holistic, better integrated Agency if 
nuclear security is a core mission.  In addition, Canada feels it 
does not get a full accounting from the Agency Secretariat and 
pointed out that the Safeguards budget was under-spent by 5 percent 
in 2008. That said, Canada does agree that nuclear security should 
be a core part of the Agency. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Netherlands DCM Coppoolse noted that The Hague had 
supported nuclear security becoming a part of the regular budget 
four years ago.  She recalled specifically that her own first 
intervention in an IAEA Board meeting on instruction had addressed 
three items: safeguards noncompliance on the part of Iran, promotion 
of women in the Agency, and getting the NSF in the regular budget. 
On convincing the G-77, Netherlands feels that going through the 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) is the best 
route.  The Netherlands does have a concern with the overall budget 
increase of 23 percent and thinks there needs to be a more creative 
way to increase the budget, which should be discussed in the EU and 
Geneva Group. 
 
¶23. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte then suggested doing a GICNT event in 
the developed world.  Canada mentioned that there is also a question 
of the future of the GICNT, Global Threat Reduction Initiative 
(GTRI), and Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP).  Baker said 
that GTRI's budget has gone to up significantly and that the 
nonproliferation program in the National Nuclear Security 
Administration could rise to $3 billion in U.S. FY-2010.  Bieniawski 
also pointed out that with many of these programs are being 
implemented in G-77 countries. 
 
¶24. (SBU) Waller suggested that it would be good to get testimonials 
from countries on what is being done in the area of nuclear 
security.  He also pointed out that regularizing the budget helps 
make Cost Free Experts (CFE) regular staff and thereby increases the 
degree of confidentiality and helps retain expertise within the 
organization.  Waller then said it is not possible to enhance the 
Agency within the existing budget.  He has been at the Agency for 
sixteen years and it cannot be done this way and it is not a viable 
option. 
 
¶25. (SBU) Germany said it seems that nuclear security is being held 
hostage by the overall budget and an increase in one area creates a 
larger appetite in other areas as well and that is the ultimate 
problem.  Nilsson thanked everyone warmly for their input on the 
future of nuclear security at the Agency.  She pointed out that ONS 
wants to continue with voluntary contributions as well and wants to 
focus regular budget funding on long term activities such as 
publishing guidance documents.  When all the funding is directed 
towards hard security (physical protection upgrades), soft security 
items cannot be funded (recommendation and guidance documents).  She 
pointed out that the practical realities of the G-77 must be 
separated out from the budget discussions.  It is the case that from 
a programmatic level the G-77 countries do want the support of ONS, 
however, due to the funding situation, it cannot happen fast 
enough. 
 
¶27. (SBU) Ambassador closed the discussion, adding that 
sustainability is also an important factor in nuclear security and 
that the culture of security should be just as important as the 
safety culture.  He agreed that it would be impossible for the 
Agency to administer all these programs alone; however, there are 
key niches within the Agency and many countries want to only deal 
with the UN or IAEA flag.  He agreed we need to get the G-77 
countries discussing the benefits of nuclear security through the 
Missions in Vienna and also begin using the GICNT to promote nuclear 
security. 
 
-------------------------------- 
DDG Sokolov on Nuclear Power Promotion 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
¶28. (SBU) IAEA DDG for Nuclear Energy Yury Sokolov noted the 
long-standing good working relationship that his office has with 
NNSA.  He stated that since (former UNVIE Energy Attach) Anne Starz 
took a regular IAEA staff position, he hoped the U.S. would provide 
another CFE to his office to work on that portfolio. 
 
¶29. (SBU) In response to Baker's query on the application of Project 
Support Costs (PSC) and its impact to Sokolov's department, Sokolov 
said that there is no simple answer.  He noted that even "in house" 
there is not a unified view and that the case-by-case application of 
PSC to extrabudgetary projects actually started years ago.  He said 
he understood from a management and administrative point of view why 
cost recovery through OSC was necessary. 
 
¶30. (SBU) Sokolov then turned the discussion to the Global Nuclear 
Energy Partnership (GNEP) and stressed his personal belief that this 
is a very positive initiative.  There is no other forum currently 
available for collecting ideas at the ministerial level annually. 
He feels this forum should not be used to report on small activities 
but to bring principal activities to broad notice.  Sokolov 
mentioned that the Agency supports 53 countries without nuclear 
power, whereas GNEP is only supporting 10-15; he stated that on one 
hand GNEP is a good forum but on the other had it has very small 
outreach.  Sokolov noted that it is important that countries 
interested in nuclear power need to start with an effective program, 
not immediately be introduced to the "Three S Concept" ( Safety, 
Security, Safeguards).  He feels this concept should be integrated 
into the program and not pulled out as a separate concept. 
 
¶31. (SBU) Hans Forstrom on Sokolov's staff then mentioned the 
research reactor at the Vinca Institute in Serbia, noting that the 
European Commission recently committed an additional $5 million for 
the nuclear fuel to be returned to Russia. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Joint IAEA Office Nuclear Security (ONS)and NNSA Activities 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶32. (SBU) Anita Nilsson began by stating that the first drafting 
meeting for the new 2010 Nuclear Security Plan would be held in 
April 2009, with a focus on core group activities that can be used 
by all countries, transport security of nuclear and radiological 
material, and the categorization of radioactivity. 
 
¶33. (SBU) Nilsson asserted that the PSC issue is currently 
"crippling" her operations, as her funding was being held up.  She 
said a solution to the 7 percent PSC must come soon or she will have 
to begin cancelling activities.  State ISN/MNSA foreign affairs 
officer Cockerham emphasized that the PSC needs to be transparent, 
and an explanation should be given as to why the funds need to go to 
management and not program implementation.  Nilsson commented that 
an explanation of the PSC was already developed and the DG has 
decided the path forward. Regarding additional funds to ONS, Nilsson 
noted she would like to have more flexibility in how funding is used 
and examine having an account that can be spent down over a period 
of time.  In addition, she hopes that if the 2010-2011 IAEA budgets 
are adopted, she will have more regular budget funding allocated to 
ONS and be able to do more long-term planning and hire more regular 
staff (citing the importance of maintaining the necessary 
geographical balance). 
 
¶34. (SBU) Baker inquired as to Nilsson's estimated timing for 
completion of the revision to IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4.  Nilsson 
seemed to imply that her office required a larger role in this 
revision effort, noting how much had been done via the "Core Group." 
 She noted that there were some "conceptual" issues to be resolved, 
specifically: 1) the appropriate level of detail in the guidance and 
2) the interface between radiological-related documents (e.g., the 
issue of irradiation, which is still being discussed.) 
 
¶35. (SBU) Nilsson also noted her satisfaction with recent NNSA-ONS 
cooperative activities, specifically a security sustainability pilot 
project with GTRI.  She also noted that she would like to add 
modules on Trigger List and dual-use commodity ("equipment") 
recognition to ONS's counter-illicit smuggling/nuclear security 
courses, and requested NNSA assistance in that area.  The NNSA team 
pledged to take that back to appropriate staff within the Office of 
Nonproliferation and International Security for response. 
 
------------------------- 
Dr. Jamal Sharaf Director General, 
Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
 
------------------------- 
 
¶36. (SBU) Baker noted Jordan's strong regional leadership on 
nonproliferation, and Jordan likewise praised the cooperative 
relationship.  Jordan especially noted the successful partnership 
with the Second Line of Defense program, stating that Jordan hopes 
to cover additional 2-4 border crossings (perhaps 2 on the Syrian 
border and 2 on the Saudi border).  Jordon also mentioned that 
Jordan is looking at constructing a "mini" HAMMER facility within 
the region, possibly as an elaboration of the Cooperative Monitoring 
Center in Amman, and similar to the HAMMER facility at the 
Department of Energy's Hanford Site.  Jordanian officials requested 
NNSA support on this issue. He noted that Jordan feels establishing 
such a facility in the region is important due to the difficulty of 
getting U.S. visas for stateside training; with a Jordanian 
facility, he stressed, key GCC participants from Lebanon, Egypt, and 
elsewhere would not require visas.  Jordan said they also talked to 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) about establishing a 
facility in the region, and noted that they would like to have 
access to use NARAC facilities for environmental monitoring 
activities.  Baker noted the NRC and NA-40 (Adm. Krol) as the 
appropriate POCs for these issues and said that he would take this 
back to Washington. 
 
---------------------- 
Briefing with Missions 
---------------------- 
 
¶37. (U) A NNSA briefing was given by Baker, Bieniawski and Huizenga 
to several Missions (Afghanistan, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, 
Malaysia, Morocco, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay, 
Vietnam, Pakistan, Ecuador, Sri Lanka, Algeria, Australia, Saudi 
Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, 
UK, Mexico, Turkey) on NNSA's Global Threat Reduction Initiative and 
Second Line of Defense activities.  Participant response was 
positive, with one foreign representative suggesting that there is 
only one global threat, and that is "terrorism."  The group was 
impressed with the various activities NNSA has underway throughout 
the world and praised U.S. efforts overall in this area. 
 
--------------------------------- 
World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS) cooperation with NNSA 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶38. (SBU) Roger Howsley, Executive Director thanked NNSA for its 
support of WINS and updated on efforts to build WINS support, 
stating that WINS is recruiting staff and currently looking at 2 or 
3 permanent positions, then other positions in the coming months. In 
addition, WINS is working to indentify/recruit Board 
Members--particularly in Russia, France, Japan and Argentina. 
Howsley expects that the Board would physically meet once a year, 
and would hold several other meetings via telephone. 
 
-------- 
Comment 
-------- 
 
¶39. (SBU) The IAEA's nuclear security efforts are undertaken in the 
framework of four-year Nuclear Security Plans approved by the IAEA's 
Board of Governors.  The next plan, covering 2010 -2013, is in 
preparation and it is important that the U.S. press the IAEA to 
adopt a systematic approach that identifies core-long-term 
activities, emphasizing the sustainability of nuclear and 
radiological security improvements.  Furthering this goal is the 
incorporation of IAEA security activities into the regular budget; 
this could reduce exposure of nuclear security activities to the 
uncertainty of voluntary contributions and most importantly brings 
the nuclear security activities of the IAEA into the Agency's 
mainstream. 
 
SCHULTE