VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0222/01 1311520
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111520Z MAY 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9451
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1650
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
AFGHA/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0094

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000222 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
SRAP for Paul Jones 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: SNAR AF PK UN PTER UK
 
SUBJECT: UNODC and AFPAK STRATEGIES Loom Large for Vienna Friends of 
Afghanistan 
 
REF: A: 08 UNVIE VIENNA 170 
 B: KABUL 1064 
 C: UNVIE VIENNA 195 
 D: UNVIE VIENNA 152 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  In a meeting on April 28 chaired by the UK 
Ambassador, Vienna's Friends of Afghanistan heard a presentation by 
the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on its 2009-2011 
Afghanistan counter-narcotics strategy.  UNODC Executive Director 
Antonio Costa informed delegations he would travel to Afghanistan on 
the week of May 4 on a fact-finding mission, specifically with 
regard to narcotic issues on the Afghanistan-Iran-Pakistan border 
("triangle border").  He expressed his hope that UNODC would be 
briefed on ISAF military operations executed against heroin labs, 
convoys and markets.  Other UNODC officials discussed new 
developments in their ongoing efforts to promote the rule of law and 
combat the opium poppy/heroin problem, with a specific focus on its 
Triangular Initiative.  Ambassador elaborated on the new U.S. AFPAK 
strategy, for which delegations expressed their support.  (Note: 
Pakistan was not invited to join the Friends group owing to 
Afghanistan's characterizing it as "premature". (Ref A) End Note.) 
Reflecting sensitivity over suggestions that Indian companies had 
become a major source of heroin precursors, the Indian Ambassador 
persistently and aggressively questioned UNODC officials on the 
origin of precursor chemicals to Afghanistan, and when UNODC would 
initiate a precursor monitoring project to determine the origins of 
such chemicals.  Mission was encouraged by the unqualified support 
for the AFPAK strategy, and by UNODC's increasing emphasis on its 
long-standing regional approach for combating Afghan drugs.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------- 
UNODC's 2009-2011 Afghanistan 
Strategy and Budget Shortfall 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) UNODC's Kabul office recently rolled out its draft 
Afghanistan Strategy Paper 2009-2011 to major donors in Kabul (Ref 
B).  Both Costa and Bernard Frahi, Deputy Director of UNODC's 
Division of Operations described the increasing regional dimension 
of UNODC's efforts in Afghanistan, trying to identify within its 
Rainbow Strategy where UNODC could add value and implement programs. 
 Frahi highlighted UNODC's efforts to strengthen Afghanistan's 
western border with 25 new posts, and to supply additional equipment 
and mentoring programs to the Afghan police and other law 
enforcement officials, including the new police garrison in Nimroz 
charged with monitoring the triangle border.  Frahi also noted 
UNODC's provision of basic training in office management and 
alternative development programs for five Ministry of Counter 
Narcotics (MCN) offices being established in the provinces, as well 
as law libraries for six new provincial Justice Support Centers. 
Finally, Frahi detailed the creation of a High Office of Oversight 
in Kabul to help in the fight against corruption, and noted UNODC 
assistance to the Afghan Bar Association in this regard.  Frahi 
stressed that UNODC had a total Afghanistan budget of USD72 million 
for 2008, and delivered USD20 million of services with a 94pct 
implementation rate. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Frahi expressed concern about the projected budgetary 
shortfall for UNODC's 2009-2011 Afghanistan strategy.  While the 
USD6 million budgeted for research and analysis will be fully 
funded, UNODC expects a more than 50pct shortfall for UNODC's other 
programs in Afghanistan: in health and human development, and 
governance, security and rule of law.  He promised to disseminate a 
list of such unfunded and under-funded projects.  [Note: Frahi and 
Costa's power point presentations have been forwarded to INL/PC. 
End note.] 
 
--------------------------------- 
Indian Ambassador Makes His Point 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Interrupting Costa and Frahi, the Indian Ambassador 
pointedly asked why UNODC had yet to initiate a project aimed at 
better understanding the origins of the precursor chemicals 
currently crossing Afghanistan's borders.  Costa and his staff 
attempted to explain the magnitude and complexity of the precursor 
problem, and the difficulty of creating any report or monitoring 
mechanism.  However, the Indian Ambassador insisted on UNODC 
explaining "the obvious source of the precursors."  Despite Costa's 
plea not to make this a "bilateral issue," the Indian Ambassador 
 
continued his aggressive line of questioning. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Chair UK Ambassador asked the meeting to move on to the 
next agenda item, with the understanding that the precursor 
chemicals issue would need to be further addressed.  Costa pointed 
to the Mexican decision to outlaw the importation of potassium 
pomagranate (a precursor for cocaine) as an example of how to start 
the fight against acetic anhydride (a precursor for heroin).  The 
Afghan Ambassador pointed out that last fall Afghanistan formally 
declared that the country had no legitimate use for acetic 
anhydride, thereby making any import illegal.  Costa, apparently 
surprised by this information, stressed the need to implement this 
law. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Afghan Ambassador complimented the UNODC for its 
Triangular Initiative, but lamented that its focus so far is only 
drug trafficking. In his words, "Our neighbors are consumers as 
well, and wherever these drugs go, so goes corruption.  The time has 
come to deal with our neighbors on increasing cooperation on 
consumption, corruption and precursors."  Costa demurred, but stated 
that the Triangular Initiative could in the future lead to other 
illegal "flows" like arms, humans and money. 
 
-------------------------- 
UK: Helmand Plan May Work, 
CARD Fully Funded 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Mark James, Head of UK's Counter Narcotics Strategy Team 
in the Afghanistan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, updated the Group on UK's current 
counternarcotics plan in Helmand Province and its CARD Program. 
While the results of the Helmand plan will not emerge until next 
growing season, James stated that initial indications show success 
in depressing opium cultivation, and a very positive effect on 
Afghan perceptions of the provincial government, which is 
increasingly viewed by the people as responsive to and engaged in 
their concerns.  James also admitted that while eradication is a 
controversial subject, it is one component of Afghanistan's national 
strategy.  He stressed that eradication should be manual, 
ground-based, conducted early in the growing season, and targeted to 
those areas where alternative development is possible (such as the 
food zones in Helmand).  Finally, James briefed the Friends on CARD, 
which he described as essentially a rural development program 
targeted at maintaining a province's poppy-free status.  James 
stated that it is currently fully funded, at least for the first 12 
months of its implementation. 
 
---------------------------- 
Costa Asks for ISAF Briefing 
on Military Operations 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Costa expressed support for the ISAF-NATO decision to 
conduct counter-narcotics military operations against the opium 
market (Ref C) He named Operations Diesel, Buenos Aires, Tucker and 
Henry as those of which he had knowledge from press reports. 
However, he reiterated his wish to be de-briefed on current and 
future operations, so that UNODC could factor these operations into 
its ongoing analysis of poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking 
(Ref C). 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Costa also expressed satisfaction that the long-standing 
and thorny issue of the ATTA trade/transportation agreement would be 
addressed during upcoming Washington visits by the presidents of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.  He said it is now time to "neuter the 
problem" and update the agreement. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Responding to a question from the German Ambassador about 
the effectiveness of UNAMA coordinating activities, Costa retold the 
story of Kai Eide  pointing out that there are many "c's" of concern 
-- including "coordination"-- and blaming member states for the lack 
coordination .  The Afghan Ambassador agreed, stating that such 
coordination has been lacking since day 1.  He described a "parallel 
mechanism" that is working alongside, but not in concert with, the 
Karzai government.  James defended the coordination in Kabul, but 
acknowledged that it is informal in nature and needs to be more 
strategic. 
 
------------------------------- 
AFPAK Strategy Receives Support 
------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Drawing on Department non-papers, Ambassador elaborated 
on the goals and methods of the new AFPAK strategy, as well as the 
 
President's support for the Kerry/Lugar legislation.  The 
Afghanistan Ambassador expressed his government's full support for 
the strategy, calling it "even better than we could have hoped."  He 
referred to a Charlie Rose interview of Special Representative 
Richard Holbrooke during which Ambassador Holbrooke asserted that 
even with the best possible government and border control in 
Afghanistan, akistan's western tribal areas would still be a 
undamental problem.  Germany, Canada, UK, the Euroean Commission 
and Turkey expressed similar suppot.  The Turkish Ambassador 
reminded the Friends hat a regional approach to deal with the 
problemthe Ankara Process-already exists.  The German Ambssador 
complimented the work of UNODC's Terroris Prevention Branch in 
Pakistan, and stated his goernment was looking to continuing 
funding of tha project.  Japanese DCM touted the Japan's recent 
USD3 million contribution to UNODC's Afghanistan rojects, and 
stated it was considering another UD2 million to Iran border 
projects.  (Note:  The SD3 million was Japan's first-ever donation 
for NODC's Afghanistan activities.  At Japan's request UNODC is 
also preparing a country paper on Pakitan. (Ref D). End Note.) 
European Commission Ambssador agreed that Pakistan demanded 
"upgraded atention."  Canada, Germany and EC all said they wer 
looking to increase and/or widen their assistane in the region. 
 
-------- 
Comment 
-------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The unqualified support for our AFPAKstrategy was 
encouraging, especially in light of ssertions by Canada, Germany 
and EC that they ar looking to increase and/or widen their 
assistane in the region taking advantage of UNODC's unique 
capabilities to operate cross-border between Pakstan, Afghanistan 
and Iran.  Furthermore, James' entative assessment of the gains 
made in Helmandspeak to the positive impact comprehensive 
countr-narcotic strategies can have on public confidenc in 
government.  Finally, UNODC's attempt to vie the challenges in 
Afghanistan through an expanding regional lens-including Operation 
TARCET against precursor chemicals and the Triangular Initiative to 
promote counternarcotics cooperation among Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
and Iran, reinforces the USG position that the issues of heroin, 
governance, security and terrorism are inextricably interlinked and 
must be tackled in a comprehensive manner. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) On the same day as the meeting, Embassy Kabul dispatched 
a cable on "Implementing a Comprehensive Counter-Narcotics Strategy" 
(Ref B) END COMMENT 
 
PYATT