VZCZCXRO7626
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1133/01 1390707
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 190707Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3049
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 6385
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 4055
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 7857
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 1674
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 4586
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9327
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 5345
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5112

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 001133 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 05/19/09 
 
INDEX: 
(1) Document - DPJ in turmoil: Swinging between elation and 
desperation based on public opinion; LDP wary of drop in support 
ratings for Aso cabinet (Nikkei) 
 
(2) DPJ should openly discuss future options for security-treaty 
policy, Article 9 (Yomiuri) 
 
(3) Healing the scars of war: On the Japanese government's apology 
to American POWs (Mainichi) 
 
(4) Editorial: Concern about possible dual power structure in 
Hatoyama-led DPJ (Nikkei) 
 
(5) Editorial: "New DPJ Leadership: A passable restart, but..." 
(Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
(6) Editorial: Rejection of Guam International Agreement weighs 
heavily on DPJ (Nikkei) 
 
(7) Editorial: "Futenma Relocation: Revise plans for acceptance by 
local community" (Mainichi) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Document - DPJ in turmoil: Swinging between elation and 
desperation based on public opinion; LDP wary of drop in support 
ratings for Aso cabinet 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
May 19, 2009 
 
"We have finally made it this far." Having lunch with his closest 
aides, including Hirofumi Hirano and Yorihisa Matsuno, at a Chinese 
restaurant near the Diet on May 18, Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
President Yukio Hatoyama, who selected the new party leadership on 
the previous day," responded to them with a smile, "You all helped 
me." 
 
"I want to take part in party head talks" 
 
The support rating for the DPJ in a poll carried out jointly by 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun and TV Tokyo rose by 10 points. Referring to 
the next Lower House election, Hatoyama on an evening TV Tokyo 
program presented figures that were more bullish than those the 
party aimed at when Ichiro Ozawa was president: "We must secure at 
least 160 to 170 seats out of 300 single-seat constituencies." He 
said with great eagerness, "I want to take part in party head talks 
proactively." 
 
Katsuya Okada, who was appointed to serve as secretary general, on 
the afternoon of the same day took over Hatoyama's duties as 
secretary general at the party headquarters. He told reporters, "I 
have joined the leadership after a hiatus of four years." Visiting 
Okada's office in the Diet building, Kozo Watanabe encouraged him, 
saying, "The public supports you. Do it with your head held high." 
 
Other opposition parties, which had established a friendly 
relationship with Ozawa, are anxious. Secretary General of the 
People's New Party (PNP) called Okada early in the morning and 
proposed, "Let's hold a meeting of the three secretaries general 
(including the Social Democratic Party's secretary general) as soon 
 
TOKYO 00001133  002 OF 010 
 
 
as possible." Okada responded, "I am not as stubborn as people say. 
I am rather flexible." 
 
Though Hatoyama and Okada are zeroing in on Prime Minister Taro Aso 
in confronting the ruling parties, party members' concerns are fixed 
on Hatoyama's relationship with Ozawa, who is virtually in charge of 
leading the party's Lower House election campaign. Asked by 
reporters whether Hatoyama was unable to grasp the outcome of a 
survey of the situation concerning the upcoming election, Okada 
winced, noting, "I have not heard about the details. However, it is 
impossible that the secretary general does not know of such an 
outcome." 
 
Prime Minister Aso spouted at a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
executive meeting on the evening of the 18th: "Whoever becomes the 
president of the DPJ, the point is whether the person has 
capabilities to run the government. The LDP should stake out 
differences with the DPJ, by speaking out of its own accord. We 
cannot possibly evade the consumption tax hike issue for as long as 
four years." 
 
The outcome of the opinion poll exposed the fragility of public 
support for Aso. The support rating for his cabinet, which had been 
on the recovery track, dropped to 30 PERCENT . Aso took a beating in 
the poll, which asked respondents who they considered to be most 
appropriate as prime minister after the Lower House election. 
 
Even so, Internal Affairs Minister Kunio Hatoyama, the prime 
minister's close friend, said, "That rating is probably a 
celebratory favor (given by poll respondents). It was good that all 
media organizations covered his election, and yet the support rating 
for him was as low as that." LDP Election Committee Vice Chairman 
Yoshihide Suga told reporters in Yokohama: "This support rating is 
temporary. Nothing has changed." The unanimous view of lawmakers 
close to the prime minister is that the current popularity of the 
DPJ will not last long. 
 
However, these responses given by the prime minister's side are not 
necessary in accord with responses of all the ruling party members. 
Former prime minister Yasuo Fukuda on the afternoon of the 18th 
cautioned Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura who visited him at 
his office in the Lower House Members' Office Building: "The trend 
could change again. You should not drop your guard. Brace 
yourself." 
 
Aso returning to danger zone 
 
A senior LDP official said, "There will never be a movement to oust 
Aso." However, public support ratings for his cabinet have begun 
taking a downward turn. Prime Minister Aso is now about to return to 
the danger zone in maintaining his administration. A situation in 
which Prime Minister Aso, who has not quite turned around the harsh 
situation facing his cabinet, and President Hatoyama jostle each 
other about is about to begin. 
 
(2) DPJ should openly discuss future options for security-treaty 
policy, Article 9 
 
YOMIURI (Page 13) (Full) 
May 19, 2009 
 
By Masayuki Yamauchi, professor at the University of Tokyo 
 
TOKYO 00001133  003 OF 010 
 
 
 
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has advocated a review of the 
Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), a key part in the 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, even while expressing a willingness to 
keep the Japan-U.S. alliance as the basis for Japan's national 
security. Remembering former president Ichiro Ozawa's remark that 
the U.S. Navy 7th Fleet would be sufficient (for Japan's national 
security)," many people wonder if the DPJ is willing to radically 
review the ideology and operation of the U.S-Japan Security Treaty. 
I would expect the new Hatoyama-Okada leadership to explain this 
point in detail. 
 
The DPJ is also aiming to transfer U.S. Marines Corps bases in 
Okinawa to areas outside of Okinawa. If this idea is translated into 
action, the burden on the local communities now hosting the bases 
would be reduced. In this sense, this idea is appropriate, but I 
wonder whether the DPJ, in scrambling to grab political power, will 
be able to give a proper explanation to the residents of the 
prefectures that would be involved in the new plan. 
 
In the current Diet session, the DPJ has opposed the government's 
antipiracy bill, which governs the dispatch of Maritime Self-Defense 
Force (MSDF) vessels (to waters off Somalia). The party is instead 
calling for sending destroyers possessed by the Japan Coast Guard 
(JCG). I do not think it is proper to prepare legislation in each 
case the SDF is dispatched overseas. Even so, this cannot be used as 
the reason for imposing a heavier burden on the JCG, which engages 
in coastal patrolling. While keeping constitutional reform in mind, 
the DPJ should consider how to establish a new international peace 
order for the 21st century and future options for contributions by 
the SDF. 
 
If the DPJ is aiming at a change in government, the party must 
change its ambiguous stance about the right to collective 
self-defense and constitutional revision. 
 
In an open debate conducted at the Japan Press Club on May 15, new 
DPJ President Hatoyama said: "Mr. Ozawa takes the view that the UN 
is the ultimate (decisions at the UN take top priority), but I take 
a UN-centered policy, at most." Ozawa asserted that under a 
resolution of the UN Security Council, SDF troops should be allowed 
to use armed force, regardless of the relevant stipulation in 
Article 9 of the Constitution. Hatoyama said: "I do not intend to 
follow (Ozawa's) policy that Japan should do everything that the UN 
has decided." He showed a view different from Ozawa's. Many people 
probably are perplexed at this wide perception gap between the 
incoming and outgoing presidents over matters related to the 
Constitution. 
 
Hatoyama puts forth "a diplomacy of fellowship" as his political 
principle. I feel rather awkward about this slogan, because it gives 
an impression that issues pending between two countries with 
different national interests and governance ideologies can be 
settled at the level of romanticism. I do not think it is proper for 
a person in a responsible person to set forth such a principle. 
Hatoyama is interested in the Northern Territories issue under the 
influence of his grandfather Ichiro Hatoyama, a former prime 
minister who signed the Japan-Soviet Union joint declaration, but 
Russia, which has faith in the ideology of power, could cleverly use 
the principle of "fellowship" against Japan, 
 
If the DPJ gives priority to the goal of taking over political 
 
TOKYO 00001133  004 OF 010 
 
 
power, the party may find it difficult to step into discussing 
collective self-defense and constitutional revision. But a regime 
change will be brought about under the initiative of the largest 
party in the opposition camp. Although some say that foreign and 
security policies are not vote-getting, the next House of 
Representatives election is expected to be different in nature from 
the past elections. If the DPJ seeks the voters' judgment on which 
political parties (the LDP or the DPJ) they choose as the party in 
power, the main opposition party should openly discuss future 
options for the nation, such as what to do about the Japan-U.S. 
security arrangements and the use of the right to collective 
self-defense. Hatoyama has said that he outgrew his old self (under 
President Ozawa). We expect him to come up with practical diplomatic 
policies. The people also hope that the DPJ will detail its policies 
its policy manifesto for the next Lower House election. 
 
(3) Healing the scars of war: On the Japanese government's apology 
to American POWs 
 
MAINICHI (Page 4) (Full) 
Evening, May 18, 2009 
 
Kazuhiko Togo, visiting professor at Kyoto Sangyo University, former 
ambassador to the Netherlands 
 
One of the deep scars between Japan and the United States relating 
to the memories of the war is about to be healed. 
 
I think this is one of the achievements of the Taro Aso cabinet that 
will go down in history. I would like to pay my sincere respect to 
the work done by my former colleagues at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. It is unfortunate though that such a momentous event is 
taking place practically unnoticed by the Japanese people. 
 
The question of mistreatment of soldiers and officers of the allied 
forces during the Pacific War was dealt with through the trial of 
Class B and C war criminals and payment of compensation to the 
countries of the prisoners-of-war under Article 16 of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty. However, since the 1990s, former POWs whose 
trauma had not been healed have filed cases at Japanese courts 
seeking redress. The Japanese government began a project to promote 
reconciliation by inviting the former POWs and their families to 
Japan to meet Japanese individuals involved with the events during 
the war by launching the "Peace, Friendship, and Exchange 
Initiative" in 1995. By 2004, 784 former POWs were invited to Japan 
from Britain, 425 from the Netherlands, and 56 from Australia. 
Activities under the initiative were concluded in 2004, but 
reconciliation projects have continued through funding by the 
concerned ministries. 
 
However, American POWs have been excluded from the initiative. As 
illustrated by accounts such as the Death March of Bataan (the 
Philippines), the treatment of American POWs was in no way any 
better than that of the Europeans. Then, why were they not part of 
the initiative? If this was not the result of bureaucratic apathy, 
then there could be only one reason. 
 
There seemed to be popular sentiment about whether there was any 
need for further reconciliation with the American soldiers who were 
prisoners-of-war, for they had killed many Japanese citizens with 
their atomic bombings, carpet bombings, and other operations. Such 
seemed to have been taken into consideration. However, cruelty by 
 
TOKYO 00001133  005 OF 010 
 
 
one side does not justify cruelty by the other side. The fact that 
there is such a sentiment among the Japanese is probably 
incomprehensible to almost all Americans. Such culturally-based 
distrust will shake the very foundation of the alliance. There is a 
need for somebody to have the courage to break off this negative 
linkage. 
 
Recently, a friend in the U.S. sent me a copy of the letter sent by 
Lester Tenney, president of the American Defenders of Bataan and 
Corregidor (ADBC) to President Barack Obama and Ambassador to the 
U.S. Ichiro Fujisaki. Tenney has worked patiently to convince the 
Japanese government to treat American POWs in the same manner as the 
British, the Dutch, and the Australians. He also contributed an 
essay to the April 15 Issue of the Japan Times detailing ADBC's 
recent activities. 
 
1) In November, 2008, Ambassador and Mrs Fujisaki were the first 
senior Japanese officials to meet him and listen seriously to his 
account of his bitter experience. 
 
2) Based on his request at this meeting, he received a letter in 
December from the Japanese government through the ambassador 
stating: "We express our sincere apologies for inflicting damage and 
pain on many people, including those who experienced the tragedy of 
Bataan and Corregidor." 
 
3) In February, 2009, a statement based on the cabinet decision that 
the apology applies to "all former POWs" was conveyed to Diet 
members. 
 
4) We, the American POWs, accept the apology that the Japanese 
government has come up with after its long search. 
 
The ADBC will be disbanded this month. Before the group is 
dissolved, Tenney expresses hope for the American POWs to be 
included in the "Peace, Friendship, and Exchange Initiative" or a 
similar framework. He says that if this is realized, he would like 
to invite Ambassador Fujisaki to the last meeting of ADBC and 
present this as the final embodiment of the reconciliation. I truly 
hope that this will materialize. 
 
In light of the above positive steps, have there been any changes in 
the moves on the American side with regard to the atomic bombings? 
 
In this regard, Mainichi Shimbun has reported several times that 
with former Kyodo News correspondent in Washington Fumio Matsuo 
taking the lead, an idea for the U.S. president to offer flowers in 
Hiroshima and for the Japanese prime minister to offer flowers at 
Pearl Harbor is being considered. 
 
Two years ago, this idea was discussed at a seminar on history 
issues at the University of California in Santa Barbara, where 
Matsuo was invited as a guest speaker. The reaction of the 
participants was that this was "premature." 
 
However, I had an opportunity to hold discussions with some of the 
participants at that time this past January, and the reaction of the 
American scholar who had been most negative about the plan had 
changed. He said: "This idea may move forward under Obama." 
 
History is moving in a positive direction, albeit slowly. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001133  006 OF 010 
 
 
(4) Editorial: Concern about possible dual power structure in 
Hatoyama-led DPJ 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
May 19, 2009 
 
The new leadership of the Democratic Party of Japan led by President 
Yukio Hatoyama will be formally launched today. Former President 
Ichiro Ozawa will become vice president in charge of election 
strategy. Katsuya Okada, Hatoyama's rival in the leadership 
election, will assume the post of secretary general. Although 
Hatoyama technically has formed a unified party arrangement, there 
is a possibility that the new leadership will have a dual power 
structure, under which Ozawa will continue to wield the real power 
in managing the party. 
 
Hatoyama must first eliminate the party's negative image created by 
the arrest and indictment of Ozawa's state-funded secretary for 
receiving illegal donations from Nishimatsu Construction Co. 
 
It is hard to say that Ozawa has fully fulfilled his accountability 
for how he used the money donated by Nishimatsu. The DPJ's response 
to this issue is being tested. In this respect, it is extremely hard 
to understand why Ozawa has been retained in a key post responsible 
for making strategy for the next House of Representatives election. 
Winning the upcoming election has become the uppermost task for the 
DPJ for the time being. 
 
Although a court will ultimately resolve the political donation 
case, the impression that cannot be erased is one of Hatoyama having 
ignored public opinion, which called on Ozawa to resign as DPJ 
leader to take responsibility for the scandal. Once the way 
Nishimatsu Construction made political donations is clarified in the 
trial that will start soon, the DPJ leadership will find itself 
under fire. 
 
According to a spot opinion poll conducted on the weekend (May 
16-17) by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun along with TV Tokyo, the support 
rate for the DPJ rose to 38 PERCENT , a 10 point jump over the level 
of a poll carried out in late April. The approval rate for the LDP, 
however, dropped three points to 33 PERCENT . The support rates for 
the LDP and DPJ are now close to the levels the two parties secured 
in early March when the scandal involving Nishimatsu Construction 
Co. was uncovered. In the popularity ranking of political parties 
for the proportional representation segment in the next general 
election, the DPJ topped the LDP, with the DPJ tallying 41 PERCENT 
and the LDP securing 28 PERCENT . 
 
However, it is too early to think that the DPJ has completely 
regained public confidence. The survey found that 47 PERCENT  of the 
public had expectations for Hatoyama, while 49 PERCENT  had no 
expectations of him. The poll was carried out before the leadership 
lineup was formed. To the question whether Ozawa should remain in a 
key post, 54 PERCENT  of the respondents opposed and 32 PERCENT 
supported the decision. 
 
The House of Councillors will launch deliberations on May 20 on the 
fiscal 2009 extra budget. The terms of the Lower House members will 
end in September. With an eye on the dissolution of the Lower House 
and snap election, the fierce maneuvering between the ruling and 
opposition camps will enter a final situation. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001133  007 OF 010 
 
 
In the DPJ presidential election, the candidates stressed such 
inward-looking assertions that all party members should play ball 
and the party should solidify itself like a rock. Taking advantage 
of such opportunities as a party-heads debate in the Diet, Hatoyama 
must take responsibility to clarify the DPJ's differences with the 
LDP. 
 
(5) Editorial: "New DPJ Leadership: A passable restart, but..." 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 5) (Full) 
May 19, 2009 
 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Yukio Hatoyama has 
appointed his leadership team with party unity as the keyword. While 
support from the public, which had abandoned the party for a while, 
has returned, there is also a feeling of hesitation in public 
opinion with regard to the birth of a "DPJ administration." Whether 
this hurdle can be overcome will be a litmus test for the new 
leadership. 
 
Hatoyama has appointed Katsuya Okada, who had distanced himself from 
Ichiro Ozawa and who ran against him in the presidential election, 
as secretary general, while Ozawa was named deputy president in 
charge of election strategy. Yoshihiko Noda, who supported Okada, 
was given the post of deputy secretary general, in consideration of 
the sentiments of the younger generation members who seek the 
complete elimination of the Ozawa color. 
 
Unity was given top priority since the sole goal is to achieve a 
change of administration. The appointments reflect the 
Hatoyama-style shift to a general election mode, with Okada, who 
enjoyed popular support as the next leader, being designated as the 
"face" of the election and Ozawa taking charge of the practical 
work. Even though there has been some criticism of Ozawa's 
appointment to a senior position, this was probably a realistic 
decision to count on "Ozawa the election expert," who is feared by 
the ruling parties. 
 
However, what will be the division of labor between Okada, who will 
be responsible for giving encouragement to the candidates and 
heading the election campaign, and Ozawa? While it is said that they 
have each marked out their territories, will there not be any 
conflict in the future? If signs of "Ozawa as the power behind the 
throne" -- which continues to be a subject of concern -- become 
stronger, this may quickly result in the voters "abandoning the 
DPJ." 
 
Hatoyama has a sizable lead over Prime Minister Taro Aso in various 
ad hoc opinion polls conducted by the media on who is more suitable 
to serve as prime minister. The DPJ also leads the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) in the voters' choice for the proportional 
representation ticket. This is good news for Hatoyama's DPJ. 
 
On the other hand, a poll by Kyodo News shows that 50.6 PERCENT  of 
the respondents "have no expectations of Hatoyama," exceeding the 
47.5 PERCENT  who do. The public want a change of administration, 
but they are doubtful if the DPJ is up to the job. 
 
With a change of leader, the cover of the book has changed, but what 
about the contents? Can the party be entrusted with the 
administration? Are the DPJ's economic policies fully backed by 
revenue sources? Such are the doubts and concerns of the voters. 
 
TOKYO 00001133  008 OF 010 
 
 
These will have to be dispelled one by one. 
 
The debate in the final stretch of the Diet session will be the 
perfect opportunity to do so. This can be done at the House of 
Councillors's deliberation of the FY09 supplementary budget, which 
is being criticized for creating wasteful funds among other things, 
and during the party leaders' debate. We hope Mr Hatoyama will take 
a positive attitude toward the debate with the prime minister and 
present a concrete vision of the government. 
 
The ruling parties are most probably shocked by the DPJ's unexpected 
rebound because they had thought that Hatoyama would be easy to 
handle. The people continue to look at the LDP-New Komeito 
administration with skepticism. They should analyze quickly why this 
sudden "reversal of support" happened so easily. 
 
(6) Editorial: Rejection of Guam International Agreement weighs 
heavily on DPJ 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
May 15, 2009 
 
The House of Councillors voted down in its plenary session on May 13 
the Guam International Agreement designed to have the Japanese 
government contribute up to 2.8 billion dollars as part of the cost 
of the relocation of 8,000 U.S. Marines and their dependents from 
Okinawa to Guam. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the largest 
party in the Upper House, prevented the agreement from being 
automatically approved by the Diet at zero hours on May 14. Was (the 
DPJ) aware of the possibility of its becoming a burden in the 
future? 
 
The Guam International Agreement is a treaty. Article 61 of the 
Constitution stipulates that when the two Diet chambers make 
different decisions on a treaty or when the Upper House fails to 
take final action within 30 days after the receipt of the treaty 
passed by the Lower House, the decision of the Lower House shall be 
the decision of the Diet. For this reason, the agreement was 
approved by the Diet, even though it had been voted down in the 
Upper House. 
 
It is understandable for the DPJ, an opposition party, to feel 
discontent with the content of the agreement and oppose it in the 
Lower House. It is also logically natural for the party to take the 
same attitude in the Upper House. At the same time, the chamber 
could have waited for half a day to let the treaty clear the Diet 
automatically. In view of the diplomatic implications of its 
rejection, the DPJ's step was actually somewhat absurd. 
 
The next Lower House election will take place by the fall, and there 
is a possibility that the DPJ will take power. A party decision to 
wait for automatic Diet approval could have hinted at its response 
in such a case. Meanwhile, the fact that the Upper House voted down 
the agreement would consequently place a DPJ-centered administration 
in the future under a political obligation to seek a revision to the 
agreement in its talks with the United States. 
 
Negotiations would be cumbersome. U.S. reluctance to respond to such 
a call would delay the overall realignment of U.S. military bases in 
Japan, including the transfer of U.S. Marines and the relocation of 
Futenma Air Station. The day to reduce Okinawa's base burden would 
slip away. A large part of work for managing the Japan-U.S. alliance 
 
TOKYO 00001133  009 OF 010 
 
 
would have to be devoted to them. 
 
Responses to threats to national security, such as the North Korean 
nuclear issue, might be neglected as a result. The Japan-U.S. 
alliance might be driven by centrifugal force instead of centripetal 
force. Once a party opposed a matter in the Lower House, it is 
natural for it to take the same attitude in the upper chamber as 
well. But the DPJ apparently did not give thought to its diplomatic 
implications. 
 
Such was fine if the DPJ was a minor opposition party. But being a 
party that has the next administration within its reach, the DPJ 
should have thought through the Guam International Agreement as a 
matter closely associated with its ability to run the government. 
Unable to think about the future in the run-up to the presidential 
election following Ichiro Ozawa's resignation, the DPJ has taken a 
step that will only make its load even heavier. 
 
(7) Editorial: "Futenma Relocation: Revise plans for acceptance by 
local community" 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
May 15, 2009 
 
The "Agreement on the Relocation of U.S. Marines in Okinawa to Guam" 
between the Japanese and U.S. government has been approved by the 
Diet. The two main points of the agreement are Japan's funding of up 
to $2.8 billion and the prohibition of the use of such funds for 
other purposes. Furthermore, the marines' relocation comes in a 
package with the relocation of the U.S. Forces' Futenma Air Station 
in Ginowan City, Okinawa to Nago City. 
 
Problems with the purpose of the funding and the basis of the 
calculation have not been clarified fully at the Diet deliberations, 
while the relocation of the Futenma base is experiencing rough 
sailing in negotiations with the local communities. The government 
should continue its efforts to come up with clear answers to 
questions relating to the Guam relocation plan and also work 
seriously to resolve the issues of Futenma relocation. The reduction 
of the burden imposed by the bases on Okinawa, which marks the 37th 
anniversary of its reversion to Japanese administration on May 15, 
should be realized. 
 
One problem with the agreement is that the question of whether 
funding the construction of facilities in Guam that will also be 
used by the U.S. navy and air force in the name of marine relocation 
does not constitute the use of such funds "for other purposes" 
remains unanswered. Moreover, the basis for calculating the upper 
limit of Japan's financial share has not been explained. 
 
A new issue emerged during the Diet deliberations on the number of 
marines in Okinawa to be reduced with the relocation to Guam. The 
government had explained that "some 8,000 marines and their 
families, making a total of about 9,000 will move to Guam" and there 
is a clear provision on this in the agreement. However, the size of 
reduction is actually the reduction of the authorized troop size 
from 18,000 to 10,000. The actual number of marines in Okinawa right 
now is approximately 13,000, so the actual cutback will only be 
around 3,000. The "reduction of 8,000 troops" has been symbolic of 
the reduction of the burden on Okinawa. Therefore, the lightening of 
the burden will be less than what had been explained. There is no 
denying that this constitutes a de facto revision of the original 
 
TOKYO 00001133  010 OF 010 
 
 
plan. 
 
Even as doubts about the agreement remain, the relocation of Futenma 
Air Station, which is located near the urban center of Ginowan City, 
needs to be implemented for the sake of the safety of the local 
residents and in order to resolve noise and other environmental 
issues. 
 
Thirteen years have passed since the Japanese and U.S. governments 
agreed on the return of Futenma. The U.S. Forces Japan realignment 
road map agreed upon by the two governments in 2006 provides for the 
completion of the facility replacing Futenma in the coastal area of 
Camp Schwab in Nago City by 2014. A conclusion has to be reached by 
next spring. Okinawa Prefecture and Nago City demand that the 
substitute facility be built farther from the coast than the 
location the two governments have chosen in order to deal with noise 
and environmental problems. The government should respect the wishes 
of the local governments and residents, deal with the matter 
flexibly, and reach an agreement at an early date. 
 
Meanwhile, the policy of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) on 
Futenma relocation as stated in its "Okinawa Vision 2008" calls for 
"looking at the possibility of relocation outside Okinawa and aiming 
at relocation outside Japan." Does this mean that the agreement will 
be reviewed if the DPJ takes over power? We would like to see the 
party come up with a concrete plan for realizing its Okinawa policy 
under its new president as the general election approaches. 
 
ZUMWALT