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Viewing cable 09TOKYO1108, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 05/15/09

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TOKYO1108 2009-05-17 22:06 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO6386
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1108/01 1372206
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 172206Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2982
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 6331
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 4001
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 7803
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 1623
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 4532
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9272
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 5290
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5058
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 15 TOKYO 001108 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 05/15/09 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Concerned ministries comment on Okinawa Times-Asahi poll on 
Futenma relocation: Efforts to win understanding to continue 
(Okinawa Times) 
 
(2) ConGen Maher says opposition to Futenma relocation superficial 
in interview (Okinawa Times) 
 
(3) Okinawa poll on U.S. force realignment (Asahi) 
 
(4) Editorial: Futenma relocation; Revise plan so that local 
residents can accept it (Mainichi) 
 
(5) Government tacitly approves deployment of MV22 Osprey, showing 
its secrecy-prone aspect (Ryukyu Shimpo) 
 
(6) Editorial: With rejection of Guam agreement, DPJ now shoulders 
heavy load (Nikkei) 
 
(7) Poll on Aso cabinet, political parties (Mainichi) 
 
(8) Senior U.S. official reveals controversial remark by DPJ Vice 
President Maehara that "Japan is too obsessed with the abductions" 
(Shukan Shincho) 
 
(9) U.S. Secretary of Treasury to visit China later this month, 
without stopping in Japan (Asahi) 
 
(10) MSDF in high spirits for national interests (Mainichi)  11 
(11) Antinuclear movement after Obama's speech: Views toward Asia to 
be tested (Mainichi) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Concerned ministries comment on Okinawa Times-Asahi poll on 
Futenma relocation: Efforts to win understanding to continue 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 2) (Full) 
May 15, 2009 
 
Tokyo 
 
Administrative Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kohei Masuda 
commented on the opinion poll conducted jointly by Okinawa Times and 
Asahi Shimbun at a news conference on May 14. Concerning the poll 
finding that 80 PERCENT  of the respondents were unconvinced by the 
explanation given by the Ministry of Defense on the environmental 
assessment being conducted in preparation for the construction of 
the facility replacing Futenma Air Station, Masuda said: "If we have 
not won the Okinawan people's understanding, we have probably not 
explained adequately. We will continue to explain meticulously." 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement which pointed out 
that, "U.S. Forces Japan realignment is a policy that has to be 
implemented in order to reduce the burden on Okinawa while 
maintaining deterrence. We will continue our efforts to win the 
local community's understanding and cooperation in the processes 
relating to Futenma relocation, relocation of the Marines to Guam, 
and the return of land south of Kadena Air Base." 
 
Minister of State for Okinawa Affairs Tsutomu Sato of the Cabinet 
 
TOKYO 00001108  002 OF 015 
 
 
Office also stressed that the Japan-U.S. road map was agreed upon 
from the standpoint of reducing Okinawa's burden while maintaining 
deterrence. He issued the comment that, "The government believes 
that it is important to continue to listen to the local community's 
views carefully and proceed while gaining their understanding." 
 
(2) ConGen Maher says opposition to Futenma relocation superficial 
in interview 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 2) (Full) 
May 15, 2009 
 
At a regular news conference on May 14, U.S. Consul General in 
Okinawa Kevin Maher commented on the results of a joint Okinawa 
Times-Asahi Shimbun opinion poll which show that 68 PERCENT  of the 
respondents are against the relocation of the Futenma Air Station 
within Okinawa. He said:  "If you ask 'inside or outside Okinawa,' 
the answer will be outside Okinawa. But if you ask the more 
realistic question of 'relocation to Camp Schwab or status quo in 
Futenma,' a majority will probably answer that relocation should 
take place." 
 
Maher stressed that the other goal of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) 
realignment is the enhancement of deterrence. He stated that, "If 
reducing the burden is the sole objective, the facility can be 
closed or moved outside Okinawa. However, it is necessary to 
maintain the capability of Futenma." 
 
On the poll result that 64 PERCENT  of Okinawans do not think that 
USFJ realignment will result in reducing the burden, Maher 
emphasized that the target date for completing the realignment 
agreement is 2014. He said that progress is being made in 
environmental assessment and budget procedures in the Diet and the 
U.S. Congress for Futenma and Guam relocation and that, "While the 
Japanese and U.S. governments may not have explained this fully, 
implementation of realignment will result in a major reduction of 
the burden." Regarding Camp Zukeran, where the land area to be 
returned has not yet been determined, Maher said, "I am confident 
that this will be a substantial amount. This is being coordinated," 
but he refrained from disclosing details about the size and the 
schedule for making the announcement. 
 
Discussing the local community's concerns about the increase in 
noise from the F-22A Raptors that will be stationed temporarily at 
Kadena Air Base again this month, Maher stated: "The U.S. government 
does not distinguish between aircraft from elsewhere and 
Okinawa-based ones. Since the F-22s are the most advanced model, 
they tend to stand out. Rotation with another fighter squadron for 
operational reasons has been taking place on Kadena for some time 
now. This is nothing new." He indicated that, "The advanced aircraft 
should be welcomed because they contribute to Japan's defense." 
 
(3) Okinawa poll on U.S. force realignment 
 
ASAHI (Page 4) (Full) 
May 14, 2009 
 
Questions & answers 
(Figures shown in percentage) 
 
Q: Which political party do you support? 
 
 
TOKYO 00001108  003 OF 015 
 
 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 18 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 15 
New Komeito (NK) 2 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 2 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 3 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0 
Reform Club (RC or Kaikaku Kurabu) 0 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0 
Okinawa Socialist Masses Party (OSMP or Shadaito) 0 
Other political parties 1 
None 42 
No answer (N/A) + don't know (D/K) 17 
 
Q: Do you appreciate the Aso cabinet's stance of addressing 
Okinawa's base issues? 
 
Yes 9 
No 61 
 
Q: Do you support Okinawa Prefecture's Governor Hirokazu Nakaima? 
 
Yes 50 
No 24 
 
Q: Do you appreciate Gov. Nakaima's economic policy measures? 
 
Yes 36 
No 26 
 
Q: Do you appreciate Gov. Nakaima's way of addressing base issues? 
 
Yes 42 
No 32 
 
Q: The Japanese and U.S. governments finalized their agreement in 
2006 to realign U.S. forces stationed in Japan, including relocating 
Futenma airfield within Okinawa Prefecture and transferring 
Okinawa-based U.S. Marines to Guam. Do you support this finalized 
agreement on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan? 
 
Yes 28 
No 43 
 
Q: Okinawa is saddled with a large number of bases. To what extent 
do you think this U.S. force realignment will reduce Okinawa's 
base-hosting burden? (One choice only) 
 
Very much 5 
Somewhat 24 
Not very much 43 
Not at all 21 
 
Q: To what extent do you think Okinawa Prefecture's public opinion 
has been reflected in going ahead with the U.S. force realignment? 
(One choice only) 
 
Very much 2 
Somewhat 22 
Not very much 50 
Not at all 18 
 
Q: The U.S. force realignment roadmap incorporates relocating 
 
TOKYO 00001108  004 OF 015 
 
 
Futenma airfield to a coastal area of Camp Schwab in Nago City. Do 
you support relocating Futenma airfield within Okinawa Prefecture? 
 
Yes 18 
No 68 
 
Q: Gov. Nakaima has accepted the planned relocation of Futenma 
airfield within Okinawa Prefecture. When it comes to the Japan-U.S. 
agreement to lay down a V-shaped pair of airstrips in a coastal area 
of Camp Schwab, however, he has been calling for the construction 
site to be moved to an offshore area. Do you appreciate this 
stance? 
 
Yes 39 
No 44 
 
Q: Regarding the Japan-U.S. agreement to build an alternative 
facility for Futenma airfield in a coastal area of Camp Schwab, the 
Defense Ministry says it will have little impact on the environment. 
Is this account from the Defense Ministry convincing? 
 
Yes 7 
No 80 
 
 
Q: Do you support the idea of moving some of the U.S. military bases 
and facilities in Okinawa to other areas in Japan in order to 
realign and reduce the U.S. military presence in Okinawa? 
 
Yes 38 
No 46 
 
Q: Do you think it would be better to reduce the U.S. military 
presence in Japan, including Okinawa, or do you otherwise think the 
U.S. military presence can be maintained at the current level? 
 
Reduce 73 
Maintain at current level 16 
 
Q: The DPJ has been calling for Futenma airfield to be relocated 
elsewhere outside Okinawa Prefecture for now and outside Japan in 
the future. Do you have expectations for the DPJ's efforts for base 
issues? 
 
Yes 45 
No 41 
 
Polling methodology: The survey was conducted May 9-10 over the 
telephone on a computer-aided random digit dialing (RDD) basis. 
Respondents were chosen from among Okinawa Prefecture's voting 
population. Households with one or more eligible voters totaled 
1,396. Valid answers were obtained from 858 persons (61 PERCENT ). 
 
(4) Editorial: Futenma relocation; Revise plan so that local 
residents can accept it 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
May 15, 2009 
 
The agreement to relocate U.S. Marines from Okinawa Prefecture to 
Guam reached by the governments of Japan and the U.S. secured Diet 
approval. The pact features Japan providing up to 2.8 billion 
 
TOKYO 00001108  005 OF 015 
 
 
dollars and a ban on the use of the funds for other purposes. The 
relocation of U.S. Marines is tied to the relocation of Futenma Air 
Station in Ginowan City, Okinawa to Nago City. 
 
Issues such as the intended use of the funds and the basis of cost 
calculations have not been cleared up in Diet deliberations. Talks 
on the relocation of Futenma functions are also encountering 
complications. The government should continue efforts to come up 
with unequivocal replies to questions about the Futenma relocation. 
It should also seriously tackle the Futenma heliport relocation 
issue so as to realize a reduction in the burden of U.S. military 
bases imposed on Okinawa, which has marked the 37th anniversary of 
the reversion to Japan. 
 
The question of whether funds provided for the relocation of U.S. 
Marines involving the construction Guam facilities used by the U.S. 
Navy and Air Force will fall under the use of funds for purposes 
other than the original intent was not settled. The basis for 
calculating the upper limit of Japan's share was not clarified, 
either. 
 
Diet deliberations have also revealed a new problem about the number 
of Marines based in Okinawa to be reduced as a result of their 
transfers to Guam. The government had explained that about 8,000 
Marines and their 9,000 family members would be transferred to Guam. 
These figures are mentioned in the agreement as well. However, what 
has been revealed through Diet deliberations is that the reduction 
means not the actual number of Marines based in Okinawa to be 
reduced but cutting the quota of servicemen based there from 18,000 
to 10,000. Since the actual number of Marines based in Okinawa is 
now approximately 13,000, the actual number to be reduced would come 
to approximately 3,000. Cutting 8,000 Marines was a figure 
symbolizing a reduction of the burden imposed on Okinawa. If this is 
the case, the reduction in the burden on Okinawa is smaller than the 
explanations given thus far. It's no wonder that the U.S. Marine 
reduction policy has effectively been changed. 
 
Those questions about the agreement remain unsettled. The relocation 
of the Futenma Air Station, which is located in an urban area of 
Ginowan City, must be realized by all means for the sake of securing 
the safety of local residents and settling noise and environmental 
problems. 
 
It has been 13 years since the governments of Japan and the U.S. 
reached the agreement on the return. According to the roadmap for 
the U.S. Forces Japan realignment plan as agreed upon between the 
governments of Japan and the U.S. in 2006, facilities replacing the 
Futenma Air Station will be completed by 2014 on the coastal area of 
Camp Schwab in Nago City. Okinawa Prefecture and Nago City are 
calling for moving the planned site further offshore than the 
original location mentioned in the agreement reached between by 
Japan and the U.S. as a measure to deal with noise and environmental 
problems. The government should deal with the matter in a flexible 
manner, addressing the wishes of local governments and residents, 
and work toward reaching an agreement at an early date. 
 
The DPJ's Okinawa Vision 2008 states that the party will aim for the 
relocation of the Futenma Air Station outside the prefecture or 
overseas. Does it mean if it takes the reins of government, it will 
revise the agreement through cooperation between Japan and the U.S.? 
We hope the DPJ under a new leader will come up with a specific road 
map to realize its Okinawa policy in anticipation of the upcoming 
 
TOKYO 00001108  006 OF 015 
 
 
general election. 
 
(5) Government tacitly approves deployment of MV22 Osprey, showing 
its secrecy-prone aspect 
 
RYUKYU SHIMBUN (Page 3) (Full) 
May 15, 2009 
 
When the U.S. agreed to return Okinawa to Japan, the two countries 
made secret promises, including Japan's agreements to help cover 
expenses for U.S. Force's presence and to tacitly allow 
nuclear-armed U.S. ships into Japanese territory. Such facts have 
been revealed in testimonies by negotiators from that time and U.S. 
official documents, but the government has yet to admit the 
existence of such agreements. The current situation is far from what 
local people envisioned when Okinawa was returned to Japan 37 years 
ago. The U.S. plans to deploy the MV-22 Osprey, a next-generation 
aircraft with vertical take-off and landing capability, to the 
planned new base to be constructed to take over the functions of the 
U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station. It has been revealed, 
however, that the Japanese government had asked the U.S. side not to 
specify this plan (in the SACO final report), showing that the 
government still has its secrecy-prone feature. 
 
A number of MV-22 crashes killing crew members that occurred during 
test flights have been reported so far, raising serious doubts over 
its safety and reliability. On the plan of the Osprey's deployment 
in Okinawa, as well, there was a secret agreement between Japan and 
the U.S. In the final stage in drafting the final report of the 
Special Actions Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in November 1996, the 
Japanese government asked the U.S. side not to specify the 
deployment plan in the final report. 
 
Even now, the government has avoided explaining the deployment plan, 
saying that the U.S. has not formally talked about the plan. Japan's 
request in the process of drafting the SACO final report shows 
indisputably that Japan already acknowledged in 1996 the possibility 
of the Osprey's deployment in Okinawa. 
 
The draft of the SACO final report produced by the U.S. included 
this phrase: "The maritime base (the planned new facility) will 
support an Osprey unit." This means that the Osprey will be deployed 
to the new facility in the future. According to a consultations memo 
from that time disclosed by the U.S. side, the U.S. Forces in Japan 
asked the Japanese side to publicize the plan of the Osprey's 
deployment in Okinawa to the nation. But the Japanese government 
feared that if the deployment plan was specified in the report, 
anti-base movements by local residents could intensify because of 
the MV-22s' frequent crashes. In response to its request to the U.S. 
to remove that phrase, the phrase was deleted from the final 
report. 
 
It has also been unveiled that a Defense Ministry official at that 
time had coordinated views with the U.S. government officials on 
supposed questions from Okinawa and prepared answers, in order to 
avoid reference to the Osprey's deployment plan. 
 
Since that time, the U.S. side has specified the Osprey deployment 
plan in its aircraft deployment plan each fiscal year. 
 
Meanwhile, the Japanese government recognizes the possibility of 
deployment in Okinawa, but Defense Minister has just repeated this 
 
TOKYO 00001108  007 OF 015 
 
 
remark: "The U.S. has not formally talked about the plan." The 
government also has avoided an explanation about what response it 
would make if the Osprey is deployed in Okinawa in the future. 
 
While the Japanese government remains silent, the U.S. is steadily 
pushing ahead with the deployment plan. The government stance might 
be taken as tacitly approving the deployment plan in effect. 
 
(6) Editorial: With rejection of Guam agreement, DPJ now shoulders 
heavy load 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
May 15, 2009 
 
An agreement under which Japan will contribute up to 2.8 billion 
dollars toward the relocation of about 8,000 U.S. Marines and their 
families from Okinawa to Guam was rejected on May 13 at a plenary 
session of the House of Councillors. The Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ), the largest opposition force in the Upper House, prevented 
the agreement from automatically receiving Diet approval at midnight 
on May 14. Was the DPJ aware that its rejection could become a 
burden? 
 
The Guam agreement is a treaty. Article 61 of the Constitution 
stipulates that when the two houses of the Diet make different 
decisions, and when the Upper House fails to take final action 
within 30 days after receiving a treaty passed by the House of 
Representatives, the decision of the Lower House shall constitute 
the decision of the Diet. For this reason, the agreement was 
approved by the Diet, although the Upper House turned it down. 
 
It is understandable that the main opposition DPJ rejected the pact 
at the Lower House as it is not satisfied with its contents. It is 
only natural theoretically for the party to take the same stand at 
the Upper House. Even though the agreement would have automatically 
received Diet approval in half a day, the DPJ rejected it. Given 
diplomatic effects, it is difficult to understand the DPJ's action 
from a political point of view. 
 
The Lower House election must be held by the fall. There is a 
possibility that the DPJ will win the election and take the reins of 
government. If the party waited for automatic approval, it would 
have had the option to respond to the accord when it takes the reins 
of government. However, with its rejection at the Upper House, the 
DPJ will inevitably have to urge the United States to hold talks on 
revising the agreement if it assumes political power. 
 
The negotiations will be tough. If there is no prospect that the 
United States will easily accept the DPJ's request, not only the 
transfer of U.S. Marines but also the realignment of U.S. forces in 
Japan, including the relocation of the U.S. Marines' Futenma Air 
Station, will be delayed. The day when Okinawa's burden of U.S. 
military bases is eased will slip away. A DPJ-led administration 
will have to spend most of its effort on this. 
 
If so, there is a possibility that little heed will be paid to such 
security threats as North Korea's nuclear ambitions. There is a 
possibility that centrifugal force will be stronger than centripetal 
force for the Japan-U.S. alliance. It makes sense to take the same 
stance at both Diet chambers. The DPJ, however, probably did not 
consider diplomatic effects. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001108  008 OF 015 
 
 
That would have been acceptable if the DPJ were simply an opposition 
party. However, the largest opposition party, with a chance of 
taking over political power, should have dealt carefully with the 
matter, realizing that it is closely related to the capability of 
assuming the political reins. While the DPJ is busy with moves 
connected with the presidential election to replace President Ichiro 
Ozawa, it has taken on a heavy responsibility. 
 
(7) Poll on Aso cabinet, political parties 
 
MAINICHI (Page 3) (Full) 
May 14, 2009 
 
Questions & Answers 
(T = total; P = previous; M = male; F = female) 
 
Q: Do you support the Aso cabinet? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 27 (24) 28 27 
No 52 (56) 57 49 
Not interested 20 (18) 15 23 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the above question) Why? 
 
 T P M F 
Because the prime minister is from the Liberal Democratic Party 34 
(31) 35 34 
Because something can be expected of the prime minister's leadership 
10 (11) 15 7 
Because there's something familiar about the prime minister 22 (21) 
22 22 
Because something can be expected of the prime minister's policy 
measures 30 (32) 27 31 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the above question) Why? 
 
 T P M F 
Because the prime minister is from the Liberal Democratic Party 8 
(7) 12 7 
Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's leadership 
28 (32) 25 31 
Because there's something imprudent about the prime minister 21 (19) 
20 21 
Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's policy 
measures 42 (41) 43 41 
 
Q: Which political party do you support? 
 
 T P M F 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 27 (23) 28 26 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 24 (24) 31 20 
New Komeito (NK) 6 (5) 3 7 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 3 (3) 1 5 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 1 (2) 1 1 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0 (1) 1 0 
Reform Club (RC or Kaikaku Kurabu) 0 (--) -- 0 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0 (0) 0 -- 
Other political parties 2 (1) 2 2 
None 36 (40) 32 38 
 
Q: DPJ President Ozawa has announced his resignation, saying he will 
 
TOKYO 00001108  009 OF 015 
 
 
strengthen his party's unity by stepping down in order for his party 
to take control of the government in the House of Representatives 
election. Do you appreciate his resignation? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 49  51 48 
No 47  48 47 
 
Q: DPJ President Ozawa stayed on when his state-funded secretary was 
indicted in March on the charge of violating the Political Funds 
Control Law, saying his party will take office. One and a half 
months later, he announced his resignation. What do you think about 
this? 
 
 T P M F 
Appropriate 14  17 12 
Too late 66  63 68 
No need to quit 17  19 17 
 
Q: Do you think DPJ President Ozawa has established his 
accountability to the public on the case? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 13  15 12 
No 83  83 83 
 
Q: Who do you think is appropriate to become DPJ president? Pick 
only one from among those listed below. 
 
 T P M F 
Yukio Edano 1  2 1 
Katsuya Okada 25  31 23 
Naoto Kan 12  12 12 
Akira Nagatsuma 5  6 5 
Yoshihiko Noda 1  1 1 
Yukio Hatoyama 13  11 13 
Seiji Maehara 8  10 7 
None 29  23 32 
 
Q: Which party, the LDP or the DPJ, would you like to see win in the 
next election for the House of Representatives? 
 
 T P M F 
LDP 34 (32) 33 34 
DPJ 45 (42) 53 41 
Other political parties 17 (19) 11 19 
 
Q: The government and ruling parties have decided on an additional 
economic stimulus package amounting to over 15 trillion yen. Do you 
appreciate this? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 37  41 35 
No 54  54 54 
 
Q: Do you appreciate the government's per capita cash benefit 
handout of 12,000 yen? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 35 (39) 28 39 
No 62 (56) 70 57 
 
 
TOKYO 00001108  010 OF 015 
 
 
(Note) Figures shown in percentage, rounded off. "0" indicates that 
the figure was below 0.5 PERCENT . "--" denotes that no respondents 
answered. "No answer" omitted. Figures in parentheses denote the 
results of the last survey conducted April 10-11. 
 
Polling methodology: The survey was conducted May 12-13 over the 
telephone across the nation on a computer-aided random digit 
sampling (RDS) basis. A total of 1,598 households with one or more 
eligible voters were sampled. Answers were obtained from 1,003 
persons (63 PERCENT ). 
 
(8) Senior U.S. official reveals controversial remark by DPJ Vice 
President Maehara that "Japan is too obsessed with the abductions" 
 
SHUKAN SHINCHO (Page 51) (Full) 
May 21, 2009 
 
Vice President Seiji Maehara is said to be the most realistic 
politician in the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). How about this 
recent remark? He is reported to have said that "Japan is too 
obsessed with the abductions" in the U.S. and this has created a 
stir. 
 
This controversial remark surfaced at a meeting between persons 
concerned with the abduction issue and a senior U.S. official when 
they visited the U.S. in late April. 
 
One participant in the meeting said: "The six Japanese participants 
were Shigeo Iizuka, head of the association of families of the 
abductees; Teruaki Masumoto, secretary general of the association; 
Tsutomu Nishioka and Yoichi Shimada, president and vice president, 
respectively, of the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese 
Kidnapped by North Korea; Jin Matsubara, House of Representatives 
member of the Parliamentary Union for the Abduction Issue; and House 
of Councillors member Ichiro Tsukada. A senior official of the Bush 
administration participated from the U.S. side." 
 
"From the Japanese side, Mr Iizuka talked at length. He said that in 
Japan, the abduction issue is the most important issue in relations 
with North Korea and that he wants the U.S. government to put the 
DPRK back into the list of state sponsors of terrorism. He also said 
that it appears that the Obama administration gives higher priority 
to dialogue, but he would like to see stronger pressure and tougher 
sanctions." 
 
The senior U.S. official listened in silence but eventually spoke 
up. 
 
"On condition that this would be off-the-record, this official said 
that, 'We really understand your efforts and realize that the 
abduction issue is an important issue for Japan, like the nuclear 
issue. However, it seems that there is an opinion that this is no 
longer so'." 
 
When the Japanese participants leaned forward and asked: "What do 
you mean?" 
 
"The senior U.S. official went on to say: 'The DPJ's Messrs Maehara 
and Okada (Vice President Katsuya Okada) came to the U.S. recently 
and talked about the fact that Japan's abduction issue is an 
obstacle to the DPRK's abandonment of its nuclear programs. The 
dominant view among U.S. government officials is that the DPJ will 
 
TOKYO 00001108  011 OF 015 
 
 
take over the next Japanese administration. From the behavior of 
these two, some of us reckon that the DPJ holds a different view 
from the Japanese government on the abduction issue'." 
 
Since this was supposed to be off-the-record, the above Japanese 
participant had not intended to reveal the discussions. 
 
"Even Secretary General Masumoto merely said 'certain Japanese 
politicians' at his news conference, but Mr Shimada was unable to 
restrain himself; he revealed the two names." 
 
They will not listen anymore 
 
Shimada says: "What is important now is for Japan, the U.S., and the 
ROK to work together in applying pressure on North Korea. We are 
talking to the U.S. as part of this effort. If DPJ leaders say that 
denuclearization is more important than the abductions at a time 
like this, the U.S. will not listen to what we say anymore." 
 
Masumoto also says: "I am thinking of talking to the two to verify 
if they indeed said such things." 
 
When the two DPJ officials were asked, Okada said: "I have never 
said anything to that effect, including to U.S. government 
officials. I intend to lodge a strong protest over these remarks 
that were contrary to facts," denying the allegation flatly. 
 
On the other hand, Maehara did not answer the question on whether he 
made the statement in question and merely asked us to read his blog. 
The blog reads: "I wonder about the appropriateness of Japan's 
position that even if there is progress in the Six-Party Talks on 
the nuclear and missile issues, Japan alone will not be able to 
cooperate on what is agreed at the Talks because of the abduction 
issue. This amounts to us spoiling the opportunity for dialogue 
ourselves." 
 
This shows precisely that he is virtually saying that Japan is too 
obsessed with the abductions. 
 
(9) U.S. Secretary of Treasury to visit China later this month, 
without stopping in Japan 
 
ASAHI (Page 12) (Full) 
Evening, May 13, 2009 
 
Toshihiko Ogata, Washington) 
 
The U.S. Department of the Treasury announced on May 12 that 
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner will visit China in late May. He 
is scheduled to meet senior Chinese government officials on June 1-2 
to deepen bilateral economic ties. Geithner has chosen China as the 
destination of his first overseas trip in his new post, showing that 
Washington is prioritizing China in its economic policy. 
 
A Treasury Department official explained to the Asahi Shimbun the 
same day: "It is impossible for the secretary to visit Japan this 
time for scheduling reasons," but the official added: "He is 
strongly hoping to visit Japan in the near future." 
 
In the previous Bush administration, then Treasury Secretary Henry 
Paulson made efforts to strengthen economic relations with China, as 
represented by the establishment of the U.S.-China Strategic 
 
TOKYO 00001108  012 OF 015 
 
 
Economic Dialogue (SED). After the administration of President 
Barack Obama was launched, State Secretary Hillary Clinton visited 
China in February and agreed with her counterpart to expand the SED 
into high-level talks to also discuss security and other issues. 
 
During his Senate confirmation hearings in January, Geithner voiced 
criticism, saying that "China has manipulated the yuan's value." 
Some anticipated that (the Geithner remark) might trigger renewed 
tensions between the two countries. But the secretary later softened 
his attitude and praised China's huge economic stimulus package. 
 
The treasury secretary's planned visit to China, with no visit to 
Japan, might set off shock waves among Japanese involved in economic 
affairs. 
 
(10) MSDF in high spirits for national interests 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Abridged) 
May 13, 2009 
 
This February, there was a meeting in a conference room of the 
Defense Ministry, which is headquartered at Ichigaya in Tokyo. In 
attendance at the meeting were business executives from the Japanese 
Shipowners' Association and shipping business companies. There were 
also government officials from the Defense Ministry and the Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport Ministry. 
 
During the Pacific War, the now-defunct Japanese navy expropriated 
all merchant ships. In those days, many shipowners lost their cargo 
ships and seamen. One shipping firm executive recalled those days, 
saying: "The military just exploits us according to their needs. We 
can never trust them." It has been a half century since then. Even 
now, the bitter memories still remain deep-seated among seafarers. 
Merchant ships fly their flags to pay their respects to foreign 
naval vessels when they meet them at sea. However, there are also 
many ships that ignore Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels. 
 
The conference room was filled with an awkward atmosphere. An MSDF 
brass officer then stood up. "We know 60,000 seamen lost their lives 
during the war," the MSDF officer said. He was seeking 
reconciliation. "This time," he added, "the Maritime Self-Defense 
Force has embarked on its first postwar overseas mission to protect 
the lives of civilian people, and this is a great honor." 
 
Japan has sent out a squadron of MSDF destroyers on an antipiracy 
mission in waters off the eastern African coast of Somalia. This 
overseas mobilization of MSDF destroyers aims to change the course 
of history of the Self-Defense Forces' overseas activities in the 
past. In 1991, Japan sent MSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf 
after the Gulf War broke out. In 1992, Japan sent a detachment of 
Ground Self-Defense Force troops to Cambodia in order to back up 
United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKO) and then to Mozambique 
in 1993 for PKO activities. In 1994, Japan sent SDF troops for the 
relief of Rwandan refugees. And in 2004, the SDF went on a mission 
to assist Iraq with its reconstruction. All those SDF dispatches 
were in the name of international contributions. But Tokyo was 
always sensitive to Washington. 
 
This time around, however, the SDF went abroad to protect the 
"national interests" of Japan for the first time, even though its 
mission is to convoy commercial ships against pirates that are no 
more than robbers or kidnappers. This MSDF deployment to Somalia 
 
TOKYO 00001108  013 OF 015 
 
 
waters was touched off by the United States and China. It has been 
said that the MSDF is only capable of backup for the U.S. Navy. The 
MSDF is in high spirits, taking its antipiracy mission as the first 
step to stand on its own feet. 
 
However, it is not so easy to meet the actual situation. On April 
12, the United States got excited. A U.S. freighter was attacked off 
Somalia by pirates on April 8. Its captain, who became a hostage on 
behalf of his crew, was rescued by a U.S. Navy special taskforce. 
The naval taskforce shot three pirates to death and detained another 
pirate, who was taken to the United States for a trial under U.S. 
law. That day happened to fall on Easter. The U.S. media flashed the 
news as a "wonderful gift." 
 
The SDF, which is only allowed to use of weapons on its overseas 
missions for legitimate self-defense or emergency evacuation, was 
also bewildered at the U.S. Navy's sudden use of armed force against 
pirates shortly after its arrival there in the Gulf of Aden off 
Somalia. The MSDF destroyers, currently deployed to Somalia waters, 
have special rangers onboard from the Japan Coast Guard. This is the 
JCG's first overseas task. Tensions are now running high because of 
the U.S. naval shootout. A senior Defense Ministry official was at a 
loss. "We will tell the MSDF to remain extremely cautious in their 
activities." Due to the U.S. Navy's shootout incident, however, this 
official was concerned about public opinion, wondering how it would 
react should a Japanese ship be targeted there. 
 
(11) Antinuclear movement after Obama's speech: Views toward Asia to 
be tested 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Abridged slightly) 
May 15, 2009 
 
As seen in antipiracy and nuclear disarmament, global challenges for 
peace have drastically changed since the Cold War era. The 
government is not the only one that is being pressed for a shift in 
thinking. 
 
"Nuclear weapons are good weapons. They have freed people from 
Japan's colonial rule and a nuclear deterrent prevented an invasion 
by North Korea during the Korean War. Most South Koreans have a 
positive impression of nuclear weapons." 
 
This was part of a report presented by Johns Hopkins University 
Associate Professor Kim Dong Won at the International Symposium on 
Nuclear Histories in Japan and Korea, held in March at the Tokyo 
Institute of Technology Ookayama Campus in Tokyo's Meguro Ward. 
Japanese researchers and antinuclear activities found his view 
troubling. 
 
Japan was moved by U.S. President Barack Obama's speech that went, 
"As the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United 
States has a moral responsibility to act." Nevertheless, the view 
that an atomic bomb that helped to end WWII is a good weapon is 
prevalent not only in the United States but also in former Japanese 
colonies or countries invaded by it, such as South Korea and China. 
Nuclear disarmament in Asia cannot be discussed without the question 
of perceptions of history. 
 
Tokyo Institute of Technology Professor Masakatsu Yamazaki proposed 
that "North Korea's nuclear program is a countermeasure against the 
United States. Nuclear disarmament must be pursued in East Asia by 
 
TOKYO 00001108  014 OF 015 
 
 
putting an end to the Korean War, which is still in a state of 
ceasefire under international law, and reducing nuclear weapons in 
North Korea and the need for the U.S. nuclear umbrella." 
 
Ending the Korean War means normalizing diplomatic ties between the 
United States and North Korea. The option does not seem to sit well 
with Japan's public opinion on the abduction issue. 
 
Hiroshima Mayor Tadatoshi Akiba delivered a speech at UN 
headquarters on May 5 in which he said: "President Obama's speech 
has assured us that the vast majority of the world is absolutely 
right in asserting that nuclear weapons should be abolished. He has 
given all of us new energy and hope. His speech is an extension of 
our assertion." The United States, however, is calling for nuclear 
nonproliferation chiefly for the purpose of avoiding nuclear 
terrorism and obtaining cooperation of the international community. 
Akiba is hoping to hold the Obama-advocated international conference 
in Hiroshima. The conference's theme, though, is not nuclear 
disarmament but the modality of nuclear security to prevent nuclear 
terrorism. 
Bridging the gap between the ideal of nuclear disarmament and 
political reality is a diplomatic challenge for the Japanese 
government. The awareness and strategy of the antinuclear movement 
will also be put to a test. 
 
Masafumi Takubo, 58, who has been responsible over the last 12 years 
for operating international conferences and collecting information 
at the Japan Congress against A- and H-Bombs, holds a severe view. 
"You cannot clarify problems in the government's policy by just 
urging the government to aim immediately at nuclear disarmament and 
to tell that to the United States." 
 
The antinuclear movement was nationally organized in March 1954 
after a Japanese fishing boat was damaged by the U.S. hydrogen bomb 
test conducted in Bikini Atolls on March 1 that year. A 
signature-collection drive seeking to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs 
began in Tokyo's Suginami Ward in May 1954. Driven by an acute sense 
of alarm, as was exemplified by the household phrase, "H-bomb tuna," 
some 30 million signatures, or one-third of the total population 
back then, were collected before the first World Conference against 
Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs was held in Hiroshima in 1955. 
 
"Conservative lawmakers also subscribed to it because it was aimed 
at defending the people's livelihood and was anti-U.S. nationalism," 
Rikkyo University Professor Akira Kurosaki, who is well-versed in 
the Japan-U.S. nuclear issue, explained. 
 
The movement that started out as a popular anti-U.S. drive split due 
to the conservative-progressive dispute over the 1960 revision of 
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the China-Soviet Union conflict. 
Nuclear policy has been discussed in the framework of the Japan-U.S. 
security setup. Reflecting restrictions of the times, such as the 
Cold War and the Japan-U.S. axis, awareness behind the antinuclear 
movement in Asia has weakened. 
 
Renewed momentum for nuclear disbarment in this post-Cold War era 
again originated from the United States. In the wake of President 
Obama's speech, the government is trying to confirm the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella regardless of its content. Without any reserve capability 
to resolve the questions of America's motives and Japan being a 
member of Asia, the antinuclear movement pins its hopes on President 
Obama's leadership. There is not much difference between the two 
 
TOKYO 00001108  015 OF 015 
 
 
sides' thinking and action patterns of relying on the United States 
in bringing about a peaceful future. 
 
ZUMWALT