VZCZCXRO7648
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHNEH RUEHPW RUEHSK
RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHNT #0649/01 1261244
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 061245Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0841
INFO ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TASHKENT 000649 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TSPL KNNP PREL PGOV PBTS UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: Short but Positive Meeting on Nuclear Forensics 
Cooperation 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: In a short but positive meeting at the Institute 
of Nuclear Physics (INP) on April 21, INP officials signaled their 
receptivity to cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 
and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) on nuclear 
forensics.  (Note: Nuclear forensics involves the joint collection, 
analysis, and evaluation of isotopic and chemical signatures from 
uranium sites in order to support efforts to determine the source, 
origin, route, and responsibility for illicit trafficking.  End 
note.) This cooperation may improve Uzbekistan's current nuclear 
detection architecture by enhancing its ability to determine the 
origin, route, and responsibility for illicit trafficking in 
nuclear materials and help characterize their own material.  INP 
personnel welcomed the reestablishment of scientific ties between 
DOE/LLNL and INP.  Future nuclear forensics cooperation may include 
information exchanges on analytic methods, joint nuclear forensic 
analysis of uranium samples, collaboration on the development of 
standard operating procedures, and raising awareness of nuclear and 
radiological threats in Uzbekistan.  INP appeared receptive to 
follow-on discussions in the near future on nuclear forensics.  End 
summary. 
 
 
 
Meetings Truncated Due to "Anti-Crisis Measures" 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) On April 21, a visiting U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE)/Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) team met with 
five Institute of Nuclear Phyiscs (INP) officials including 
Director Umar Salikhbaev and Leading Researcher Vitaliy Petrenko to 
discuss nuclear forensics cooperation.  Though two full days of 
meetings had been scheduled, Director Salikhbaev regretfully 
indicated that the meetings would have to be condensed into less 
than four hours that day due to an April 29 "innovation fair" that 
Uzbekistan has organized as part of its anti-crisis economic 
program.  INP's leadership was being pulled into intensive 
preparations related to the fair starting that afternoon, which 
would include meetings with energy and health officials and 
representatives of the Navoi Metallurgical Combine. 
 
 
 
Nuclear Forensics Proposal 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) The U.S. side noted that the United States and Uzbekistan 
had signed a Master Task Agreement (MTA) in May 2005 (valid until 
September 30, 2010) to conduct meetings and workshops to promote 
regional security through nuclear forensics cooperation.  (Comment: 
The deterioration in bilateral relations in 2005 had precluded 
joint nuclear forensics work in the wake of the agreement's 
conclusion.  End comment.)    The U.S. team complimented Uzbekistan 
on the leadership it has shown in counterproliferation and 
expressed interest in reestablishing scientific ties between the 
U.S. Department of Energy, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 
and Uzbekistan's Institute of Nuclear Physics.  Nuclear forensics 
cooperation may advance Uzbekistan's ability to analyze suspect 
materials at the country's points of entry and augment Uzbekistan's 
existing nuclear detection architecture.  Through nuclear 
forensics, Uzbekistan may determine where materials detected at 
radiation portal monitors (or found in other ways) are from as well 
as determine the threat such materials pose to public health and 
the environment. 
 
 
 
Uzbekistan's Capabilities 
 
---------------------------- 
 
TASHKENT 00000649  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) Director Salikhbaev replied that everyone at the Institute 
of Nuclear Physics supports stronger ties with the U.S. Department 
of Energy.  Vitaliy Petrenko, noting that he was familiar with the 
first two elements of nuclear forensics-detection and primary 
analysis-delivered a presentation on Uzbekistan's detection 
capabilities and welcomed U.S. assistance in developing this. 
Uzbekistan has 175 radiation portal monitors: 118 vehicle monitors 
distributed among 19 vehicle points of entry; 40 rail monitors 
among 10 rail points; 12 monitors at Tashkent airport; two at the 
State Customs Committee Institute; and three at the Institute of 
Nuclear Physics.  He showed a map of Uzbekistan depicting the 
locations of these monitors, which are particularly dense at 
Uzbekistan's border with Kazakhstan near Tashkent.  Petrenko 
described INP's role in training Customs officers and several 
recent instances of radiation detection at Uzbekistan's borders, 
appearing particularly proud that the train with radioactive 
materials bound for Iran from Kyrgyzstan in November 2007 was 
detected at Nazarbek after having passed through two other 
countries undetected.  Uzbekistan's policy has been to ship 
radioactive materials back to their point of origin. 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Another specialist named Ilkhom Sadikov delivered a 
presentation on Uzbekistan's nascent nuclear forensics program. 
Uzbekistan's radioanalytic center and mobile labs have conducted 
some 30 chemical analyses of various materials between 2005 and 
¶2009.  While these facilities can identify unknown materials and 
Uzbekistan has the capability to conduct such tests almost anywhere 
in the country, the creation of a database to keep track of uranium 
sources and origins would be valuable.  Sadikov stressed that such 
a database should involve representatives from all over Central 
Asia, and that participation from Uzbekistan alone would be 
insufficient.  The Uzbek side also noted certain shortfalls with 
detection equipment: Uzbekistan's equipment can give only an 
approximate level of enrichment of uranium materials and assessing 
plutonium is more difficult.  Uzbekistan also is unable to conduct 
crystallographic analysis.  They have optical microscopes, but no 
electromicroscopes which would be better for nuclear forensics. 
 
 
 
Interested in Further Dialogue 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) The U.S. side elaborated on what nuclear forensics 
cooperation for the next few years would entail.  This would 
revolve around five tasks: First would be the exchange of nuclear 
forensic analytical techniques between Lawrence Livermore National 
Lab and INP.  LLNL would provide descriptions of methodologies for 
analysis of uranium ores, uranium ore concentrates, and residual 
materials to INP.  INP would provide a similar list and 
descriptions of similar methods in Uzbekistan.  Salikhbaev 
responded that there would be no problem in such an information 
exchange.  The second task would be the pursuit of a comparative 
bilateral nuclear forensic analysis using a common sample exchanged 
between the U.S. and Uzbekistan.  INP and LLNL would jointly select 
an Uzbek sample of uranium to analyze for forensic signatures at 
both institutions.  The U.S. is especially interested in 
Uzbekistan's yellow cake, which is a higher-consequence material 
with a greater potential for illicit trafficking.  Salikhbaev 
stated that INP has no direct access to yellow cake and would 
require permission from Navoi Metallurgical Combine for this.  He 
added that INP could request this directly from the combine during 
meetings with their representatives the following day, and also 
suggested that the U.S. consider sending its samples to Uzbekistan, 
to which the U.S. did not agree.  Third, LLNL would collaborate 
with Uzbek scientific experts at Uzbekistan's radiological lab to 
develop standard operating procedures in nuclear forensics. 
Fourth, LLNL and INP would work together to identify five to ten 
Uzbek samples of uranium that are promising for nuclear forensic 
analysis.  Fifth, both sides would assess the existing state of 
public awareness of threats from nuclear and radioactive materials 
and work to develop technical training related to radiation 
science, nuclear forensics, and national response.  The U.S. side 
 
TASHKENT 00000649  003 OF 003 
 
 
mentioned that this may also be of interest to the International 
Atomic Energy Association.  Salikhbaev responded that Uzbekistan is 
working with Pacific Northwest National Lab on a course for Uzbek 
law enforcement officials on dual-use commodities, and suggested 
that such proposals be coordinated through Uzbekistan's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent. 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) Both sides suggested meeting in the near future, perhaps 
in September on the margins of a physics conference in Tashkent, to 
discuss nuclear forensics cooperation further.  The U.S. side noted 
that for this particular initiative, DOE will not pay for equipment 
for or salaries of Uzbek personnel, but the expertise of LLNL would 
be made available to INP as appropriate.  Salikhbaev welcomed 
direct contact between DOE/LLNL and INP personnel. 
 
 
 
Comment: 
 
------------ 
 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) This was a productive first meeting that appears to have 
laid the groundwork for nuclear forensics cooperation between the 
United States and Uzbekistan, and the positive tone of the 
discussions suggests that Uzbekistan will be receptive to at least 
some elements of the nuclear forensics proposal.  Uzbekistan 
clearly has the scientific expertise and capabilities to be a 
strong partner in nuclear forensics, and INP's rhetoric about the 
importance of regional cooperation on cataloguing uranium sources 
is encouraging.  Nevertheless, it is unclear at this point whether 
higher-level decision-makers in Uzbekistan will share INP's views. 
Uzbekistan's sometimes prickly relations with neighboring Central 
Asian states and mutual distrust could limit the effectiveness of 
some aspects of this cooperation, such as the proposal to create a 
database of uranium sources to be shared between Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. 
NORLAND