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UNCLAS STATE 055511 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP MNUC ASEC KCRM PARM PINR RS XG XH
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE IN STRENGTHENING 
INTERNATIONAL FORENSICS COOPERATION 
 
REF: CURRY-KLEPP E-MAIL DATED MAY 29 2009 WITH AN 
     INVITATION TO THE FORENSICS MEETING 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request for Embassy Moscow.  Please 
see paragraph 4. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) BACKGROUND: Experts from the United States, 
European Union, and the IAEA have developed a proposed 
nuclear forensics framework to strengthen international 
cooperation to end nuclear smuggling.  While forensics 
cooperation is desired in a number of areas (e.g., 
safeguards, attribution), opportunities to advance 
international collaboration are probably greatest in 
combating nuclear smuggling - a largely trans-national, 
criminal phenomenon involving non-state actors.  While 
governments have had some success seizing smuggled nuclear 
material, rarely are the sources of these materials ever 
effectively investigated or prosecuted.  Forensics 
cooperation can produce investigative leads to link a seizure 
by one country with a diversion in another to successfully 
prosecute the people involved. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The forensics framework would provide a basis for 
cooperation on smuggling that has been either lacking or ad 
hoc and would establish elements needed for forensics 
cooperation in other areas.  The framework includes a system 
of national nuclear forensics libraries and a directory of 
national points of contact.  Together, these will allow law 
enforcement officials to contact atomic energy experts in 
neighboring countries to determine if seized material was 
diverted from one of their facilities.  The libraries will 
include a range of data (e.g., isotopic composition, chemical 
form) relevant to identifying nuclear material although 
exchanging material is optional and at the discretion of each 
individual government. On June 29, the IAEA will host 
forensics experts from more than 35 countries, including 
Russia, to initiate a technical review of the framework 
(reftel).  Mr. V. Erastov and Mr. V. Ostropikov from Rosatom 
have been invited as has Ms. E. Kuteynikov from Bochvar.  In 
2006, at Umea, Sweden, Mr. 
 Erastov briefed the International Technical Working Group on 
Nuclear Smuggling (ITWG), which is co-sponsoring the meeting 
on June 29, regarding Russian efforts. 
 
¶4. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Drawing from the background above, 
the Department requests that post inform the GOR that during 
the June 16-17 plenary of the Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the United States will brief 
international partners on the concept of national nuclear 
forensics libraries and encourage Russia's participation in 
the June 29th technical review.  Post should invite the GOR 
to share its experiences with forensic databases at the June 
29th meeting and suggest the GOR join the United States in 
encouraging additional governments to participate in the 
meeting.  Post may want to emphasize that the library concept 
is simply a framework for strengthening cooperation and does 
not obligate governments to share material. Additionally, the 
Department requests that post pass the non-paper (para 6) to 
the highest appropriate Russian officials and gauge GOR 
interest in the national libraries concept and nuclear 
forensics cooperation in general. 
 
¶5. (SBU) REPORTING DEADLINE:  Department Requests that post 
respond via front-channel cable no later than June 10, 2009. 
 
¶6. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF NON-PAPER. 
 
Framework for Nuclear Forensic Cooperation 
 
Trafficking of nuclear material is one of the more likely 
pathways for terrorists to acquire material needed for an 
improvised nuclear device. While the frequency of known 
incidents involving weapons-grade material and quantities of 
seized material have generally declined since the mid-1990s, 
smuggling of these dangerous materials continues. 
Governments have shown some success seizing smuggled 
material, but rarely are these incidents, particularly 
diversions, effectively investigated or prosecuted. 
 
To support cooperation between governments, international 
experts envision a framework of national nuclear forensic 
libraries and a directory listing national points of contact. 
 The libraries would contain forensically significant 
information on nuclear and radiological material manufactured 
by or on the territory of a particular country.  This 
framework would allow law enforcement officials to contact 
atomic energy experts in neighboring countries to determine 
if smuggled material was diverted from one of their 
facilities.  Governments would be encouraged to develop 
procedures for making and responding to queries, but 
cooperation would be at the discretion of each individual 
government. 
 
On June 29, 2009, the IAEA will host forensics experts from 
more than 35 countries, including from Rosatom, to discuss 
the proposed framework, and over the next twelve months, the 
United States also will facilitate this technical review 
among interested Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism (GICNT) partners.  At the June 16-17 plenary of the 
GICNT, the United States will discuss the proposed framework 
and encourage participation in the technical review. 
 
Russia's advanced forensic capabilities, experience with 
forensic databases, knowledge of the nuclear fuel cycle, and 
co-chairmanship of the GICNT, give it a unique position to 
assist in this effort.  As the co-chair of the International 
Technical Working Group on Nuclear Smuggling, which is 
helping IAEA organize the meeting on June 29, the United 
States would welcome a presentation by the Russian Federation 
on its experience on nuclear forensics databases. 
 
The United States and Russia Federation have unique 
capabilities to address nuclear terrorism threats.  We hope 
that Russia will favorably consider the invitation to 
participate in the technical review of the national nuclear 
forensics library proposal and share its experience in this 
area. 
 
END TEXT OF NON-PAPER. 
 
¶7. Washington appreciates Post's assistance.  Contact Michael 
Curry (currymr@state.gov, 202-736-7692) in ISN/WMDT for more 
information on the details. 
CLINTON