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TO RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 8419
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 1381
INFO CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 7886
RUEHMZ/AMCONSUL MUNICH 4039

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 STATE 053816 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCFE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: HLTF: GUIDANCE FOR MAY 26-28 AWAY DAY 
 
REF: A) STATE 41124 (U.S. NON-PAPER ON THE 
STATUS OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE CFE PARALLEL ACTIONS 
PACKAGE); B) JCG.JOUR/693/CORR.1 ANNEX 3 (RF AIDE 
MEMOIRE) 
 
¶1. (SBU) The NATO High Level Task Force (HLTF) will meet 
from May 26-28 at the NATO School in Oberammergau to 
take stock of the current situation with CFE and 
brainstorm on possible ways forward.  During the April 
29 meeting, Allies agreed that discussion at the Away 
Day would be based on the U.S. non-paper on the status 
of bilateral discussions on the Parallel Actions Package 
(ref A), the Russian Aide Memoire (ref B), and Germany's 
latest revision of its concept paper for the June 10 
Berlin meeting on the future of conventional arms 
control and European security.  The International Staff 
has not circulated a detailed agenda for the Away Day, 
but indicated verbally that intentions for framing the 
meeting include: three presentations ? current state of 
play of NATO-Russia relations, of Russian Federation 
military forces (by Norway), and of NATO military 
forces; discussion of contacts and status of bilateral 
negotiations; point-by-point review of Russian positions 
outlined in its Aide Memoire; and synthesis of 
conclusions that should shape a common approach for 
Berlin. 
 
U.S. goals for the May 26-28 HLTF Away Day and related 
meetings are to: 
 
-- review in detail the Russian position on the elements 
of the Parallel Actions Package to delineate the 
distance between our positions and identify areas that 
require further clarification from Russia and further 
thought from Allies; 
 
-- focus discussion on the core issues in considering 
near-term steps on CFE, and elicit views and ideas for 
moving forward; 
 
-- reinforce the continued need for a unified NATO 
message to Russia on CFE and other security issues; 
 
-- shape discussion to reach agreement on a common NATO 
message for the June 10 German-hosted meeting in Berlin; 
 
-- as appropriate, use opportunities at the away day to 
shape plans for U.S.-Russia-Allies meeting on the 
margins of the June 10 seminar; and 
 
-- with Quad Allies, comment on Germany's draft 
"chairman's statement" for the June 10 event. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
PRESENTATIONS 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (SBU)  The three presentations ? current state of 
play of NATO-Russia relations, of Russian Federation 
military forces (by Norway), and of NATO military forces 
? will primarily serve as scene-setters for the core of 
the discussion which will focus on the Russian Aide 
Memoire, brainstorming on ideas for moving forward, and 
shaping a common message for Berlin.  U.S. del may draw 
from the following observations in contributing to 
discussions on the presentations: 
 
-- NATO-Russia Relations:  U.S. thinking on next steps 
in the NATO-Russia relationship is well reflected in the 
Strasbourg-Kehl summit communique and in the U.S.- 
German-Czech paper on charting renewed, better focused 
and more effective NATO-Russia relations.  Our openness 
to dialogue on cooperative approaches to enhance 
European security and to invigorate dialogue with Russia 
to resolve problems, address concerns, and build 
practical cooperation should serve to lend a positive 
dynamic as we engage Russia on arms control.  We are 
open to engaging in discussions with the Russians about 
their ideas in appropriate fora, 
such as the NATO-Russia Council.  At the same time, we 
agree with Allies that the OSCE, with its inclusive 
membership and comprehensive concept of security which 
 
STATE 00053816  002 OF 007 
 
 
includes human and economic dimensions, as well as 
political-military aspects, is the most appropriate 
forum for discussion of ways to improve Euro-Atlantic 
security.  Our aim should be to enhance the 
effectiveness of existing Euro-Atlantic institutions and 
agreements, not replace them with new ones.  Russia's 
decision not to implement its CFE obligations is 
particularly significant and must be addressed in 
parallel with broader discussions on Euro-Atlantic 
security. 
 
-- Status of Russian and NATO Military Forces:  Overall 
trends indicate a significantly different security 
situation in Europe as compared to the early 1990s.  We 
all appreciate the role the CFE regime has played in 
achieving the force reductions, transparency, and the 
stability and predictability which contribute to Euro- 
Atlantic security.  How to maintain this positive 
environment and to promote stability in this 
significantly different security situation in Europe 
must factor into our considerations of ideas for moving 
forward.  But we also need to take into account that 
despite this positive aggregate picture, including the 
unprecedented level of transparency and predictability 
that is a benefit of CFE, Europe has experienced 
devastating regional conflicts in the last 20 years. 
There is an argument that it is precisely the detailed, 
disaggregated information and transparency provided by a 
regime like CFE that can help to assuage security 
concerns that can lead to conflict.  But the fact that 
those conflicts occurred also points to its limits. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
CONTACTS and STATUS OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3. (SBU) Allies are already aware that State VCI A/S 
Gottemoeller will meet with Russian Security and 
Disarmament Director Antonov in Geneva on June 3 with 
experts to discuss CFE.  U.S. rep may indicate that this 
senior-level bilateral dialogue on CFE will serve as an 
opportunity for a substantive review of CFE issues 
(which have been complicated by Russia's invasion of 
Georgia and its failure to implement CFE for a year and 
a half) and for seeking further details on the positions 
outlined in Russia's paper while probing for potential 
flexibility.  We want to use this meeting to assist in 
assessing Russia's willingness to engage seriously on 
the Parallel Actions Package and to make progress on 
core issues as we engage in the U.S.-Russia context.  We 
also hope to use the event to reach agreement with 
Russia, if possible, on the idea of augmenting the 
bilateral discussion with an expanded group discussion, 
including a number of Allies who may be interested in 
participating, on the model suggested by Turkey and 
others at the last HLTF.  This meeting will assist us in 
gauging Russia's seriousness in engaging the new U.S. 
administration on the Parallel Actions Package, while 
underscoring the need to address the additional CFE- 
related problems posed by expanded Russian military 
presence on the territory of Georgia since August 2008. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
RUSSIAN AIDE MEMOIRE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4. (SBU) The U.S. non-paper provided at the April 28 
HLTF provided a summary of the core substantive 
challenges that have emerged in the parallel actions 
discussion to date.  That analysis was reinforced by 
Russia's Aide Memoire (provided to A/S Gottemoeller on 
April 24 and distributed to all CFE States Parties at 
the JCG in Vienna on May 5.)  U.S. rep should seek 
Allied views on the range of issues in both papers with 
a view to reaching a common understanding of core 
challenges: Russia's insistence on abolishing the flank 
for itself; Russia's continuing failure to implement 
CFE; and Russia's continued disregard for the principle 
of host-nation consent in both Georgia and Moldova.  In 
addition to a point-by-point discussion of Russia's Aide 
Memoire, we would also welcome new ideas for a way 
forward on these individual issues.  U.S. del may draw 
from the following and from ref A, as appropriate, in 
discussion of Russia's position generally and point-by- 
point while also eliciting input from Allies on each 
element: 
 
STATE 00053816  003 OF 007 
 
 
 
-- General Comments: Russia's Aide Memoire states that 
the Parallel Actions Package could serve as a basis for 
restoring the viability of CFE.  Substantively the Aide 
Memoire does not reflect significant new ideas or 
flexibility; rather, it largely repeats familiar 
positions.  It is fair, however, to say that the Aide 
Memoire is not a step backward regarding Russian 
positions articulated since 2007.  In at least one case 
- regarding transparency for Moldova and the 
Transcaucasus - it will be useful to probe details of 
Russian thinking, since Russia has invited the 
possibility of such measures, which will be essential in 
finding a way forward.  In another case - the question 
of a collective ceiling - it is not clear whether the 
Russians have moved toward NATO's proposal to consider 
reductions in national ceilings in lieu of a collective 
ceiling, or continues to seek the latter.  We hope we 
can build on Russia's apparent interest in re-engaging 
to try to redirect CFE negotiations to a positive 
trajectory.  In responding to the Russian Aide Memoire, 
we must ensure the continuation of a unified NATO 
message to Russia on CFE and other security issues. 
 
-- Point 1 ? Ratification of the Agreement on 
Adaptation: Russia remains focused on eliciting as much 
certainty as possible regarding Allies' plans for 
ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty -- with 
particular interest in ratification by the U.S., the UK, 
Germany, and France, as well as Georgia and Moldova.  In 
the fall of 2007, Allies developed a three-phase matrix 
of ratification plans and processes.  Russia does not 
mention this approach in its Aide Memoire.  We should 
think creatively about what assurances we can provide 
regarding ratification plans.  It is also worth 
highlighting that Russia has sought to insist that 
"ratification" means deposit of instruments, as well as 
parliamentary/executive approval.  Allies had, in the 
matrix process, envisioned a staggered series of NATO 
ratifications, culminating in a moment when all Allies 
would deposit instruments together.  This is because 
Allies wanted to maintain a unified position on this key 
matter.  We would be interested in any further Allied 
thinking on this point. 
 
-- Point 2 - Provisional Application:  The first phase 
of Russia's two-phased approach seems to be in keeping 
with the generalized political commitment proposed by 
NATO, that all parties would act in a manner consistent 
with the object and purpose of the Adapted Treaty 
(A/CFE) until it enters into force.  Russia's idea of 
provisional application within 6 months of agreement on 
the package raises serious concerns for the U.S.: it 
would be politically impossible for the U.S. to 
provisionally apply a Treaty prior to the Senate 
providing advice and consent for its ratification.  The 
notion that Allies would provisionally apply A/CFE while 
Russia fails to implement CFE is unreasonable, 
especially in light of Russia's actions in South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia since August 2008.  It would be useful to 
know in what circumstances other Allies could 
provisionally apply A/CFE. 
 
-- Point 3 - Abolish the Flank regime for Russia:  Along 
with Russia's suspension of its implementation of CFE, 
the flank is the core issue now in play.  The Russian 
proposal would change a fundamental element of the 
Adapted Treaty prior to its ratification, which could 
imperil prospects for entry into force of A/CFE.  Russia 
remains firm making clear the flank is a high-level 
political issue and a sine qua non for achieving 
agreement on the package.  The Aide Memoire is the first 
time Russia has indicated in writing the possibility of 
confidence-building measures to address concerns about 
abolition of the flank for Russia.  We would be very 
interested in Allies' thinking on this Russian idea, 
which appears to us to imply the possibility that Russia 
would consider substitution of political commitments for 
the legal limits and related provisions concerning the 
flank in the Adapted CFE Treaty, on the basis of 
reciprocity, a reference presumably to political 
commitments NATO States have made. However, there is no 
indication that Russia is prepared to forego legally 
binding flank limits on NATO states. 
 
- U.S. team should also elicit discussion of other 
 
STATE 00053816  004 OF 007 
 
 
implications of the Russian proposal:  the implications 
for Ukraine, for stability in the Caucasus, for 
accession by the Baltic states. 
 
-- Point 4 - Equipment Reductions for NATO States 
Parties:  It is not clear whether Russia has moved 
toward the U.S./NATO idea of considering lowering 
national equipment ceilings rather than establishing a 
collective ceiling for NATO.  It would be useful to 
clarify this point in further discussions with Russia. 
 
- We would be interested in knowing whether individual 
Allies envision possible reductions in ceilings in any 
equipment category. 
 
-- Point 5 - Conditions for Accession:  Russia continues 
to insist on establishing the conditions of accession to 
CFE in the near term for the Baltic states and Slovenia, 
and now Croatia and Albania as well.  This remains an 
issue of timing.  U.S. team should elicit thinking from 
the Baltics and others directly concerned, and engage 
Croatia and Albania on their thinking as well. 
 
-- Point 6 - Definition of "Substantial Combat Forces": 
Insistence on defining this term as part of the package 
is yet another unwavering Russian position.  Definition 
of "substantial combat forces," as the phrase is used in 
the NATO-Russia Founding Act, should only be developed 
in the context of a deal on CFE.  Such a discussion is 
not appropriate for the OSCE in Vienna - this is a NATO- 
Russia, not a CFE or OSCE issue. 
 
-- Point 7 - Future Review:  Russia's position goes 
beyond the NATO position to review the operation of the 
Adapted Treaty once it is in force by calling for a 
guarantee to update the Treaty after it is in force and 
the possibility of including a sample list of (yet to be 
specified) issues as part of the package.  The NATO 
position calls for a political commitment to review the 
Treaty after its entry into force and specifies the 
consideration of changes to equipment ceilings and sub- 
ceilings (e.g., flank limits).  Including in the package 
a specific commitment to change, following Allied 
ratification, key provisions of the Adapted Treaty would 
make ratification highly problematic. 
 
-- Point 8 - Moldova: NATO Allies should continue to 
give primacy to Moldova's position on the status of the 
1992 ceasefire agreement.  The Istanbul commitments 
required withdrawal of Russian military forces from 
Moldova by the end of 2002; that deadline was extended 
to 2003.  The withdrawal was not completed.  The 
language of the Parallel Actions Package was a 
significant change in the U.S./NATO position, which 
previously had simply insisted on fulfillment of that 
withdrawal commitment as a prerequisite for ratification 
of the Adapted Treaty by NATO Allies. 
 
-  In general, it seems that progress is possible on the 
Moldova portion of the Parallel Actions Package.  The 
package does not require that Russia withdraw its PKF 
from Moldova as the basis for agreement, but instead 
focuses on establishing a structure to promote 
demilitarization of the conflict, eventual replacement 
of the existing PKF with multinational observers, and 
enhanced transparency. 
 
- The U.S. will continue to engage with both Moldova and 
Russia to see if more common ground is possible.  We are 
mindful of Romanian concerns regarding status of the 
PKF.  Obviously, appropriate assurances are necessary 
for Moldova's neighbors as well as for Chisinau. 
 
-- Point 9 - Regional Transparency-related Issues:  We 
welcome Russia's readiness to consider possible 
transparency measures for Moldova and the Transcaucasus. 
The U.S. plans to probe Russian thinking on this point 
when we meet in the bilateral format, and seek 
clarification on how this element of the Aide Memoire 
applies to specific ideas advanced by the U.S. in the 
Georgia and Moldova contexts.  We note that Russia used 
the word "Transcaucasus" rather than mentioning Georgia; 
this may be a step that can be built upon, if it 
provides a way to avoid problem issues relating to the 
status of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian regions of 
Georgia. 
 
STATE 00053816  005 OF 007 
 
 
 
- The U.S.-Georgia proposals developed in December 2008 
to update the Georgia portion of the package did not 
propose a full Russian military withdrawal from the 
regions of South Osetia and Abkhazia, nor did they 
require resolution of their political status.  Rather, 
the U.S.-Georgia points offered a way forward that would 
eliminate the heavy equipment associated with the 
Russian presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, provide 
transparency regarding Russian and other military forces 
throughout the region, and offer international 
observation where there are significant new 
concentrations of forces.  In addition to disbanding and 
withdrawing the Russian military base at Gudauta by 1 
July 2001, Istanbul required Russia and Georgia to agree 
on the utilization of remaining military facilities and 
infrastructure at Gudauta, which is located in Abkhazia. 
That deal will not happen; Georgia will not recognize 
Russian ownership of the base as legitimate.  The three 
elements developed by Georgia and the U.S. in effect 
leapt over this problem, and thus provide a conceptual 
basis for seeking ratification of the Adapted Treaty. 
 
-- Point 10 ? Mechanism for Approving Package:  Russia 
suggests using the Final Document of a new Extraordinary 
Conference of CFE States Parties as the mechanism.  This 
seems like a viable option assuming core issues are 
resolved in advance. It is also an idea previously 
advanced by Russian authorities.  We will want to 
consider how some of the elements of the package would 
be handled in the context of a Final Document of CFE 
States Parties, considering some, such as defining 
"substantial combat forces," do not fall strictly within 
the purview of CFE. 
 
-- Point 11 - Russian Implementation of CFE:  Russia's 
failure to implement is, along with the flank, a core 
issue that hinders prospects for ratification of A/CFE, 
and agreement on a way forward.  In the Aide Memoire, 
Russia indicates openness to some level of 
implementation of reciprocal transparency measures on a 
bilateral basis after agreement on the package (likely 
based on our suggestion that fulfillment of data 
exchange/information and inspection provisions would be 
a useful step.)  This is another element that will be 
explored with Russia to probe for maximum flexibility. 
 
- We would be interested in Allied views on whether 
Russian implementation of elements of the Adapted Treaty 
on a bilateral basis would facilitate agreement on a 
package or ratification by Parliaments. 
 
-- Point 12 - Intensified Efforts to Resolve the 
Impasse: The Aide Memoire stresses the importance of the 
bilateral channel to make progress.  While we welcome 
Russia's reaffirmation of its willingness to step up 
efforts, we do not concur that disaggregating the 
package for discussion in Vienna would be beneficial to 
achieving resolution.  It would risk Russia pocketing 
further gains or even derailing the process entirely. 
In terms of variable geometry, if Russia seriously 
engages, we agree with the idea - that Allies have 
proposed in recent HLTF discussions - of augmenting the 
bilateral track by engaging with the Russians together 
with a small group of Allies in discussing the full 
range of issues. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
COMMON APPROACH FOR BERLIN 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5. (SBU) Allies agreed that the Away Day would serve as 
a key event to prepare for the June seminar.  U.S. rep 
should encourage Allies to agree on an approach for 
Berlin that strives to achieve maximum benefit for 
efforts to resolve the impasse ? rather than an extended 
meeting in which familiar maximalist positions are 
repeated and a negative tone is perpetuated.  We might 
seek to emphasize the value of transparency and mutual 
confidence, and the contribution that conventional arms 
control has made to security and stability in Europe. 
The June 10 meeting should not be allowed to turn into a 
negotiating session and there should not be any effort 
to conduct an element-by-element examination of either 
the Package or the Aide Memoire. 
 
 
STATE 00053816  006 OF 007 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Themes.  U.S. team should suggest that Allies 
agree on a set of themes for discussion on June 10, on 
the following lines: 
 
-- The importance of military transparency as a 
contribution to Euro-Atlantic security and stability, 
and the key role that arms control, including CFE, has 
played in providing it. 
 
-- Readiness of Allies to work to resolve CFE issues in 
a way that is acceptable to all CFE states and results 
in implementation of the regime by all signatories. 
 
-- Desirability of achieving entry into force of Adapted 
CFE and to extend participation beyond the current 30 
CFE states, recognizing that the CFE regime is important 
to all of Europe, not only to the current States 
Parties. 
 
-- Importance of implementing all legal and political 
commitments. 
 
-- Utility of arms control in providing verifiable 
information regarding the defense arrangements of 
neighbors, so as to facilitate rational defense planning 
in a time of limited economic resources. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Meetings on the Margins.  U.S. team should, as 
appropriate, outline for Allies U.S. hopes for meetings 
on the margins of the June seminar (including a meeting 
of all Allies, and possibly an initial meeting of a 
small, self-selected group of Allies, with Russia, as an 
expansion of the U.S.-Russia bilateral dialogue, if 
Russia agrees). 
 
¶8. (SBU) Annotated Agenda.  The Germans have circulated 
an annotated agenda for the Berlin seminar that includes 
two broad topics: "Stocktaking and Perspectives for 
Conventional Arms Control in Europe" and "Challenges and 
Options for the Future."  The latter includes the 
expected sub-categories of "Regional Crises" and 
"Progress of Technology" as areas that could benefit 
from additional new arms control measures without any 
details as to which advances in technology and military 
capabilities are up for discussion.  U.S. rep should 
seek further clarification from the German delegation on 
this agenda item and in particular what it implies for 
current NATO positions.  We feel strongly that the first 
step in exploring new ideas is an internal and Alliance 
discussion, before brainstorming with an audience that 
includes not only Russia but also non-CFE states.  We 
also have concerns with broaching any topics (such as 
UAVs) for which there is not yet an Alliance position. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Draft Chairman's Statement.  U.S. team should 
seek an opportunity with UK, French, and German 
delegations, to provide comments on Germany's draft 
"chairman's statement," circulated for comment to the 
quad only. 
 
-- In general we believe the German chairman's statement 
makes sense in the context of a seminar that will 
include a very wide net of participants, not all of 
which are CFE states.  It does not go into detail, which 
is probably appropriate for an event which is not 
intended to produce specific conclusions.  It does not 
set up an extension of the German meeting process, which 
would be unhelpful.  Future work needs to concentrate on 
a CFE solution, not on generalized events lauding arms 
control. 
 
-- We note that the German paper does not mention the 
importance of meeting Treaty and political obligations. 
This seems to us an essential, basic point which a 
number of delegations are certain to raise, and Germany 
would do well to consider how to incorporate this theme 
into its statement. 
 
-- Point (3): the idea of comparable levels of security 
for all nations, does not seem to us necessarily 
problematic, but it also is not clear.  What is required 
for a small country to enjoy a comparable level of 
security when its neighbor has a large military 
organization which can easily menace its political 
independence?  Should the small country join a military 
alliance with friends, and thus gain "comparable 
 
STATE 00053816  007 OF 007 
 
 
security?"  This idea may raise more difficulties in 
discussion than common ground. 
 
-- Point (5): the call for further work to find a CFE 
solution based on the Parallel Actions Package, 
especially if Russia engages seriously on June 3, seems 
likely to find favor with both Russia and NATO. 
 
-- Point (6):  the linkage between arms control and the 
Georgia conflict raises conceptual problems.  No arms 
control regime will prevent a war.  Arms control-like 
steps may help to build confidence in Georgia now, but 
only if all sides are prepared to implement them in good 
faith. 
 
-- Point (7):  it is a fair point, in principle, that 
arms control should take account of new technologies 
where appropriate.  We question, however, Germany's goal 
in including this point.  We doubt that Russian 
authorities would welcome a call to set limits on a 
number of new military technologies, such as armed 
drones, and we consider it even more unlikely that 
Russia would be prepared to endorse restrictions on 
military-technical advances that cut equally against 
Russia and NATO Allies. 
 
-- Point (10):  We are not fully comfortable with the 
language of point 10:  at this stage we should not 
suggest that it is sufficient to preserve "the 
substance" of the CFE regime.  It may come to that.  But 
NATO's stated goal is to achieve entry into force of the 
Adapted CFE Treaty, and then further modernize and 
enhance it. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
DATE OF NEXT HLTF MEETING 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10. (SBU) The IS has indicated that July 9 is not 
workable for all for the next HLTF and will propose July 
16 as an alternate.  This date is fine from the U.S. 
perspective and will allow for drawing conclusions from 
the preceding events and considering next steps in light 
of any developments. 
CLINTON