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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 STATE 052964 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL NPT
SUBJECT: REPORT ON FIRST WEEK OF NPT PREPCOM III, MAY 4-8, 
2009 
 
REF: STATE 044744 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  This is the first in a series of reporting 
messages on the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee 
for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 
(NPT PrepCom III), which met in New York on May 4-15, 2009. 
The U.S. Delegation to the PrepCom achieved much of its 
modest aims in the first week of the proceedings, 
contextualizing the President,s Prague speech within the 
NPT, and engaging on an eventual P-5 statement to the 
PrepCom.  The U.S. opening statement, delivered by Assistant 
Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and 
Implementation Rose Gottemoeller, set a positive tone that 
was rarely spoiled.  The Iranian delegation was a notable 
exception, delivering a series of harsh statements and 
working papers (eliciting retorts by the UK and France, among 
others), while the Egyptians questioned the future of the 
Treaty over a lack of progress on creating a Middle East zone 
free of nuclear weapons.  By the end of the week, the PrepCom 
had agreed on a president-designate 
, and agenda, and rules of procedure for the 2010 RevCon; 
however, the PrepCom chairman also had circulated a draft 
final document that over-reached, and delegations considered 
how to respond to the Chair,s document.  Septels have 
reported on various bilateral and other meetings held by A/S 
Gottemoeller on the margins of the PrepCom.  End Summary 
 
---------------------------- 
Opening Statements: Overview 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Countries gave their opening statements, including 
the United States - delivered by Assistant Secretary of State 
for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Rose 
Gottemoeller.  She set a positive tone, securely framing 
 
STATE 00052964  002 OF 010 
 
 
President Obama,s nonproliferation, disarmament, and 
peaceful uses of nuclear power policies within the NPT 
context.  Other Parties gave similarly upbeat assessments of 
the current trends, including positive comments on the 
President,s speech.  The Arab Group welcomed the positive 
atmosphere created by the U.S.; however, it said that the 
proposed U.S. initiatives alone were insufficient, and that 
progress must be made on the 1995 Resolution on the Middle 
East if the 2010 RevCon is to be successful. 
 
¶3. (U) A few Parties gave negative opening statements, 
including Iran.  Its lengthy statement argued that alleged 
noncompliance by the United States, France, and the United 
Kingdom (notably omitting Russia and China) on Articles I, 
IV, and VI was the greatest threat to the Treaty.  Iran 
claimed that U.S. nuclear cooperation with Israel was in 
violation of the Treaty, and discounted the President,s 
speech in light of prior &unfulfilled promises8 by the 
United States.  The United Kingdom exercised its right of 
reply in response to Iran,s specific criticisms of its 
disarmament record. 
 
¶4. (U) NAM president Cuba criticized nuclear cooperation with 
India, and implied that it benefited from non-safeguarded 
facilities in violation of NPT Article III.  Egypt criticized 
(without naming names) cooperation with non-NPT Parties, and 
called NSG attempts to restrict "sensitive" nuclear 
technologies discriminatory.  It blasted Israel for not 
joining the NPT, not having IAEA safeguards, and for creating 
the potential for a regional arms race.  This sentiment was 
echoed by most Arab Parties and several other members of the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).  Several Parties made specific 
mention of the Democratic People,s Republic of Korea in 
their opening statements, but none ) including the United 
States - made specific reference to Iran and its 
noncompliance with its Treaty obligations. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Opening Statements:  Disarmament 
-------------------------------- 
 
STATE 00052964  003 OF 010 
 
 
 
¶5. (U) States welcomed the U.S. Administration,s renewed 
efforts to fulfill its Article VI obligations, although the 
Arab League echoed Iran by stating that these were made 
previously through the 2000 RevCon Final Document, and 
subsequently were ignored.  Very few (UAE was one) 
specifically mentioned the &13 practical steps.8  Thailand 
called for the enactment of the UN Secretary General,s 
5-Point Proposal on Nuclear Disarmament.  Russia wanted 
post-START obligations to prohibit the deployment of 
offensive or defensive weapons outside national territory, 
and continued to oppose missile defense.  China boasted of 
its strong record on disarmament, emphasizing its policies on 
no first use, no use against any non-nuclear-weapon state 
(NNWS), its status as a signatory to the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and its support for legally 
binding negative security assurances (NSA).  Several Parties, 
principally NNWS and NAM members, supported the call for a 
legally binding NSA treaty.  Many states exp 
ressed support for nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) in 
general, with specific praise for the entry into force of the 
Central Asia NWFZ, and one call from Thailand for the nuclear 
weapon states (NWS) to join SEANWFZ. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Opening Statements:  Nonproliferation 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) A growing number of Parties support holding up the 
Additional Protocol as the new international "standard" for 
safeguards, while almost all noted the need to negotiate and 
implement some level of safeguards agreement.  Almost all 
Parties voiced support for CTBT entry into force and the 
negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (with Egypt 
and Australia emphasizing the &Shannon mandate8).  Syria 
focused significant attention on Israel,s failure to submit 
to IAEA safeguards.  General calls for the universalization 
of the NPT also were made, including the need to take 
measures to compel non-members to join.  The Arab League 
remarked on Israel, noting that some states provide 
 
STATE 00052964  004 OF 010 
 
 
rationales and excuses for Israel not to join, and used 
strong language concerning the implementation of the 1995 
Middle East Resolution as a non-negotiable, overriding 
priority.  The UAE indirectly criticized Iran, and possibly 
Syria, by calling for an end to attempts to acquire nuclear 
weapons, and demand steps to halt att 
empts to transfer the production and stockpiling of nuclear 
weapons.  Iran exercised its right of reply to correct the 
reference to the Arab Gulf region, noting that its correct 
name was the Persian Gulf. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Opening Statements:  Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶7. (U) A broad number of Parties, including from the NAM, 
called for reaffirming the inalienable right of Parties to 
the Treaty to develop nuclear programs for peaceful use 
without discrimination.  Some states called for the promotion 
of technology transfer, while a few noted the need to balance 
rights and responsibilities ) nuclear safety, security, and 
safeguards obligations - and that there should be a greater 
balance among the three NPT pillars.  Syria, however, noted 
asserted a double standard in the application of the Treaty 
pillars. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Opening Statements:  Administrative Matters 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) Chairman AMB Boniface Chidyausiku (Zimbabwe) proposed 
to change the dates of the RevCon (to May 3 - 28), and named 
the prospective president of the RevCon ) AMB Libran 
Cabactulan of The Philippines.  The Chair also announced that 
the RevCon agenda was still under consultation (COMMENT: 
France was blocking progress.  END COMMENT), and that he 
would circulate draft elements of substantive recommendations 
from the PrepCom to the RevCon to facilitate discussion the 
following week.  Canada reiterated its long-suggested 
improvements to the NPT review process, including annual, 
 
STATE 00052964  005 OF 010 
 
 
shorter sessions, and the establishment of a quasi-permanent 
secretariat staff.  Several NAM statements called for the 
establishment of subsidiary bodies on security assurances, 
nuclear disarmament, and the implementation of the 1995 
Middle East Resolution. 
 
¶9. (U) On May 6, the PrepCom adopted by consensus the 
Provisional Agenda for the RevCon, the proposed dates for the 
next RevCon (delayed one week to May 3)28), the draft Rules 
of Procedure, and the selection of the RevCon President and 
of Chairpersons for its Main and Drafting Committees. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Statements by Non-Governmental Organizations 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (U) Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) were given time 
on May 5 to deliver statements to those delegates who cared 
to attend.  Notably, Tadatoshi Akiba, current President of 
Mayors for Peace and Mayor of Hiroshima, coined the phrase, 
"Obamajority," to describe the new majority of individuals 
and countries who support the President,s vision of a 
nuclear-weapon-free world. 
 
------------------------- 
Cluster One:  Disarmament 
------------------------- 
 
¶11. (U) Most delegations continued to praise the April 1 
statement by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, the improved 
atmosphere for advances in this area, and progress towards a 
CTBT and FMCT.  The Netherlands emphasized the need for a 
verifiable FMCT, with the IAEA fulfilling the verification 
role. There was a noticeable trend towards emphasizing 
de-alerting (including by the &De-Alert Group,8 made up of 
Malaysia, Nigeria, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
Chile), as well as transparency in disarmament, in several 
statements. 
 
¶12. (U) The EU statement proposed "to start the consultations 
 
STATE 00052964  006 OF 010 
 
 
on a treaty banning short- and intermediate-range 
ground-to-ground missiles."  The UK emphasized the importance 
of the 2010 RevCon and its upcoming P-5 conference on 
verification issues, as well as its work with Norway on 
disarmament verification.  France gave one of the strongest 
statements, pointedly reminding the NNWS that the NNWS shares 
responsibility for disarmament:  "We must better control 
exports, control access to the most sensitive training, stop 
proliferating trafficking, criminalize proliferation 
activities and crack down on their funding.8  Brazil said 
that the success of the 2010 RevCon rested on a global 
re-commitment to the &zero option.8 
 
¶13. (U) Japan set out eleven benchmarks needed in three areas 
for nuclear disarmament progress:  (1) measures that need to 
be taken by the USA and Russia, such as a START follow-on 
agreement; (2) measures that need to be taken by the 
international community as a whole, such as CTBT and FMCT; 
(3) the restriction of ballistic missiles.  China touted its 
negative security assurances and the need for &fairness, 
justice, gradual reduction and downward balance," as well as 
for a treaty to keep weapons out of outer space.  Russia 
noted that zero is only possible with strengthened strategic 
stability and equal security, echoed China,s call for a 
space treaty, emphasized irreversibility and, without naming 
it, criticized &Global Strike.8 
 
¶14. (U) In an unusual tit-for-tat, Syria responded to 
Canadian and New Zealand criticism of its non-compliance by 
stating that "all reports" support Syria,s adherence to the 
NPT.  Syria said that the credibility of the NPT is 
undermined when people use &counterfeit New Zealand 
passports,8 that it joined the NPT before Canada, and that 
Canada neglected to note Israel,s absence at the PrepCom. 
In reply, Canada expressed its delight that Syria joined the 
NPT before it, but noted that the right to use nuclear energy 
brought obligations. Canada said that the IAEA report issued 
recently did not reflect full Syrian cooperation, welcomed 
Syria,s future cooperation, and looked forward to subsequent 
IAEA reports on the matter. 
 
STATE 00052964  007 OF 010 
 
 
 
¶15. (U) There were a great many calls from developing 
countries for a legally binding instrument on security 
assurances; several delegations, including Indonesia on 
behalf of the NAM, asserted that the NNWS have a "right" to 
negative security assurances, and that nuclear disarmament 
was the ultimate objective of the NPT.  There also were 
several calls from the NAM and others on the need for 
subsidiary bodies at the 2010 Review Conference on negative 
security assurances and nuclear disarmament.  Iran lamented 
that no practical steps had been taken to reduce tactical 
nuclear weapons, and leveled criticisms at the &NPR8 that 
seemed moored in 2002.  It also repeated criticisms of the 
U.S., the UK, and France, and called for either the 
negotiation of a timetable for nuclear disarmament at the 
2010 RevCon, or an amendment to the NPT to include a 
disarmament timetable.  France came back at Iran, listing 
inaccuracies in its statement, with Iran replying that French 
steps towards disarmament have not been verified o 
r otherwise subject to international inspections. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Cluster Two:  Nonproliferation, Safeguards, NWFZs 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶16. (U) Most countries endorsed the need for universal 
acceptance of the Additional Protocol and enhancing IAEA 
safeguards verification capabilities. The NAM reiterated that 
the right to develop peaceful nuclear energy must not be 
infringed upon.  The UK called on India, Israel, and Pakistan 
to sign the NPT, and for the DPRK to return to full 
compliance with the NPT.  Many countries expressed support 
for the Global Initiative and PSI.  Turkey expressed support 
for the P5 process in Iran, the Six-Party talks in the DPRK, 
and a WMDFZ in the Middle East.  Iran provided a rambling 
statement listing 20 principles that states "have to take 
into serious consideration," including that safeguards 
obligations are voluntary in nature, and that strengthening 
comprehensive safeguards agreements only can only be possible 
if applied universally.  Syria again reiterated that Israel 
 
STATE 00052964  008 OF 010 
 
 
unfairly targeted a non-nuclear, military-only facility, and 
that Syria was in compliance with its safeguards obligations. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Cluster Special Session:  Regional Issues 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (U) The focus on the 1995 Middle East Resolution by 
States Party came as no surprise to anyone.  NAM and Arab 
states attacked Israel for not acceding to the Treaty as a 
NNWS and submitting its nuclear activities to IAEA 
safeguards.  Several NAM states proposed institutional 
changes to the RevCon process to help implement the 
Resolution, including the establishment of a Subsidiary Body 
to Main Committee II of the RevCon that would focus on 
practical steps, the creation of a Standing Committee of the 
NPT on implementation, inter-sessional meetings on 
implementation, and a 2011 Conference on a Middle East NWFZ. 
Iran delivered a rebuke to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission for entering into an Agreement with the Israeli 
Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), and to the U.S. in general 
for allegedly providing Israel with nuclear weapons, as 
outlined in a "top secret document dated 23 August 1974." 
(COMMENT: Those remarks in all probability referred to a 
declassified &Special National Intelligence Estimate8 t 
hat reflected the first official U.S. judgment that Israel 
possessed operational nuclear weapons.  END COMMENT) 
 
¶18. (SBU) Other Parties used this occasion to criticize Iran 
and the DPRK.  Many urged Iran to resolve the outstanding 
issues surrounding its nuclear program by complying with all 
relevant UNSCRs and working with the IAEA.  Parties also 
urged the DPRK to return to the Six-Party process, abandon 
all nuclear weapons programs, and return to compliance with 
the provisions of the NPT without delay.  Some States 
criticized U.S. nuclear cooperation with India as a perceived 
violation of the NPT.  Strong support was expressed for 
NWFZs, and several Parties gave their approval to the Central 
Asia NWFZ. 
 
 
STATE 00052964  009 OF 010 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Cluster Three:  Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶19. (U) The Parties, statements generally reiterated the 
idea that all States Party to the NPT support the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy, although the levels of rights and 
responsibilities outlined by various states predictably 
differed.  The NAM, Brazil, Thailand, and Turkey all noted 
their support for non-discriminatory use of nuclear energy, 
and called on all IAEA Member States to implement total 
transparency.  The EU, the UK, and France all noted their 
extensive records regarding financial and technical support 
to the IAEA in all areas, including peaceful uses.  Australia 
noted its concern over terrorist use of nuclear material and 
encouraged all States Party to ratify the Convention on 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM), implement 
UNSCR 1540, and support the International Convention for 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.  The IAEA provided 
a briefing on the IAEA,s Multilateral Approach to the 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle.  Of note, the IAEA stated that it had 
been approached by 45 countries 
 within the past year to discuss possible future nuclear 
programs, mostly in response to expected global regulations 
limiting the amount of fossil fuel emissions.  The IAEA 
further stated that a new multilateral fuel framework will 
require a verifiable FMCT for it to be successful. 
 
-------------------------- 
Chairman,s Final Statement 
-------------------------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) At the end of the May 8 morning session, the Chair 
provided delegations with his lengthy, detailed, and 
potentially controversial draft &Recommendations to the 2010 
Review Conference,8 inviting comments.  The U.S. Delegation 
began reviewing the statement and began work on a shorter, 
more general alternative. 
 
-------- 
 
STATE 00052964  010 OF 010 
 
 
Wrap-up 
-------- 
 
¶21. (SBU) The Delegation made substantial progress towards 
fulfilling U.S. objectives for the PrepCom (Ref A).  Those 
objectives were to work with other NPT Parties to complete 
arrangements for a successful RevCon, to place the 
President,s recent Prague speech into the NPT context, and 
to pursue a P-5 statement only if consensus language therein 
reflected U.S. policy.  The first two objectives were met by 
the end of the first week.  On a P-5 statement, there was no 
easy consensus on language, but further negotiations were to 
continue during week two.  Overall, the overarching U.S. goal 
- to ensure a RevCon that strengthens the NPT and advances 
the President,s nonproliferation and disarmament agenda ) 
was well advanced during week one of the PrepCom. 
CLINTON