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UNCLAS STATE 050499 
 
SIPDIS 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR ECON PREL PGOV EWWT KCRM PBTS PHSA
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: MAY 29 MEETING OF CONTACT  GROUP 
ON PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA 
 
REF: A. STATE 42291 B. STATE 45157 
 
¶1. This is an action request; please see paragraph 3. 
This demarche is info only for Embassy Nicosia, as Cyprus 
has not been invited to participate in the May 29 meeting. 
 
---------------- 
OBJECTIVES 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  Reference A announced the upcoming plenary meeting of 
the Contact Group on Piracy of the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) 
and Reference B provided talking points for posts to deliver 
to governments invited to attend.  This cable provides the 
agenda, administrative information, and USG positions on the 
issues to be discussed 
 
---------------------- 
ACTION REQUEST 
---------------------- 
 
¶3.  Posts are asked to share the attached agenda and 
administrative information,and to preview issues to be 
discussed with host governments at the appropriate level. 
Posts are requested to obtain from capitals by May 21 the 
names, titles,and contact information (phone, fax and email) 
of persons who will be attending the CGPCS and to forward 
this information to the points of contact in the last 
paragraph. 
 
-------------------- 
DRAFT AGENDA 
-------------------- 
 
¶4.  The draft agenda is as follows.  Participant views on 
additional agenda items should be communicated to the points 
of contact in the last paragraph. 
 
09:30-10:00 a.m.  Registration and Coffee 
10:00-10:15 a.m.  Introductory Comments and Outline of 
                  Objectives 
10:15-11:15 a.m.  Brief (1 minute) Remarks by Participants 
                  Desiring to Speak 
11:15-11:45 a.m.  Break 
11:45-1:00 p.m.   Reports from Working Groups 
-- Working Group 1 and Shared 
Awareness and Deconfliction Process 
(UK, Chair) 
-- Working Group 2 and International 
Trust Fund proposal(Denmark, Chair) 
-- Working Group 4 (Egypt, Chair) 
1:00-2:30 p.m.          No Host Lunch 
2:30-4:00 p.m.          New Business 
                  -- Tasking Proposal for Working Group 3 
                  -- U.S. proposal to create Working Group 5 
                  on Financial Levers 
                  -- Other business as raised by participants 
4:00-4:30 p.m.          Break 
4:30-5:30 p.m.          Next Steps and Concluding Remarks 
                  -- Date, Host, and Venue for next plenary 
-- Approve Communiqu Language 
5:30 p.m.         Press Availability for Heads of Delegations 
 
 
--------------------------- 
Administrative Information 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5.  The meeting will take place at the United Nations 
Headquarters Building,New York City, in Conference Room 
Four from 9:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.  Morning and afternoon 
refreshments will be provided by the U.S. outside the 
Conference Room;no-host luncheon will be available in the 
UN Dining Room or Cafeteria facilities.Special Event building 
passes for delegation members not holding UN credentials 
will be issued at a reception table inside the building at 
the Visitors Entrance. Conference packages will be 
distributed inside the Conference Room; only those delegates 
requiring passes need visit the reception table.  Conference 
staff will circulate an attendance roster to collect, and 
will subsequently make available to all attendees, delegate 
contact information. 
 
--------------- 
USG Positions 
--------------- 
 
¶6.  The following paragraphs articulate USG positions on 
the primary issues we intend to raise for discussion. 
Conference organizers would welcome information from post 
in advance of the plenary regarding these views by other 
CGPCS participants. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
PRESS THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FORCES 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶7.  Operational coordination through regular Shared 
Awareness and Deconfliction(SHADE) meetings at the 
military operational level has improved the international 
community,s ability to deter pirate attacks, especially in 
the Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor (IRTC) in 
the Gulf of Aden (GOA).  The IRTC allows for the west-to-east 
transit of commercial traffic in a sanitized zone, limiting 
the number of military vessels required to secure the IRTC. 
SHADE meetings now occur weekly, co-hosted by the 
Coalition Maritime Forces and EU Naval Forces commanders, 
with higher-level meetings held every six weeks to ensure 
that scarce resources are used effectively.  This 
coordination 
has proved effective and the U.S. would oppose any proposed 
mechanism that would duplicate, impede upon, or attempt to 
replace the SHADE process.  The huge expanse of territory in 
the Somali Basin and irregular transit patterns makes an 
IRTC - type transit corridor there unworkable.  Additional 
forces, especially maritime patrol aircraft and unmanned 
aerial vehicles, are required to effectively patrol the 
Somali Basin.  The United States urges CGPCS 
participants and others concerned with countering piracy to 
provide additional military assets. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
ADOPT NATIONAL POLICIES TO SUPPORT DETENTION AND PROSECUTION 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
¶8.  States, especially those with international treaty 
obligations to do so,should ensure that they have in 
place policies and legislation that permit the detention 
and prosecution of pirates.  CGPCS Working Group 2 will offer 
two papers during the May 29 meeting.  The first lists 
impediments to prosecution in past cases and the second is a 
checklist of steps that states can take to ensure that they 
are able to prosecute suspected pirates.  Affected states with 
the ability to do so, including the states of registry, 
ship owners, cargo owners, and crew nationalities of pirated 
ships, should favorably consider the prosecution of suspected 
pirates in their domestic courts.  When the U.S. - 
flagged Maersk Alabama was attacked, the U.S. Undertook to 
prosecute the suspected pirate.  Other affected states have 
also prosecuted pirates. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
CREATE WORKING GROUP 5 ON FINANCIAL LEVERS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶9.  The United States will call for the creation of a 
fifth working group to examine financial levers that 
might be used against pirates and their enablers. 
Working Group 5 should focus on understanding informal 
financial systems as well as the formal systems that 
are potentially facilitating the activities of pirates 
off the Coast of Somalia.  It should examine the 
feasibility of disrupting the financing of pirate 
operations and pirateleaders through tracking and 
freezing of their assets.  It should also explore 
engaging international bodies, such as the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), to assist in 
developing standards that could be presented to 
the CGPCS, as well as bodies that track illicit 
financial flows to pirates and their operations. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
AGREE ON NEW TASKING FOR WORKING GROUP 3 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶10.  The U.S. will continue to work with industry to 
promote the implementation of self-protection measures. 
The U.S. suggests that Working Group 3 review, on a 
quarterly basis, lessons learned from pirate attacks 
and update anti-piracy guidance as necessary based 
upon new information.  In addition, the US also 
suggests that Working Group 3 undertake development 
of best management practices for use by owners, 
labor, and seafarers welfare organizations in aiding 
seafarers affected by piracy. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
PROMOTE NO CONCESSIONS POLICY 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶11.   Concessions to pirates, including the payment of 
ransom, encourage piratical activities and hostage taking. 
The USG has a long-standing No Concessions policy with 
regard to kidnapping and extortion, including piracy. 
No Concessions does not mean no action; the USG is 
committed to the safe recovery of pirated hostages. 
There is flexibility in negotiation processes to influence 
hostage-takers, thinking and to try and bring about the 
safe release of hostages; the act of talking to and trying 
to influence hostage-takers can have beneficial effects 
without concessions.  The USG discourages concessions by 
private parties, but prefers to remain informed if such 
discussions are underway. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
MAINTAIN PUBLIC AFFAIRS FOCUS IN WORKING GROUP 4 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶12.  The U.S. believes that Working Group 4 should focus 
on developing public affairs strategies for discouraging 
piracy, not on soliciting or managing strategies for 
capacity building or nation-state development.  While 
maritime security and prosecutorial capacity building and 
economic development in Somalia will play key roles in 
defeating piracy, these are being addressed in other CGPCS 
and international fora.  The CGPCS tasked Working Group 1 
with examining maritime capacity building needs around the 
Horn of Africa and East Africa.  The United Kingdom has 
traveled to the Somalia region to assess maritime capabilities 
in the region.  The CGPCS should empower Working Group 1 to 
continue these efforts.  Working Group 2 is the best place to 
work on building regional judicial capacity, given the 
expertise of the group,s members.  Any capacity building 
undertaken through the CGPCS must be in response to assessed 
needs and coordinated with other regional capacity development 
efforts, including the UNODC and IMO as well as other regional 
and bilateral capacity development.  The International Contact 
Group on Somalia, the UN, and bilateral initiatives by UN 
member 
states are the best mechanisms to help foster economic 
development in Somalia.  The CGPCS must do a better job 
informing the public and those thinking about becoming pirates 
of the destructive consequences of piracy to trade and 
development in Somalia and the region.  Working Group 4 was 
formed to perform this function and should concentrate on it. 
 
----------------- 
Points of contact 
----------------- 
 
¶13.   Department points of contact for this meeting are 
PM/PPA David Foran, 202-647-7162, forandm@state.gov, 
Aiyaz Husain, 202-647- 6058, husaina2@state.gov, and 
Christina Rosati, 202-647-3034, rosatics@state.gov. 
CLINTON