VZCZCXYZ0008
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #9044 1380500
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 132052Z MAY 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV IMMEDIATE 0110-0112
INFO RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 7835-7837

UNCLAS STATE 049044 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y  (ADDED SENSITIVE CAPTION) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MOPS NATO PARM PREL UP
SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT RESPONSE ON UKRAINIAN DEMILITARIZATION 
PROPOSAL 
 
REF: 2008 KYIV 2436 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1. (U) This is an action message.  Please see para 3. 
 
¶2. (U) Summary:  U.S. firearms and legal experts reviewed the 
Ukrainian technical proposal on conversion of small arms into 
souvenirs and found that the technique does not demilitarize 
the weapons according to U.S. regulations.  If modified 
according to the proposal, the USG would consider the 
souvenirs ineligible for unrestricted commercial sale in the 
U.S., and the trophies will remain a small arms proliferation 
risk.  The U.S. continues to believe that destruction, and 
not demilitarization, is the surest way to obtain both NATO 
and U.S. agreement to continue the NATO Partnership for Peace 
Trust Fund project beyond the end of 2009, and for the U.S. 
to continue as lead nation.  End Summary. 
 
¶3. (U) ACTION REQUEST:  The Department requests that Embassy 
Kyiv draw from the following objectives in relaying USG 
concerns to appropriate GoU interlocutors and to deliver the 
nonpaper in para 7.  The non-paper should be provided to the 
GOU along with a PDF file, to be e-mailed to Post, that 
contains recommendations from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) on where exactly to make the 
cuts to the firearms' receivers in order to meet ATF 
requirements for demilitarization.  ATF has provided a 
diagram of the recommend cuts onto the original GOU proposal. 
 Department will also send a spreadsheet informally provided 
to the Department by the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency 
(NAMSA), which provides a rough cost estimate of modifying 
approximately 200,000 firearms to meet ATF standards for 
irreversible demilitarization.  If deemed appropriate, Post 
may present the NAMSA cost estimate to the GOU for reference. 
 Department requests Embassy Kyiv to keep the NAMSA abreast 
of discussions with Ukraine on this matter. 
 
BEGIN OBJECTIVES 
 
-- Continue to urge the GOU decision to make a final decision 
to release 52,000 SA/LW for destruction and reiterate that 
the surest way to obtain approval for the U.S. to continue as 
lead nation for the NATO PfP Trust Fund project in Ukraine is 
to destroy the remaining approximately 216,000 SA/LW per the 
original commitment.  (Approximately 132,000 weapons of the 
originally planned 400,000 have been destroyed to date.) 
 
-- Explain that the GOU proposal to convert SA/LW into 
souvenirs does not meet U.S. standards for demilitarization. 
Non-paper in para 7 and the PDF file of the original GOU 
proposal with ATF edits, to be e-mailed to Post, describe the 
steps necessary to demilitarize the SA/LW irreversibly.  At 
Post's discretion, NAMSA's cost estimate on demilitarization 
per ATF standards can also be provided to the GOU. 
 
-- Emphasize to the GOU that it is important that it 
understand there is no flexibility on our standards for 
demilitarization as outlined in para 7 if the GOU desires to 
sell the trophies as commercial items without further ATF 
review.  Any alterations in addition to the ATF 
demilitarization plan outlined in the non-paper will require 
the GOU to submit an application as well as sample 
demilitarized firearms to the ATF for technical review in the 
United States. 
 
-- Convey to the GOU that U.S. law enforcement authorities 
have seen weapons demilitarized in a manner similar to that 
indicated in the Ukrainian proposal, which were then 
illicitly trafficked into the U.S. and made operable again 
for use in criminal acts. 
 
-- Note that any demilitarization, destruction, or re-sale of 
U.S.-origin weapons, such as the Thompson submachine gun 
(which was included in the GOU demilitarization proposal), 
will require additional prior approval from the USG, a 
process that may take more than a month.  Confirm whether the 
GOU plans to demilitarize or destroy any U.S.-origin weapons. 
 
-- Remind the GOU that irreversible demilitarization per para 
7 or destruction are required for U.S. agreement to continue 
the NATO Partnership-for-Peace (PfP) Trust Fund beyond 2009. 
 
-- Clarify that the process described in para. 7 is necessary 
not only for export of the demilitarized weapons to the 
United States, but also to any other country, in order to 
attain U.S. agreement for the Trust Fund to continue beyond 
¶2009. 
 
-- IF ASKED:  The USG is willing to send U.S. experts to Kyiv 
to explain and discuss the demilitarization proposal, per a 
previous GOU request.  Our preference would be for such a 
visit to coincide with the next Non-Proliferation Working 
Group. 
 
BACKGROUND AND NON-PAPER 
------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (U) ATF requires that specific cuts be made to all 
components of a firearm in order for the firearm to be 
considered demilitarized.  Para 7 non-paper and the PDF file 
to be e-mailed to Post describe the necessary steps, as well 
as alternatives pre-approved by the ATF.  The PDF file is the 
original GOU proposal upon which the ATF overlaid specific 
cuts on the firearms' receivers to ensure the main components 
with the exception of the barrel would be demilitarized 
irreversibly. Methods to demilitarize the barrel are also 
described in the non-paper.  Any other methods of 
demilitarization are assessed to be reversible, and therefore 
pose the risk that the firearm could be reconstituted or 
repaired and used in criminal activities.  Demilitarization 
of the remaining 216,000 SA/LW must meet the requirements set 
forth in para 7.  Any other process will not be acceptable to 
the U.S. and will result in a decision to shut down the NATO 
PfP Trust Fund project for the destruction of conventional 
arms and munitions in 
Ukraine once the remaining funds have been expended.  The 
Department will also e-mail Post a rough estimate of the 
costs associated with demilitarization to ATF standards that 
was informally provided to the Department by NAMSA.  The 
demilitarization costs, which do not take into account 
marketing and other expenses associated with sales of the end 
products, may be provided to the GOU at Post's discretion. 
 
¶5.  (SBU/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE) ATF noted to the 
Department that there are ongoing investigations into cases 
where Thompson sub-machineguns were allegedly sold by 
individuals in Ukraine to buyers in the United States.  These 
weapons were "demilitarized" in a manner similar to that 
proposed by the GOU, but the end users were able to make the 
weapons serviceable again.  The Department has seen no 
evidence of GOU involvement in the aforementioned case.  This 
is simply to note that the demilitarization technique 
proposed by the GOU has, in fact, been reversed. 
 
¶6.  (U) Section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act and the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations, as well as the 
original Letter of Agreement at the time of receipt of U.S. 
arms and other defense articles, require recipients of U.S. 
Munitions List defense articles to obtain authorization from 
the USG prior to a change in end-use of the defense articles 
for other than the purpose of receipt.  The disposal or 
demilitarization of such articles is considered a change in 
end-use.  The request for authorization should be submitted 
via the U.S. Embassy to the Office of Regional Security and 
Arms Transfers (PM/RSAT), Arms Transfer Division, U.S. 
Department of State.  The requirements for authorization 
requests and additional information can be obtained at 
www.state.gov/t/pm/rsat/C14025.htm. 
 
¶7.  (U) Begin non-paper: 
 
The United States Government (USG) technical and legal 
experts have reviewed the technical proposal on the 
demilitarization of small arms/light weapons (SA/LW) 
presented to the U.S. Embassy by the Government of Ukraine 
(GOU).  According to USG standards, SA/LW converted in 
accordance with the GOU-proposed modifications could be 
reversed, or otherwise reassembled using spare parts, to make 
the SA/LW operational. 
 
The U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives, (ATF) has defined certain requirements in order 
for a firearm to be considered demilitarized.  According to 
ATF requirements, the components (i.e. receiver, trigger, 
barrel, hammer, slides, and magazines) of a firearm must be 
severed and irreversibly demilitarized using diagonal 
oxy-acetylene torch cuts that are at least 1/4-inch thick. 
Each cut must effectively remove and destroy a 1/4 inch of 
the original material.  (Note:  Cuts using bandsaws or 
cut-off wheels are insufficient.  The 1/4 inch or more of 
material removed must be destroyed by the cutting process. 
End Note.)  The receiver itself must receive three cuts "that 
sever or pass through...(1) the threaded portion of the 
receiver ring and magazine well opening at bottom; (2) the 
hinge pin, ejector block and bolt guide rails, and; (3) the 
body locking lug and bolt guide rails."  On a separate 
document that will be provided to the GOU, ATF has drawn 
lines on the GOU proposal where specific cuts should be made 
on the firearms to meet the aforementioned requirements. 
Alternatively, the firearm components may be mangled, 
crushed, or sheared to the point that they are unrecognizable 
and unable to be put back into service.  Additional, required 
modifications on specific modifications in the proposal 
follow: 
 
--For all barrels, the cut through the barrel must be through 
the entire length of the barrel on at least one side.  A 
notch that only creates a depression in the barrel without 
cutting through one side, or a cut that does not run through 
the entire length of the barrel will be deemed insufficient. 
 
--NAGAN Revolver:  The cylinder must be drilled oversized 
throughout the cylinder or severed completely into two 
sections. 
 
There is no flexibility on our standards for demilitarization 
as outlined above if the GOU desires to sell the trophies as 
commercial items without further ATF review.  Any alteration 
to the ATF demilitarization plan outlined in this paper will 
require the GOU to submit an application as well as sample 
demilitarized firearms to the ATF for technical review in the 
United States.  Alternative methods, however, are highly 
unlikely to be approved, as ATF has seen many allegedly 
demilitarized firearms repaired and used in criminal acts. 
Any process that deviates from these standards will result in 
the end products being classified as firearms by the ATF and 
would not be considered to be irreversibly demilitarized. 
 
In addition, U.S. law requires preapproval for 
demilitarization or destruction of defense articles provided 
by the USG through a foreign assistance program.  For 
example, the GOU would need to seek approval for modification 
of the Thompson submachine guns, included in the types of 
firearms to be converted into collectibles according to the 
GOU proposal.  The U.S. Department of State will then need 
from the GOU the exact number and type of U.S.-origin 
weapons, such as the Thompson, that the GOU intends either to 
destroy or demilitarize.  As the original list of 400,000 
SA/LW to be destroyed did not include any U.S.-origin 
weapons, the USG requests clarification from the GOU on 
whether the list has changed to include U.S.-origin weapons. 
 
End non-paper. 
 
POINT OF CONTACT 
---------------- 
 
¶8.  (U) Please contact Sho Morimoto (PM/WRA) at (202) 
663-0290 or via e-mail for any necessary further background 
information or points to meet our objectives.  Department 
appreciates Embassy assistance. 
CLINTON