VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #5914 1311345
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061315Z MAY 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 4937-4941
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 5140-5144

UNCLAS STATE 045914 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y  (ADDED PARAGRAPH MARKING 1,3 AND 4) 
 
SIPDIS 
THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CA KTIA PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC):  HOST COUNTRY 
AGREEMENT WITH CANADA ON CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS (SBU) 
 
REF: A. STATE 112672 08 
     ¶B. OTTAWA 000037 09 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Action Request in Paragraph 9. 
 
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OBJECTIVES 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Department requests Embassy to pursue the following 
objectives: 
 
-- Work with the Government of Canada to negotiate a Host 
Country Agreement (HCA) on the conduct of Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) challenge inspections. 
 
 
------------------ 
REPORTING DEADLINE 
------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) Embassy should report results of discussions with 
Canadian officials by cable to ISN/CB Eugene Klimson NLT MAY 
15, 2009. 
---------------- 
POINT OF CONTACT 
---------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Please contact ISN/CB Eugene Klimson at (202) 647-5165 or 
via email for any further background needed to meet our 
objectives. 
 
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BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The United States and Canada have been negotiating 
a Host Country Agreement (HCA) on the conduct of Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) challenge inspections since 2005. 
In November 2008, the United States delivered a Draft 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to Canada (Ref A) and held 
subsequent negotiations in December 3, 2008 during the CWC 
Conference of States Parties in The Hague.  At the end of 
negotiations, three brackets remained outstanding.  On 
January 13, 2009 Canada provided new text for U.S. 
consideration based on the December discussions (Ref B). 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Washington has reviewed Canada's amendments and can 
accept the proposed changes with two administrative changes 
to the Annex Title.  Canada had proposed:  &EXCHANGE OF 
NOTES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AND CANADA ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF CHALLENGE 
INSPECTIONS UNDER THE CWC.8  We accept that title, but would 
replace the word ¬es8 with the word &letters8 and 
replace the initials &CWC8 with the words &CHEMICAL 
WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC).8 which is to fully write out 
&CWC8.  The United States also accepts Canada's 
understanding that in participating on the inspection host 
team, the other Participant would work communications through 
the Inspected State Party Head of Delegation based on the 
legislative requirements in Canada.  This would not, however, 
affect normal U.S. communications with the Organization for 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) from Washington or 
its Permanent Mission in The Hague. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Washington also seeks a substantive change, which 
is to delete paragraph III.D on managed access.  The United 
States and Canada have been unable to agree on terminology 
concerning the implementation of managed access by the other 
State Party.  Therefore, the United States is recommending 
dropping the text addressing managed access and may address 
it at a later date. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) As a courtesy, the United States reprinted the 
draft final text at the end of the cable for final review by 
the Canadian Government.  Upon their concurrence, the U.S. 
National Authority is ready to sign the letter and will 
forward the final signed copy upon concurrence of the 
Canadian Government. 
 
-------------- 
ACTION REQUEST 
-------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Drawing on the background and talking points, 
Embassy Ottawa is requested to deliver the talking points in 
paragraph 9 and the draft HCA text in paragraph 10 to the 
appropriate Canadian officials and report the results of 
these discussions to Washington. 
 
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TALKING POINTS 
-------------- 
 
¶10.  (FOUO) Talking points for delivery: 
 
- The United States appreciates Canada's continued 
cooperation in concluding a Host Country Agreement (HCA) in 
the event of a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) challenge 
inspection involving both U.S. and Canadian assets. 
 
- On January 13, 2009, your government provided us with a few 
amendments to the U.S. draft HCA proposal discussed at the 
2008 CWC Conference of States Parties in The Hague. 
 
- The United States is pleased to inform you that we can 
accept the final changes and we are ready to exchange 
diplomatic letters. 
 
-  We suggest two administrative changes to the title of the 
Annex.  First we propose changing the phrase &exchange of 
notes8 to &exchange of letters8 and to replace the acronym 
&CWC8 with &Chemical Weapons Conventions (CWC)8 since the 
Annex is a separate attachment. 
 
-  We also deleted paragraph III.D. managed access. 
 
- We also understand Canada's legislation requires that, 
except for cases involving a sovereign vessel or aircraft of 
another state, Canada must always be the Inspected State 
Party for an inspection occurring on Canadian territory. 
Therefore, when participating in an inspection, we will 
respect that Canada will be the official voice for the 
Inspected State Party when U.S. sovereign vessels or aircraft 
are not involved. 
 
-This would not affect normal diplomatic communications with 
the OPCW through capital or permanent representation in The 
Hague where U.S. interests are involved. 
 
- We have for you a final draft as we understand your 
changes, and will forward a letter from Washington upon your 
final concurrence. 
 
- We are very pleased to bring this matter to a successful 
conclusion. 
 
End of Talking Points. 
 
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DRAFT TEXT 
---------- 
 
¶11.  (FOUO) Text for Delivery to Canadian Officials: 
 
Mr. James A. Junke 
National Coordinator 
Canadian National Authority for the Chemical Weapons 
Convention 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
125 Sussex Drive 
Ottawa, Canada K1A 0K6 
 
Dear Mr. Junke 
 
I have the honor to refer to the discussions between the 
United States and Canada concerning challenge inspections 
under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
Their Destruction (CWC). 
 
The United States proposes that a set of arrangements and 
principles for the conduct of challenge inspections under the 
Convention apply to the conduct of any challenge inspection 
in the territory of one Participant in which the assets of 
the other Participant may be within, or in the vicinity of, 
the inspection site. 
 
Nothing in these principles should be interpreted as altering 
in any way any agreements in force between the United States 
and Canada.  These principles should be interpreted in a 
manner that is consistent with the Convention and any 
agreements entered into between either Participant and the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). 
 
In the event there is a conflict between the provisions of 
the Convention or any agreement between either Participant 
and the OPCW and this arrangement, the provisions of the 
Convention or such agreement with the OPCW should take 
precedence. 
 
In this regard, the United States understands that the 
Canadian National Authority has informed the Director-General 
of the OPCW that, in accordance with Canadian domestic 
legislation, Canada will be the sole inspected State Party 
for any challenge inspection on its territory except for 
cases in which a sovereign vessel or aircraft of another 
country is the subject of the inspection.  Canada understands 
that the United States does not have domestic legislation 
similar to Canada's that would require that the United States 
be the sole inspected State Party for any challenge 
inspection on its territory. 
 
The arrangements and principles may be amended in writing by 
the United States and Canada. 
 
If the principles and arrangements set out in the Annex below 
are acceptable to the Government of Canada, I have the honor 
to suggest that this letter and your reply to that effect 
will place on record the understanding of the United States 
and Canada in this matter that will come into effect on the 
date of your reply and will remain in effect until 90 days 
after the receipt of notice of termination by either Canada 
or the United States. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Robert Mikulak 
National Authority for the Chemical Weapons Convention 
Department of State 
Washington, D.C. 
USA 
 
 
 
Annex 
 
EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA AND CANADA ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE 
CONDUCT OF CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS UNDER THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
CONVENTION (CWC) 
 
For the purpose of these principles and arrangements, &Host 
State Party8, denotes the State on whose territory lie 
facilities or areas of another State Party to this 
Convention, that are subject to inspection under the CWC. 
The &non-Host Party8 is the State on whose territory a 
challenge inspection is not taking place but that may have an 
asset potentially affected by a challenge inspection. 
&Inspected State Party8 is used in accordance with the 
Verification Annex, Part I.12.  The &other Participant8 
denotes the Participant that is not the inspected State Party. 
 
The United States and Canada affirm the importance of the 
effective implementation of the CWC and intend to work 
closely and cooperatively together in order to fulfill their 
obligations concerning the conduct of a challenge inspection 
under the Convention. 
 
The United States and Canada affirm that nothing in this 
Annex should be interpreted as altering in any way any 
agreements in force or understandings in effect between the 
United States and Canada or in a manner that is inconsistent 
with the Convention, or any agreements entered into between 
either Participant and the OPCW. 
 
¶I.  In the event that a challenge inspection takes place on 
the territory of the United States or Canada, and that 
inspection may affect the assets of the non-Host Party, the 
United States and Canada each intend to: 
 
¶A.  Coordinate to ensure that their sovereign rights can be 
exercised and national interests protected in meeting their 
obligations under the Convention. 
 
¶B.  Make every effort to provide, within two hours of receipt 
of a notification of a challenge inspection on its territory 
or in any other place under its jurisdiction from the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 
copies of the Inspection Notification and the identity of the 
Requesting State Observer to the other Participant.  In 
addition, the Inspected State Party intends to provide a copy 
of the Inspection Mandate to the other Participant when 
received from the inspectors.  The points of contact for 
notifications to the United States are the United States 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (telephone 01-202-647-9166, fax 
01-202-647-4892) and the U.S. Northern Command Joint 
Operations Center (01-719-554-2361, fax 01-719-554-2368). 
The point of contact for notification for Canada is (Canada 
to provide). 
 
¶C.  Exercise full sovereign rights with regard to its 
government sovereign vessels and aircraft.  When government 
sovereign vessels and aircraft are the sole object of an 
inspection, the Participant owning or operating such assets 
should be the Inspected State Party.  If the Host State 
Party, not owning these assets, is designated the Inspected 
State Party, the Host State Party should advise the OPCW that 
the government vessel or aircraft is solely under the 
jurisdiction and control of the non-Host State Party and 
that, therefore, the non-Host State Party is properly the 
Inspected State Party. 
 
¶D.  Provide each other, as soon as possible after receipt of 
initial notification, any relevant information about the 
inspection as such information becomes available. 
 
¶E.  Upon receipt of the list of inspectors and inspection 
assistants, consult with each other if any individuals on the 
list raise concerns, and on the access that should be 
accorded that individual. 
 
¶F.  Consult with each other regarding whether to accept an 
observer designated by the Requesting State Party whenever 
assets from both Participants may be within the inspectable 
area, and on the degree of access that the requesting State 
Party observer should be accorded. 
 
¶G.  Consult with each other concerning the handling of media 
relations before, during, and after a challenge inspection. 
 
¶H.  Reach agreement on the release of any information 
provided pursuant to these principles and arrangements to any 
third party. 
 
¶I.  Exchange the names of approved inspectors on an annual 
basis. 
 
II.  The Host State Party intends to: 
 
¶A.  Expedite the entry of the liaison officers, and their 
equipment and material (possibly including a mobile 
laboratory) from the non-host State Party into its territory, 
which may include, but is not limited to, the provision of 
aircraft and diplomatic clearance, and assistance with 
customs. 
 
¶B.  Manage the conduct of the inspection when taking place on 
its territory, to take into account the need of personnel 
from the non-host State Party to travel from the territory of 
the non-host State Party to the inspection site in order to 
assist the host State Party in the expeditious conduct of the 
inspection. 
 
III.  The Inspected State Party should: 
 
¶A.  Allow the other Participant to send representatives to 
observe and advise the Inspected State Party on any matters 
pertaining to the national security interest of the other 
Participant at all stages of the challenge inspection, 
including, but not necessarily limited to:  point of entry 
procedures; perimeter negotiations; inspection of OPCW 
approved equipment; pre-inspection briefing; conduct of 
inspection and, sampling and analysis and at all levels 
(including sub-team activities). 
 
¶B.  Not provide access to any area, building, or facility 
used by the other Participant without prior consultation with 
the designated representative of the other Participant. 
 
¶C.  Not provide access to any citizen, equipment or vehicle 
owned by the other Participant without prior consultation 
with the designated representative of the other Participant 
and an opportunity to prepare its asset. 
 
¶D.  Coordinate with the other Participant on the provision of 
access or information to be given to the inspection team 
concerning an asset of the other Participant. 
 
¶E.  Provide the other Participant, on a cost-recovery basis, 
any administrative support required or requested, including 
transportation, accommodation, lodgings, meals, 
communications, and any necessary protective clothing or 
equipment. 
 
¶F.  Ensure that the other Participant, if deemed necessary, 
has up to 108 hours from the inspection team's arrival at the 
point of entry before providing the inspection team access to 
its assets inside the perimeter. 
 
¶G.  Provide the other Participant a copy of the Preliminary 
Inspection Report and Draft Final Inspection Report as soon 
as such findings are provided to the Inspected State Party by 
the Inspection Team. 
 
¶H.  Provide the other Participant an opportunity to offer 
comments within 24 hours on the Preliminary Inspection Report 
hours and similarly offer comments within 48 hours on the 
Draft Final Inspection Reports with respect to any parts 
thereof pertaining to the national security interests of the 
other Participant. 
 
¶I.  Consult with the other Participant on any request for the 
extension of the period of inspection. 
 
¶J.  Provide to the other Participant, without delay, all 
information resulting from the inspection pertaining to the 
national security interests of the other Participant. 
End of Annex. 
CLINTON