VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #4996 1260828
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041534Z MAY 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 3965-3971
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 2945-2952
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0465-0465
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI PRIORITY 9304-9311
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 3580-3587
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 6157-6164
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 0518-0525
RUEHPL/AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS PRIORITY 2736-2743
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 1659-1667
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 9050-9057
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 044996 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
C O R R E C T E D   C O P Y (ADDING SENSITIVE CAPTION) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MTCRE PREL MNUC KSCA ETTC TSPA
SUBJECT: HCOC - ENCOURAGING ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES TO 
SUBSCRIBE (PART II) 
 
REF: A. 02 STATE 209829 
     ¶B. 02 STATE 237600 
     ¶C. 02 STATE 238689 
     ¶D. 02 STATE 259795 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see para 4. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Background:  Per reftels, the Hague Code of 
Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC; 
also known as the International Code of Conduct, or 
ICOC; text at para 5) was formally brought into effect 
on November 25, 2002 at a Launching Conference hosted 
by the Netherlands in The Hague.  Since then, HCOC 
Subscribing States have held several meetings to 
further elaborate issues relating to the HCOC's 
implementation, including pre-launch notifications and 
Subscribing States' annual declarations on space and 
ballistic missile policies.  As of April 2009, 130 
countries have subscribed to the HCOC (see para 7). 
 
--  The HCOC is aimed at bolstering efforts to curb 
ballistic missile proliferation worldwide, and to 
further delegitimize such proliferation.  The HCOC 
consists of a set of general principles, modest 
commitments, and limited confidence-building measures. 
It is intended to supplement, not supplant, the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and is administered 
collectively by all of the countries that subscribe to 
it.  There is not a formal secretariat or implementing 
organization, and thus we do not foresee any financial 
burden for most Subscribing States.  The HCOC will hold 
its Eighth Regular Meeting on May 28-29, 2009 in 
Vienna. 
 
--  On December 2, 2008, 159 nations voted in favor of 
a resolution in the UN General Assembly supporting the 
HCOC (GA Resolution 63/64).  This support shows that 
the Code is relevant and legitimate. 
 
--  In light of the overwhelming support for the UNGA 
resolution, we want to approach action addressee 
countries which have not yet subscribed to the HCOC and 
did not vote in favor of the UNGA HCOC resolution to 
impress upon them the widespread support for and 
legitimacy of the HCOC.  (Note: only one country - Iran 
- actually voted against the HCOC.  Eighteen countries 
abstained while others did not record a vote.  End 
note.)  The fact of the resolution leads us to redouble 
our efforts to convince as many countries as possible 
to subscribe to the HCOC, highlighting the large and 
diverse number of current subscribers.  (Note: Septel 
being sent to non-subscribing countries that voted in 
favor of the UN resolution.  End note.) 
 
¶3.  (U) Objective: We want to encourage non-subscribing 
countries to subscribe to the HCOC. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Action Request:  Drawing on the talking 
points and other information in paras 5-8 below (which 
may be left as non-papers), request post approach 
appropriate senior-level host government officials at 
the earliest opportunity and urge them to subscribe to 
the HCOC.  Post is requested to report reply via cable 
slugged for ISN/MTR with "HCOC" in the subject line. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Begin Text of Talking Points: 
 
--  The United States urges your country to join us and 
129 other countries in actively supporting 
international missile nonproliferation efforts by 
subscribing to the Hague Code of Conduct Against 
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). 
 
-- We have previously approached your government 
concerning the HCOC because the U.S. and the 
other 129 Subscribing States view the HCOC as an 
important and meaningful way to help curb the 
proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of 
delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - 
proliferation declared by the UN Security Council 
in Resolution 1540 to represent a threat to 
international peace and security. 
 
--  The HCOC is a political commitment that is open to 
all countries' voluntary subscription.  By subscribing, 
countries show their support for halting the spread of 
ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons. 
 
--  Because the HCOC is not a treaty or other legally 
binding obligation, the vast majority of countries are 
able to subscribe as an executive act without any need 
for parliamentary approval or ratification.  There are 
no assessed contributions or other monetary costs of 
subscribing. 
 
--  The current 130 Subscribing States include 
countries from sub-Saharan Africa (such as Eritrea, 
Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria and South Africa), Central and 
South America (including Argentina, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, and Peru), North Africa and the Middle East 
(including Jordan, Libya, Morocco, and Turkey), Central 
and West Asia and the Caucasus (including Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan) and the Asia-Pacific 
region (including Australia, Cambodia, Japan, South 
Korea, and the Philippines), as well as all members of 
the European Union. 
 
--  The subscription of such a large and diverse group 
of countries shows that there is widespread support for 
the HCOC and the idea that (1) the proliferation of WMD 
capable ballistic missiles should be impeded, and (2) 
that countries should voluntarily cooperate to impede 
this proliferation. 
 
--  This notion is underlined by the December 2, 2008 
approval by 159 countries in the UN General Assembly of 
a resolution endorsing the HCOC (GA Resolution 63/64). 
 
--  Among the non-subscribing countries that voted in 
favor of the UN resolution are Kuwait and Iraq in the 
Middle East; Botswana and Cote d'Ivoire in Africa; 
Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka in South Asia; and 
Singapore, Thailand and Brunei in East Asia. 
 
--  We know your country shares the same concerns about 
missile proliferation as the subscribers to the HCOC, 
and therefore we strongly urge you to join with us and 
subscribe.  This will allow you to make a concrete 
political contribution to addressing the global missile 
threat. 
 
--  Your subscription to the HCOC would be greatly 
appreciated by the United States. 
 
--  Your country can subscribe by simply sending a Note 
Verbale to the Government of Austria, which is the 
Executive Secretary of the HCOC.  (Hand over example 
note at para 8.) 
 
--  We would be happy to answer any questions you may 
have about the HCOC, and look forward to your 
subscribing 
soon. 
 
END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS 
 
¶6.  (U) The government of the Netherlands distributed 
the HCOC text to all countries invited to the November 
2002 Launching Conference.  The text is repeated below. 
Department also has the text in French, Spanish, and 
Russian available upon request to ISN/MTR. 
 
Begin text of HCOC: 
 
International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation 
 
Preamble 
 
The Subscribing States: 
 
Reaffirming their commitment to the United Nations 
Charter; 
 
Stressing the role and responsibility of the United 
Nations in the field of international peace and 
security; 
 
Recalling the widespread concern about the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their 
means of delivery; 
 
Recognizing the increasing regional and global security 
challenges caused, inter alia, by the ongoing 
proliferation of Ballistic Missile systems capable of 
delivering weapons of mass destruction; 
 
Seeking to promote the security of all states by 
fostering mutual trust through the implementation of 
political and diplomatic measures; 
 
Having taken into account regional and national 
security considerations; 
 
Believing that an International Code of Conduct against 
Ballistic Missile Proliferation will contribute to the 
process of strengthening existing national and 
international security arrangements and disarmament and 
non-proliferation objectives and mechanisms; 
 
Recognising that Subscribing States may wish to 
consider engaging in co-operative measures among 
themselves to this end; 
 
¶1.    Adopt this International Code of Conduct against 
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (hereinafter referred 
to as 'the Code'); 
 
¶2.    Resolve to respect the following Principles: 
 
a)    Recognition of the need comprehensively to 
prevent and curb the proliferation of Ballistic Missile 
systems capable of delivering weapons of mass 
destruction and the need to continue pursuing 
appropriate international endeavors, including the 
Code; 
 
b)    Recognition of the importance of strengthening, 
and gaining wider adherence to, multilateral 
disarmament and non-proliferation mechanisms; 
 
c)    Recognition that adherence to, and full 
compliance with, international arms control, 
disarmament and non-proliferation norms help build 
confidence as to the peaceful intentions of states; 
 
d)    Recognition that participation in this Code is 
voluntary and open to all states; 
 
e)    Confirmation of their commitment to the United 
Nations Declaration on International Cooperation in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and 
in the Interest of All States taking into particular 
Account the Needs of Developing Countries, adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly (Resolution 51/122 
of 13 December 1996); 
 
f)    Recognition that states should not be excluded 
from utilising the benefits of space for peaceful 
purposes, but that, in reaping such benefits and in 
conducting related cooperation, they must not 
contribute to the proliferation of Ballistic Missiles 
capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction; 
 
g)    Recognition that Space Launch Vehicle programmes 
should not be used to conceal Ballistic Missile 
programmes; 
 
h)    Recognition of the necessity of appropriate 
transparency measures on Ballistic Missile programmes 
and Space Launch Vehicle programmes in order to 
increase confidence and to promote non-proliferation of 
Ballistic Missiles and Ballistic Missile technology; 
 
¶3.    Resolve to implement the following General 
Measures: 
 
a)    To ratify, accede to or otherwise abide by: 
-  the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (1967), 
-  the Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects (1972), 
-  the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space (1975); 
 
b)    To curb and prevent the proliferation of 
Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons of 
mass destruction, both at a global and regional level, 
through multilateral, bilateral and national 
endeavours; 
 
c)    To exercise maximum possible restraint in the 
development, testing and deployment of Ballistic 
Missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass 
destruction, including, where possible, to reduce 
national holdings of such missiles, in the interest of 
global and regional peace and security; 
 
d)    To exercise the necessary vigilance in the 
consideration of assistance to Space Launch Vehicle 
programmes in any other country so as to prevent 
contributing to delivery systems for weapons of mass 
destruction, considering that such programmes may be 
used to conceal Ballistic Missile programmes; 
 
e)    Not to contribute to, support or assist any 
Ballistic Missile programme in countries which might be 
developing or acquiring weapons of mass destruction in 
contravention of norms established by, and of those 
countries, obligations under, international disarmament 
and non-proliferation treaties; 
 
¶4.    Resolve to implement the following: 
 
a)    Transparency measures as follows, with an 
appropriate and sufficient degree of detail to increase 
confidence and to promote non-proliferation of 
Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons of 
mass destruction: 
 
i) With respect to Ballistic Missile programmes to: 
-  make an annual declaration providing an outline of 
their Ballistic Missile policies.  Examples of openness 
in such declarations might be relevant information on 
Ballistic Missiles systems and land (test-) launch 
sites; 
-  provide annual information on the number and generic 
class of Ballistic Missiles launched during the 
preceding year, as declared in conformity with the pre- 
launch notification mechanism referred to hereunder, in 
tiret iii); 
 
ii)   with respect to expendable Space Launch Vehicle 
programmes, and consistent with commercial and economic 
confidentiality principles, to: 
-  make an annual declaration providing an outline of 
their Space Launch Vehicle policies and land (test-) 
launch sites; 
-  provide annual information on the number and generic 
class of Space Launch Vehicles launched during the 
preceding year, as declared in conformity with the pre- 
launch notification mechanism referred to hereunder, in 
tiret iii); 
-  consider, on a voluntary basis (including on the 
degree of access permitted), inviting international 
observers to their land (test-) launch sites; 
 
iii)  with respect to their Ballistic Missile and Space 
Launch Vehicle programmes to: 
-  exchange pre-launch notifications on their Ballistic 
Missile and Space Launch Vehicle launches and test 
flights.  These notifications should include such 
information as the generic class of the Ballistic 
Missile or Space Launch Vehicle, the planned launch 
notification window, the launch and the planned 
direction; 
 
b)   Subscribing States could, as appropriate and on a 
voluntary basis, develop bilateral or regional 
transparency measures, in addition to those above. 
 
c)   Implementation of the above confidence building 
measures does not serve as justification for the 
programmes to which these confidence building measures 
apply; 
 
¶5.    Organisational aspects 
 
      Subscribing States determine to: 
 
a)    Hold regular meetings, annually or as otherwise 
agreed by Subscribing States; 
 
b)    Take all decisions, both substantive and 
procedural, by a consensus of the Subscribing States 
present; 
 
c)    Use these meetings to define, review and further 
develop the workings of the Code, including in such 
ways as: 
-  establishing procedures regarding the exchange of 
notifications and other information in the framework of 
the Code; 
-  establishing an appropriate mechanism for the 
voluntary resolution of questions arising from national 
declarations, and/or questions pertaining to Ballistic 
Missile and/or Space Launch Vehicle programmes; 
-  naming of a subscribing state to serve as an 
immediate central contact for collecting and 
disseminating Confidence Building Measures submissions, 
receiving and announcing the subscription of additional 
States, and other tasks as agreed by Subscribing 
States; and 
-  others as may be agreed by the Subscribing States, 
including possible amendments to the Code. 
 
 
¶7.  (U) List of Subscribing States as of April, 2009. 
 
¶1. Afghanistan 
¶2. Albania 
¶3. Andorra 
¶4. Argentina 
¶5. Armenia 
¶6. Australia 
¶7. Austria 
¶8. Azerbaijan 
¶9. Belarus 
¶10. Belgium 
¶11. Benin 
¶12. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
¶13. Bulgaria 
¶14. Burkina Faso 
¶15. Burundi 
¶16. Cambodia 
¶17. Cameroon 
¶18. Canada 
¶19. Cape Verde 
¶20. Chad 
¶21. Chile 
¶22. Colombia 
¶23. Comoros 
¶24. Cook Islands 
¶25. Costa Rica 
¶26. Croatia 
¶27. Cyprus 
¶28. Czech Republic 
¶29. Denmark 
¶30. Dominican Republic 
¶31. Ecuador 
¶32. El Salvador 
¶33. Eritrea 
¶34. Estonia 
¶35. Ethiopia 
¶36. Fiji 
¶37. Finland 
¶38. France 
¶39. Gabon 
¶40. Gambia 
¶41. Georgia 
¶42. Germany 
¶43. Ghana 
¶44. Greece 
¶45. Guatemala 
¶46. Guinea 
¶47. Guinea-Bissau 
¶48. Guyana 
¶49. Haiti 
¶50. Holy See 
¶51. Honduras 
¶52. Hungary 
¶53. Iceland 
¶54. Ireland 
¶55. Italy 
¶56. Japan 
¶57. Jordan 
¶58. Kazakhstan 
¶59. Kenya 
¶60. Kiribati 
¶61. Latvia 
¶62. Liberia 
¶63. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
¶64. Liechtenstein 
¶65. Lithuania 
¶66. Luxembourg 
¶67. Madagascar 
¶68. Malawi 
¶69. Maldives 
¶70. Mali 
¶71. Malta 
¶72. Marshall Islands 
¶73. Mauritania 
¶74. Micronesia (Federated States of) 
¶75. Monaco 
¶76. Mongolia 
¶77. Montenegro 
¶78. Morocco 
¶79. Mozambique 
¶80. Netherlands 
¶81. New Zealand 
¶82. Nicaragua 
¶83. Niger 
¶84. Nigeria 
¶85. Norway 
¶86. Palau 
¶87. Panama 
¶88. Papua New Guinea 
¶89. Paraguay 
¶90. Peru 
¶91. Philippines 
¶92. Poland 
¶93. Portugal 
¶94. Republic of Korea 
¶95. Republic of Macedonia 
¶96. Republic of Moldova 
¶97. Romania 
¶98. Russian Federation 
¶99. Rwanda 
¶100. Samoa 
¶101. San Marino 
¶102. Senegal 
¶103. Serbia 
¶104. Seychelles 
¶105. Sierra Leone 
¶106. Slovakia 
¶107. Slovenia 
¶108. South Africa 
¶109. Spain 
¶110. Sudan 
¶111. Suriname 
¶112. Sweden 
¶113. Switzerland 
¶114. Tanzania 
¶115. Tajikistan 
¶116. Timor-leste 
¶117. Tonga 
¶118. Tunisia 
¶119. Turkey 
¶120. Turkmenistan 
¶121. Tuvalu 
¶122. Uganda 
¶123. Ukraine 
¶124. United Kingdom 
¶125. United States 
¶126. Uruguay 
¶127. Uzbekistan 
¶128. Vanuatu 
¶129. Venezuela 
¶130. Zambia 
 
¶8. (SBU) Begin text of example Note Verbale: 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of (country) presents 
its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Government of Austria and has the honour to inform 
the Republic of Austria that (country) wishes to become 
a subscribing state to the Hague Code of Conduct 
against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, which was 
adopted at an international launching conference held 
at The Hague on 25 and 26 November 2002, and that it 
wishes (country) to be included in the list of 
Subscribing States that will serve as an annex to the 
aforementioned Code of Conduct. 
 
Done at (capital) 
 
Date 
 
Seal 
 
¶9. (U) Please contact ISN/MTR's John Paul Herrmann with 
any questions or follow-up issues related to this case 
(202-647-1430 - herrmannjp@state.sgov.gov or 
herrmannjp2@state.gov) and slug reporting on this issue 
for ISN/MTR. 
CLINTON