VZCZCXYZ0014
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #4644 1211951
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 011932Z MAY 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0000
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 044644 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP AORC ENRG MNUC PARM PREL CDG UNGA IAEA NPT UP
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT): RESPONSE 
TO UKRAINIAN NON-PAPERS 
 
REF: A. A) STATE 40237 
     ¶B. B) STATE 06970 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action message; see paragraph 3 below. 
 
¶2. (U) SUMMARY:  Ref A requested relevant reporting from host 
governments most likely to influence the outcome of critical 
upcoming NPT meetings.  Ukraine responded (ref B) with a 
non-paper titled &Sharing Informal Views on the NPT: 
Ukrainian viewpoint,8 that laid out Ukraine's position and 
built on a related working paper that the GOU submitted 
during the 2008 PrepCom ("Preparing for a Successful Review 
Conference 2010").  Department requests Embassy to make the 
points in para three below to appropriate MFA officials.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
------------------- 
Action Request 
------------------- 
¶3. (U) Embassy should reply to Ukrainian officials, drawing 
on the following points, which may be left as a non-paper: 
 
Begin text: 
--    As President Obama stated in Prague on April 5, 
strengthening the NPT will be one of the Administration's top 
priorities over the next few years. 
--    We are encouraged by your February non-paper on 
Ukraine's views and priorities in the NPT review process. 
Your views largely accord with ours. 
--    It is clear that Parties should seek procedural success 
at the 2009 PrepCom and substantive success at the 2010 
RevCon. 
--    The United States will demonstrate further progress on 
fulfilling our disarmament-related obligations under Article 
VI and will be taking concrete steps, such as working to 
ratify the CTBT, beginning negotiations on a verifiable FMCT, 
and negotiating with Russia to follow on the START treaty 
before the end of 2009. 
--    We want to work with Ukraine and other NPT Parties to 
encourage the universalization of the NPT and full compliance 
with its obligations, while discouraging countries from 
violating, and then withdrawing from, the Treaty. 
--    Our two governments understand that solving issues such 
as noncompliance by Iran, North Korea and Syria will require 
concerted, consistent, multilateral diplomacy. 
--    We both believe in the fundamental importance of IAEA 
safeguards and will work towards the universalization of the 
Additional Protocol. 
--    We both acknowledge the existential danger of nuclear 
terrorism to our countries and the United States hopes to 
continue to work with other states to increase the security 
of nuclear materials world-wide.  To this end, President 
Obama has committed to host a Global Summit on Nuclear 
Security within the next year. 
--    We also share with Ukraine the belief that 
international fuel banks could be an excellent solution to 
the challenge of sharing in the benefits of nuclear 
technology without increasing the risks of proliferation. 
--    On other points raised in your non-paper, we are still 
formulating our policies.  As you may know, Congress has 
required that the U.S. Government review its nuclear weapons 
policies as part of a Nuclear Posture Review, due later this 
year.  The results of this review will help us address many 
additional nuclear weapon issues. 
--    The President has made clear that the United States is 
committed to bringing about a world free of nuclear weapons. 
We look forward to cooperating closely with Ukraine 
throughout the NPT review process to the end. 
End text 
 
¶4. (SBU) NOTE FOR EMBASSY KYIV: There are some issues 
contained in the Ukrainian NPT non-paper that relate to START 
and a START follow-on agreement that will be addressed 
separately. 
 
In addition, Ukraine's non-paper supports several positions 
that the United States cannot support, in part or in full. 
These include: 
--    Changes in U.S. nuclear weapons policy, to include 
de-alerting, withdrawal to storage, and formalized reporting 
of nuclear weapons deployments and force levels; 
--    Negotiation of a legally binding negative security 
assurances treaty; and 
--    Establishment of a permanent NPT secretariat to support 
meetings and of a standing bureau to monitor compliance. 
Embassy should refer MFA interlocutors, specific concerns 
regarding these policies to Washington. 
 
¶5. (U) Questions regarding this message may be directed to 
Scott Davis (ISN/MNSA), who can be reached at 
davisms@state.sgov.gov, davisms@state.gov, or 1-202-647-1141. 
 Please slug reply for the Department (ISN/MNSA), Geneva 
(CD), and USUN (POL). 
CLINTON