VZCZCXRO2390
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSQ #0214/01 1321823
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 121823Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8234
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0524

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000214 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR REEKER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MOPS GR KV MK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MACEDONIA 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
¶1. (SBU) Your visit presents an opportune moment to 
underscore to Macedonians that the Obama Administration is 
not "pro-Greek," that the United States is prepared to engage 
in active behind-the-scenes support for developing a 
reasonable solution to the name dispute  -- working with BOTH 
sides -- and that we expect better performance from the 
Gruevski government on building a genuinely multiethnic, 
democratic, law-based society. 
 
Key points to make: 
 
--It is time for real negotiations on the name issue, to 
replace FYROM with something acceptable and to work out a 
deal on the remaining details. The identity that the United 
States sees at stake here is Macedonia's identity as a full 
member of the Euro-Atlantic community. 
 
-- The United States wants to help you achieve this goal this 
year but we can only do so with your active involvement.  I 
understand you doubt Greek willingness to conclude a deal, 
but I need your pledge to test that doubt by negotiating 
seriously. 
 
-- The U.S. is seeking to support the UN process, not replace it. 
 
-- Significantly greater progress on reaching modern European 
standards on interethnic relations, rule of law, and 
political dialogue is critical to Macedonia's future. 
Well-functioning democratic practices and good governance 
will produce the stability and prosperity that all your 
citizens want. 
 
Additional objectives/points: 
 
--Thank Gruevski for his positive approach to Kosovo 
(recognition, support for IMF membership) and urge formal 
diplomatic relations ASAP. 
 
--Reconfirm the GoM's commitment to send an additional 50-75 
troops to Afghanistan with the Vermont National Guard in 
late 2009/early 2010. 
 
Gruevski in Control 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) Your visit comes as PM Nikola Gruevski and his VMRO 
party have consolidated almost complete political control: 
VMRO controls an outright majority in parliament, the 
Presidency, and 56 of 85 municipal governments following 2008 
parliamentary elections and March/April 2009 presidential and 
local elections.  Gruevski will not have to face the voters 
again until 2012, (though he may be tempted to call early 
elections again), and now has a clear opportunity to tackle 
the name dispute with Greece.  The Alliance reaffirmed 
Macedonia's readiness to join NATO -- pending resolution on 
the name issue -- at the Strasbourg-Kehl summit, and 
President Obama's statement gave the always-insecure 
Macedonians (of all ethnicities) reassurance of U.S. support. 
But Gruevski must understand that 
this deadlock cannot continue in perpetuity. 
 
Getting to Yes on the Name Issue 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Bucharest outcome was a psychologically 
devastating blow to Macedonia's fragile confidence. 
Following the summit, Gruevski called early elections, 
indulged in anti-Greek rhetoric, and pursued other follies 
bound to annoy Athens, such as suing them at the ICJ, sending 
multiple letters to world leaders, naming roads and other 
public spaces after Philip of Macedon and Alexander the 
Great, and unveiling plans to build an enormous (22 meter) 
statue of Alexander in the center of Skopje.  Gruevski 
admitted to me six months ago that he "may have been wrong" 
in his strategy to "remind everyone that the Greeks pay a 
price too."  He is reluctant to acknowledge publicly, 
however, that his actions have gained him nothing but ill 
will in Washington and European capitals. In keeping with his 
pledge to me, he calmed down his own public statements 
(though he has failed to reel in his Foreign Minister, 
Antonio Milososki). 
 
¶4. (SBU) Gruevski, his VMRO party faithful, and many others 
in the press, have recently emphasized that any deal on the 
name must "preserve our identity as Macedonians," claiming 
that the Greeks want "to change our language and our 
nationality."  The trouble is that it is next to impossible 
that the GoG would ever agree to a document that would define 
 
SKOPJE 00000214  002 OF 002 
 
 
the citizens of this country as "Macedonians" or the language 
as "Macedonian."  If negotiations actually progress, this 
issue may prove the sticking point.  I recommend that you 
tell Gruevski that we are sympathetic on this question, but 
in the end an agreed name and its scope of use may have to be 
the sole focus of any agreement.  "Diplomatic finesse" is a 
concept seemingly alien to Macedonians. 
 
Close the Deal on Kosovo Relations 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) At our urging, Macedonia finally recognized Kosovo 
as an independent state in October, but Gruevski has refused 
to establish formal diplomatic ties with Pristina pending 
final demarcation of their mutual border.  The two sides are 
nearly there, and the GoK has offered a territorial offset 
(involving around 100 hectares of remote land) in order to 
avoid having some querulous Kosovars owning land on the 
Macedonian side of the border.  Gruevski is considering this, 
but believes that for complex legal reasons he must take the 
issue to parliament, which he is reluctant to do (despite the 
fact that he controls a majority of the seats and his ethnic 
Albanian coalition partner, DUI, wants a deal now).  While 
thanking Gruevski for voting yes on Kosovo's IMF/World Bank 
membership bid, you should urge him to close this matter 
ASAP. 
 
More Help for ISAF 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Macedonia has been a serious ally on the 
international security front, sending troops to both Iraq and 
Afghanistan since the beginning.  (Their troops left Iraq at 
the end of 2008, with the expiration of UNSCR 1790.) 
Macedonia has 168 troops in Afghanistan and told us in our 
bilateral defense review last December that it would send an 
additional 50-75 troops to serve for one year with the 
Vermont National Guard contingent deploying late this year or 
in early 2010.  You should ask Gruevski for his firm 
commitment to this plan. 
 
Concerns on Interethnic Relations, Rule of Law, and Political 
Dialogue 
 
¶7. (SBU) The ethnic Albanian community is increasingly 
discontented, and murmurs of separatism are starting to 
grow.  Ethnic Albanians are concerned that Gruevski is 
running away from Euro-Atlantic integration by refusing to 
negotiate meaningfully on the name issue.  This concern is 
compounded by Gruevski's lack of interest in interethnic 
relations or in full implementation of the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement (OFA), which -- with heavy U.S. involvement -- 
ended the brief civil conflict in 2001.  Ministers from DUI, 
the largest e-Albanian party and Gruevski's coalition 
partner, are increasingly complaining that they are 
marginalized in the government and not treated as equal 
partners.  E-Albanians were deeply unhappy with VMRO's 
presidential candidate (now President) Gjorge Ivanov, who 
opposed the OFA and who made no attempt to reach out to 
e-Albanian voters in his campaign.  This anger is now 
compounded by Gruevki's plan to build a large Orthodox 
Christian church -- with taxpayer money -- on Skopje's main 
square; such a move is not only insensitive to the 
e-Albanians, but also a questionable use of resources even as 
the economic situation has compelled the GoM to cut its 
budget by 6.2%, including an 18% cut in defense. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Political dialogue and rule of law -- key EU 
benchmarks as well as issues of importance to us -- are on 
the decline.  Problems include excessive pretrial detention, 
a corrupt and pressured judiciary, inadequate parliamentary 
deliberation of government initiatives.  Even by Macedonia's 
standards, Gruevski rarely reaches across the aisle nor even 
to his e-Albanian coalition partner on issues large or small, 
preferring ad hominem attacks to genuine discussion. 
Government ministers and officials regularly interfere in the 
judiciary.  A 200 million Euro judgment against Austrian 
electricity distributor EVN followed a trial chock full of 
irregularities, despite the presence of international 
observers.  This cannot help but have a chilling effect on 
foreign investment as well. 
 
 
REEKER