VZCZCXRO7488
RR RUEHKW RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSQ #0203/01 1261125
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 061125Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8216
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0960
INFO RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA 4513
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 1899
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1490
RUCNEEC/EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 SKOPJE 000203 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP AND EUR/SCE (STINCHCOMB) 
DEPT PASS TO CONNECTICUT PASSPORT AGENCY FOR HANS MAURER 
POSTS FOR CONSULAR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS AND DHS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC KV MK
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - SKOPJE 
 
Ref: 08 SKOPJE 395 
SUMMARY:  This fraud summary covers the six-month period from 
September 2008 through February 2009. Post saw routine NIV, IV, and 
ACS fraud during the period; however a routine review of media 
reports by FPU revealed a common pattern of B visa abuse by local 
artists and performers. This sparked an investigation which has 
resulted in several visa revocations and is ongoing. Post met with 
counterparts from the European missions to coordinate a fraudulent 
document referral program with the Macedonian police. 
END SUMMARY. 
(a) Country conditions: Macedonia and Kosovo both continue to suffer 
from high unemployment, with significant numbers of individuals 
living below the poverty level. Due to the shortage of economic 
opportunities, many seek to leave the region to live and work 
illegally in the EU and the U.S. Document fraud exists in both 
countries due to lack of strong institutions and pervasive 
corruption, though the problem is especially acute in Kosovo. Kosovo 
is going through a period of transition after its declaration of 
independence and post records show that during previous times of 
crisis and uncertainty, such as in 1999 and 2001, overstay rates and 
NIV fraud increased. The Kosovo Ministry of Internal Affairs began 
issuing passports and travel documents on July 29, 2008. Many of the 
functions formerly administered by the UN Mission in Kosovo continue 
to be turned over to local counterparts, and document and visa fraud 
may increase as a result. In December 2008 the EU Rule of Law 
Mission (EULEX) formally replaced the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
after the end of UNMIK's mandate. EULEX will assist and support the 
Kosovo authorities in the areas of rule of law, specifically in the 
police, judiciary and customs areas. 
 
Post shipped a total of 726 CAT1 files to Kentucky Consular Center 
(KCC). The files reflected CAT1 records from 1996 to the present day 
and had been maintained in storage at post. The files were sent for 
scanning and permanent archiving in the Kentucky Consular Center. 
 
(b) NIV fraud: Post continues to scan all supporting documents for 
all non-B applications (including C1/D, J, F, H, O and P visas). 
 
Consular officers referred 182 NIV cases to the FPU, which confirmed 
fraud in five cases. Suspicious documents were noted in five cases. 
The five cases of confirmed fraud will be discussed in detail below 
followed by an overview of other suspicious and/or potentially 
fraudulent cases which Post encountered during the period. 
 
In the longest running and most interesting of the fraud cases, an 
NIV applicant applied for a B visa to attend an alumni program at 
Harvard in October 2008. This applicant had been refused under 
section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) in 1995 after she submitted false 
documentation in support of a DV application in an effort to avoid 
her two year residency requirement stemming from her participation 
in a J visa exchange program. Subsequent to this finding, the 
applicant visited the U. S. multiple times on G visas for which the 
ineligibility did not apply. In 2004, she applied for a G visa along 
with her purported fianc who was issued a B visa to visit the U.S. 
during the applicant's tenure there. Post's callback program later 
revealed that the man was not, in fact, her fianc and was married 
to another individual. The applicant confirmed that she had never 
been engaged or married to the man. Post is unsure about the man's 
actual purpose for travel though he did return to Macedonia after a 
five month stay in the U.S. At the most recent visa interview, the 
interviewing officer explained to the applicant that she would need 
to apply for a waiver of her ineligibility; she chose not to request 
one and was refused. 
 
In the second case, an applicant for a J-1 au pair visa was asked to 
bring proof of her student status. She submitted suspicious-looking 
attendance records and grades reports. The FPU reviewed the 
documents and contacted the university to verify their authenticity. 
The university confirmed that the documents were falsified and 
advised the FPU that the student had contacted the university, 
purporting to be a U.S. embassy employee, and tried to obtain 
information about the FPU investigation. The applicant was 
re-interviewed and she admitted that the documents were false and 
that she had contacted the university under false pretences. She was 
refused under Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) due to material 
misrepresentation. 
 
The third case involved a professor from Mehmet Akif private college 
in Kosovo who applied together with a colleague. While his colleague 
planned to visit a partner school in Texas, the applicant stated he 
wanted to go to Pennsylvania to visit Fethullah Gulen, founder oQ 
the network of schools, of which Mehmet Akif College is a member. 
Although the applicant indicated he was not accompanying his 
colleague to Texas, his name appeared on the invitation letter. He 
had previous refusals in Turkey and had taught in Turkmenistan and 
Syria. He had weak ties to Kosovo and vague travel plans. The 
 
SKOPJE 00000203  002 OF 007 
 
 
applicant appeared to be using his colleague's legitimate travel as 
a cover to enter the U.S. and was refused under Section 214(b) of 
the INA. This case is particularly relevant due to a recent 
application by another professor from the same school, with a 
similar travel history to unusual places, who appeared to be using 
the cover of a group of students visiting a science fair to apply. 
He applied two weeks earlier than the group and could not discuss 
their purpose of travel intelligently. He was also refused under 
Section 214(b). 
 
In the fourth case, an NIV applicant did not disclose on the DS-156 
form a previous arrest in the U.S. for criminal drug possession. The 
IAFIS check revealed the arrest record and the applicant admitted in 
a subsequent interview that he had been arrested for cocaine 
possession. He did not complete his suspended sentence of community 
service and instead left the country. Per the guidance in the 
advisory opinion from CA/VO/L/A the applicant was refused under 
Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i), due to material misrepresentation, and 
Section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), as a controlled substance violator. The 
applicant expressed a desire to continue with his visa application 
and the case is ongoing, pending further documentation and his 
waiver requests. 
 
In the final case, the applicant claimed to be divorced; however a 
Lexis Nexis check revealed that her husband was residing in the U.S. 
When confronted with this information, the applicant admitted that 
her husband and son had immigrated illegally to the U.S. The 
applicant was refused under Section 214(b). 
 
During the period, 11 individuals reported the loss/theft of their 
passports containing valid U.S. visas. None of the cases appeared to 
involve any fraud by the passport holders. All of the visas were 
reported to CA/FPP and appropriate lookouts were entered in INK as 
per the SOP. 
 
Additional fraud encounters: 
 
A chance reading of a newspaper article led to the discovery of 
widespread B visa abuse by local artists and musicians. The fraud 
LES member read an article in a local paper which included an 
interview by a well-known Macedonian musician. The article included 
quotes from the musician about his recent concert series in the 
U.S., however FPU found that he did not have an approved P petition 
and was performing on a B visa. Using open source tools such as 
Google and YouTube, the FPU found multiple records of paid 
performances conducted by this artist. During the investigation, the 
FPU also found references to many other artists from Macedonia and 
Kosovo who performed in the U.S., without approved petitions, in 
violation of their B status. This investigation is ongoing. In the 
meantime, however, the B visas of five performers have been revoked 
and post has changed its procedure to include an information letter 
which will be given to all performers applying for B visas. The 
letter outlines the activities allowed while traveling on a B visa 
and advises about the consequences of performing without an approved 
petition. 
 
 
SKOPJE 00000203  003 OF 007 
 
 
Post was able to successfully conclude a case of B visa abuse by a 
married Macedonian couple. In the summer of 2008, post received a 
poison pen letter stating that the visa holder and his spouse were 
travelling to the U.S., living in New Jersey, and illegally working 
as asbestos inspectors. A Lexis Nexis search showed records 
consistent with illegal employment for the husband and bank records 
for both applicants. ADIS showed multiple entries and exits from the 
U.S. for the couple since they received their visas in 2002. The 
couple appeared to be living in the U.S. for approximately five 
months each year, always traveling at the same time. After receiving 
the poison pen, FPU reviewed ADIS records which indicated the 
husband was in the U.S. at that time. FPU waited until the husband 
returned from the U.S. and then revoked both visas, as per the 
advisory opinion received from CA/VO/L/A. Post attempted to contact 
the applicants by telephone but was not successful and then mailed 
written notifications to the address indicated on the applications. 
Upon receiving notification, the applicants contacted the consular 
section. They spoke with a consular officer and admitted to working 
in the U.S. while on tourist visas. 
 
A group of 22 beneficiaries under one H2B petition applied to work 
as truck drivers for a Chicago-based trucking company. The FPU had a 
previous encounter with this company which was associated with 
overstays by previous applicants. Chicago is a nexus for illegal 
immigration from Macedonia. Many of the applicants displayed poor 
qualifications for the employment they were going to assume and weak 
ties to Macedonia. One beneficiary had a direct CAT1 hit for a 
possible crime involving moral turpitude. All the applicants were 
refused under Section 214(b). After a request for re-application was 
received from the petitioner's attorney, we allowed 11 to reapply 
and three were issued after presenting additional documentation and 
displaying better knowledge about their prospective employment in 
the U.S. and a command of the English language. The FPU will conduct 
callbacks on the issued applicants and verify their return. 
 
The bankruptcy of the U.S. company "Century Pool" was followed with 
interest in Macedonia as students have worked for this company for 
years as part of the Summer Work and Travel program. The overstay 
rate for participants working for this company has consistently been 
less than 10 percent. This year, despite the company's problems and 
their non-payment of employees, post is proud to announce a zero 
percent overstay rate for the students who worked for Century Pool 
in the U.S. in 2008. The students were contacted upon their return 
to Macedonia and they all shared their disappointment with Century 
Pool, however several of them expressed the desire to participate in 
2009 Summer Work and Travel program again. The payment issues and 
contractual problems that the students experienced with Century Pool 
were reported to CA/VO and ECA/ECD. 
 
 (c) IV fraud: Officers referred 161 cases to FPU for both IV and DV 
cases. Two IV cases were confirmed to involve fraud; both applicants 
had previously attempted to travel or applied for an immigration 
benefit with forged documents. Two DV cases were confirmed to 
involve fraud; both applicants submitted fraudulent diplomas in 
support of their applications and were refused under Section 
212(a)(6)(C)(i). 
 
SKOPJE 00000203  004 OF 007 
 
 
 
Post continues to forward cases which involve potential tax fraud to 
the IRS office in Frankfurt. Post sent ten cases to IRS Frankfurt 
for suspected tax fraud during the reporting period. 
 
Post conducted 65 investigations of various types, including 
official requests for document verification, personal visits by 
consular staff, and review of open source materials, in relation to 
family-based visa applications. There were no instances of 
fraudulent documents submitted to post in association with a 
family-based petition during the reporting period. 
 
The immigrant visa unit returned 22 IV petitions to DHS as not 
clearly approvable during the period. Each case was accompanied by a 
cover memo recommending revocation of the petition and summarizing 
the relevant fraud indicators. 
 
During the reporting period the immigrant visa unit forwarded eight 
waiver requests for various Grounds of Excludability, associated 
with IV petitions processed at post, to the DHS/CIS office in 
Vienna, Austria. 
 
Post continues to proactively combat fraudulent marriage cases by 
screening applicants who appear for notarization of the required 
"Free-to-Marry" statements. Consular officers and ACS staff conduct 
mini-interviews of the applicants to gauge whether possible fraud 
exists. Questionable cases are referred to NVC's FPP unit with a 
write-up about the case which is then entered by NVC FPU as a 
lookout. The FPU then automatically receives the case file when it 
appears at NVC for the documentary review. 
 
(d) DV fraud: Post continues to verify every high school diploma 
submitted in support of Kosovo DV cases as part of its SOP.  High 
school diplomas submitted in support of DV cases from Macedonia are 
verified on a case-by-case basis. A total of 35 investigations were 
conducted for high school diploma fraud. Two cases were proven to be 
fraudulent by FPU, while six cases are still open pending the 
investigation results. The percentage of high school diploma fraud 
for Kosovo applicants continues to show a significant decline during 
this reporting period. Post now sends a consular investigator to 
visit the issuing high school in person to review the supporting 
records. Many of the cases which involve fraud are done in collusion 
with school officials; however the officials cannot alter all of the 
supporting records without drawing unwanted attention. The personal 
visits have resulted in quick identification of the fraudulent 
cases. Post attributes the continuing decline in Kosovo DV fraud to 
wider public knowledge about the rigorous verification process. 
 
One DV case was refused under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) for a Crime 
Involving Moral Turpitude due to a police records check which 
returned positive for a criminal conviction. 
 
(e) ACS and U.S. passport fraud: Three passport applications at post 
had positive CLASS hits. One case was completed and the passport was 
issued as per OCS guidance. In a second case, the CLASS hit revealed 
an outstanding warrant for the applicant in the U.S. Post worked 
 
SKOPJE 00000203  005 OF 007 
 
 
with CA/PPT and the RSO to develop a response. The ARSO at post 
interviewed the applicant who confessed to the crime and agreed to 
return to the U.S. to face prosecution. Per instructions from 
CA/PPT, the consular section provided the applicant with a denial of 
passport letter and informed him that he could be issued only a 
limited passport for direct return to the U.S. The applicant 
indicated that he wanted to document his children as U.S. citizens, 
which was why he was applying to renew his own passport. To date, he 
has not returned to the consular section to either document his 
children or to indicate he is ready to return to the U.S. The final 
case remains open pending receipt of further documentation from the 
applicant. 
 
In November 2008 the Kosovo police advised Embassy Pristina that an 
American citizen and his LPR partner were involved in visa fraud in 
Kosovo and that there was an outstanding warrant for their arrest. 
The two had opened an office in Gjilan, Kosovo and launched a 
website claiming they could assist people in obtaining a U.S. visa. 
The Kosovo police opened the investigation after several people 
filed complaints stating they had paid money to the men but had not 
received their visas. When the police raided the office, they found 
sufficient evidence to issue the warrants, but were unable to locate 
the men. The FPU has no information that indicates either the 
American citizen or the LPR actually approached the consular section 
in either Skopje or Pristina on behalf of any visa applicants. When 
post was informed of the arrest warrants, we immediately notified 
neighboring posts in case the men showed up requesting assistance, 
and entered notes into the ACS system. FPU later learned that the 
two men did show up at Embassy Tirana requesting a travel letter to 
enable the LPR to return to the U.S. During the course of processing 
his request, Embassy Tirana discovered there were outstanding 
warrants in the U.S. for the LPR. In March 2009, Embassy Tirana 
informed FPU that the LPR did get a transportation letter and was 
arrested at the port of entry in the U.S. upon his return. 
(f) Adoption Fraud:  There were no cases of adoption fraud during 
the reporting period. 
 
(g) Use of DNA testing:  Two IR2 IV cases were returned to NVC for 
revocation after the DNA results showed that the petitioner was 
excluded as the biological parent of the beneficiaries. FPU cannot 
confirm whether the petitioner believed the beneficiaries to be his 
biological children or whether this was a case of attempted fraud. 
 
(h) Asylum and other DHS benefit fraud: Post continues to process 
Visas 92 and Visas 93 cases. In the reporting period, post issued a 
total of 50 Visas 92 to beneficiaries of asylum claims. 
 
We returned one Visas 92 case for revocation. The petitioner and the 
beneficiary were officially divorced at the time the petitioner was 
granted asylum and at the time he filed the follow-to-join paperwork 
for his wife. They did not remarry until after the petition was 
filed. 
 
Post issued four transportation letters to returning residents. Post 
sent three expired green cards and two expired Refugee Travel 
documents to DHS Vienna as the holders had naturalized as U.S. 
 
SKOPJE 00000203  006 OF 007 
 
 
citizens. 
 
(i) Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist Travel: 
 The Macedonian government continues to press criminal charges 
against individuals who are involved in alien smuggling and human 
trafficking. Both are considered criminal offenses in Macedonia. 
 
The Macedonian media continues to report on individual incidents 
involving attempted alien smuggling from Macedonia into Greece. 
These attempts are not the work of organized smuggling rings, and 
are unsophisticated in their execution. Macedonia, as well as other 
Balkan countries, is located in the path of a common route for 
illegal immigration from Central Asia and Eastern Europe to Western 
Europe and the United States. The majority of illegal immigration to 
the U.S. utilizes routes through Western Europe to Mexico ending in 
an attempt to cross the U.S - Mexico border without inspection. 
 
(j) DS criminal fraud investigation: There were no DS investigations 
during the reporting period. 
 
(k) Host country passport, identity documents and civil registry: 
Macedonia issues biometric passports, ID cards and driver's 
licenses. All of them require a personal appearance for application. 
See reftel for more information about Macedonia's documents. 
 
Post has an arrangement with the Ministry of Interior to verify 
identity documents and civil registry documents issued to Macedonian 
citizens. 
 
Kosovo started issuing their national biometric passports on July 
29, 2008 and now issues all local identity documents. The UNMIK 
travel document is still valid; however it is being phased out. 
UNMIK no longer extends the validity of the travel document. FPU 
expects that all UNMIK travel documents will be out of circulation 
by mid-2010. 
 
(l) Cooperation with host government authorities: Post has excellent 
cooperation with host country authorities in Macedonia and Kosovo 
and can send communications directly to the Ministry of Interior 
without first routing them through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 
The immigration enforcement officer at the British embassy invited 
FPU to discuss a proposal to create a fraudulent documents referral 
program, whereby international missions would collect and share any 
fraudulent documents received in connection with a visa application 
to the Organized Crime Unit at the Macedonian Ministry of Interior. 
The point of contact at the MOI will draft a quarterly report on 
submissions received, providing valuable information on types of 
fraudulent documents being seen by various embassies and on possible 
trends. The MOI has agreed to this plan. In the longer term, it is 
hoped that the MOI will take a more active role against document and 
visa fraud, to which they also have agreed. To date, all EU missions 
in Skopje and post's FPU have decided to participate in the program. 
The program will start in April, with the first documents to be 
provided to the embassies' point of contact by April 15. The EU 
 
SKOPJE 00000203  007 OF 007 
 
 
mission of the country with the EU presidency will take 
responsibility for collecting and preparing the documents to be 
provided to the MOI. 
 
(m) Areas of particular concern: Kosovo and Macedonia have signed 
new legislation regarding the expunction of criminal records. After 
specific periods of time, or after a judicial order, certain 
criminal records can be expunged from an individual's record. This 
may lessen the value of court and police certificates for the IV and 
DV process. Post will continue to work with the Ministries of 
Interior and the RSOs in both countries to develop contacts for 
cases when verification of criminal records is needed. 
 
(n) Staffing and training: A vice consul currently serves as Post's 
Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) and the consular section has one 
full-time LES Fraud Prevention Assistant (FPA). One visa assistant 
is detailed to the Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) on a half-time basis 
and serves as backup to the full-time FPA. The FPU's email address 
is SkopjeF@state.gov. 
 
The FPM is James Catto (CattoJA@state.gov, 389 2 311 6180 x2223), 
who also serves as IV unit chief. He took the FPM course in February 
¶2008. 
 
Lauren May, chief of the consular section, is the backup FPM 
(MayLI@state.gov, 389 2 311 6180 x2107). She took the FPM course in 
July 2008. 
 
The FPA is Marija Vucidolova (VucidolovaM@state.gov, 389 2 311 6180 
x2183), who also serves as ACS backup.  She took the FPU LES course 
in March 2003. 
 
The half-time fraud assistant is Mimoza Kasapi-Nuhiu 
(KasapiM@state.gov, 389-2 311 6180 x3144).  She spends approximately 
60 percent of her time on fraud-related issues. She attended the FPU 
LES course in March 2009.