VZCZCXRO7481
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0201/01 1261119
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061119Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8212
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0518
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000201 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MK
SUBJECT: REFLECTING ON BRANKO CRVENKOVSKI'S PRESIDENCY 
 
REF: A. 08 SKOPJE 512 
     ¶B. 08 SKOPJE 140 
     ¶C. 08 SKOPJE 696 
     ¶D. 08 SKOPJE 327 
     ¶E. 08 SKOPJE 538 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Reeker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  As his five-year Presidential term comes 
to an end  May 12, Branko Crvenkovski prepares himself for 
yet another political transition --this time returning to 
resurrect his opposition Social Democrats (SDSM), in shambles 
following devastating losses in 2008 parliamentary and 2009 
municipal and presidential elections.  Not deterred by the 
substantial work ahead, Crvenkovski believes time is on his 
side as he rebuilds the party and continues to be a thorn in 
the side of PM Gruevski.  His presidency was marked by a 
genuine dislike between the two and a tendency for each to 
score-keep rather than unite to advance Macedonia,s goals. 
The Embassy has enjoyed a good relationship with Crvenkovski, 
who has proven generally more reasonable, reliable and 
sophisticated than Gruevski, especially in strategic thinking 
on international relations.  But Crvenkovski is also a 
ruthless politician who has not hesitated to oppose positive 
steps (passage of a language law, recognition of Kosovo) in 
an effort to score points with the ethnic Macedonian 
community.  He is self-promoting and a chameleon who 
reinvented himself with the changing environment.  The term 
of his successor, politically-inexperienced professor Gjorge 
Ivanov, will likely be markedly different than his own. 
Handpicked by Gruevski as VMRO-DPMNE,s candidate, Ivanov is 
unlikely to be a strong independent voice.  Ivanov is also 
unlikely to make the same impression that Crvenkovski did -- 
of an experienced politician with a good sense of how the 
world works.  End Summary. 
 
His Presidency 
------------- 

¶2.  (C) Crvenkovski,s dislike for and opposition to the 
policies of PM Gruevski was never kept out of the public eye. 
 Daily battles in the media marked their relationship, which 
at times became so tense that they would not be in the same 
room together.  They presented a divided front which made 
progress on Euro-Atlantic integration exceedingly difficult. 
Crvenkovski believes that Macedonian policy should be a 
"three-legged stool" -- inter-ethnic issues, the economy, and 
international engagement; he says openly that Gruevski has 
failed in all three.  Gruevski, always over-sensitive to 
criticism, has long been intimidated by Crvenkovski -- a fact 
that Crvenkovski knew well and used to his advantage. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Though the office of the Presidency is 
constitutionally much less powerful than that of the PM, 
Crvenkovski used his limited powers strategically.  Most 
notably, he ended a standoff and secured the return to 
Parliament of boycotting SDSM and e-Albanian party DPA in 
August 2008 (reftel A) by pardoning SDSM leader Zoran Zaev 
and refusing to sign the laws adopted under emergency 
procedures in the absence of the opposition.  Though the 
refusal to sign the laws was only a ceremonial veto (a second 
parliamentary vote passed them with ease and forced 
Crvenkovski,s signature), he was able to mark his scorecard 
with a strategic win on that one. 
 
Crvenkovski on the Name Dispute and Euro-Atlantic Integration 
----------------------------------- 

¶4.  (C)  President Crvenkovski generally thought more 
strategically about the name issue than PM Gruevski, heeding 
our advice and encouraging Gruevski not to say "no" to Nimetz 
proposals -- even what he viewed as "the worst Nimetz had 
ever tabled" in February 2008 (reftel B), instead calling on 
the PM to highlight what was acceptable in the proposal. 
Crvenkovski told us on several occasions that he did not 
think Gruevski was serious about wanting to resolve the name 
dispute, and instead tried to "freeze it," especially with a 
return to the non-starter "double name formula" (one name for 
relations with Greece, the constitutional name for everyone 
else) in response to the October 2008 Nimetz proposal. 
Shocked and disappointed by the government,s 2007 renaming 
of Skopje airport to "Aleksandar the Great Airport" 
(Crvenkovski told the Ambassador that when he got wind of it 
he immediately inquired of FM Milososki, who initially also 
expressed shock.  After Milososki discovered Gruevski had 
personally ordered the name change, Milososki changed his 
tune and said he supported it).  Crvenkovski also questioned 
the utility of the suit against Greece in the ICJ for 
violating the 1995 Interim Accord (reftel C).  Crvenkovski 
saw the government actions through a prism that Gruevski 
seemingly never used -- that of whether it would provoke 
Greece unnecessarily or hinder progress in the name 
negotiations. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Crvenkovski also issued a stark warning on what he 
views as Gruevski,s "we can make it without NATO" attitude, 
warning that populism won,t get Macedonia what NATO and EU 
integration will.  In his December State of the Republic 
address, Crvenkovski said "by using populism and misusing 
patriotic feelings of the citizens, by dividing into patriots 
and traitors, but creating the sense that we want to be in 
NATO and the EU but we do not have to, and that the 
Government has an alternative strategy for a comprehensive, 
economic, democratic and social development of the country 
outside of Euro-Atlantic structures we are setting the 
foundation for a major historic defeat."  He added, "in the 
choice the Government is currently offering in Macedonia  -- 
that someone either support its policies or be proclaimed a 
traitor --  I voluntarily and with full responsibility decide 
to remain on its list of traitors.  And I have no doubt that 
time will show what true patriotism is and who true patriots 
are." 
 
¶6.  (C)  While he views the PM as at the center of the 
populist and, in his view, isolationist strategies, he also 
sees FM Milososki as adding fuel to the fire.  Crvenkovski 
told the Ambassador privately that while he thinks Milososki 
is "brighter than Gruevski," he,s been amazed and 
disappointed at the Foreign Minister's tendency to 
"out-Gruevski Gruevski" with isolationist or reactionary 
stances. 
 
His View of the Problems Ahead 
-------------------------- 

¶7.  (C)  Increasingly concerned about the economy, 
Crvenkovski thinks that the PM and VMRO-DPMNE Government are 
hiding their heads in the sand and ignoring the looming 
crisis.   Crvenkovski views the Government as incapable of 
attracting foreign investment and compounding the problem 
with irresponsible fiscal policy, citing the millions spent 
on monuments and the Government's continued insistence to 
fund construction of an Orthodox church on Skopje's main 
square.  At a recent dinner, President Crvenkovski also told 
the Ambassador privately that he believes Gruevski is also 
"milking the budget" to his own benefit through two streams 
-- (1) his cousins the Mijalkov brothers, Sasho (Director of 
Security of Counterintelligence) and Vladimir (Advisor to the 
Head of Customs Vanco Kargov); and 2) DPM Zoran Stavreski and 
Vlatko Cingoski, President of the state-owned electricity 
producer ELEM. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Inter-ethnic issues, in Crvenkovski,s view, have 
also been "dangerously neglected" by PM Gruevski.  He 
believes the PM and Government did not do enough ahead of 
June 2008 parliamentary elections to stop the rising 
intra-Albanian violence, saying that Gruevski "started the 
gladiator battle" between rival parties DPA and DUI (reftel 
D) by promising each a place in the future governing 
coalition.  While Crvenkovski is highly critical of the PM,s 
dismissive handling of ethnic Albanian issues, he has not 
taken on a single ethnic Albanian in his own cabinet.  His 
talk may be more enlightened than his actions on inter-ethnic 
issues.  As noted, his party has not joined VMRO in moving on 
key issues for the ethnic Albanian community (language law, 
Kosovo recognition). 
 
His Successor 
------------ 

¶9.  (C)  Gjorge Ivanov, Crvenkovski,s successor, due to take 
office on May 12, brings no political experience and very 
little charisma or personal presence to the table.  He is an 
academic also lacking in experience with foreign 
interlocutors.  Crvenkovski said Ivanov "doesn't know what 
he,s in for."  Ahead of the presidential elections, Ivanov 
rarely met with anyone in the international community without 
bringing DPM (and his former student) Ivica Bocevski with 
him.  The pattern has remained the same since he has become 
President-elect.  In a post-election congratulatory meeting 
with the Ambassador, Ivanov, accompanied by Bocevski, spoke 
only of his plans to start a new inaugural tradition, 
bringing in presidents of neighboring countries.  In an 
awkward meeting, Ivanov could not be coaxed to speak of 
anything remotely substantive, and only nodded when the 
Ambassador suggested he reach out to those who did not vote 
for him, including the ethnic Albanian community, and to 
include ethnic minorities in his cabinet. 
 
What he Returns To 
------------------ 
¶10.  (C)  Politically, Crvenkovski returns to a party in 
shambles, with SDSM suffering staggering losses in 2008 
parliamentary and 2009 municipal and presidential elections. 
In addition to its losses at the ballot box, SDSM faces a 
substantial debt of nearly 2 million Euros.  Undeterred, 
Crvenkovski spoke at a March dinner with the Ambassador of 
plans to resurrect the party.  He envisions creating a 
"shadow government" and plans for the process to take nearly 
a year, beginning with a party congress on May 24 where he 
expects to be re-elected as President of the party. 
Crvenkovski recently told the Ambassador that he will bring 
in experts and consultants in an effort to jump-start the 
party reorganization.  Interim SDSM President Zoran Zaev, 
recently re-elected Mayor of Strumica in one of SDSM,s very 
few mayoral wins, will not challenge Crvenkovski for the 
party presidency, and it is not clear what role he or other 
current SDSM leaders will play following the re-shuffle. 
Crvenkovski blames Zaev and other SDSM leaders for the state 
of the party, saying the party,s massive defeat in 2008 
parliamentary elections was due to its lost identity, as the 
party appeared "even more nationalistic than Gruevski,s 
VMRO-DPMNE" and  flip-flopped on key issues such as the name 
issue, and support for the Ohrid Framework Agreement (reftel 
E).  Despite the challenges ahead of SDSM, PM Gruevski has 
told the Ambassador that he sees Crvenkovski as formidable 
opposition. 
 
¶11. (C)  Personally, Crvenkovski, his wife and two teenaged 
children return to a flat of only 60 square meters, no doubt 
a bit of a shock to the system after life in the Presidential 
residence (and earlier, the Prime Ministerial quarters).  His 
love of fine whiskey, basketball, and political intrigue may 
provide some distraction.  Crvenkovski might also be 
distracted by legal battles, as the Government seems to 
increasingly wield the threat of charges/arrests against its 
political opponents.  Crvenkovski personally claims not to be 
concerned about possible charges against him. 
 
¶12.  (C)  Comment:  Crvenkovski has been a key player since 
(and before) Macedonia's independence.  He will continue to 
be an important force in Macedonian politics, and presents 
possibly the only chance for  SDSM to regain its relevance. 
If SDSM rises from the ashes, we expect that Euro-Atlantic 
integration will remain the centerpiece of the party,s 
platform, and that the party,s approach to Greece and the 
name dispute would be more strategically intelligible and 
less intentionally provocative than VMRO's.  That said, the 
road to relevance ahead for Crvenkovski and his party is a 
tough one  -- at the local level where SDSM holds only 7 
mayoral seats to VMRO,s 56, and at the national level where 
the party lost nearly 2 to 1 to VMRO in the 2008 
Parliamentary race and in the recent Presidential election. 
But Crvenkovski, an experienced politician and strategist, is 
determined to succeed and has the track record to back it up. 
REEKER