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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 SEOUL 000843 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; May 28, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
Chosun Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, Segye Ilbo, All TVs 
¶N. Korea Declares "End to Korean War Armistice;" 
Warns of "Military Action" 
 
Dong-a Ilbo, Hankook Ilbo, Seoul Shinmun 
¶N. Korea: "We Can No Longer Guarantee Safety of Vessels 
in the Waters West of the Peninsula" 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun 
Grief over Former President Roh's Death Reaching Fever Pitch 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
--------------------- 
 
The ROK military has been placed on high alert following North 
Korea's May 27 warnings that it is no longer bound by the 1953 
Korean War Armistice and "will immediately respond with a powerful 
military strike to any hostile act against our peaceful vessels." 
North Korea also warned that it can no longer guarantee the safety 
of ROK and U.S. military vessels as well as civilian ships in the 
waters west of the peninsula. (All) 
 
This North Korean move apparently came in retaliation for Seoul's 
decision to participate fully in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI), which aims to prevent the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction. (All) 
 
In the aftermath of North Korea's second nuclear test, there are 
growing calls in ROK political circles to delay the 2012 transfer of 
wartime operational control (OPCON) from the U.S. to the ROK and to 
"restore the nation's nuclear sovereignty." (Chosun, Dong-a, 
Hankook, Segye) 
 
In a related development, the ruling Grand National Party (GNP) 
asked the ROKG yesterday to reconsider the (timing of the) wartime 
control transfer in 2012. (All) Ruling GNP Chairman Park Hee-tae was 
quoted as saying: "It is time for the ROK to be in close contact 
with the U.S. to discuss specifics of the U.S. pledge for a nuclear 
umbrella." (Chosun, JoongAng, Dong-a, Hankyoreh, Segye, Seoul) 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
-------------------------- 
 
North Korea has launched five short-range missiles since its 
underground nuclear test on May 25, further heightening tensions on 
the Korean Peninsula and across the region. (All) 
 
Analysts viewed these launches as aimed at deterring ROK and U.S. 
reconnaissance planes from approaching the North to verify its 
claimed nuclear test. (All) 
 
Hard-line opinions against North Korea are gaining momentum in 
Washington, with U.S. experts on the Korean Peninsula - 
conservatives and progressives alike - calling for a resolute and 
effective response at the international level, without being dragged 
along by North Korea. (Chosun) 
 
In a related development, the Obama Administration is reportedly 
considering re-listing North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, 
as well as imposing further financial sanctions against the North. 
(All) 
 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
--------------- 
 
-North Korea 
 
SEOUL 00000843  002 OF 009 
 
 
------------ 
Most ROK media carried inside-page reports that the five permanent 
UN Security Council (UNSC) members and the ROK and Japan have begun 
discussions on possibilities for a new resolution against North 
Korea. 
 
Moderate Hankook Ilbo and KBS TV quoted a source at the UN: "It is 
unlikely a decision will come within the week, because there is no 
progress in detailed talks due to China's undecided stance." 
 
Most ROK media replayed foreign media reports that the Obama 
Administration is considering re-listing North Korea as a state 
sponsor of terrorism, as well as imposing further financial 
sanctions against the North.  Moderate Hankook Ilbo headlined its 
story: "U.S. Seeks Independent Sanctions on North Korea" 
 
Noting North Korea's launches of five short-range missiles since its 
underground nuclear test on May 25, most ROK media cited analysts as 
viewing the launches as aimed at deterring ROK and U.S. 
reconnaissance planes from approaching the North to verify its 
claimed nuclear test. 
 
The ROK media gave top front-and inside-page play to North Korea's 
May 27 warnings of military action against the ROK following Seoul's 
decision to participate fully in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI), which aims to prevent the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction. 
 
The ROK media widely cited the North's May 27 statement issued by 
its military mission to the joint security area in the truce village 
of Panmunjeom: "Our military is no longer bound by the 1953 Korean 
War Armistice.  Our revolutionary forces will consider the (ROK's) 
full participation in PSI a 'declaration war' and will immediately 
respond with a powerful military strike to any hostile act against 
our peaceful vessels including search and seizure."  The North also 
said that it can no longer guarantee the safety of ROK and U.S. 
military vessels as well as civilian ships in the waters west of the 
peninsula, according to media reports. 
 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo viewed the waters near the Northern Limit 
Line (NLL), the de facto maritime border in the Yellow Sea, as the 
most likely place where North Korea could carry out provocations. 
In an editorial entitled "North Korea's Threats and Provocations 
Reach Dangerous Level," Chosun Ilbo commented: "Given that North 
Korea has continuously created tensions with its unpredictable 
brinkmanship tactics and provocations, no one can be sure when the 
North will put their threats into action." 
 
Most ROK media reported that there are growing calls in ROK 
political circles to delay the 2012 transfer of wartime operational 
control (OPCON) from the U.S. to the ROK and to "restore the 
nation's nuclear sovereignty,"  in the aftermath of North Korea's 
second nuclear test. 
 
According to media reports, the ruling GNP asked the ROKG yesterday 
to reconsider the (timing of the) wartime control transfer in 2012, 
and its Chairman Park Hee-tae said yesterday: "It is time for the 
ROK to be in close contact with the U.S. to discuss specifics of the 
U.S. pledge for a nuclear umbrella," while stressing the importance 
of "making our own efforts to obtain a sufficient deterrent against 
North Korea's nuclear weapons." 
 
Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo editorialized: "North Korea announced 
that 2012 will be (the year) when it achieves its goal of becoming a 
'powerful country.'  Based on this statement, some (ROK) military 
observers predict that the North (intends to) become a nuclear 
weapons state by that year.  This forecast may have seemed too 
far-fetched (before) but it isn't any longer after this week's 
nuclear test.  This means that our security could be in jeopardy if 
this crucial change (the transfer of wartime control) is made in the 
combined forces under the circumstances.  We hope that President Lee 
Myung-bak will ask the U.S. to delay the transfer (of OPCON) at the 
upcoming ROK-U.S. summit scheduled for June 16.  If the U.S. 
accepts, then the ROK can quell fears stirred up by the nuclear test 
 
SEOUL 00000843  003 OF 009 
 
 
and focus on economic recovery." 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
------------------- 
 
LESSONS FROM A FORMER AMBASSADOR'S REGRETS 
(Chosun Ilbo, May 26, 2009, Page 30) 
 
By Washington Correspondent Lee Ha-won 
 
Memoirs reveal the truth of history, it is said.  The memoirs 
recently published by senior American officials who served in South 
Korea in the early 2000s are important in that context. 
 
Thomas Hubbard, the American Ambassador in Seoul (who took office 
in) 2001, when South Korea began to turn left, regrets the 2002 
accident when two Korean schoolgirls were crushed to death under the 
wheels of a U.S. armored vehicle.  He most seriously regrets that he 
didn't forcefully push President George W. Bush to make an apology, 
Hubbard disclosed in "Ambassadors' Memoir," published by the Korea 
Economic Institute.  The deaths of the two Korean schoolgirls, 
mishandled by the U.S., affected the 2002 South Korean presidential 
election, he added. 
 
Second Infantry Division Commander General Russel Honore, who served 
in Korea at that time and who now works as a disaster specialist, 
also refers to the accident in a memoir titled "Survival."  He said 
he let a young major be the face and voice of the Second Infantry 
Division's response to the tragedy.  You should be in the 
apologizing mode.  My young public affairs officer was in the 
explaining mode," he recalled.  "He sent the wrong message to the 
Korean people which played into the hands of the anti-American 
minority party and the results were riots and demonstrations 
throughout the country.  By the time I realized my mistake it was 
too late to make amends." 
 
No life is free from regret.  Humans are bound to make one mistake 
after another.  But the regrets expressed by a former American 
Ambassador in Seoul and a senior U.S. Forces Korea Commander, who 
influenced Korean Peninsula policy, are not the same as those of 
ordinary people. 
 
When the 2002 accident happened, the American officials concerned 
thought they made a rational decision.  They attached importance to 
the legal aspect that the tragedy occurred due to the restricted 
vision of an armored vehicle on training conducted for the security 
of South Korea.  They paid greater attention to rationalizing the 
situation at the time, rather than (considering the) possible 
repercussions of the accident.  It didn't take long for them to 
realize that their response was foolish rather than immature. 
 
The Barack Obama Administration's recent North Korea policy reminds 
me of that situation.  The Obama Administration says North Korea is 
missing the opportunity even as Washington is promoting 
reconciliation with Cuba, Iran and Syria, breaking with the Bush 
Administration's policy.  It rationalizes the fact that it has moved 
North Korea down its list of priorities since it alone has failed to 
respond to offers of dialogue. 
 
There can be no objection to the view that the North continues to 
make misjudgments.  The strategy of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il 
to carry out a second nuclear test warrants world condemnation. 
 
But we should reconsider the (policy) of leaving the North Korean 
issue behind and watching the North take self-destructive action. 
We need to keep in mind that the Bush administration's policy of 
neglect (towards North Korea) prompted the North to carry out the 
first nuclear test in 2006. 
 
The Obama Administration's foreign affairs and security policy 
makers will write their own memoirs before long.  I hope they will 
have no regrets about the way they handled North Korea in 2009. 
Imagine a scenario where Pyongyang threatens the entire world with 
 
SEOUL 00000843  004 OF 009 
 
 
an intercontinental ballistic missile fitted with a nuclear warhead: 
it's high time that we found a breakthrough. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
DELAY WARTIME CONTROL TRANSFER 
(JoongAng Ilbo, May 28, 2009, Page 38) 
 
Should South Korea reconsider taking back wartime operational 
control of its forces from the United States now that North Korea 
has conducted its second nuclear test?  The transfer of wartime 
command is scheduled for 2012, and some people are voicing concern. 
With tensions building on the Korean Peninsula, the strength of the 
Korea-U.S. combined forces should not be compromised in any way, 
they argue.  And the transition from U.S. to South Korean control 
runs the risk of, at some juncture, weakening defenses. 
 
We agree with this perspective, but we oppose entirely halting the 
transfer of wartime operational control, which has already made 
sizable progress.  The problem is the deadline for transfer: 2012. 
South Korea is at fault for setting such a close date and we highly 
recommend that the South Korean government rush to discuss the 
timing again with the United States. 
 
Also, 2012 will be a busy year for both countries.  The South and 
the U.S. are set to have presidential elections that year, and 
neither country wants to see the essential elements of the 
Korea-United States alliance changed at such a crucial time.  We 
need everyone to have their eyes on the transfer when it eventually 
goes ahead, and nobody wants any distractions.  The plan is also on 
shaky ground because people are worried that the initial deal was 
established in the wrong atmosphere.  Some feel that the decision to 
take back operational command was taken without sufficient 
confidence or understanding by the administration of the late 
President Roh Moo-hyun.  The transfer emerged as an issue between 
the two allies in early 2003.  Roh came up with the idea of making 
national defense more self-reliant. From that time on, both 
countries have harbored different views on a range of security 
issues and Korea-U.S. ties subsequently deteriorated to the lowest 
levels in history throughout Roh's term.  This mood has made an 
immense impact on discussions concerning taking back wartime 
operational control.  For example, while Korea wanted the year to be 
2015, the U.S. proposed 2009, displaying its displeasure with the 
South Korean government.  That mood, say some Korean government 
officials, still remains among U.S. defense officials.  Then, early 
this year, North Korea announced that 2012 will be (the year) when 
it achieves its goal of becoming a 'powerful country.'  Based on 
this statement, some (ROK) military observers predict that the North 
(intends to) become a nuclear weapons state by that year.  This 
forecast may have seemed too far-fetched (before) but it isn't any 
longer after this week's nuclear test.  This means that our security 
could be in jeopardy if this crucial change (the transfer of wartime 
control) is made in the combined forces under the circumstances. 
 
We hope that President Lee Myung-bak will ask the U.S. to delay the 
transfer (of OPCOM) at the upcoming ROK-U.S. summit scheduled for 
June 16.  If the U.S. accepts, then the ROK can quell fears stirred 
up by the nuclear test and focus on economic recovery. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
NORTH KOREA'S THREATS AND PROVOCATIONS REACH DANGEROUS LEVEL 
(Chosun Ilbo, May 28, 2009, Page 27) 
 
 
North Korea's permanent military mission to the joint security area 
in the demilitarized zone in a statement Wednesday said it cannot 
guarantee the legal status of the five islands (Baekryeong, 
Yeonpyeong, Daecheong, Socheong and Udo islands) in the West Sea 
controlled by the South in the North's territorial waters and safe 
 
SEOUL 00000843  005 OF 009 
 
 
passage of U.S. and South Korean ships. 
 
This was the first North Korean response after South Korea on 
Tuesday joined the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative, which 
aims to stem trafficking of weapons of mass destruction.  North 
Korea's Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland 
said it would deem South Korea's full participation in the PSI as a 
"declaration of war" and vowed to "counter them with prompt and 
strong military strikes." 
 
The North Korean military says South Korea's membership in the PSI 
is a violation of the armistice agreement that ended the 1950-53 
Korean War.  The North claims the armistice prohibits maritime 
blockades, and therefore Pyongyang is now also no longer bound by 
the agreement.  But even when the armistice was signed, the clause 
on the prohibition of maritime blockades stipulates that such moves 
will be banned only when the Allied Forces gain full control of the 
airspace and maritime space on the Korean peninsula, including North 
Korea, and a ceasefire is established. 
 
The PSI takes into consideration the domestic laws of the 
participating countries, as well as international laws and the 
decisions of the UN Security Council.  South Korean authorities 
cannot search North Korean vessels outside the South's territorial 
waters.  So it is nonsense to claim that the activities of the PSI 
constitute a "maritime blockade."  But regardless of the validity of 
North Korea's claim, given that North Korea has continuously created 
tensions with its unpredictable brinkmanship tactics and 
provocations, no one can be sure when the North will put their 
threats into action. 
 
A naval battle in 1999 lasted 14 minutes, and another one in 2002 18 
minutes.  North Korea has been firing short-range missiles in 
exercises on its western and eastern coasts, and there is no telling 
when it will lob surface-to-ship or ship-to-ship missiles at our 
naval vessels.  If North Korea resorts to military provocation, it 
could be limited to a single area or it could happen simultaneously 
in several locations.  It would be too late to look for a response 
after the provocations take place.  Front-line military commanders 
must prepare for a wide range of North Korean provocations and come 
up with specific responses. 
 
Defense Minister Lee Sang-hee told the National Assembly on Feb. 20 
that North Korean missile launchers must be attacked if they fire at 
South Korean targets. If this happens, we cannot rule out the 
possibility of an escalating military confrontation.  So we need to 
come up with responses for each scenario and each stage.  We must be 
able quickly defeat North Korean provocation so they do not 
seriously threaten the security of this nation. 
 
The best way to deal with North Korean military provocation is to 
prepare responses at the government level rather than entrusting the 
military with the task.  This is because if a military clash takes 
place, it is necessary to consider the safety of workers in the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex and other variables as well as military 
responses.  The best option is to prevent such acts of provocation 
from happening in the first place.  The most important factor is a 
firm military posture, based on the South Korea-U.S. alliance, to 
deal with any threats by North Korea. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
KOREAN MILITARY TENSION RISES 
(Hankyoreh Shinmun, May 28, 2009, Page 23) 
 
Military tensions between North Korea and South Korea are rising. 
In statements announced yesterday, North Korea's military mission to 
Panmunjeom and the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the 
Fatherland called once again the South Korean government's 
declaration of full-scale participation in the U.S.-led 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) a "declaration of war." 
They also announced that the 1953 Armistice Agreement is no longer 
 
SEOUL 00000843  006 OF 009 
 
 
binding.  The possibility that North Korea will go beyond making 
mere verbal threats towards provoking an actual military clash has 
grown.  North Korea's statement that it would react to "even the 
slightest hostile act" with immediate and powerful military strikes 
shows their disapproval of South Korea's full participation in PSI. 
North Korea has gone further to claim that participation in PSI is a 
clear denial of both international law and the Armistice Agreement, 
which forbids the placing of a blockade of any kind against the 
other side.  As a form of response, North Korea has warned it will 
not guarantee the legal status of five islands (Baengnyeong-do, 
Daecheong-do, Socheong-do, Yeonpyeong-do and U-do) in the "disputed 
maritime demarcation zone" (Yellow Sea) or safe passage of U.S. and 
South Korean naval ships or civilian shipping vessels in neighboring 
waters. 
 
North Korea had already issued warnings twice this year that it 
would consider South Korea's full participation in PSI a declaration 
of war.  The previous warnings were communicated through a 
conversation with a Spokesman from the Committee for the Peaceful 
Reunification of the Fatherland (Jo Pyeong Tong or the North Korean 
Workers' Party organization responsible for dealings with South 
Korea) on March 30 and a Q&A session with a chairman of North 
Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff on April 18.  This time, however, the 
specific announcement was made through the North Korean Mission to 
Panmunjeom that deals with the Armistice Agreement and differs in 
both quality and intensity (from the earlier warnings.)  In 
particular, it hints that aside from the Yellow Sea, where there 
have been intermittent armed clashes, a clash could take place on 
land, too. 
 
 
If North Korea's warnings turn into actual provocations, it is clear 
that inter-Korean relations, which have been steadily deteriorating, 
will race towards the bottom.  This situation helps neither North 
Korea nor South Korea.  Neither side can gain anything by 
instigating an armed clash.  In particular, if North Korea provokes 
a clash first, it would be the same as inviting international 
isolation on itself. 
 
 
The Lee Myung-bak Administration bears a great deal of 
responsibility for the current situation.  One might say it was 
necessary for the government to find a way to respond to North 
Korea's second nuclear test, but participating fully in PSI has 
nothing to do with finding a solution to the nuclear issue.  In 
fact, North Korea's reaction to the decision is just one example of 
how inter-Korean relations have worsened and how South Korea's 
ability to resolve the nuclear issue has weakened.  If the 
government says that its immediate goal is to stop North Korea from 
developing nuclear weapons and to bring peace and stability to the 
Korean Peninsula, it must devote more effort in (devising) a 
strategic approach to bring North Korea back to the negotiating 
table. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
ROKG SHOULD TELL PEOPLE ABOUT NORTH KOREA'S STUBBORNNESS AND 
SOPHISTRY 
(Dong-a Ilbo, May 28, 2009, Page 27) 
 
North Korea said yesterday in reference to the ROKG's full 
participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), "It 
has brought the Korean Peninsula to war," threatening to "counter 
any hostile action against (North Korea) with prompt and strong 
military strikes." 
 
The ROKG's participation in the PSI came as a countermeasure against 
North Korea's second nuclear test and missile development.  Unless 
the North uses our territorial waters to transport nuclear weapons, 
missiles and their parts, we will not stop North Korean vessels for 
cargo inspection.  North Korea's Committee for the Peaceful 
Reunification of the Fatherland even said, "There is nothing wrong 
 
SEOUL 00000843  007 OF 009 
 
 
with a nuclear state conducing a nuclear test, and it is very 
natural."  However, Pyongyang's nuclear test is tantamount to a 
declaration of war against us. 
 
The Panmunjeom Mission of the North Korean People`s Army cited the 
Armistice Agreement as a ground for its military retaliation.  It 
seems to point to Paragraph 15 of the Agreement, "This Armistice 
Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval 
forces...shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea." 
However, PSI activities do not involve total blockage of specific 
waters but only target vessels suspected of carrying banned items. 
The PSI, which has 95 members, does not target a specific country. 
Moreover, the PSI does not restrict the normal operation of civilian 
ships.  Therefore, it is preposterous for North Korea to argue that 
the ROK's participation in PSI is a violation of the Korean War 
Armistice. 
 
A military reaction by North Korea to (the ROK's) PSI activities 
would violate the Maritime Agreement reached between North Korea and 
the ROK in 2004.  The Maritime Agreement allows North Korean and ROK 
civilian vessels to pass through each other's territorial waters in 
order to reduce sailing time.  North Korean vessels sailing on a 
designated route with prior approval (from the ROK) are protected 
under this (Maritime) Agreement regardless of the ROK's 
participation in PSI.  The ROK can take action, such as inspections, 
only when North Korean vessels are suspected of carrying weapons or 
(their) parts, or undermining peace, order and security. 
 
This is not the first time North Korea has attempted to nullify the 
Armistice.  We should be on high alert, however, since this time 
North Korea threatens immediate military retaliation through "action 
against action."  (ROK) military authorities should be thoroughly 
prepared against any military provocations and clashes which could 
occur in the waters west of the peninsula and should brace 
themselves to take countermeasures.  Also, the ROKG needs to 
properly explain to the public the exact nature of North Korea's 
absurd logics and deceptive arguments, and the ROK's logic against 
North Korean claims.  The public, government and military can 
respond more adequately (to this critical situation) when they have 
a shared sense of security against North Korea. 
 
 
FEATURES 
-------- 
 
NORTH KOREA THREATENS ROK OVER PSI ENTRY 
(Dong-a Ilbo, May 28, 2009, Front Page) 
 
By Reporters Shin Suk-ho and Yoon Sang-ho 
 
North Korea stepped up its hostile rhetoric against South Korea 
yesterday, calling Seoul's full participation in the U.S.-led 
Proliferation Security Initiative a declaration of war. 
 
"We will react militarily to any hostile act by South Korea," the 
North said.  "The Korean War armistice has lost its binding power, 
so the Korean Peninsula is at war." 
 
In a statement issued through the North's state-run Korean Central 
News Agency, the Panmunjeom Mission of the North Korean People`s 
Army said, "We cannot guarantee the legal status of South Korea's 
five islands (Baeknyeong, Daecheong, Socheong, Yeonpyeong and Udo) 
in waters northwest of our maritime borders and the safety of U.S. 
and South Korean naval and commercial vessels operating in 
neighboring waters." 
 
Experts say this comment, along with the declaration to nullify the 
Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea in January, is a signal from 
the North that it is prepared for a military confrontation with the 
South. 
 
Blasting the South for joining the U.S-led initiative, the North 
said, "Any hostile act by South Korea, including a crackdown on and 
search of our vessels, will be deemed a violation of our republic's 
 
SEOUL 00000843  008 OF 009 
 
 
sovereignty and met with strong military attacks." 
 
"Our military is no longer bound to the armistice," it said, adding, 
"If the armistice loses its binding power, the Korean Peninsula is 
legally at war.  Accordingly, our revolutionary forces will carry 
out military action." 
 
The North`s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the 
Fatherland also issued a statement the same day, saying, "(The 
South) has declared war on us by brutally trampling on our dignity 
and autonomy," adding, "We will respond with measures corresponding 
to those taken in wartime." 
 
South Korean President Lee Myung-bak learned of the North's reaction 
to South Korea's decision to join the initiative at a meeting with 
foreign affairs and security advisers.  He ordered relevant 
ministries to react calmly, according to Presidential Spokesman Lee 
Dong-kwan. 
 
A South Korean destroyer has been dispatched to the Yellow Sea to 
prepare for a possible military provocation.  The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff in Seoul said, "We've prepared countermeasures based on 
various scenarios for North Korea's possible provocations near the 
Northern Limit Line, though we cannot disclose more details about 
them." 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
MILITARY ON ALERT AFTER N. KOREAN THREATS 
(Chosun Ilbo, May 28, 2009, Page 3) 
 
By Military Affairs Reporter Yu Yong-won 
 
The South Korean military is on alert after North Korea on Wednesday 
warned it cannot guarantee safe passage for South Korean and U.S. 
ships in the Yellow Sea and will no longer respect the armistice 
agreement.  The saber rattling apparently comes in protest against 
South Korea's decision to join the Proliferation Security 
Initiative, a U.S.-led anti-proliferation regime. 
 
The most likely place where North Korea could carry out provocations 
is in waters near the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the de facto 
maritime border in the Yellow Sea.  The Panmunjeom mission of the 
North Korean Army also hinted in a statement Wednesday at the 
possibility of provocations along the NLL near the five islands. 
 
South Korean military authorities speculate that the North could 
fire surface-to-ship or ship-to-ship missiles or shells from a west 
coast artillery battery, send gunboats to clash with South Korean 
vessels, or send fighter jets to fly close to the NLL. 
 
North Korea fired five short-range missiles from the east coast on 
Monday and Tuesday, four of which reportedly were surface-to-ship 
missiles, including the KN-01 with a range of 160 km.  The North 
Korean military staged 19 firing exercises firing a total of 1,000 
shells in waters near Daesuap Island on the northern side of 
Yeonpyeong Island since early this year. 
 
The South Korean military is most concerned about illegal fishing 
near the NLL by Chinese fishing boats.  Currently, some 300 Chinese 
fishing boats are engaged in illegal fishing in waters off 
Yeonpyeong and Daecheong islands near the NLL.  The military 
speculates that more Chinese fishing boats will arrive, with about 2 
more tons of fish expected to be caught than last year. 
 
The North could also heighten tensions by sending fighter jets near 
the NLL or the demilitarized zone.  The frequency of North Korean 
fighter drills above the west coast has increased six times over 
last year. 
 
Minister of National Defense Lee Sang-hee said at a parliamentary 
hearing in February, "If North Korea launches a preemptive attack, 
 
SEOUL 00000843  009 OF 009 
 
 
we will strike military positions (where the missile or artillery 
attacks originate.)"  This means that the ROK will not be hit 
unilaterally but it will clearly respond to any attack by the 
North. 
 
Accordingly, since the North began ratcheting up tensions at the end 
of January, the ROK military has reportedly conducted precision 
bombing practice runs, involving F-15K fighter jets, targeting North 
Korea's ground-to-ship missile bases or coast batteries in the 
Yellow Sea, from which the North has attacked ROK vessels in 
emergencies.  The ROK Navy plans to move a 3500-ton destroyer and a 
number of convoys, corvette and high-speed patrol craft forward near 
the NLL, and the ROK Marine Corps plans to deploy the K-9 
self-propelled gun (with a maximum firing range of 40 km) to 
Baeknyeong-do and Yeonpyeong-do. 
 
* We have compared the English version on the website with the 
Korean version and added the last two paragraphs to make them 
identical. 
 
 
¶N. KOREA'S NUKE TEST REVIVES DEFENSE DEBATES 
(Chosun Ilbo, May 28, 2009, Front Page) 
 
By Reporter Yoon Jung-ho 
 
North Korea's nuclear test has revived debate in the South about the 
handover of wartime operational control over the South Korean troops 
from the U.S. and nuclear armament. 
 
At the request of Liberty Forward Party lawmaker Chough Soon-hyung, 
the Ministry of Legislation recently issued a formal statement 
saying the current procedure for the takeover of wartime operational 
control of South Korean troops from the U.S. "leaves room for 
unconstitutionality."  The ministry partially accepted Chough's 
argument that it was against the Constitution for the previous 
government to push for the takeover, a matter that could have 
decisive effects on national security and require an additional 
budget of hundreds of trillions of won, without a review by the 
Cabinet and approval from the National Assembly. 
 
At a meeting of senior government and ruling party officials on 
Wednesday, the ruling Grand National Party again asked the 
government to reconsider the takeover.  During the Roh Moo-hyun 
Administration, Seoul and Washington agreed the South Korean 
military would have exclusive control over its own troops, which in 
wartime is nominally still in U.S. hands, as of April 2012. 
 
The GNP also reportedly asked the government to see if the issue can 
be raised at the upcoming Seoul-Washington summit in June. 
 
Meanwhile, there are calls for South Korea to reconsider nuclear 
armament. GNP Chairman Park Hee-tae urged the government to find out 
how the U.S. will ensure a nuclear umbrella for the South.  He 
called for South Korea to "make our own efforts to obtain enough 
deterrence against the nuclear weapons the North has already 
developed."  In the same meeting, lawmaker Gong Sung-jin, a GNP 
Supreme Council member, said, "We should calmly review whether the 
inter-Korean declaration on nuclear-free Korean Peninsula is still 
effective."  In an interview, LFP Spokesperson Park Sun-young called 
for "a plan to develop nuclear weapons for self-defense." 
 
However, Democratic Party Spokesman Roh Young-min said in a 
commentary, "Arguments for nuclear sovereignty and a delay in the 
transfer of wartime operational control are raising tensions on the 
Korean Peninsula." 
 
* We have compared the English version on the website with the 
Korean version and added the last paragraph to make them identical. 
 
 
STEPHENS