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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SEOUL 000758 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; May 12, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
Chosun Ilbo 
University of Hong Kong Ranked First in Asian University Assessment 
Conducted by Chosun Ilbo and QS; KAIST 
and Seoul National University Ranked 
Seventh and Eighth, Respectively 
 
JoongAng Ilbo 
Ethnic Koreans Living Overseas Come Home for Health Care; 
Inexpensive Services, Quality Care 
Bringing Back Ethnic Koreans 
 
Dong-a Ilbo 
Gyeongsangnam-do Province Governor to be Summoned 
for Taking Huge Amount of Money 
from Former Taekwang Industrial CEO 
 
Hankook Ilbo, Hankyoreh Shinmun, Segye Ilbo, All TVs 
Angered by Supreme Court Ethics Committee's Decision to Spare 
Justice Shin Any Punishment for His Attempt to Influence Politically 
Sensitive Trials, Junior Judges Call for 
"Justice Shin to Step Down" 
 
Seoul Shinmun 
ROKG Seeks to Merge Allowances of Public Servants 
with Their Basic Pay 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
------------------ 
 
According to Japan's Mainichi Shimbun, there is a high possibility 
that North Korea might have planned in advance to arrest the two 
U.S. journalists who were caught in March reporting on the plight of 
North Korean refugees along the China-North Korea border. (Dong-a, 
Segye) 
 
A U.S. journalist jailed in Iran, meanwhile, was freed yesterday 
after an Iranian court reduced her prison term for spying to a 
two-year suspended sentence. (All) 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
 
-North Korea 
------------ 
Moderate Seoul Shinmun gave inside-page play to a report that Seoul 
and Washington have decided not to hurry talks with North Korea, 
which has boycotted the Six-Party Talks.  A senior ROKG official was 
quoted: "In a situation where North Korea refuses to budge an inch 
on repeated U.S. overtures for bilateral and multilateral talks, the 
U.S. and the ROK judge it better to watch further developments, 
rather than hurrying talks with North Korea." 
 
Conservative Dong-a Ilbo and Segye Ilbo replayed a May 11 report by 
Japan's Mainichi Shimbun that North Korea might have planned in 
advance to arrest the two U.S. journalists who were caught in March 
reporting on the plight of North Korean refugees along the 
China-North Korea border.  The Mainichi Shimbun report cited a 
source in Beijing privy to Chinese government (intelligence) saying 
that a local Korean-Chinese guide, who had taken the U.S. 
journalists to the border area, admitted to Chinese authorities that 
he was a collaborator with North Korea. 
 
-Iran - Release of Roxana Saberi 
-------------------------------- 
Citing the foreign media, the ROK media carried inside-page reports 
on the May 11 release of U.S.-born reporter Roxana Saberi from a 
Tehran jail after an Iranian court reduced her prison term for 
spying to a two-year suspended sentence. 
 
SEOUL 00000758  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
Newspapers carried the following headlines:  "The Green Light On for 
Improved U.S.-Iran Relations" (Conservative Chosun Ilbo and Dong-a 
Ilbo); "A Warm Breeze Blows for Improved Bilateral Ties" (moderate 
Hankook Ilbo); and "Release of U.S. Reporter Likely to Act as a 
Catalyst for Improved U.S.-Iran Relations" (left-leaning Hankyoreh 
Shinmun and moderate Seoul Shinmun) 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
------------------- 
 
WASHINGTON AND SEOUL SHOULD DISCUSS DELAYING THE TRANSFER OF WARTIME 
OPERATIONAL CONTROL 
(Dong-a Ilbo, May 12, 2009, Page 31) 
 
There are a growing number of reasons why the transfer of wartime 
operational control of ROK troops from the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces 
Command (CFC) to the ROK should be delayed from its original 
schedule of April 2012.  For one, North Korea's military threat, 
which is the most important consideration in the transfer of wartime 
operational control, is getting worse day by day.  Also, that over 
60 reserve officers urged the ROKG last month to postpone the 
wartime command shift can be seen as a manifestation of ardent 
patriotism.  Seoul should take seriously (their) warning that if the 
ROKG recklessly pushes for the shift before assuming an independent 
national defense stance for the sole purpose of meeting the agreed 
upon transfer deadline with the U.S., it will be difficult to 
prevent North Korea's provocations. 
 
The Roh Moo-hyun Administration, in a situation where it was 
difficult to fully control or curb North Korea's provocation, simply 
viewed the wartime command shift as a matter of independence and 
sovereignty, thereby sparking anxiety.  And although the Roh 
Administration said, "We will create an elite unit by 2020 for our 
self-reliant national defense," their assertion turned out to be 
just a bluff because they had not carefully considered the ROK's 
actual capabilities.  The introduction of the Global Hawk 
High-Altitude, Long-Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (HAE UAV) 
program, a key military capability needed to collect strategic 
intelligence about North Korea, was delayed until 2015, and the 
introduction of tanker aircraft, which are necessary to expand the 
operation area of fighter jets, was postponed until 2014.  (These 
postponements) are a result of it being impossible to secure a 
budget to replace the war capability of USFK in the short term. 
 
The relocation of Yongsan Garrison and the U.S. Second Division in 
northern Gyeonggi-do province, which is linked to the transfer of 
wartime operational control, was postponed to 2015 and 2016. 
(However), there is no guarantee that another postponement will not 
occur.  In this regard, a considerable amount of responsibility 
should be borne by the U.S. since it had agreed to the transfer of 
wartime operational control in order to assure strategic 
flexibility. 
 
While preparations for the transfer of wartime operational control 
from the U.S. to the ROK have hit a snag, North Korea launched a 
rocket and is threatening a second nuclear test this year. 
Therefore, it is self-destructive for the ROK to take over wartime 
operational control and dissolve the U.S-ROK Combined Forces Command 
despite this deteriorated security environment. 
 
The U.S. and ROK governments should review the seriousness of the 
security situation on the Korean Peninsula.  At a summit scheduled 
for June in Washington, leaders from both countries will mainly 
discuss their future strategic alliance.  No other pending issues 
are more urgent than reviewing the transfer.  President Lee 
Myung-bak should be determined to rectify errors in the security 
strategy to which the previous government has committed itself.  He 
should clearly explain to the U.S. problems about the transfer. 
This is a mission for the Commander-in-Chief, the very person 
responsible for national security.  The U.S. should not take the 
reasons for postponing the transfer lightly.  If the ROK's security 
is shaky, then the U.S.-ROK alliance becomes meaningless.  The U.S. 
 
SEOUL 00000758  003 OF 003 
 
 
and the ROK should address the timing of transferring wartime 
operational control by bracing themselves against the worst case 
scenario. 
 
 
 
STANTON