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Viewing cable 09SEOUL745, SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; May 11, 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL745 2009-05-11 07:32 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO0875
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHUL #0745/01 1310732
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 110732Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4277
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 8525
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDI/OEA//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-Z//
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 9690
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5833
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5926
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0668
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 4352
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 3333
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 6533
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0945
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2283
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1357
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1966
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 SEOUL 000745 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; May 11, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
Chosun Ilbo 
Chang Young-hee, Renowned English Professor and Columnist, 
Dies of Cancer 
 
JoongAng Ilbo 
Volkswagen Overtakes GM and Renault in Global Car Sales, Becoming 
the World's Second-Largest Carmaker, as Consumers Favor Small and 
Inexpensive Cars amid Economic Slump 
 
Dong-a Ilbo, Hankook Ilbo 
Prosecution Expanding Investigation of 
President Lee's Close Friend 
for His Influence-Peddling 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun 
ROKG's Aid for Private Organizations "Turns Right;" 
ROKG Replaces 75 Percent of Its Aid Recipients with 
Conservative Organizations 
 
Segye Ilbo 
ROKG to Provide Jobs to 250,000 Low-income People 
 
Seoul Shinmun 
Allegations that Chung Sang-moon, Former Secretary of President Roh, 
Asked President Roh to Help Taekwang Industrial CEO Win Business 
Contract in Vietnam 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
--------------------- 
 
North Korea's Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the 
Fatherland, in a May 9 statement, claimed, "There simply is no need 
to even consider holding talks between the two Koreas while the Lee 
Myung-bak group is publicly trying to smear the name of our republic 
and bluntly denying it." (All) 
 
This statement, coming amid reports that the second inter-Korean 
government-level talks might be held as early as this week, is 
casting doubt on whether the second meeting will actually take place 
and, particularly, on the prospects of discussing the (situation of 
the) ROK worker who has been detained in the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex in the North. (Chosun, Hankook, Hankyoreh, Segye, Seoul, all 
TVs) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
-North Korea - Special Envoy Bosworth's Visit 
--------------------------------------------- 
On Saturday (May 9), the ROK media gave wide play to U.S. Special 
Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth's May 8 
arrival in Seoul as part of a visit to the region to discuss the 
North Korean nuclear issue with regional partners. 
 
Ambassador Bosworth was widely quoted as telling a press conference 
in Seoul: "If the North Koreans decide to carry out a second nuclear 
test, we will deal with the consequences of that.  And there will be 
consequences."   The Ambassador was further quoted: "The door to 
dialogue (with North Korea) is always open.  We're also prepared to 
deal with North Korea on a bilateral basis, but in a way that 
reinforces the multilateral (Six-Party) process." 
 
In a related development, left-leaning Hankyoreh Shinmun today cited 
experts as commenting that (Ambassador Bosworth's visit) was 
significant in that it was part of a process to exchange views among 
concerned parties on the need and the timing for U.S.-North Korea 
talks but that the visit fell far short of making a breakthrough in 
easing heightening tensions on the Korean Peninsula. 
 
SEOUL 00000745  002 OF 007 
 
 
 
Hankyoreh also quoted a senior ROKG official as saying on May 10 
that Washington and Seoul are considering the timing of U.S.-North 
Korea talks, which should be scheduled at an appropriate time to 
avoid any appearance of giving in to the North's recent harsh 
rhetoric. 
 
The North Korean Foreign Ministry's May 8 statement - accusing the 
Obama Administration of harboring a hostile policy toward Pyongyang 
- also received wide press coverage today.  An unnamed North Korean 
Foreign Ministry Spokesman was quoted as telling the official 
(North) Korean Central News Agency: "There is nothing to be gained 
by sitting down together with a party that continues to view us with 
hostility.   The DPRK will bolster its nuclear deterrent as it has 
already clarified."  Most ROK media viewed this North Korean 
statement as timed to coincide with Ambassador Bosworth's visit to 
Seoul. 
 
The ROK media also gave attention to a May 9 statement by North 
Korea's Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland 
which claimed, "There simply is no need to even consider holding 
talks between the two Koreas while the Lee Myung-bak group is 
publicly trying to smear the name of our republic and bluntly 
denying it." 
 
This statement, coming amid reports that the second inter-Korean 
government-level talks might be held as early as this week, is 
casting doubt on whether the second meeting will actually take place 
and, particularly, on the prospects of discussing the (situation of 
the) ROK worker who has been detained in the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex in the North, according to media reports.  Right-of-center 
JoongAng Ilbo speculated that the North Korean statement might have 
been intended to gain the upper hand in the upcoming inter-Korean 
talks. 
 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo editorialized today: "It is high time to 
think seriously whether it is appropriate to prolong this deadlocked 
situation (on North Korea).  No one knows for sure what such an 
unpredictable country as North Korea will do in isolation, and the 
North will not change its behavior even if we wait (for it to 
change).  There is also very little likelihood of North Korea 
buckling under international sanctions.  For this very reason, the 
U.S. and the ROK should discuss how to manage this deadlocked 
situation and share a strategy for dealing with a situation after 
this impasse." 
 
Left-leaning Hankyoreh Shinmun editorialized: "If North Korea 
continues to make provocations, thereby narrowing the room for 
negotiations, international calls for sanctions on it will continue 
to grow.  In order to turn this situation around, the U.S. should 
promptly conclude its review of North Korea policy and engage in 
high-level talks with North Korea.  If the U.S. and North Korea 
simply speak at cross purposes like they are doing these days, we 
cannot avoid aggravating the situation." 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
------------------- 
PRECONDITIONS FOR DISCUSSIONS ON TROOP DEPLOYMENT TO AFGHANISTAN 
(JoongAng Ilbo, May 11, 2009, Page 42) 
 
By Deputy Political Affairs Editor Kang Chan-ho 
 
Troop deployment to Afghanistan will be the biggest item on the 
agenda in the U.S-ROK summit scheduled for June 16.  However, 
President Lee Myung-bak should not reach a compromise deal linking 
troop deployment (to Afghanistan) to the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
issue or to North Korea policy, but should (focus on) building 
trust.  The key mission should be to solidify the 6-decade alliance 
between two countries.  A solution to the Afghanistan issue should 
be sought after working-level officials from both countries 
understand each other's position. 
 
What President Lee Myung-bak should pay the most attention to is the 
 
SEOUL 00000745  003 OF 007 
 
 
communication with the political circles, particularly, the 
opposition party.  President Lee should leave all possibilities 
including troop deployment open and persuade the public.   The 
opposition party should remember that when it held the reins of 
power, it sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan for national interest 
against opposition from its political base.  The opposition party 
should cooperate open-mindedly. 
 
Lawmakers should meet with U.S. officials and politicians 
individually and show their interest in the Afghanistan issue.  This 
'parliamentary diplomacy' will be very meaningful.  However, the 
reality is regrettable.  Among more than 100 lawmakers who left for 
Europe, Asia and Africa, few have shown interest in the Afghanistan 
issue.  They dub their trip abroad 'parliamentary diplomacy.'  What 
they call 'parliamentary diplomacy' will end up as merely a 
'parliamentary trip' if they turn a blind eye to important pending 
issues. 
 
 
SEOUL, WASHINGTON NEED NEW N. KOREA STRATEGY 
(Chosun Ilbo, May 11, page 35, 2009) 
 
The North Korean Foreign Ministry in a statement on Friday said its 
study of the policies of the Obama Administration for the past 100 
days "made it clear that the U.S. hostile policy toward North Korea 
remains unchanged." 
 
It said there was "nothing to be gained by sitting down together 
with a party that continues to view us with hostility."  Instead, 
North Korea issued the usual threat to "bolster its nuclear 
deterrent."  After all this time trying to force direct talks with 
the U.S., the North is now denouncing dialogue as pointless. 
 
Washington is also stubborn.  Stephen Bosworth, Special 
Representative for North Korea Policy, said Friday there is not much 
the U.S. can do to prevent Pyongyang from conducting a second 
nuclear test, but added, "If the North Koreans decide to carry out a 
second nuclear test, we will deal with the consequences of that. 
And there will be consequences." The remarks were made with stronger 
UN Security Council sanctions against the North in mind. 
 
Asked if she intends to visit Pyongyang in a bid to resolve the 
stalemate with North Korea, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
flatly replied Thursday, "No."  U.S. President Barack Obama's 
coordinator for weapons of mass destruction policy, Gary Saymore, 
said a while ago, "It's very clear that the North Koreans want to 
pick a fight," and that his government will "just wait" until North 
Korea returns to the dialogue. 
 
This series of remarks by senior U.S. government officials indicates 
that Washington will adopt a "pressure and (ignore)" tactic for the 
time being.  The Obama Administration intends to concentrate on the 
economic crisis; on international issues it is focused on 
Afghanistan.  North Korea's antics, it believes, can hardly threaten 
the U.S. right away. 
 
All in all, it's become difficult for the North to pursue past 
tactics of forcing Washington to the negotiation table.  Views in 
the U.S. are that the Six-Party talks on North Korea's nuclear 
disarmament or bilateral Washington-Pyongyang talks may not be held 
this year.  If the North conducts a second nuclear test, China and 
Russia will find it difficult to shield Pyongyang at the UN Security 
Council as they did when the North fired a long-range missile in 
April.  Chances are that an additional nuclear test will result in 
greater isolation and harsher sanctions for North Korea.  Diplomatic 
circles say the North, accustomed to its past practices, has made a 
misjudgment.  It would be wiser to accept, even now, the Obama 
Administration's offer of bilateral dialogue rather than treading 
this uncertain path that demands sacrifices from the entire North 
Korean population. 
 
It is North Korea's fault that the U.S. is ready to endure the 
current stalemate.  Despite the Obama Administration's offer of 
direct dialogue, North Korea has made a series of provocations 
 
SEOUL 00000745  004 OF 007 
 
 
including the long-range missile launch.  Washington feels that the 
North should be made to pay a price before dialogue is resumed.  The 
North's strategy of dealing directly with the U.S. and freezing out 
the ROK has brought about its own isolation instead.  However, it is 
high time to think seriously whether it is appropriate to prolong 
this deadlocked situation (on North Korea.)  No one knows for sure 
what such an unpredictable country as North Korea will do in 
isolation, and the North will not change its behavior even if we 
wait (for it to change).  There is also very little likelihood of 
North Korea buckling under international sanctions. 
 
For this very reason, the U.S. and the ROK should discuss how to 
manage this deadlock and share a strategy for dealing with a 
situation after this impasse.  They should use diplomatic means to 
enable the other members of the Six-Party Talks -- China, Japan and 
Russia -to participate in the process.  Only then will we be able to 
prevent Pyongyang from committing irrevocable provocations and (be 
able to) resolve the problems by effectively persuading and 
pressuring North Korea in the future. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
LOCATING AN EXIT TO NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR ISSUE STALEMATE 
(Hankyoreh Shinmun, May 11, page 23, 2009) 
 
It has been close to four months since U.S. President Barack Obama 
took office and efforts to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue, 
including the restart of the Six-Party Talks, have not escaped 
stalemate.  Moreover, it does not appear that inter-Korean issues 
are improving.  In short, we find ourselves in a rather frustrating 
situation, with regards to North Korea-related issues, in which 
there is no way out. 
 
U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth, 
who is on his second tour of Six-Party Talks nations since his 
appointment, is leaving the ROK without having made any clear gains. 
 He said he would continue to work to get North Korea back to the 
Six-Party Talks, but he reportedly did not put forward a plan to 
make that happen.  Like his last tour, he did not visit North Korea 
or meet with high-ranking North Korean officials.  Indeed, North 
Korea declared on Friday, the day Ambassador Bosworth arrived in the 
ROK, that there was no change that they could discern in the U.S.'s 
hostile policy towards them, even under President Obama, and that 
Pyongyang would continue to work on strengthening its nuclear 
deterrent.  The statement issued during Ambassador Bosworth's second 
tour basically reconfirmed a statement made by a North Korean 
Foreign Ministry spokesperson on April 29, in which North Korea 
declared it would conduct a second nuclear test, test fire an 
intercontinental ballistic missile or develop uranium enrichment 
technology. 
 
In response to the ROKG raising the issue of North Korea's human 
rights record, North Korea's Committee for the Peaceful 
Reunification of the Fatherland took a hardline approach and said 
Friday that there was no need to engage in inter-Korean dialogue. 
The committee even coarsely condemned the ROK's response to North 
Korea's detainment of a South Korean Hyundai Asan employee. 
Accordingly, there are growing predictions that, despite the 
impending second round of inter-Korean governmental talks concerning 
the Kaesong (Gaeseong) Industrial Complex, this issue will not be 
resolved easily. 
 
It is unclear whether this is part of North Korea's strategy to go 
on its own path until it is recognized as a nuclear state, or 
brinkmanship intended to maximize Pyongyang's bargaining power with 
Washington.  Regardless of which it is, what is clear is that it is 
putting up obstacles to resolving the nuclear issue.  If North Korea 
continues to make provocations, thereby narrowing the room for 
negotiations, international calls for sanctions on it will continue 
to grow. 
 
In order to turn this situation around, the U.S. should promptly 
 
SEOUL 00000745  005 OF 007 
 
 
conclude its review of North Korea policy and engage in high-level 
talks with North Korea.  If the U.S. and North Korea simply speak at 
cross purposes like they are doing these days, we cannot avoid 
aggravating the situation. The ROKG meanwhile must both 
substantively support North Korea-U.S. dialogue and take a concrete 
approach to North Korea that can change the basic framework of 
inter-Korean relations. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
FEATURES 
-------- 
 
BOSWORTH SAYS THERE IS NOT MUCH TO DO 
(Chosun Ilbo, May 9, 2009, Page 6) 
 
Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, the U.S. Special Representative for 
North Korea Policy said that many things have happened since his 
visit last March but little has changed. 
 
Ambassador Bosworth made this remark during his meeting with Foreign 
Minister Yu Myung-hwan.  This remark apparently indicates his 
anxiety (over the current situation).  The issue of North Korean 
denuclearization has been deadlocked for months.  Also, the prospect 
of resuming the Six-Party Talks remains uncertain.  North Korea 
rejected Ambassador Bosworth's offer in March to visit the North. 
Moreover, in time for Ambassador Bosworth's visit to the ROK, North 
Korea issued a harsh statement saying there is no need for 
negotiations with the U.S., 
 
There is not much (for the U.S.) to do. 
 
Special Representative Bosworth arrived in the ROK after his visit 
to China.  He met with Minister Yu, Senior Presidential Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs and National Security Kim Sung-hwan, and ROK's 
Chief Delegate to the Six-Party Talks Wi Sung-lac and discussed ways 
to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table.  However, he 
failed to come up with specific solutions. 
 
During a press conference, when asked what specific plans (the U.S.) 
has to improve the Six-Party Talks, Ambassador Bosworth said that 
for now (the U.S.) has no specific plans.  He added that should 
North Korea go ahead with a second nuclear test, there will be 
consequences.  Meanwhile, he noted that there is not much the U.S. 
can do to prevent the North from carrying out a nuclear test. 
 
Ambassador Bosworth's statements are very different from those of 
Christopher Hill, the former Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs and former chief negotiator for the Six-Party Talks. 
 Ambassador Hill liked to use the media by employing extravagant 
diplomatic language.  However, Ambassador Bosworth expressed 
directly that the current situation is difficult. 
 
An (ROK) diplomatic official said that Ambassador Bosworth's visit 
is focused on assessing the current situation and sharing 
understanding with regional partners in how to respond in the future 
rather than devising an immediate solution. 
 
Bilateral talks will be held within the Six-Party Talks. 
 
Ambassador Bosworth said that the Six-Party Talks are at the heart 
of U.S. efforts in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue.  He 
made clear that, for now, the U.S. is not considering an alternative 
to the Six-Party Talks.  He repeatedly emphasized that the door to 
dialogue is open.  Also, he noted that the U.S. is prepared to deal 
with North Korea bilaterally, but in a way that reinforces the 
Six-Party Talks.  Meanwhile, he denied the possibility of the U.S. 
and North Korea having bilateral talks outside of the Six-Party 
Talks framework. 
 
Ambassador Bosworth mainly discussed two options during a series of 
meetings with the ROK and China.  One was China's sending an envoy 
 
SEOUL 00000745  006 OF 007 
 
 
to North Korea to persuade North Korea (to return to the Six Party 
Talks.) Another was that the ROK, China, Russia and Japan, with the 
exception of North Korea, may hold a separate meeting to deliver a 
united message calling for the North to return to the Six-Party 
Talks, thereby pressuring North Korea. 
 
Chief Delegate Wi Sung-lac did not deny the possibility that China 
may send an envoy to North Korea, saying that consultations between 
North Korea and China could benefit the Six-Party Talks.  Also, an 
ROK government official noted that China was vehemently opposed to 
the Five-Party Talks (before) but apparently has changed its 
position. 
 
Ambassador Bosworth will pay a courtesy visit to former President 
Kim Dae-jung on May 9th.  He will stay in the ROK through the 
weekend and then leave for Japan on May 11th. 
 
 
ROK SENIOR OFFICIAL: U.S. TO NEITHER SEND HIGH-LEVEL ENVOY TO DPRK, 
NOR TAKE STEPS TO REVIVE SIX-PARTY TALKS (Yonhap, May 10, 2009) 
 
The U.S. administration of President Barack Obama does not intend to 
send a high-level envoy to North Korea or take any other steps to 
revive the Six-Party talks on the communist nation's nuclear 
program, a senior ROKG official said Sunday. 
 
The U.S. believes that it has done enough to convey its willingness 
to engage in both bilateral and multilateral talks with the defiant 
North and that it is time for Pyongyang to give an answer, according 
to the official. 
 
"There can be progress in dialogue only when a partner responds (to 
proposals for talks) and shows interest," the official said in a 
background briefing for reporters on the results of consultations 
with Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, Obama's special envoy on North 
Korea.  Ambassador Bosworth arrived in Seoul on Friday for a series 
of meetings with top ROK officials, including Foreign Minister Yu 
Myung-hwan (Yu Myo'ng-hwan), Unification Minister Hyun In-taek and 
top nuclear negotiator Wi So'ng-rak (Wi Sung-lac). 
 
As North Korea is aware of Washington's willingness for dialogue, 
the official added, it would be "rational" to take a wait and see 
approach. 
 
"If North Korea is interested in dialogue, it will respond," he 
said. 
 
Ambassador Bosworth, on a tour of Northeast Asia to discuss ways to 
resume the denuclearization process, openly acknowledged that 
Washington is willing to talk with Pyongyang.  State Department 
spokesman Robert Wood also said in a press briefing on Friday that 
the U.S. "is prepared to deal with North Korea bilaterally in a way 
that reinforces the multilateral process." 
 
The U.S. has also expressed its willingness to talk with North Korea 
on several occasions through its diplomatic mission at the United 
Nations, known as the "New York" channel.  But the North remains 
unresponsive. 
 
The official said Ambassador Bosworth and ROK officials reviewed the 
current situation but did not discuss any new specific initiative to 
persuade the North to return to the bargaining table. 
 
He said the current stalemate will continue unless Pyongyang changes 
its attitude. 
 
North Korea has threatened to conduct a second nuclear test and 
pursue a uranium enrichment program in anger over the U.N. Security 
Council's condemnation of its April 5 rocket launch. 
 
"With regard to the nuclear test issue, we have no information on 
any concrete move," the official said. 
 
The ROK and the U.S. made clear that the North will face 
 
SEOUL 00000745  007 OF 007 
 
 
"consequences" if it presses ahead with additional provocative steps 
including another nuclear test. 
 
 
ΒΆN. KOREA THREATENS TO `BOLSTER NUCLEAR DETERRENT` 
(Dong-a Ilbo, May 9, page 4, 2009) 
 
North Korea yesterday said it will bolster its nuclear deterrent 
since the U.S. has not changed its hostile policy toward the North. 
 
 
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman said, "We have closely 
watched the policies of the Obama Administration for the past 100 
days since its inauguration.  Now, it is clear that the hostile U.S. 
policy toward us has not changed at all.  As previously stated, we 
will bolster our nuclear deterrent." 
 
Answering a question from a journalist on the North`s state-run 
Korea Central News Agency, the spokesman said, "U.S. President 
Barack Obama argued that we should be punished for our rocket 
launch, while describing the peaceful satellite launch as acts of 
defiance and provocation.  Also, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
has labeled our regime a despotic or rogue government like her 
predecessors." 
 
"The essence of the U.S. government's hostile policy toward us is 
its attempt to destroy the thoughts and system adopted by our 
people.  We cannot gain anything even if we sit face to face with a 
nation that has continuously taken a hostile attitude toward us." 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
STANTON