VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSJ #0448/01 1492029
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 292029Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0888
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0060

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000448 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN; WHA/CCA AND USOAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2019 
TAGS: ETRD ETTC PREL CU CS
SUBJECT: COSTA RICA AND CUBA: A SNAPSHOT OF RELATIONS FOR 
THE LIBERTAD ACT 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 48487 
     ¶B. SAN JOSE 225 
     ¶C. SAN JOSE 18 
     ¶D. 08 SAN JOSE 1000 
     ¶E. 08 SAN JOSE 629 
     ¶F. 08 SAN JOSE 438 
 
Classified By: DCM Peter Brennan for reasons 1.4 (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Costa Rica's March 18 re-establishment of 
full diplomatic relations with Cuba (Ref B) has made little 
impact thus far. In Costa Rica, the news generated more 
questions than kudos to President Oscar Arias.  In Cuba, the 
Castro government hardly noticed.  The GOCR has yet to 
designate an Ambassador to Cuba, officially convert its 
Consulate in Havana into an Embassy, or send a high-level 
delegation to the island to discuss the "new relationship", 
but we understand that discussions have begun about an MoU 
which would set the framework.  The upgraded relationship may 
temper Costa Rica's public criticism of Cuba, but any 
bilateral thaw will be slow: the two countries and systems of 
government are simply too different to move quickly. Costa 
Rica likely will seek an intermediary role on some 
Cuba-related multilateral issues, such as the mechanics and 
timing of Cuba's return to the OAS, but we anticipate no 
sudden, drastic changes in the bilateral ties between San 
Jose and Havana.  Suspending Title III of the Libertad Act in 
regard to Costa Rica thus remains in the U.S. national 
interest, especially as we encourage the GOCR to use its 
upgraded ties for Arias' stated intent: to establish a 
"direct and open dialogue" which could positively influence 
the Castro regime.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) The following answers are keyed to Ref A questions: 
 
-- Costa Rica has traditionally been a strong critic of the 
Cuban government. The recent re-establishment of diplomatic 
relations between Costa Rica and Cuba has brought with it a 
lull in outspoken calls for democratic development in Cuba, 
as the GOCR has yet to use it's new relationship to promote 
the promised "dialogue" on democratic change with Cuba. 
 
-- Costa Rica has not made official statements condemning 
the Cuban government in the past six months. 
 
-- There have been no high-level diplomatic visits between 
Costa Rica and Cuba in the last six months.  Costa Rica 
maintains a consulate in Miramar, Cuba, and Cuba maintains 
a consulate in San Jose.  However, FonMin Bruno Stagno told 
an academic audience on May 28 that he and his Cuban 
counterpart, Bruno Rodriguez, had begun discussions about a 
bilateral Memorandum of Understanding on the margins of the 
May 14 Rio Group-EU meeting in Prague. 
 
-- Post is not aware of any major Costa Rican business 
investments in Cuba. However, a number of Costa Rican 
businesses import cigars from Cuba and repackage them. In 
addition, Costa Rican tourists regularly visit Cuba and 
vice versa. 
 
-- Post is not aware of any bilateral trade agreements 
between Costa Rica and Cuba. 
 
-- Post is not aware of any significant exchange programs 
between Costa Rica and Cuba. A limited number of Costa 
Rican students have accepted scholarships to study medicine 
and film in Cuba, but we are not aware of any formal exchange 
or scholarship programs between Cuban and Costa Rican 
universities. 
 
-- We have no information on the number of Costa Ricans 
who may have traveled to Cuba for medical treatment, 
but we expect that number is small, given the availability 
of government-subsidized health care in Costa Rica. We 
estimate that there may be a few hundred Cuban doctors 
working in Costa Rica, either in private practices or with 
Costa Rican hospitals.  Many of these doctors fled Cuba for 
greater political and economic freedom in Costa Rica, and 
eventually naturalize as Costa Rican citizens. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶3. (C) After a protracted period hinting at change (Refs 
C-F), the GOCR's announcement of re-establishing full 
diplomatic relations landed with a thud.  Arias seemed 
surprised at the skeptical media reaction at the time, which 
raised questions on human rights, and disappointed that this 
 
third "grand" foreign policy gesture had such little domestic 
or international impact.  (Arias, other "big" foreign policy 
steps were to move the Embassy in Israel from Jerusalem to 
Tel Aviv in 2006 and to recognize China in 2007.) Since 
announcing full relations in March, the Arias administration 
has reiterated that Costa Rica will be able to exercise 
positive influence on Cuba. Stagno made the same point to his 
audience on May 28.  We should urge the GOCR to really do so. 
BRENNAN