VZCZCXRO7832
RR RUEHFL RUEHNP
DE RUEHRO #0508/01 1261507
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 061507Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2031
INFO RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE 3615
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN 0027
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES 3804
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEAHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000508 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PLEASE PASS TO WILLIAM KILMARTIN AND 
STEPHANIE CLARKE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IT PGOV ETRD PBTS PTER PARM
SUBJECT: MEGAPORTS IN ITALY: DETECTING NUCLEAR MATERIALS 
AMIDST THE MAFIA (PART II) -- AN IMPLEMENTING STRATEGY 
 
REF: A. 08 NAPLES 36 
     ¶B. ROME SEPTEL PART 1 OF THIS CABLE 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The DOE Megaports program seeks to protect 
the United States from attack by placing radiation detectors 
in container ports.  Italy has long been on the Department of 
Energy's list of desired Megaports participants, but efforts 
to institute the program in Italy stalled several years ago. 
This cable (Part I described the port situation in Italy and 
outlined the reasons for installation of Megaports here) 
endeavors to illuminate the challenges in its establishment. 
Mission believes that an approach that establishes political 
will among key GOI players will likely be more effective than 
one that begins at the operational level of the agencies 
involved.  We also seek guidance and assistance in 
coordinating a USG strategy to reignite Megaport negotiations 
with the Government of Italy. In Mission's view, concrete 
information on how Megaports is managed in other EU countries 
will be essential, as would be information on how Megaports 
will help prepare Italian ports for compliance with the USG's 
looming (2012) requirement for 100 percent of all entering 
containers to be scanned for radiation.  If we can 
demonstrate to the Italians that their ability to ship to 
U.S. ports could be damaged, while their competitors with 
existing Megaports programs will benefit, our approach will 
be fundamentally strengthened.  Post sees a good first step 
in selling the Megaports program would be for a senior DoE 
Megaports official to come to Rome in the near future. End 
Summary 
 
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Pitfalls 
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¶2. (SBU) The last efforts to enact Megaports in Italy (in 
2004 and 2006) failed.  The reasons given for the failure of 
the earlier effort are varied, but they include turf 
questions among Italian agencies, Italian doubts about the 
relevance of the program, and questions over whether the EU 
or Italy has competence over port security issues. 
 
Dueling agencies and Complicated Divisions of Responsibilities 
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¶3. (SBU) One of the qualities that has made CSI success 
easier to attain than Megaports success is that CSI is viewed 
by the Italians as an agency-to-agency program.  US Customs 
and Border Protection works with its Italian counterpart. 
The Department of Energy, however, has no precise Italian 
equivalent, which has made establishing reliable points of 
contact in Italy difficult.  Also, USG personnel are on site 
at CSI ports and able to work with the Italians, but Italians 
would need to run Megaports without assistance from U.S. 
personnel.  There are clearly defined agency roles in Italy 
that could be upset in the process of establishing the 
program.  Because customs (Dogana) officials are the port of 
entry front line for containers arriving in Italy, they have 
been seen as the logical agency to administer Megaports. 
This creates a problem, however, because if a Radiation 
Portal Monitor alarmed, customs officials would not be 
authorized to handle this.  The fire department has 
competency over radiation threats.   Furthermore, any 
investigative activity would need to be done by law 
enforcement. 
 
¶4. (SBU) There is no easy path to coordinating among these 
entities.  Placing the Dogana in charge of this program would 
put it in a position to get additional authority and by 
extension, additional money -- something likely to upset 
other agencies.  (Comment:  Managing tension among agencies 
for what is perceived as an American program is something the 
GOI is not likely to want to tackle.  As such, movement 
forward will require a solid strategy for presenting 
compelling evidence to the right GOI principals.  An approach 
that establishes political will among key GOI players will 
likely be more effective than one that begins at the 
operational level of the agencies involved.  End comment.) 
 
Doubt about the threat and method of containment 
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¶5. (SBU) Smuggled nuclear and radioactive materials are a new 
threat - and not one that springs instantly to the minds of 
 
ROME 00000508  002 OF 003 
 
 
Italians.  As such, screening containers indiscriminately 
seems to them a bit overblown.  Radiation Portal Monitors 
(RPMs) were purchased for many Italian ports after the 
Chernobyl reactor disaster for use in scanning metals coming 
out of Russia.  This sort of targeted screening seems to the 
Italians more logical than the comprehensive scanning that 
would be done under Megaports.  Now that Chernobyl has 
receded as a radioactivity threat, most (if not all) of these 
RPMs sit unused at Italian ports. Also needing to be overcome 
are the risk assessment preferences of the Dogana. They 
understand the methodology, put considerable stock in its 
effectiveness and need to be convinced that the universal 
scanning offered by RPMs is a significant added benefit. 
 
¶6. (SBU) An event that occurred in 2005 further weakened the 
impression of Megaports among Italian officials. Megaports 
was still undergoing installation in Sri Lanka when a 
container set off the RPM alarm.  Because the system was not 
yet fully operational, officials were not able to determine 
which container had caused the alarm, but only knew it was 
one of a number of containers that had already continued on 
to their next port of call. Since one of those was bound for 
Italy, Italian officials were asked to track down and examine 
the container.  The cargo turned out to be unwieldy, but 
presumably safe manhole covers from India.  Because of what 
they perceived to be a huge reaction over what turned out to 
be a non-existent threat, Italian officials were left with a 
negative impression of the effectiveness of Megaports. 
(Note: After the unfortunate impression was created, 
Megaports subsequently confirmed that a genuine radioactive 
source had tripped the alarm and the suspect container was 
eventually located elsewhere.) 
 
Who has competence - Italy or EU? 
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¶7. (U) Italian officials have in the past asserted that they 
may not have the right to negotiate a Megaports MOU, saying 
port security issues are the purview of the EU.  Questions 
over whether the EU or member states have competence to 
negotiate port security agreements came up in the context of 
CSI implementation.  After CSI was well underway in many 
European ports, the EU started infringement proceedings 
against the U.S., asserting the agreements should have been 
negotiated with the EU and not bilaterally.  Customs and 
Border Protection then agreed to include the EU in future 
negotiations, but at that point most CSI programs were 
already in operation.  Conversations with current Megaports 
posts in the EU and with Megaports officials indicate there 
has been no such conflict in the implementation of Megaports 
in EU ports.  The current Megaports agreements were all 
negotiated at nation-state level without EU participation. 
Since Italy willingly set up CSI bilaterally, and since there 
is no evidence of EU-Member State conflict in setting up 
Megaports, we suspect Italy is using the EU's alleged 
competency as an excuse not to go forward. 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) Concrete information on how Megaports is managed in 
other EU countries will be essential to convince Italy that 
this will work within the EU context.  Complementing that 
would be information regarding how Megaports will help 
prepare Italian ports for compliance with the USG's looming 
(2012) requirement for 100 percent of all entering containers 
to be scanned radiation.  If we can demonstrate to the 
Italians that their ability to ship to U.S. ports could be 
damaged, while their competitors with existing Megaports 
programs will benefit, our approach will be fundamentally 
strengthened. 
 
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COMMENT/ACTION REQUESTS 
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¶9. (SBU) We obviously have some work to do in convincing the 
Italians to embrace Megaports.  As described above, they 
appear to have ready an arsenal of bureaucratic stumbling 
blocks, horror stories and excuses, all intended to prevent 
this program from going forward.  But given the severity of 
the threat, the new administration's emphasis on 
nuclear-material security, and the special organized-crime 
concerns in Italian ports, we think the USG should push hard 
to get this program launched in Italy. 
 
 
ROME 00000508  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) Post believes that before the USG launches another 
effort with the Italians, we should make sure that all 
concerned USG agencies are on-board with the project and 
ready to cooperate.  We think a good first step in this 
direction would be for a senior DoE Megaports official to 
come to Rome.  Mission proposes an initial set of meetings 
with the Rome representatives of concerned USG agencies.  If 
appropriate, meetings with Italian officials could follow. 
This official should be prepared to brief in detail on the 
threat, the need for Megaports, implementation, experiences 
in other EU countries, and the possibility for USG 
interagency cooperation. We further request any quantitative 
or qualitative data available for use in tangibly 
demonstrating the threat of covert transport of nuclear or 
radioactive materials and suggestions for managing the turf 
issues surrounding Megaports in Italy. 
DIBBLE