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FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8395
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1360
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 6816
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 000930 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL SF
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY LOOKS FOR GAINS FOLLOWING ZUMA WIN 
 
PRETORIA 00000930  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (SBU)  The South African Communist Party (SACP), whose 
membership totals have slowly eroded in recent years, is 
looking to rebound following African National Congress (ANC) 
President Jacob Zuma's selection as the country's next ruler. 
SACP members can belong both to the ANC and to the Congress 
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) so it is difficult to 
identify SACP loyalties.  Eighty SACP members served in the 
National Assembly following the 2004 election and former 
President Thabo Mbeki had SACP members within his Cabinet. 
SACP expects its influence and access to grow under the Zuma 
administration, and some signs suggest that this will happen. 
 The question will be whether they will use that access and 
influence successfully to pursue SACP policy goals.  End 
Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
The South African Communist Party Today 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU)  The SACP has been a close ally of the ANC since the 
mid-20th century and provides its ideological framework -- 
and some of its personnel -- to the ruling party.  The SACP, 
like the ANC, regards itself as the vanguard of the working 
class and still espouses Marxist and Leninist theories to 
underpin its vision of governance for South Africa.  Even 
though the party claims to have roughly 40,000 members, it is 
more likely that the number stands closer to 12,000-15,000. 
The party historically has been the intellectual home of 
communist leaders such as Joe Slovo and Chris Hani.  The 
party claims its medium term vision is to secure "working 
class hegemony" in the state and in all other centers of 
power.  The party over the longer term seeks to pave the way 
for the establishment of a socialist state for "the permanent 
socialist revolution."  The SACP has not made any secret of 
the fact that it wants to secure its visions by gaining 
increased influence over the Zuma-led ANC. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  The desire for greater influence over ANC policies 
emerges partly because of the marginalization the SACP faced 
under Mbeki.  Although a former SACP member himself, Mbeki 
fell out with the SACP leadership during the late 1980s.  He 
left the organization (along with Zuma) during the fallout 
and devoted his energy to negotiation with the apartheid 
government and to building ANC structures in the country. 
During his years as Deputy President and then President, 
Mbeki and the SACP grew further apart and tension mounted as 
Mbeki increasingly espoused a market-oriented economic 
structure.  Despite harsh public criticism from both SACP and 
COSATU, Mbeki maintained his economic approach throughout his 
presidency and his recall in September 2008.  Whenever SACP 
criticized Mbeki directly, accusing his policies of creating 
a widening gulf between the rich and the poor, Mbeki made it 
clear that the alliance "was led by the ANC and by ANC 
policies."  In 2005, when SACP threatened to break away from 
the alliance and contest the 2009 election on its own -- no 
longer as a partner with the ANC -- Mbeki lashed back and 
warned that the SACP "does not tell the ANC how to run the 
country."  SACP does not have either the funding nor the 
organization to break away from the alliance in the near 
future.  Some pundits say if SACP was to break from the 
Qfuture.  Some pundits say if SACP was to break from the 
alliance, it would become as irrelevant as the Pan-African 
Congress or the Azanian People's Organization. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  Following the 2004 national election, the SACP 
seated about 80 members in the National Assembly under the 
ANC's banner.  The mere fact that 80 of the ANC's 
parliamentary seats between 2004 and 2009 belonged to SACP 
members demonstrated the degree to which the SACP is deeply 
embedded within the ruling party and has the opportunity to 
impact both executive and legislative decisions.  Even with 
the tension between Mbeki and SACP, the communist party had 
several leaders in the former President's Cabinet.  Cabinet 
members from the SACP included Sydney Mufamadi, Charles 
Nqakula, and Rob Davies.  Despite this inclusion, SACP had no 
members in the top six of the ANC's National Executive 
Committee (NEC).  This changed in 2007 when SACP member Gwede 
Mantashe became the party's Secretary General.  Mantashe and 
other SACP leaders played key roles in ensuring that Zuma 
would be elected as ANC leader at the party's congress in 
 
PRETORIA 00000930  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
December 2007. 
 
----------------------------------- 
SACP's Impact Under Zuma ... So Far 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU)  Under the incoming Zuma administration, key SACP 
members are expected to be given Cabinet positions.  SACP 
Secretary General Blade Nzimande, who rose through the 
communist party's ranks quickly even though he only joined in 
the late 1980s, is one of the most prominent members expected 
to receive an appointment.  Such a job in Zuma's Cabinet 
would make him accountable, as a "deployed cadre," to the 
ANC.  (Note:  There are rumors that Nzimande may become the 
Minister of Education or the Deputy Minister of Education. 
End Note.)  In recent months both SACP and COSATU already 
have exerted their influences over the South African 
Government.  One example was the appointment of the Deputy 
Finance Minister.  Originally, President Kgalema Motlanthe 
wanted to appoint NEC member Enoch Gongwana to the post, but 
Nzimande blocked this move within the NEC and offered Finance 
Portfolio Committee chair George Nene as the preferred 
candidate.  Nene ultimately won the position.  Another 
example is the recent appointment of the new Gauteng premier. 
ANC provincial leader -- who had been Gauteng premier -- 
Paul Mashatile was expected to be retained as the premier. 
However, the ANC replaced him with NEC member Nomvula 
Mokonyane.  Mokonyane sits on the SACP's Central Committee. 
(Note:  Mokoyane also was educated briefly at both the 
Harvard University Business School and the University of 
Pennsylvania's Business School, and has made some pro-West 
statements in recent months.  End Note.)  SACP is hoping that 
its influence grows, but it is still too soon to say how much 
Zuma will rely on the party as opposed to his allies in 
COSATU or the ANC's Youth League. 
 
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Comment 
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¶6. (SBU)  The SACP under a Zuma presidency now judges that it 
is positioned to increase its influence and power within the 
ANC.  At the same time, members in the ANC, COSATU, and the 
ANC Youth League feel Zuma "owes" them as they view their 
support as pivotal for Zuma's elevation to the ANC 
presidency.  ANC Youth League President Julius Malema stated 
publicly that the alliance partners "put Zuma into power" and 
if he does not do what they want they can "remove" him like 
they did to Mbeki in September 2008.  It is likely that an 
increased number of SACP members will hold more senior 
positions in the Zuma administration.  The question will be 
whether they will use that access and influence successfully 
to pursue SACP policy goals. 
 
LA LIME