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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6705
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 NEW DELHI 001052 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR S/CT HILLARY BATJER JOHNSON AND S/CT PAUL SCHULTZ, 
NCTC, DHS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PK IN
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR UPDATES ON INFORMATION ON 
HOST GOVERNMENT PRACTICES-INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING 
AND SHARING 
 
REF: STATE 032287 
 
¶1. (SBU) The following information is provided in response to 
reftel request for details of India,s immigration and border 
controls. 
¶A. (SBU) Immigration Data Bases and Traveler Information 
Collection: 
-- What computerized immigration databases are used to track 
entries and exits? Foreigners Regional Registration Officers 
(FRRO) uses a computerized entry/exit tracking system, but 
these systems are not linked to a centralized database. 
-- Is the computerized immigration database available at all 
ports of entry (POE5)? Most air ports of entry and some land 
ports of entry have access to such systems, but they are not 
linked to a centralized database. 
-- If immigration databases are available at some POEs, but 
not all, how does the host government decide which POEs will 
receive the tool? Apparently, this is determined by a 
combination of factors to include: volume of crossings or 
entries, affluence of the state containing the POE and the 
perceived importance of the POE by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs (MHA). 
-- What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the 
systems? The systems do not read biometric passports and are 
isolated (not linked to a centralized database). 
-- For example, limited training, power brownouts, budgetary 
restraints, corruption, etc.? All of the above. Further 
Police and other law enforcement and court agencies will 
write requests to the Bureau of Immigration for input of 
derogatory data, such as convictions, warrants etc. into the 
lookout systems. This is a time delay. The state agencies do 
not have electronic linking of such data to Bureau of 
Immigration Computer Systems. 
-- How often are national immigration databases updated? This 
info has not been shared by MHA. 
-- What are the country,s policies (legislation, mandates, 
etc.) on collecting information from travelers arriving in 
the country? India recently began requiring air carriers to 
provide APIS info on travelers coming to India pursuant to an 
amendment to the Foreigners Order, 1948 which was published 
in the Gazette of India on January 24, 2008. 
-- Are there different policies for entry and exit at air, 
sea, and land POE5 and for domestic flights? It would appear 
as such, but MHA will neither confirm nor deny this. These 
different POEs are controlled by different entities such as 
the military, the Border Security Force (BSF), the Bureau of 
Indian Immigration and the state police. The Immigration 
services at the major International Airports in India and the 
Foreigners, registration work in five major cities, are 
handled by the Bureau of Immigration (BOI). The field 
officers in charge of immigration and registration activities 
at Delhi, Muxnbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Amritsar are called 
Foreigners Regional Registration Officers (FRRO5). Apart from 
the FRROs who look after the immigration/registration 
functions in the above mentioned five cities, the concerned 
Districts Superintendents of Police function as Foreigners 
Registration Officers (FROs) in all the states in the 
country. 
-- What agency oversees the collection of traveler 
information? The Ministry of Home Affairs manages most of 
these activities in conjunction with the Indian Intelligence 
Bureau (IB), the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) which is 
India,s foreign intelligence agency, the Central Industrial 
Security Forces (CISF), the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security 
(BCAS), the state police and the Bureau of Immigration (BOl). 
-- What are the policies of the collecting agency to share 
that information with foreign governments? India shares 
information with foreign partners sparingly and only on a 
limited bi-lateral basis. The U.S. does not have an 
 
NEW DELHI 00001052  002 OF 008 
 
 
Immigration Mutual Assistance Agreement with India at this 
time, so our requests for information are viewed on a 
case*by-case basis where responses are given sometimes or 
not at all. In March 2002 the Indian Parliament, in a rare 
joint session, passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) 
over the objections of several opposition parties and in the 
face of considerable public criticism. The National Human 
Rights Commission, an independent government entity, 
criticized the measure finding the existing laws were 
sufficient to combat terrorism. The law codifies the 
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance that in turn builds on the 
repealed Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) 
Act (TADA). It gives law enforcement sweeping powers to 
arrest suspected terrorists, intercept communications, and 
curtail free expression. Critics argue that the experience of 
TADA and POTA shows that the power was often misused for 
political ends by authorities and that POTA does little to 
curb those excesses. POTA was repealed in the year 2004, as 
minority communities were targeted in India. After 26/11 the 
TADA was amended and the National Investigation Agency was 
established to collect and share information with foreign 
governments. 
-- Does the host government collect Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) data on incoming commercial flights or vessels? Yes, 
but only as part of a pilot project mainly conducted at the 
international airports in Delhi and Mumbai. 
-- Is this data used for intelligence or law enforcement 
purposes to screen travelers in a systematic way? 
Theoretically, yes. The GOl reports that this info will be 
shared with security, intelligence and border control 
agencies. 
-- Does host government have any existing treaties to share 
PNR data? Not that we can determine. At this point in time, 
the Indian APIS data is not collected and stored in a format 
compatible with the European and American APIS systems. 
-- If applicable, have advance passenger information systems 
(APIS), interactive advanced passenger information systems 
(IAPIS), or electronic travel authority systems been 
effective at detecting other national security threats, such 
as wanted criminals? Most likely, but no reports of this have 
been received from the GOl. It appears that APIS is used 
primarily to expedite immigration clearance at their woefully 
inadequate ports of entry. 
¶B. (SBU) Watchlisting: 
-- Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen 
travelers at POEs? Yes. 
-- What domestic sources of information populate the 
name-based watchlist, i.e. names of deported persons, 
terrorist lookouts, and criminal wants/warrants? lB terrorist 
lookouts and Interpol warrants mainly. However, all law 
enforcement agencies within India are able to enter lookouts, 
referred to as in India as Look Out Circulars (LOC) by 
forwarding a request to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), 
Joint Director for Zimnigration. These requests follow a 
standard format, which includes at least three identifying 
factos such as full name, passport number, date and place of 
birth, and photo if available. The LOC indicators contact 
information for the originator of the LOC as well as the 
action requested by the originator if the subject of the 
lookout is encountered, to include detention. The LOC will 
remain in place for 12 months but can be extended. 
-- If host government maintains a watchlst, how many records 
does the watchlist contain, and how many are 
terrorist-related? Unable to say; info not shared by GOl at 
this level. 
-- Which ministry or office maintains the watchlist? Mainly 
the Indian Intelligence Bureau, who works closely with the 
Bureau of Immigration. Also, Bureau of Immigration, Foreign 
Regional Registration Office (FRRO), located at R.K. Puram, 
 
NEW DELHI 00001052  003 OF 008 
 
 
New Delhi, is very uncooperative and reluctant to answer any 
questions concerning this information. 
-- What international watchlists does the host government use 
for screening individuals, e.g. Interpol or TSA No Fly lists, 
UN, etc.? The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) Interpol 
disseminated all Interpol Red Notices to the border and along 
with Look Out Circulars (LOCs), Interpol lookouts are part of 
the watchlists. According to police sources, these watchlists 
are not combined and generally border officials will first 
check the LOCs watchlist, followed by Interpol notices. 
-- What bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements exist 
between host government and its neighbors? This info not 
shared at this level. 
¶C. (SBU) Biometrics: 
-- Are biometric systems in place at ports of entry (air, 
land, sea)? If no, does host government have plans to install 
such a system? Only at select airports as part of a pilot 
project involving e-passports for select Indian diplomats and 
government officials. India has recently initiated first 
phase deployment of Biometric e-Passport for Diplomatic 
Passport holders in India and abroad. The new passports have 
been designed indigenously by the Central Passport 
Organization, the India Security Press and lIT Kanpur. The 
passport contains a security chip with personal data and 
digital images. Initially, the new passports will have a 64KB 
chip with a photograph of passport holder and subsequently 
include the holder,s fingerprint(s). The biometric passport 
has been tested with passport readers abroad and is noted to 
have a 4 second response time which is less than that of a US 
Passport (10 second response time). The passport need not be 
carried in a metal jacket for security reasons as it first 
needs to be passed through a reader, after which generates 
access keys to unlock the chip data for reader access. 
-- If biometric systems are available at some POES, but not 
all, how does the host government decide what POE5 will 
receive the tool? Delhi and Mumbai were chosen as most 
government officials fly via these POE5. 
-- What biometric technologies, if any, does the host 
government use, i.e. fingerprint identification, facial 
recognition, iris recognition, hand geometry, retinal 
identification, DNA*based identification, keystroke 
dynamics, gait analysis? Fingerprint identification, digital 
photo and personal info. 
-- Are the systems ICAO compliant? The Indian press reports 
indicate that the e-passport is ICAO compliant. 
-- Are biometric systems integrated for all active POE5? No. 
-- What are the systems and models used? Infineon 
Technologies (FSE/NYSE: IFX) was announced as the supplier of 
the contactless security microcontrollers for India,s 
electronic passport program. The India electronic passport 
project utilizes the SLE 66CLX800PE security microcontroller 
from Infineon which provides advanced performance and high 
execution speeds and was specifically designed for use in 
electronic passports, identity cards, e-government cards and 
payment cards. The security microcontroller features a 
crypto-coprocessor and can operate at very high transaction 
speeds of up to 848 kbits per second even if elevated 
encryption and decryption operations have to be calculated. 
In addition, the SLE 66CLX800PE offers all contactiess 
proximity interfaces on a single chip: the ISO/IEC 14443 Type 
B interface and Type A interface which are both used for 
communication between electronic passports and the respective 
readers, and the ISO/IEC 18092 passive mode interface which 
is used in transport and banking applications mainly in 
Japan. Infineon is currently the world,s only chip card IC 
provider offering contactless microcontrollers with all 
relevant contactless proximity interfaces on a single chip. 
The SLE 66CLx800PE is also compliant with global ICAO 
(International Civil Aviation Organization) standards for 
 
NEW DELHI 00001052  004 OF 008 
 
 
electronic passports. (source: WEBWIRE * Tuesday, March 03, 
2009) 
-- Are all passengers screened for the biometric or does the 
host government target a specific population for collection 
(i.e. host country nationals)? At present, they only screen 
their diplomats or government officials that have been issued 
Indian e-passports. 
-- Do the biometric collection systems look for a one to one 
comparison (ensure the biometric presented matches the one 
stored on the e-Passport) or one too many comparisons 
(checking the biometric presented against a database of known 
biometrics)? Not sure. 
-- If biometric systems are in place, does the host 
government know of any countermeasures that have been used or 
attempted to defeat biometric checkpoints? That info has not 
been shared. 
-- What are the host government,s policies on collecting the 
fingerprints of travelers coming into the country? India does 
not collect fingerprints at this point in time. 
-- Which agency is responsible for the host government,s 
fingerprint system? The Indian Government rarely collects 
fingerprints. When collected, it is done by local police in 
local jails, but only with the consent of the prisoner. 
-- Are the fingerprint programs in place NIST, INT-I, EFTS, 
UK1 or RTID compliant? No. 
-- Are the fingerprints collected as flats or rolled? We are 
not sure of the exact procedure the GOl uses to collect 
fingerprints, it should be noted that the India Bureau of 
Immigration and FRRO do not collect fingerprints. 
-- Which agency collects the fingerprints? State and city 
police. 
¶D. (SBU) Border Control and Screening: 
-- Does the host government employ software to screen 
travelers of security interest? Yes, but these systems are 
not yet networked or linked to a central database. 
-- Are all travelers tracked electronically, or only 
non-host- country nationals? Only those with machine-readable 
passports, but the systems are not linked to a centralized 
database. Only host-country officials who have been issued 
e-passports are tracked as far as we can tell. 
-- What is the frequency of travelers being &waived 
through8 because they hold up what appears to be an 
appropriate document, but whose information is not actually 
recorded electronically? Frequently with GOl employees or 
officials. 
-- What is the estimated percentage of non-recorded 
crossings, entries and exits? Though we are unable to affix a 
set percentage we can state that non-recorded crossings are 
suspected to be very high at land border crossings due to 
corruption, apathy and selfpreservation. 
-- Do host government border control officials have the 
authority to use other criminal data when making decisions on 
who can enter the country? The Border Security Force (BSF) 
which guards the India-Pakistan and the India-Bangladesh 
borders, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force (ITBPF) which 
is deployed along the India- Tibet (China) border and the 
Assam Rifles (AR) which is deployed along the India-Myanmar 
border, are usually the first representatives of the Indian 
system which travelers may encounter when they enter or exit 
India by land routes. 
The vastness of the border terrain make it difficult to 
physically man the entire international borders of India. The 
gaps in the border left unguarded, are often used by 
criminals to illegally enter/exit the Indian territory. If 
caught while entering illegally, the authorities may return 
the interloper across the border. The border guarding force 
may interrogate and detain the person as permissible under 
the law of the land, at the border itself, pending decision 
by the administrative authorities. In all such cases, the 
 
NEW DELHI 00001052  005 OF 008 
 
 
person will have to be ultimately handed over to the local 
police who will exercise their powers under relevant 
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC). 
It is part of the duty and responsibility of the border 
authorities to rule out any criminal or anti-national intent 
on the part of the traveler who may be entering the country 
for mala fide purposes. If caught illegally exiting India, 
the person may be handed over to the local police for 
investigation and for further action according to law. In 
cases where the traveler is found in possession of invalid 
travel documents or in cases of violation of any other Indian 
law, the traveler may be detained by the border authorities 
at the border post itself and are then handed over to the 
local police for investigation. In all such instances, after 
the registration of a case on the basis of a First 
Information Report, the police would lodge the accused mala 
fide traveler in the area prison and produce him/her in the 
local court for trial in conformity with the provisions of 
CrPC. 
-- If so, please describe this authority (legislation, 
mandates, etc). Indian Penal Code, the Foreigners Act, 1946, 
Foreigners Order, the Passport Act 1967 and the Criminal 
Procedure Code of India, 1973 (Cr.PC). 
-- What are the host government,s policies on questioning, 
detaining and denying entry to individuals presenting 
themselves at a point of entry into the country? The 
engagement of the BSF and their power to arrest, detain and 
question civilians in non- war situations is governed by the 
Criminal Procedure Code of India, 1973 (Cr.PC). This law that 
regulates the operation of law enforcement officers, 
including paramilitary units like the BSF in a civilian 
settings. 
-- Which agency would question, detain, or deny entry? 
Depending on the type of POE, the region, sensitivity, etc, 
usually the Indian Military Intelligence, the Border Security 
Force, the State Police, the Bureau of Immigration or the 
Intelligence Bureau would question detain or deny entry. 
-- How well does information sharing function within the host 
government, i.e., if there is a determination that someone 
with a valid host-government visa is later identified with 
terrorism, how is this communicated and resolved internally? 
Not sure how this is exactly done. As mentioned earlier the 
United States does not have an Immigration Mutual Assistance 
Agreement (IMAA) at this time. CBP has discovered the Bureau 
Of Immigration and FRRO to be uncooperative and non sharing, 
except in their time of need when they will call the 
residence for information concerning passengers at the 
Airports. 
¶E. (SBU) Passports: 
-- Does the host government issue a machine-readable passport 
containing biometric information? No. 
-- If so, what biometric information is included on the 
document, i.e. fingerprint, iris, facial recognition, etc.? 
N/A 
-- If not, does host government plan to issue a biometric 
document in the future? When? Yes, facial recognition is 
planned starting (estimate) January 2010. A second phase 
might include fingerprints. 
-- If the host government issues a machine-readable passport 
containing biometric information, does the host government 
share the public key required to read the biometric 
information with any other governments? N/A 
-- If so, which governments? N/A 
-- Does the host government issue replacement passports for 
full or limited validity (i.e. the time remaining on the 
original passports, fixed validity for a replacement, etc.)? 
Full validity is generally issued. A one-year passport may be 
issued if expedited service is requested. 
-- Does the host government have special 
 
NEW DELHI 00001052  006 OF 008 
 
 
regulations/procedures for dealing with &habitual8 losers 
of passports or bearers who have reported their passports 
stolen multiple times? Yes, according to contacts, but the 
details of the procedures were not publically available. As 
per the FRRO the Bureau of Immigration and FRRO, lookouts are 
placed on those habitual losers of passports or bearers who 
have reported their passports stolen multiple times. The 
subject is then detained and questioned when encountered in 
their entry/exit registration lookout systems. 
-- Are replacement passports of the same or different 
appearance and page length as regular passports (do they have 
something along the lines of our emergency partial duration 
passports)? Same appearance. 
-- Do emergency replacement passports contain the same or 
fewer biometric fields as regular-issue passports? Same 
appearance. 
-- Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the 
number of replacement or &clean8 (i.e. no evidence of prior 
travel) passports used to apply for U.S. visas? No. 
-- Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic number 
series or otherwise identified? No. 
¶F. (SBTJ) Fraud Detection: 
-- How robust is fraud detection and how actively are 
instances of fraud involving documents followed up? Local 
immigration and police have been very responsive to requests 
and complaints filed by USG personnel, particularly part of 
the ARSO/I program, targeting fraudulent documents. During FY 
2008, local police arrested 280 persons countrywide for 
various violations of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) related to 
document fraud. In all cases, local police require a written 
complaint, called a First Incident Report (FIR), to be filed 
before taking action. Neither immigration nor police 
officials will routinely take action against a traveler until 
the traveler presents the fraudulent documents at the 
immigration check point. 
Likewise, Airline Liaison Officers (ALOs) and document 
advisors from the UK, Canada, Austria, and Germany working at 
the airports in New Delhi and Mumbai have reported that 
immigration and police will take document fraud cases 
referred by these officers. Immigration officials at the 
primary international airports do have examination equipment 
such as U/V lamps and training on basic document detection. 
However, fraud detection varies widely depending on the 
volume of crossings or entries, affluence of the state 
containing the POE and the resources and personnel assigned 
to the POE by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). Immigration 
officials tend to detect more fraud with foreign documents as 
these travelers often receive more scrutiny that travelers 
with Indian documents. 
-- How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken 
out of circulation, or made harder to use? In cases where 
immigration officials have referred the case to police and 
the individual has been arrested, the documents are normally 
seized as part of the criminal case. However, it is normal 
for the immigration officials to refuse entry and return the 
traveler to the originating country with the same fraudulent 
documents. Gol officials do not routinely cancel, mark, or 
seize these documents, particularly for transit passengers. 
It is not uncommon for Airline Liaison Officers from the U.K. 
Canada, Germany, or Austria, to encounter or off-load the 
same traveler presenting the same fraudulent document on 
multiple occasions. Gol officials do not routinely issue a 
substitute transportation letter for the deported traveler 
and seize the fraudulent, counterfeit, or altered document. 
¶G. (SBU) Privacy and Data Security: 
-- What are the country,s policies on records related to the 
questioning, detention or removal of individuals encountered 
at points of entry into the country? These records would fall 
under Under the Right to Information (RTI) Act of 2005 as 
 
NEW DELHI 00001052  007 OF 008 
 
 
well as any other internal policy and procedure documents. 
-- How are those records stored, and for how long? Unknown. 
-- What are the country,s restrictions on the collection or 
use of sensitive data? Unknown. 
-- What are the requirements to provide notice to the public 
on the implementation of new databases of records? Unknown. 
-- Are there any laws relating to security features for 
government computer systems that hold personally identifying 
information? Unknown. 
-- What are the rules on an individual,s ability to access 
data that homeland security agencies hold about them? 
Under the Right to Information (RTI) Act of 2005, Indian 
citizens as well as overseas Indian citizens (OCI,s) and 
Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs), can request access to 
information held about them within Indian files. Under the 
Act, information is defined as any material in any form, 
including records, documents, memos, e* mails, opinions, 
advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, 
contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material 
held in any electronic form and information relating to any 
private body which can be accessed by a public authority 
under any other law for the time being in force. Likewise, 
the Act includes records in the forms of documents, 
manuscripts, files, microfiche, and copies of documents. 
Requesters may ask for certified copies of the documents as 
well as the information in the form of a diskette, video 
tapes, or any electronic medium in which it is stored. 
The Act does allow the G0I to withhold release of information 
in cases which affect issues of sovereignty, law enforcement, 
security, or bi-lateral foreign relations. The Act 
specifically allows the Gol to reject from disclosure, 
"information received in confidence from foreign Government" 
(section 8(1) (f) and "information, the disclosure of which 
would endanger the life or physical safety of any person or 
identify the source of information or assistance given in 
confidence for law enforcement or security purposes" (section 
8(l)(g)). To enhance the security of any information provided 
to the Gol, it is recommended that a provision be included by 
the USG that the information being provided to the Gol be 
exempted from disclosure under the RTI Act of 2005, sections 
8(1) (f) and/or 8(1) (g) 
Requesters under the RTI Act are required to state that they 
will not circulate, use, or share information with any person 
or in any manner which would be detrimental to the Unity and 
Sovereignty or against the Interest of India. However, it is 
unknown how vigorously this provision is enforced. 
-- Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of 
birth, etc.) versus case files (for example, records about 
enforcement actions)? Unknown. 
-- Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the 
government to obtain these types of data? Under the RTI Act, 
only citizens, OCI,s (Overseas Citizens of India) and PlO,s 
(Persons of Indian Origin) can ask for information. 
Non-Indian citizens who are married to an Indian citizen do 
qualify for PlO status and would therefore be entitled to 
request information under the RTI Act. Indian citizens 
overseas can file a request with the closest Indian Embassy 
or Consulate. The Act extends to all of India except the 
State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
¶H. (SBU) Identifying Appropriate Partners: 
Department would appreciate post,s in-house assessment of 
whether host government would be an appropriate partner in 
data sharing. Considerations include whether host government 
watchlists may include political dissidents (as opposed or in 
addition to terrorists), and whether host governments would 
share or use U.S. watchlist data inappropriately, etc. 
-- We have no information to answers these questions. 
-- Are there political realities which would preclude a 
country from entering into a formal data-sharing agreement 
 
NEW DELHI 00001052  008 OF 008 
 
 
with the U.S.? 
-- Is the host country's legal system sufficiently developed 
to adequately provide safeguards for the protection and 
nondisclosure of information? 
-- How much information sharing does the host country do 
internally? Is there a single consolidated database, for 
example? If not, do different ministries share information 
amongst themselves? 
-- How does the country define terrorism? Are there legal 
statutes that do so? 
BURLEIGH