VZCZCXRO3023
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0197/01 1461532
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261532Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6954
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000197 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DOHA FOR SE GRATION 
STATE FOR AF/C, S/USSES 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF MOPS SU LY QA CD
SUBJECT: JEM-SLA/AW ALLIANCE OFFER ON THE TABLE, BUT IN THE 
CARDS? 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU) JEM and SLA/AW leaders met north of N'Djamena May 
22 to discuss forming a political alliance, according to a 
JEM member who spoke with poloff May 25.  SLA/AW leaders told 
us that that the difference between the secular SLA and the 
Islamist JEM would likely prevent an alliance, although the 
SLA respected JEM as a movement.  The SLA/AW leaders admitted 
to vigorous internal debate but claimed that all of them 
remained loyal to Abdul Wahid.  The JEM side told poloff that 
they had had offered the possibility of an alliance to 
SLA/AW, including the options for a new name and shared 
leadership structure for the movement.  JEM felt that SLA/AW 
itself remained divided and would not be able to come to a 
decision on aligning with JEM.  We detected interest on both 
sides, but it is unclear whether JEM and SLA/AW will align 
despite the advantages an alliance brings to each group.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
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SLA/AW STILL UNIFIED... 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Abdallah Harran, Sudanese Liberation Army/Abdul 
Wahid faction (SLA/AW) political leader, Nimeri Issa Mousa, 
SLA/AW Humanitarian Coordinator, and spokesman Nimir Mohamed 
met poloff May 23 to discuss SLA's plans and goals for Sudan. 
 Harran and Mousa commented on the recent SLA workshop in 
Switzerland with Abdul Wahid, stating that the participants 
had vigorous discussion but that all participants, including 
representatives from IDP and refugee camps, remained unified 
under Abdul Wahid.  Mousa added that themes of the workshop 
centered on inclusion, openness, and development of 
international relations.  The SLA members also stated that 
SLA/AW did not want to participate in Doha for two reasons. 
They said that they did not believe the Government of Sudan 
to be an honest participant or sincere in finding a solution 
to the crisis in Darfur.  They added that they felt that the 
Abuja peace agreement had been a mistake, leaving Minni 
Minnawi without any power at all. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Harran, by way of Mousa's Arabic-to-English 
translation, stated that he and his team were in N'Djamena 
for "work" and discussed why SLA/AW and JEM could never form 
an alliance.  Harran said that SLA stood for human rights, 
democracy, federalism, liberalism, and secularism and agreed 
that JEM pursued most of those principles as well.  He added 
that SLA respected JEM as a movement but could not align its 
secular belief with JEM's Islamist one.  He made clear, 
however, that the two movements had an "understanding" that 
neither would attack the other.  Harran said that JEM may 
currently have the military might to assert that it was the 
main rebel power on the ground, but he claimed that the 
people of Sudan viewed JEM as creating confusion, not peace. 
Harran felt that JEM would say whatever was expedient to 
achieve its aim of unifying all rebels groups but not really 
change its true intentions.  By comparison, Harran stated 
that SLA/AW wanted to achieve its aims through negotiation, 
not by compromising its principles. 
 
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BUT NOT WITH JEM 
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¶4.  (SBU) JEM Economic Advisor Bushara Suleiman Nour told 
poloff May 25 that JEM and SLA/AW had held a four-on-four May 
22 meeting north of N'Djamena to discuss a possible alliance 
between the two rebel movements.  Nour said that he and 
Sulieman Jamous were among the four JEM participants and that 
Harran and Mousa were among the four on the SLA/AW side. 
Nour stated that both sides had been interested in meeting 
and that JEM offered the possibility of an alliance.  He said 
that he had told the SLA/AW representatives that JEM was 
ready to take whatever steps necessary to make an alliance 
possible, including a new name and leadership structure. 
Nour said that the SLA was indecisive and that the group had 
replied that it needed to discuss JEM's proposal with other 
commanders.  Nour had the impressions that the SLA/AW was a 
 
NDJAMENA 00000197  002 OF 002 
 
 
divided group with some elements ready to join JEM.  He also 
said SLA/AW had minimal resources and equipment and believed 
that SLA/AW would not flourish without the return of Abdul 
Wahid to Darfur, something Nour felt would never happen. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶5.  (SBU)  We detected interest on both sides, but it is 
unclear whether SLA/AW will come to a final decision about 
aligning with JEM.  SLA/AW would benefit from JEM's military 
strength and resources, as well as its experience at the 
negotiating table in Doha.  A JEM alliance with SLA/AW would 
gain JEM credibility and connection with Darfur's Fur people. 
 We will remain in touch with both groups to follow up on 
developments.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶6.  (U)  Minimize considered. 
NIGRO