VZCZCXRO1894
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0195/01 1441437
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 241437Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6949
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000195 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C AND S/USSES - SE GRATION 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF MARR MASS SU LY IS CD
SUBJECT: CHAD-SUDAN: GOC SHOULD "SEIZE THE MOMENT" TO 
PROFIT DIPLOMATICALLY FROM ITS MILITARY VICTORY 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 185 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 184 
     ¶C. NDJAMENA 175 
 
This cable is sensitive but unclassified.  Not for Internet 
dissemination. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU)  Ambassador Nigro and DCM told GOC Ambassador to 
the U.S. Bechir May 22 that the GOC should "seize the moment" 
to exploit diplomatically its recent military successes.  We 
acknowledged Bechir's expression of gratitude for the clear 
USG public position on the rebel attack and told him that 
Chad should build on SE Gration's recent visit to meet USG 
concerns by (1) reaching out to Chad rebels who might be 
newly responsive to this; (2) ending its military involvement 
with JEM; (3) continuing to exercise restraint in its 
military and diplomatic approach to Sudan; and (4) continuing 
to participate in multilateral and third-country mediation 
efforts to normalize Chad-Sudan relations.  We urged a visit 
by FORMIN Faki to Washington soon, but cautioned that the 
success of that visit hinged on the GOC's ability to 
"deliver" on those USG priorities. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Bechir, who is personally close to President Deby 
and has his ear on Chad-US relations, said that Chad 
continued to seek a "strategic bilateral partnership" with 
the USG, based on more than just "crisis management" of the 
Darfur crisis and its regional consequences.  Bechir said 
that the GOC wanted a stronger USG presence in Chad, 
including a USAID mission and a Peace Corps mission; restored 
counter-terrorism cooperation; an AFRICOM a presence here, if 
one were desired; and access to PEPFAR and Millennium 
Challenge programs. Bechir argued for USG assistance in 
procuring C-130Js and an "official visit" to Washington for 
President Deby. Bechir said that Chad was preparing to hold 
credible elections, wanted to improve its human rights record 
and practices, including on child soldiers, and was open to 
renewed outreach to Chad rebels. Bechir claimed that the GOC 
had already ended its military support for JEM and supported 
an alliance between the JEM and SLA/AW in a Darfur "United 
Front," which could negotiate or impose a solution on 
Khartoum and become a "One-Darfur regional government." 
Bechir said that he continued have President Deby's green 
light to pursue an "alliance of convenience" between the GOC, 
the SPLM/Government of South Sudan, and a Darfur "United 
Front" under joint JEM-SLA/AW leadership to negotiate with 
the GNU or impose upon the GNU a solution for Darfur and 
progress on the CPA. END SUMMARY. 
 
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CHAD-SUDAN 
---------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Ambassador Nigro and DCM told GOC Ambassador to the 
U.S. Mahamoud Adam Bechir May 22 that the GOC should "seize 
the occasion" presented by its recent military victory over 
Chad rebels to turn it to Chad's diplomatic advantage. 
Ambassador Nigro emphasized to Bechir that the USG expected 
Chad to continue to use the utmost restraint and prudence 
vis--vis Sudan at this stage, both militarily and 
diplomatically.  Chadian actions that could be perceived as 
raising tensions between Chad and Sudan would undercut Chad's 
moral high ground and encourage spurious Sudanese claims to 
have been "victimized" by a Western/Zionist conspiracy using 
Chad as its client and proxy.  Chad should be particularly 
careful not to risk direct Chad-Sudan military confrontation, 
the Ambassador stressed.  The Chadian military should attempt 
not/not to cross into Sudan in defense of Chadian security. 
If -- and only if -- doing so became necessary, Chad should 
observe strictly the rules of war governing "hot pursuit" and 
preemptive military action.  Ambassador cautioned Bechir that 
Chad should treat its recent prisoners humanely, and work 
especially closely with UNICEF to safeguard and rehabilitate 
child-soldiers among rebel prisoners.  Ambassador noted that 
Chad had been wise not to break relations with Sudan.  As 
with escalation, Chadian action to break or downgrade 
bilateral relations would redound to Khartoum's credit. 
 
NDJAMENA 00000195  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
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CHAD/JEM/HAD REBELS 
-------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Ambssador recommended that the GOC act soon on 
its ntention to send FORMIN Faki to DC as soon as possible. 
He underlined that Faki should be prepared to address USG as 
well as GOC concerns with senior officials there.  The USG 
was very interested in hearing directly from Faki that the 
GOC had renounced military assistance to all Sudanese rebel 
groups, especially the JEM, and that the GOC would maintain 
political relationships with Sudanese movements chiefly to 
further a solution to the Darfur crisis.  Ambassador said 
that we would also like to hear that the GOC was reaching out 
to Chad rebels in Sudan to reaffirm its commitment to Sirte 
Accord implementation as well as other less formal mechanisms 
to motivate rebels to renounce violence and return to Chad to 
engage in the political process.  The GoC could designate an 
individual, e.g., National Mediator Abderahman Moussa, as a 
point of contact for returning Chadian rebels.  We would 
appreciate assurances, continued the Ambassador, that the GOC 
would continue to seek diplomatic solutions to its problems 
by accepting valid multilateral and third-country mediation 
efforts to normalize Chad-Sudan relations. 
 
--------------------- 
CLOSER BILATERAL TIES 
--------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Bechir told Ambassador Nigro that the GOC was 
enthusiastically happy with the clear USG statement that 
Sudanese-backed Chad rebels had carried out aggression 
against Chad.  He indicated that he himself had lobbied hard 
for the GOC not/not to break relations with Sudan.  Bechir 
said that Chad wanted a better and closer relationship with 
the USG and was prepared to address USG interests and goals 
in the region to this end.  Among the things that Chad was 
prepared to offer was a "strategic" military-to-military 
partnership, including closer counter-terrorism cooperation 
and facilitating a presence for AFRICOM in Chad if desired. 
FORMIN Faki might be able to travel to Washington in the 
June-July timeframe, said Bechir, perhaps carrying a white 
paper that would reaffirm the GOC's "open door policy" toward 
the Chadian rebels, on the basis of the Sirte Accords; that 
would state clearly that the GOC viewed the JEM as a 
political party and that it would not provide it with 
military assistance; and that would note Chad's willingness 
to accept a UN-associated surveillance arrangement for the 
Chad-Sudan border (assuming Libyan acquiescence). 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  For its part, continued Bechir, Chad would like 
the United States to offer "strategically needed" C-130Js; 
access to the PEPFAR Program and Millennium Challenge, as 
well as Peace Corps deployments and a USAID mission; and an 
"official visit" to Washington for President Deby.  The 
United States, for its part, could call on Chad to improve 
its human rights record, protection of children and practices 
with respect to child soldiers, and to engage in 
power-sharing with Chad rebels.  The end result might be 
progress toward resolution of Chad's relations with Sudan, 
Chad's own internal problems, and Sudan's internal problems. 
 
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C-130Js 
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¶7.   (SBU)  Bechir urged Ambassador to carry out "DepSec 
Negroponte's decision" to sell Chad C-130J aircraft, which he 
insisted were needed for strategic reasons.  He emphasized 
that other types of aircraft, including older refurbished 
C-130s, would not satisfy the GOC's sense of national pride 
and self-respect.  We pointed out that Congressional approval 
of the sale was by no means certain; offered that we had 
hoped refurbished aircraft might represent a pragmatic way 
forward; and recalled that the IFI community doubted Chad's 
ability to pursue responsible public finance management 
should such a large purchase be made.  Bechir reiterated that 
Chad was not/not interested in any alternatives to C-130Js. 
 
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NDJAMENA 00000195  003 OF 003 
 
 
CHAD/JEM/SLA-AW 
--------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Bechir claimed that the GOC had effectively ended 
its military support for JEM, partly because "JEM already has 
all the arms and equipment it needs."  Bechir said that the 
GOC was actively encouraging JEM to ally with SLA/AW to 
represent "all of Darfur" vis-a-vis the GNU in Khartoum, as 
well as in negotiation and mediation efforts such as Doha. 
An alliance was needed because while JEM had the greater 
military strength, the SLA/AW represented the "majority" Fur 
and could not be ignored.  Bechir theorized that an 
arrangement could be worked out in which the JEM's Khalil 
Ibrahim would serve as Darfur opposition Chief and Abdul 
Wahid as Deputy, with more senior positions overall for the 
SLA/AW in a Darfur "United Front," and perhaps one day as a 
"One-Darfur regional government." 
 
--------------- 
BECHIR'S VISION 
--------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Bechir explained that he was pursuing with 
President Deby's permission "his personal vision" of an 
"alliance of convenience" between the GOC, the 
SPLM/Government of South Sudan, and a Darfur "United Front" 
under joint JEM-SLA/AW leadership to negotiate with the GNU 
or impose upon the GNU -- "peacefully or otherwise" -- a 
solution on both Darfur and the CPA. 
 
---------------------- 
CHAD-ISRAEL RELATIONS? 
---------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Bechir drew our attention to the text of FORMIN 
Faki's May 21 press availability, which contained standard 
GOC criticism of Sudan for having alienated Chad from the 
Arab and Muslim world.  Bechir noted in particular Faki's 
denial of Sudanese claims that a conspiracy of Western 
nations and Israel had used Chad to target Khartoum for 
religious and ethnic reasons.  Bechir offered that he was not 
personally against re-establishment of Chadian-Israeli 
relations, but he made clear that Libyan opposition to such a 
move had long prevented Chad from seriously considering the 
step.  Bechir concluded that N'Djamena's establishing ties 
with Tel Aviv just now would only feed Sudanese propaganda 
machine. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶11.  (SBU)  Bechir is personally close to President Deby and 
certainly has his ear on Chad-U.S. relations.  He appears 
also to be playing a role on the South Sudan/SPLM account and 
Chad's relations with Sudanese rebels, as his assignment by 
Deby to accompany SE Gration and JEM notables to Doha 
indicates. 
NIGRO