VZCZCXRO6999
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0184/01 1381345
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181345Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6933
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000184 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/C, AND AF/USSES - SE GRATION 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF MOPS SU LY QA CD
SUBJECT: CHAD PLANS TO WITHDRAW FROM AU AND QATARI 
MEDIATION EFFORTS, SEND ENVOYS TO FRIENDLY CAPITALS 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 652 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 177 
 
--------- 
 SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) FORMIN Faki thanked Ambassador May 15 for the USG's 
public support of Chad during the recent rebel incursion and 
explained that the GOC was likely to "freeze" or "suspend" 
participation in AU-sponsored and Qatar-sponsored mediation 
efforts to normalize Chad-Sudan relations, because of AU and 
Arab League bias toward Sudan. Faki did not mention breaking 
or downgrading relations with Sudan. Faki said that the GOC 
was planning visits by senior officials to friendly capitals 
to explain Chad,s side of the story. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Ambassador emphasized that the USG would look for 
GOC restraint in military operations against fleeing rebels, 
especially in chasing rebels into Sudan and that the GOC 
should consider carefully any decision to suspend its 
participation in diplomatic efforts to normalize Chad-Sudan 
relations.  The Ambassador also Faki that the GOC should work 
closely with the ICRC on its Chad rebel prisoners and with 
ICRC and UNICEF on any rebel "child soldiers" among them. 
Ambassador told Faki that the USG would be happy to receive a 
senior GOC visitor at any time and that Chad should 
complement such diplomatic initiatives with public diplomacy 
initiatives.  Faki did not mention breaking or downgrading 
relations with Sudan, although that remains a GOC option. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  A senior GOC visit to the U.S. would give us an 
opportunity to discuss multilateral as well as bilateral 
issues, especially Darfur, and to impress on the GOC at a 
senior level USG policy goals in that regard, building on SE 
Gration's recent successful visit here. Septel addresses the 
issue of Chadian military incursions into Sudan.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Foreign Minister Moussa Faki Mahamat convoked 
Ambassador May 15 to thank the USG for its public support of 
Chad during the recent rebel incursion and to explain the 
GOC's latest regional thinking in the wake of that attack. 
Faki said that although Chad had not made any final 
decisions, the GOC was likely to "freeze" or "suspend" 
participation in AU-sponsored and Qatar-sponsored mediation 
efforts to normalize Chad-Sudan relations, because of those 
mediators were unreliable and biased, reflecting persistent 
AU partiality to Sudan and Arab League solidarity with one of 
their own.  Faki praised the USG's "clear and specific 
message" regarding Sudanese responsibility for the had rebel 
attack and said that President Deby was especially grateful 
to Special Envoy Gration for his personal message during the 
crisis. 
 
¶5. (SBU)  Faki noted that the GOS had not responded 
positively to SE Gration,s recommendation that it disarm 
Chad rebels returning to Sudan; nor had Khartoum made any 
other conciliatory gesture.  Faki did not mention breaking or 
downgrading relations with Sudan, but the GOC could decide to 
do that.  Faki said that the GOC was planning visits by 
senior officials to friendly capitals to explain Chad,s side 
of the story. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Ambassador emphasized to Faki that USG would 
appreciate GOC restraint in military operations against 
fleeing rebels -- in chasing rebels into Sudan the GOC risks 
escalating the situation and losing the morale superiority it 
enjoyed as the victim of Sudanese sponsorship of the Chad 
rebel attack.  He also underlined to Faki that the GOC should 
consider carefully any decision to suspend its participation 
in diplomatic efforts to normalize Chad-Sudan relations; that 
the USG expected Chad to treat its Chad rebel prisoners 
responsibly (even if reports of Chad rebel atrocities toward 
ANT soldiers and Chad civilians were verified) and to work 
closely with ICRC on this; and that GOC should treat any 
"child soldiers" among those prisoners with special care and 
to work closely with UNICEF and ICRC on this. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Ambassador told Faki that the USG would be happy to 
receive a senior GOC visitor at any time and that Chad should 
complement such diplomatic initiatives with public diplomacy 
 
NDJAMENA 00000184  002 OF 002 
 
 
initiatives in the media (including the English-language 
media).  President Deby could consider giving an interview to 
an English-language media outlet, like the BBC here, as 
riposte to President Bachir,s recent BBC interview and the 
GOC should consider issuing a "white paper" detailing the 
Chad-Sudan dispute from N,Djamena,s perspective. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Although Faki did not mention breaking or 
downgrading relations with Sudan, such a step remains 
possible.  A senior GOC visit to the U.S. would give us an 
opportunity to discuss multilateral as well as bilateral 
issues, especially Darfur, and to impress on the GOC at a 
senior level USG policy goals in that regard, building on SE 
Gration's recent successful visit here.  END COMMENT 
 
¶9.  (U) Minimize considered. 
NIGRO