VZCZCXRO2990
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0175/01 1330901
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 130901Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6921
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0066
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0005
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 0040

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000175 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C AND AF/USSES - SE GRATION 
NSC FOR GAVIN AND HUDSON 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF UN SU LY CH IS QA CD
SUBJECT: CEDANT ARMA TOGAE? WHERE CHAD GOES FROM HERE, 
MILITARILY AND DIPLOMATICALLY 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 165 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 163 
     ¶C. NDJAMENA 161 
     ¶D. NDJAMENA 147 
     ¶E. NDJAMENA 111 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  The invasion of eastern Chad by Chadian rebels 
from Sudan, their decisive defeat by Chad government forces, 
and the GOC,s initial reaction to those events last week 
confirmed a changed balance of power between Chad and Chad 
rebels and raised questions regarding the GOC's military and 
diplomatic options.  Militarily, the Chadian armed forces 
proved that they could effectively exercise asymmetric 
superiority in armament and equipment to defeat dangerous 
rebel columns decisively.  We doubt that the GOC will 
exercise its right of hot ground pursuit of Chad rebels into 
Sudan, but believe the GOC might not be able to resist using 
air forces to strike Chad rebel "targets of opportunity" 
inside Sudan in the future.  Diplomatically, Chad feels that 
it was left isolated and abandoned by erstwhile friends and 
important segments of the international community.  The GOC 
blames the AU for weak "condemnation" of the rebel 
aggression.  N'Djamena blames both Libya and China for 
diluting language of the UNSC PRST.  It holds China 
accountable for supplying arms to Sudan.  The GOC expressed 
gratitude to the United States and France for their explicit 
naming of Sudan as the provenance of the rebel attacks. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Deby may break relations with Sudan, and withdraw 
from or suspend Chad's participation in efforts to mediate 
between Chad and Sudan by the Dakar Contact Group, the 
Libyans "trilaterally," and/or the Qataris.  GOC thinking 
about relations with Sudan may be conditioned by speculation 
regarding the Bashir regime,s own stability and Sudan,s 
future as a nation-state, in the light of the ICC indictment, 
growing JEM strength, and the future of South Sudan.  Chad 
will have to be especially careful in calibrating its 
criticism of Libya, given the importance of that relationship 
to Chad's stability and security.  The GOC might explore 
switching its diplomatic ties back from Beijing to Taipei and 
re-astablishing relations with Tel Aviv, athough these would 
be diplomatic longshots.  Chad increasingly sees its 
relationship with MINURCAT as a strategic asset and might be 
amenable to an eventual expansion of MINURCAT's mandate. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  SE Gration's visit and our quick and specific 
condemnation of Chad rebel aggression have gained us credit 
with the GOC.  If we want to exploit these gains, we 
recommend:  a return visit by SE Gration (one-day OK) on his 
next travel to the region; more rapid implementation of all 
aspects of UNSCR 1861, another contributiion to the MINURCAT 
Trust Fund, and assigning more military advisers to it; 
closer consultations with Paris and Brussels on Chad matters 
and regional policy; closer consultation with Libya on Chad; 
and increased USG support for Chad elections scheduled for 
2010 and 2011.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------- 
POTENTIAL FOR MILITARY ESCALATION 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  We believe it unlikely that GOC ground forces will 
cross into Sudan in hot pursuit of fleeing Chad rebels.  GOC 
forces know they are no match for the SAF, and calculate that 
pursuit of rebels may lead to confrontation with SAF.  We 
believe that it would be more likely for the GOC to use its 
air forces to strike Chad rebel "targets of opportunity" 
inside Sudan in the future.  The GOC may not be able to 
resist the temptation to strike, and may judge that air 
strikes leave less of a footprint, are less easily 
authenticated and thus less provocative to the international 
community than a ground presence in Sudan.  One thing appears 
certain:  Chadian military buildup will continue, to replace 
 
NDJAMENA 00000175  002 OF 003 
 
 
recent losses and maintain or even increase N,Djamena,s 
asymmetrical advantage over the Chadian rebels.  Where the 
money will come from is an "imponderable," as our French 
friends say. 
 
--------------------------------- 
CHAD-SUDAN BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  The GoC is thinking in terms of both short- and 
long-term measures in response to what it considers Sudan,s 
aggression in the form of attacks by Chadian rebels. 
Khartoum broke relations with Chad in May 2008 in response to 
a JEM attack on Omdurman, without the sky falling.  On May 9, 
Deby publicly threatened to sever relations with Khartoum; 
announced the closure of GOS-sponsored cultural and 
educational institutions; ordered the expulsion of Sudanese 
employees; and directed his PM to form a commission to study 
next moves vis--vis Sudan, as well as other diplomatic 
responses to the recent Chad rebel incursion. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  GOC thinking about Sudan in the longer term may be 
conditioned by speculation regarding the Bashir regime,s own 
stability and Sudan,s future as a nation-state, both of 
which have been undermined by the ICC indictment of Bashir, 
the growing strength of the JEM rebellion, and the undecided 
future of South Sudan.  The Chadians may be checking the CPA 
calendar, calculating the days until referenda in Abyei and 
the South are due.  The GOC may believe that in the Deby vs. 
Bashir struggle, time is now on Chad,s side, with the clock 
ticking on the ICC and CPA issues. 
 
--------------------- 
CHAD, DAKAR, AND DOHA 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Deby has decried AU lack of support publicly and 
privately, and considers that both the AU and the Arab League 
are anti-Chadian, as a result of manipulation by his enemies. 
 Deby sees the UNSC as ineffectual on account of Chinese and 
Libyan obstructionism.  The result may be that Chad suspends 
or ends its participation in mediation efforts by the Dakar 
Accord's Contact Group (Libya is a co-chair), Libya's 
trilateral "mechanism," and the Government of Qatar.  Deby 
announced last week that he had charged the Prime Minister 
with overseeing a GOC commission to recommend diplomatic 
steps that Chad should take in light of recent events. 
FORMIN Faki told us last week that the GOC would be 
consulting with its friends, including the U.S., as it 
decides what courses of action to take. 
 
---------- 
CHAD/LIBYA 
---------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  In recent years, Libya has been a valuable ally to 
Chad, and essential to Chad's stability and security, but 
Tripoli's failure to offer active support and its unhelpful 
stance at the UNSC have left Chad feeling doubly victimized. 
Deby will have to play this hand carefully and likely will 
not risk alienating Qadafi by going too far in pointing out 
what N'Djamena considers Libya's errors of judgment and lack 
of loyalty to the reliable friend that Deby considers himself 
to be to "the Guide." 
 
---------------- 
CHAD UN/MINURCAT 
---------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Chad increasingly sees its relationship with 
MINURCAT as more of a strategic asset than a strategic 
problem.  SRSG Angelo has increasing credibility with the GOC 
and with Deby personally.  We should keep this in mind as we 
decide how to craft our own Chad policy.  MINURCAT,s goals 
and ours are very close if not identical.  Supporting 
MINURCAT both diplomatically and concretely achieves USG 
aims.  We might even see Chad agreeing to an eventual 
 
NDJAMENA 00000175  003 OF 003 
 
 
expansion of MINURCAT's now-limited mandate, geographically 
beyond eastern Chad and also substantively into the political 
sphere. 
 
-------------------- 
WILD CARDS/LONGSHOTS 
-------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  CHAD/CHINA:  This could get really interesting. 
Chad most recently switched its diplomatic ties from Taiwan 
to China in 2006, but it has switched back and forther a 
number of times previously.  We assess that Chinese economic 
assistance to Chad is the price Beijing has agreed to pay for 
the switch, rather than economic exploitation of Chad 
facilitated by the switch.  If so, the GOC may see an 
opportunity in its perception of Chinese perfidy in its 
relations with Khartoum in general and the UNSC PSRT in 
particular.  The GOC could switch again, exacting a price 
from Taiwan as it exacted a price from Beijing in 2006. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  CHAD/ISRAEL:  Another interesting possibility. 
The idea of Chad and Israel re-establishing formal diplomatic 
relations has been floating around for some time.  (Chad once 
had relations with Tel Aviv, long since lapsed, and cafes in 
the vicinity of former Israeli property still bear names 
involving "Shalom."  The GOC continues to buy arms from 
Israeli merchants.)  Former FORMIN Allam-Mi told Ambassador 
Nigro in April 2008 that he expected that the bilateral 
relationship could be re-established "before the summer." 
That did not happen, but Deby,s ire against what he has 
often called an "Arab conspiracy" to "Islamize and Arabize" 
Chad by force might translate into a willingness to play this 
card. 
 
------------ 
OLD RELIABLE 
------------ 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  CHAD/FRANCE/EU:  France continues as Chad,s most 
important and reliable international partner.  France is 
responsible for the robust nature of the EU,s investment in 
Chad, was the motor behind EUFOR,s deployment as a bridge to 
MINURCAT, and the prime force behind MINURCAT as well.  (The 
French "master plan" for Chad involves a gradual diminution 
of bilateral implication in Chadian affairs, after plugging 
the EU and UN into the equation to replace France and French 
resources.) 
 
-------------------------- 
CHAD AND THE UNITED STATES 
-------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  We have recently gained credit with President 
Deby by quickly issuing a condemnation of Chad rebel 
aggression, by naming Sudan as the rebel base, and thanks to 
the excellent impression that SE Gration made on Deby, who 
responded actively to the SE's request for GOC help with the 
JEM (Ref D).  If the USG decides to exploit these gains, we 
recommend consideration of possible measures we have detailed 
(in Ref E) to reinforce Chad diplomatically and politically. 
We should consider: 
 
-- A return visit by SE Gration (one-day OK) on his next 
travel to the region; 
 
-- More rapid implementation of all aspects of UNSCR 1861, 
making a voluntary contribution to the UN's Trust Fund, and 
assigning more military advisers to MINURCAT; 
 
-- Closer consultations with Paris and Brussels on Chad 
matters and regional policy; 
 
-- Closer consultation with Libya on Chad; 
 
-- Increased USG support for Chad elections scheduled for 
2010 and 2011. 
NIGRO