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DE RUEHNJ #0163/01 1301235
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 101235Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6906
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0024
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0615
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0225
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000163 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
KHARTOUM FOR SE GRATION 
STATE FOR AF/C, AF/USSES, S/ES-O, DS/CC, DS/IP/AF, DS/OSAC, 
CA/OSC/ASC 
NSC FOR GAVIN AND HUDSON 
LONDON FOR POL -- LORD 
PARIS FOR POL -- D'ELIA AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MOPS ASEC PREL PREF SU UN AU LY FR CASC CD
SUBJECT: CHAD UPDATE:  FM FAKI'S MAY 9 REPLY TO U.S. 
DEMARCHE, GOC POINTS FOR DIPLOMATIC CORPS 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 156 AND PREVIOUS 
 
NDJAMENA 00000163  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
This message is Sensitive but Unclassified.  Not for Internet 
dissemination. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU)  Ambassador Nigro issued a demarche to FM Moussa 
Faki Mahamat May 9 to discourage GoC hot pursuit of remaining 
Chadian rebels into Sudan; to remind the GoC of the moral 
high ground that Ndjamena occupied at present; to describe SE 
Gration's efforts to convince the Sudanese government to 
disarm Chadian rebels fleeing into Sudan; and to press the 
GoC not to forsake opportunities for diplomatic resolution of 
bilateral differences with Khartoum, including by 
participating in a Contact Group meeting as foreseen in the 
Dakar Accord.  Faki indicated that the GoC was considering 
next steps, but was not convinced that mediation through 
Afro-Arab channels would bring about improvements in the 
situation.  He promised to stay in touch as GoC thinking 
evolved and expressed gratitude for U.S. efforts thus far, 
but made clear that continued GoC participation in attempts 
to normalize relations with Sudan was no longer a given.  End 
summary. 
 
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DEMARCHE TO FAKI 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Ambassador and DCM called on FM Moussa Faki 
Mahamat May 9 to congratulate the GoC for its decisive 
military action against Chadian rebels May 6-7; to express 
regret for loss of life; to recall the Department's public 
condemnation of the Chadian rebel attacks and our efforts 
toward a UNSC Chairman's statement along the same lines; to 
urge Chad to avoid engaging in hot pursuit into Sudan as it 
sought to restore order in eastern Chad; to describe SE Scott 
Gration's efforts to convince the Sudanese government to 
disarm and seize the armed vehicles of Chadian rebels who 
attempted to return to Sudan; to accept an invitation to 
attend an early Contact Group meeting; and to demonstrate 
leadership in efforts to pursue peace and renewed 
negotiations. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Faki expressed thanks to the U.S. for our recent 
public statements condemning the rebel attacks on Chad and 
for the activities of SE Gration, but he emphasized that the 
GoC was not convinced that mediation through the Dakar 
Process would bear fruit. "We have concluded that negotiating 
with Sudan will be hard, if not impossible, for the time 
being," said Faki.  He then drew attention to 
"obstructionism" in New York on the part of the Chinese and 
Libyan delegations with respect to the May 8 Chairman's 
Statement about Chad-Sudan tensions.  Faki noted that he had 
called in the Chinese Ambassador, and that "China had its 
regional interests, which were well known," as a partial 
explanation for its unhelpful stance at the UN.  Libya's 
position was particularly disappointing to Chad, as it 
rendered unlikely the possibility of successful African 
mediation.  "The Dakar Accord is now one year old, and Sudan 
has never respected it," Faki offered, adding that Chad's 
flexibility was perceived by Sudan as weakness.  The Arab 
League's support for Sudan as an "Arab" state made mediation 
under those auspices problematic, he continued. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Chad had not decided what course to pursue, 
indicated Faki, but it thought that perhaps mediation with 
the help of the UN, U.S. or EU might be a way forward. 
Still, GoC participation in attempts to normalize relations 
with Sudan was not a given, he emphasized.  Chad could not 
tolerate further Sudanese destabilization inside Chadian 
borders, nor should the GoS's inability to regulate the 
 
NDJAMENA 00000163  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
situation in Darfur and South Sudan be accepted by the 
international community.  Chadian rebels were still being 
recruited in Sudan, and rebel movements were still being 
supplied with arms and vehicles, said Faki.  Chad wanted to 
protect Sudanese citizens seeking refuge in Chad, but the 
rebel presence in the region was making this very difficult. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Faki promised to tell President Deby of the U.S. 
approach and made clear that he would consult with us on next 
steps.  He reiterated that "I can't anticipate what we will 
do, but the cup is now running over."  Ambassador again urged 
prudence and restraint, pointing out that as the 
international community absorbed the impact of recent events, 
increased support would no doubt emerge, so long as Chad 
exercised patience. 
 
----------------------------------- 
CONVOCATION OF DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Our call on Faki followed his convocation of the 
diplomatic, IO and NGO community May 8 to describe Chadian 
military victories at Am-Dam and Haouish May 6 and 7.  Faki 
emphasized that Chad had been attacked by forces originating 
in Sudan whose intention was to overthrow democratic 
institutions in Chad.  He indicated that the GoC had 
inflicted heavy casualties but was still engaged in 
mopping-up operations.  He castigated Sudan's duplicity 
toward Chad and the IC, its violation of the Tripoli, Riyadh 
and Dakar Agreements, and its rejection of the just-signed 
Doha Accord.  Faki praised French, U.S. and Senegalese 
statements with respect to the conflict, quoting extensively 
from the Department spokesman's comments of May 7.  He urged 
greater international attention to Chad-Sudan tensions and 
asked nations to work in the UNSC and AU to try to identify 
ways to resolve the conflict. 
 
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FRANCE-CHAD 
----------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  French President Sarkozy called Deby the evening 
of May 7 and urged Chad not to carry the war into Sudan. 
French Ambassador Bruno Foucher talked to Faki twice May 9 to 
press for a policy of restraint and patience. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶8.  (SBU)  The change in Chad's diplomatic and military 
strategy presaged by Faki would be considerable.  We will 
analyze its potential impact septel. 
 
¶9.  (U)  Minimize considered. 
NIGRO