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OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0153/01 1261507
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061507Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6892
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE PRIORITY 0045
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0020
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0217
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0607
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000153 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DOHA FOR SE GRATION 
STATE FOR AF/C, AF/USSES, S/ES-O, DS/CC, DS/IP/AF, 
CA/OSC/ASC 
NSC FOR GAVIN AND HUDSON 
LONDON FOR POL -- LORD 
PARIS FOR POL -- D'ELIA AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MOPS ASEC PREL PREF SU UN AU LY FR CASC CD
SUBJECT: CHAD UPDATE, AFTERNOON MAY 6:  CHAD GOVT AIR FORCE 
BOMB REBELS, ITS GROUND FORCES COUNTER-ATTACK IN SE CHAD 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 151 
     ¶B. DOHA 298 
     ¶C. NDJAMENA 149 
 
NDJAMENA 00000153  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) CAVEAT:  This message is based on a variety of 
sources, some more reliable than others.  We gather 
information from all sources and try to winnow the chaff from 
the wheat.  Some reports re-circulate, gaining apparent 
momentum from repetition.  Some reports are based on rumors 
or garble fact.  Some reports are more or less easily 
verifiable; others are impossible to confirm at all. 
Overall, however, this message conveys as accurate a picture 
of the state of play here as we can give. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) CHAD REBELS STATUS:  As of afternoon May 6, Chad 
rebel columns remain generally as they were this morning and 
yesterday (REF A) -- three or perhaps four columns of Chad 
rebels are strung out along the border from points SE of 
Abeche to the CAR/Sudan/Chad tri-border area, north and south 
of Goz Beida town.  They appear to continue to remain in 
static positions 50-60 miles inside the border, while sending 
out small scouting patrols.  Rebel troop strength is still 
reportedly in the 1,500 - 2,000 range.  There appear to be 
additional rebel columns still inside Sudan, of indeterminate 
size. There are reports that rebel fighter morale may be 
flagging, and that ANT combatant morale is precarious. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) CHAD MILITARY REACTION:  There was ground contact 
May 6 between ANT attackers and the rebel defenders near 
Kurfi, south of Goz Beida.  Initial reports indicate that the 
ANT was successful in this engagement.  Chadian government 
ground forces are still redeploying south out of their Adre 
base.  Rebel scouting patrols may have reached Am-Timan, 
which has been recently reinforced with elite Chadian 
government military units.  Chad government military air 
assets continue to attack rebel columns May 6.  The ANT 
remains in defensive positions around Goz Beida town. 
Military and civilian intelligence headquarters in N'Djamena 
remain relatively quiet, although there are indications of 
increased military preparations in and around the city. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) MINURCAT:  The UN is evacuating personnel to Goz 
Beida from nearby locations, in order to concentrate staff in 
a location where MINURCAT security forces are stationed.  The 
UN has suspended humanitarian assistance operations in 
several locations. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) EX-EUFOR COMMANDER COMMENTS:   Former EUFOR 
Commander General Ganascia, a French Army Brigadier, told 
Ambassador May 6 that the intent of recent rebel incursions 
into Chad appeared different from that of earlier incursions, 
and that the GOC response to them so far seemed prudent. 
Ganascia, who commanded the 5,200 EUFOR peacekeepers in Chad 
from November 2007 until March 2009, and who is winding up 
his mission this week, said that lack of rebel movement or 
apparent desire to engage subsequent to arrival in the 
vicinity of Goz Beida may be an attempt to (1) tempt Chad 
Government forces into precipitate and unplanned 
counter-attacks; (2) provoke defections from Government 
forces; (3) entice Government forces eastward from previously 
prepared defensive positions in central Chad; or (4) all of 
the above. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Ganascia drew attention to the relative restraint 
thus far of Chad Government forces, which he considered a 
good sign, in that it indicated that the Government seemed to 
want to remain on the defensive as long as possible, its most 
prudent course of action.  According to Ganascia, GOC aerial 
bombing was having a significant effect on the rebels, who 
did not seem to have responded with effective anti-air 
actions.  Ganascia tended to discount the possibility of a 
rebel advance on the capital, unless Government forces 
suffered severe defections or made gross tactical mistakes, 
among which he said he would count abandonment of traditional 
strongholds west of Mongo.  Ganascia indicated that some 
 
NDJAMENA 00000153  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
rebels seemed to be taking refuge from aerial bombardments in 
refugee camps, which he viewed as a negative development from 
the humanitarian point of view.  The Chad high command, 
Ganascia said, might have learned enough from last year,s 
hard lessons and from French military experts sent to train 
them in the meantime to understand how to exploit the 
advantages of a well-planned defense against not-preponderant 
attackers. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) CHAD-US-FRANCE: Chad Foreign Minister Moussa Faki 
Mahamat discussed the current Chad rebel situation with SE 
Gration in Doha May 5 (REF B).  Enroute from Doha, Faki 
stopped in Paris May 6 for talks with French counterpart 
FORMIN Bernand Kouchner.  According to GOF and press reports, 
the two discussed ways to avoid an escalation of the 
situation in the east and maintain the security, stability, 
and territorial integrity of Chad. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) CAPITAL CALM:  The capital remained calm May 6, 
although rumors proliferate.  International media reports of 
rebels shooting down a Chadian government helicopter are 
false.  Traffic in and out of town, including across the 
Chad-Cameroon border appears normal. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) EMBASSY ACTIONS:  We and all our partners, both 
civilian and military, continue to follow this situation 
carefully.  We will continue to report opportunely on 
developments in eastern Chad.  We continue reviewing 
emergency action procedures and sharing information with our 
non-official resident AMCIT and LES communities as 
appropriate.  We have scheduled a AMCIT warden meeting for 
May 7. 
 
¶10.  (U) Minimize considered. 
NIGRO