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Viewing cable 09NAIROBI970, SOMALIA - PRESIDENT SHARIF DESCRIBES CURRENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NAIROBI970 2009-05-14 13:54 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXRO4411
OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #0970 1341354
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 141354Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9508
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS NAIROBI 000970 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S CARSON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV MARR MOPS PINR EAID SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - PRESIDENT SHARIF DESCRIBES CURRENT 
FIGHTING, REQUESTS IMMEDIATE AID 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  TFG President Sheikh Sharif told us May 14 
that his government's al-Shabaab opponents are increasingly 
being supplemented by foreign fighters who are leading some 
of the attacks against TFG forces.  Sharif ascribed initial 
TFG setbacks in the fighting to confusion among his Alliance 
for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) forces, who were 
initially not prepared to battle fighters with whom they had 
recently been allied.  That problem has been corrected, 
Sharif said, and the TFG's current forces, led by a new 
commander, are prepared to fight, but needed salaries for 
some of the troops, certain types of ammunition, and weapons. 
 End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) In a late afternoon, May 14 telephone call, a 
subdued President Sheikh Sharif told us from offices at Villa 
Somalia, Mogadishu, that negotiations were still underway 
with one Hizbul Islam faction, presumably that part led by 
Yusuf Mohammed "Indha Adde."  The other Hizbul Islam faction 
had followed ARS-Asmara's Hassan Dahir Aweys into an alliance 
with al-Shabaab, Sharif said.  Sharif declined to predict the 
outcome of his negotiations with Indha Adde. Further 
complicating matters was the increasing presence of foreign 
fighters in Mogadishu.  Some of them, Sharif said, were 
un-masked and leading attacks against TFG positions. Other of 
the opposition fighters were hardened fighters, Sharif said, 
and still others "criminals," who were formidable opponents. 
 
3. (SBU) The TFG had been making good progress in its 
conversations with Indha Adde until Aweys's arrival in 
Mogadishu, Sharif said. Aweys's appearance, and the beginning 
of a concerted military campaign against TFG forces on May 9 
had interrupted that process.  Sharif confessed that his 
ARS-Djibouti forces were poorly prepared for the 
al-Shabaab-led offensive.  Some of the forces had defected. 
Others, initially, were confused by the prospect of battling 
fighters with whom they previously been allied.  Those 
problems had been resolved, Sherif said, and in his command 
were 2,000 troops that were backed by 800 policemen.  Still 
to be deployed were an additional 1,500 troops, many of whom 
were in need of weapons.  The leadership problems the troops 
initially encountered had been resolved with the May 14 
appointment of a new and energetic armed forces commander, 
Yusuf Hussein Osman "Dhuumaal" (Darood/Mareehan) (Note: The 
Somali word "dhuumal" roughly translates to "discreet") 
Osman began his career as a military officer, then was moved 
to the police in 1988.  He rose to Banadir Region Police 
Commissioner, then was promoted to Deputy Commissioner for 
National Police Operations.  Sharif has named him Brigadier 
General and Chief of General Staff. 
 
4. (SBU) Sharif voiced his profound gratitude for USG 
support, including the recent press release issued by the 
Department and a May 14 Embassy press release.  Needed now, 
he said, was money so that his TFG could pay its troops, and 
purchase weapons and ammunition.  Sharif agreed with us that 
AMISOM stood ready to supply small caliber ammunition. AMISOM 
did not have in its stocks, however, ammunition for heavier 
weapons, Sharif said.  (Embassy has been told separately that 
the TFG needs ammunition for RPG-7s, 12.7 mm rounds, 37mm AA 
rounds, 81/82 mm mortar rounds, 60 mm mortar rounds, 75 mm 
recoilless rounds, FALL G3s ammunition, and 145 mm AA 
rounds.)  Some of this ammunition, Sharif thought, could be 
purchased in Mogadishu's markets if cash were available. 
 
5. (SBU)  Sharif voiced his government's determination to 
continue fighting.  He believed that with the right 
resources, the TFG troops could hold their positions in 
Mogadishu and even reverse recent losses.  He repeated the 
need for money for the troops and access to superior 
firepower. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
6. (SBU) President Sharif seemed characteristically calm and 
confident that the TFG's initial setbacks could be reversed, 
provided his troops were properly supplied.  He appealed 
urgently for financial support from the USG.  At the end of 
the conversation, he asked that, with so many southern Somali 
extremist fighters converging on Mogadishu, thought be given 
to moving AMISOM troops into now-thinly al-Shabaab-occupied 
Baidoa and Kismaayo. 
RANNEBERGER