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Viewing cable 09NAIROBI1047, SOMALIA - CONTRASTS: MEMORIAL DAY WEEKEND SEES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NAIROBI1047 2009-05-26 12:19 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXRO2693
OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #1047 1461219
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261219Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9629
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS NAIROBI 001047 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PTER MARR SOCI SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - CONTRASTS:  MEMORIAL DAY WEEKEND SEES 
SUICIDE BOMBING AND UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S PRESS 
CONFERENCE IN MOGADISHU 
 
REF: NAIROBI 1037 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The May 22 - 25 weekend in Mogadishu began 
with an unsuccessful counterattack by TFG forces (reftel), 
and ended with a surprise visit by UN Special Representative 
Ould-Abdallah.  Sandwiched in between was a suicide bombing 
near the Police Academy that claimed the lives of six 
policemen.  In a May 26 telephone conversation, TFG President 
Sharif told the Ambassador that "things (in Mogadishu) are 
better than what they seem, no matter what the press says." 
Sharif thanked the USG for its assistance to his government. 
End summary. 
 
Logistical Problems 
Undercut TFG Counterattack 
-------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The May 22 - 25 Memorial Day weekend began in 
Mogadishu with an initially successful counterattack by 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces (reftel) that, 
however, lost momentum in an afternoon retreat that saw 
virtually all of the TFG's gains erased.  According to SRSG 
Ould-Abdallah, who paid a surprise visit to Mogadishu May 25, 
and spoke with the TFG, as well as the Ugandan and Burundian 
force commanders, gains during the counteroffensive were 
erased by TFG communication and logistical problems. The SRSG 
was told that the inability to supply the TFG forces with 
food and water was at the heart of the logistical problems. 
 
3. (SBU) The TFG retreat to its initial positions on May 22 
has not been followed by an insurgent attack, which some have 
seen as an encouraging sign. The May 24 suicide bombing about 
150 meters from the Police Academy, with rumors in Mogadishu 
of more such bombings to come, has suggested to some that the 
AMISOM-backed TFG's relative stable control of nine Mogadishu 
districts had caused its opponent to change tactics.  (The 
May 24 bombing reportedly killed six policemen and wounded 
several others.)  The SRSG told the Ambassador May 25, 
immediately following his return from Mogadishu, that the 
morale of the TFG leadership was "high," but that TFG 
security forces were still contending with discipline and 
resource problems.  In a separate telephone conversation May 
26, TFG President Sharif told the Ambassador that "things are 
better than what they seem, no matter what the press says." 
 
A More Robust AMISOM 
-------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) The TFG leadership also told the SRSG that they 
would like to see AMISOM's rules of engagement changed to 
allow for more aggressive action, and they pushed for rapid 
deployment of additional AMISOM troops. 
 
5. (SBU) On the same day as the SRSG's Mogadishu visit, 
President Sharif used a press conference to call for 
international help in fighting "foreign militants," praised 
the May 20 IGAD communique on Somalia as "correct," and 
defended the role of AMISOM as African fighters helping a 
"fellow African country." 
 
6. (SBU) In their May 26 telephone conversation, the 
Ambassador urged President Sharif to carefully consider the 
optics of traveling to Libya May 27 while his rival, Hassan 
Dahir Aweys, still stocked Mogadishu.  A relaxed Sharif 
promised to consider the Ambassador's advice, but countered 
that staying in Mogadishu might create the impression that 
the TFG was worried about the outcome of the struggle with 
its opponents. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7. (SBU) The opposition's recourse to a suicide bombing may 
indicate that it does not have the strength at this juncture 
to attempt a direct assault o the TFG.  By the same token, 
the TFG's increasing public and private support for a more 
robust AMISOM presence and mandate may suggest that the 
African troops are becoming more central to its strategy as 
the stalemate in Mogadishu continues. 
RANNEBERGER