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OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHMS #0457/01 1390948
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O R 190949Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0423
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000457
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/05/19
TAGS: PREL YM MU
SUBJECT: OMAN’S ALI MAJID WARNS YEMEN "ON THE BRINK"
MUSCAT 00000457 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Gary A. Grappo, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
Summary
-------
¶1. (S) In my farewell call May 18, General Ali bin Majid
al-Ma’amari, Minister of the Royal Office and Chief of the Office
of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, told me that Oman is
"very concerned about stability" in Yemen, warning its neighbor is
"on the brink." He said that southern separatists will soon
formally announce their "movement," with former South Yemen Vice
President Ali Salim al Baydh as its head. Oman has warned al Baydh
that he will lose his Omani citizenship and protection if he joins
the separatist movement. Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh is
determined to protect Yemeni unity "by all means necessary," which
would mean "another civil war" in Yemen in Ali Majid’s view.
Moreover, Al Qa’ida in Yemen is poised to exploit the situation,
siding with the separatists. Oman’s nominal second-in-command
advised that the U.S., UK, Saudi Arabia and Oman should signal
strong public support for Saleh and make clear that the separatists
will receive no support from Yemen’s friends and neighbors. End
Summary.
"Unstable and on the Brink"
---------------------------
¶2. (S) General Ali Majid moved quickly from the courtesies
surrounding my farewell call to draw attention to the "unstable"
situation in Yemen. In his meetings with President Saleh two weeks
ago, he said, Saleh appeared to underestimate the seriousness of
the problem in the south, especially in light of Yemen’s many other
ongoing challenges, e.g., the uncertain post-Saleh leadership
situation, increasing tribal anti-government activities, continuing
corruption, declining economic fortunes, government incompetence,
and Somali pirates. Ali Majid said he urged Saleh to consider
opening a dialog with the people of the south and work peacefully
to address their concerns. Saleh was resistant, however, vowing to
employ "all means necessary" to confront the separatists and
preserve Yemen’s unity. That could only mean another civil war,
said Ali Majid.
Al Qa’ida to Exploit Separatist Movement
----------------------------------------
¶3. (S) Responding to my query, he confirmed his view that Saleh
enjoyed firm support among the Yemeni security forces, the
presidential guard and "probably most" of the army. Nevertheless,
civil war would be disastrous for the country, likely destroying
what economy exists and precipitating the exodus of "millions" of
refugees to Saudi Arabia and Oman. Moreover, according to Omani
intelligence, Al Qa’ida is likely ready to side with the
separatists to exacerbate disunity, edge out the socialists, and
ultimately establish control over the south. "It would be another
Somalia and a disaster for the region."
Ultimatum to al Baydh
---------------------
¶4. (S) The General confirmed that a senior Royal Office official
had phoned al Baydh two days ago in Vienna, where he was
"vacationing," and warned that Oman would not accept one of its
citizens supporting separatism in Yemen. (Note: The former South
Yemen Vice President was given effective asylum in Oman at the end
of the civil war in 1993 and subsequently Omani citizenship.) Al
Baydh reported that he had been asked to lead the separatists and
will make a public announcement of the movement and his support in
London on 21 or 22 May. When the Omani official warned that such
an announcement would mean immediate loss of his Omani citizenship,
the exiled Yemeni replied, "I’ll mail it (his passport) to you
now."
¶5. (S) Ali Majid said Oman was firm in its position that no Omani
would be permitted to advocate on behalf of the separatists. "We
will stand by Sana’a and Saleh." He expressed anger that al Baydh
had violated the conditions of his signed agreement disavowing
MUSCAT 00000457 002.2 OF 002
future involvement in a Yemeni opposition organization of any kind.
"He’s a liar," said Ali Majid, but stopped short of categorically
proclaiming withdrawal of al Baydh’s Omani passport yet. Should he
make the statement in London, however, "He will not be an Omani."
Al Baydh’s family may also lose their Omani passports. (Comment:
Al Baydh has lived a life of considerable comfort in Oman, enjoying
many privileges and gifts from the government of Oman.)
Weak Leadership
---------------
¶6. (S) Despite Oman’s concerns about Yemen’s stability in the
face of the separatist challenge, Ali Majid voiced little
confidence in the separatists’ leadership. In addition to doubts
about al Baydh, he named Tariq al Fadhli as another likely senior
leader who would be "easily manipulated" by others, including Al
Qa’ida. In fact, he alleged, Al Qa’ida would seek to provoke armed
conflict, incite greater instability, and if unable to control the
entire south region, would likely carve out a portion in which it
could operate and govern. In sum, Ali Majid said Oman knew many of
the separatists very well, some of them "since the sixties," and
had little regard for any of them.
¶7. (S) Oman is also concerned about the leadership in Sana’a.
While Saleh remains as president, the government ought to remain
firmly in charge. But the succession picture is cloudy. He
refused to be drawn out on an assessment of Abdullah Saleh’s son,
but did evince confidence in the Northwest Regional Commander,
General Ali Mohsin al Ahmar.
What Can Be Done?
-----------------
¶8. (S) Oman is not in a position to take significant action to
mitigate the threat Sana’a faces from the southern separatists,
said Ali Majid. Nevertheless, he pronounced Oman firmly behind
Sana’a and might, if conditions warranted, be willing to come out
publicly in voicing its support. He encouraged other countries,
specifically the U.S., UK and Saudi Arabia, to consider doing the
same, especially in the event of the anticipated announcement from
London.
Comment
-------
¶9. (S) This is the fourth and most senior Omani official in a
week to share with me Oman’s grave concerns for Yemen’s future.
The issue clearly has risen to the top of Oman’s security agenda,
eclipsing for the moment even Iran. At one point when I raised
Iran, he made one brief comment ad returned immediately to the
subject of Yemen. Oman is worried that Saleh may fail to act
quickly enough to stunt the separatists, leaving armed conflict the
only remaining solution. In such an eventuality, Oman’s chief
worry is thousands of Yemeni refugees massing on its border and
attempting entry, some of whom may be with Al Qa’ida. Oman’s
government is not equipped at present to deal with such a
humanitarian crisis and lacks the resources and expertise to become
capable. In all likelihood, it would refuse the refugees entry.
GRAPPO