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Viewing cable 09MOSCOW1362, READING THE TEA LEAVES ON MEDVEDEV'S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1362 2009-05-27 13:44 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO3884
OO RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1362/01 1471344
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 271344Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3500
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001362 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM PINR KJUS RS
SUBJECT: READING THE TEA LEAVES ON MEDVEDEV'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT INITIATIVE 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  President Medvedev's May 16 proposal to 
change the way the head, deputy head and secretary of 
Russia's Constitutional Court are selected passed all three 
readings by the State Duma on May 20 and 22, received the 
approval of the Federation Council on May 27, and now appears 
headed for a quick enactment.  While Medvedev's proposal 
ignited some speculation that Putin is preparing to return as 
president, our contacts downplay theories that Medvedev is 
creating a "soft landing" for himself when he leaves the 
presidency.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) On May 16 Medvedev requested changes to the law 
governing the Constitutional Court that would have the 
Russian president propose and the Federation Council approve 
candidates for the head, deputy head and secretary of 
Russia's Constitutional Court and extended their term from 
three to six years.  On May 20 the Russian State Duma passed 
on its first reading Medvedev's proposed changes on the 
Constitutional Court by a vote of 352 (United Russia and Just 
Russia) in favor, and 53 (KPRF) opposed.  Deputies from 
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's LDPR abstained.  The Duma passed the 
proposed amendments on their second and third readings on May 
22 by a similar 352-57 vote.  On May 27 the Federation 
Council voted overwhelmingly (132 votes) in favor of 
Medvedev's proposal.  United Russia's Vladimir Pligin, head 
of the Duma Committee for Constitutional Law, proposed on May 
21 that the proposal could become law within 30 days after it 
is signed by Medvedev and published, but the law reported out 
of the Federation Council calls for the obligatory 
three-month period. 
 
3.  (U) Russia's Constitutional Court consists of 19 judges 
appointed by the Federation Council upon the nomination by 
the president.  In early 2008 the GOR moved the entire court 
from Moscow to St. Petersburg.  Under current law, the head 
of the court, the deputy chief judge and the court secretary 
are selected in a secret ballot by the entire body and serve 
three year terms.  Under Medvedev's proposal, the president 
will nominate the three, subject to the approval of the 
Federation Council, and they will serve for six years. 
Pligin argued that it would set up a unified judicial system 
because the heads of Russia's other two main courts, the 
Arbitrazh Court and the Supreme Court, are both nominated by 
the president and approved by the Federation Council for 
six-year terms.  Duma Chief Boris Gryzlov noted that the 
proposal would raise the status of the head of the 
Constitutional Court and that this system for appointing the 
head of the chief court is used in Germany, France and the 
United States. 
 
4.  (SBU) The KPRF's Sergey Obukhov, himself a former press 
secretary for the Constitutional Court during the 1990's, 
said that the proposal violated the Russian Constitution 
because it gave the executive branch too much influence on 
the judicial.  The LDPR's Zhirinovskiy said that he and his 
colleagues would not support the amendments, but in the Duma 
votes LDPR's deputies did not vote against it.  Legal experts 
roundly criticized the proposal.  Constitutional Court 
justice Gadis Gadzhiyev from Dagestan told the Kommersant 
Daily that the bill contradicts the principal of the 
independence of judicial power.  (Note:  Soon thereafter some 
commentators suggested that Gadzhiyev might be replaced by 
Kremlin-insider and deputy head of the Presidential 
Administration Larisa Brycheva).  Retired Deputy Chief Judge 
Tamara Morshchakova, one of the authors of the 1993 Russian 
Constitution, likewise told Ekho Moskviy radio station 
earlier this month that the proposal would result in a "clear 
decrease in the level of democracy and the level of 
independence in the Constitutional Court." 
 
Possible "Soft Landing for Medvedev?" 
------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) Some in the Moscow commentariat were quick to jump 
on the proposed changes as a sign that Prime Minister Putin 
will return to the job of president that he held 2000-2008 
with Medvedev shifting to the Constitutional Court.  The fact 
that the unexpected proposal from Medvedev came less than one 
week after Putin told Japanese journalists that in 2012 he 
and Medvedev would decide who should run for president only 
served to fan the flames stirred up by conspiracy theorists. 
Nicolay Petrov from the Moscow Carnegie Center told reporters 
that the change in how the court's chief judge is selected 
would only be necessary if Medvedev steps down before his 
term as president ends in 2012.  Members of the 
Constitutional Court re-elected current chief justice Valeriy 
Zorkin in February 2009 to another three-year term that will 
expire in 2012.  The terms of the deputy chief judge and 
court secretary expire in 2011 and 2010, respectively. 
 
MOSCOW 00001362  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
6.  (SBU) However, most with whom we spoke were dismissive of 
the theory that Medvedev will step down as president to 
become the court's chief judge.  Viktor Ilyukhin, the deputy 
head of the Duma's Committee on Government Structure, 
categorically denied that such was the plan, saying that 
there was no way Medvedev would become the head of the court 
because Medvedev will "run for a second term and easily be 
re-elected."  Former independent analyst Olga Kryshtanovskaya 
who signed on as a consultant with United Russia in April 
told us May 22 that any talk of Medvedev leaving the 
presidency to become head of the Constitutional Court is 
"absurd."  She added that the head of the Constitutional 
Court is a powerless position "akin to being the Russian 
ambassador to a small African country."  Head of a 
Kremlin-tolerated opposition party Leonid Gozman told us it 
was ludicrous to think any special legal machinations would 
be needed to ensure the future selection of Medvedev to the 
court:  "the judges would leap at the chance to show their 
loyalty."  Gozman too did not view the sinecure as worthy of 
Medvedev's pursuit. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  (SBU) The haste with which Medvedev's proposal sped 
through the Duma and Federation Council has raised eyebrows 
here and reinforced the tendency to view the legislation 
through the succession prism.  While we are skeptical the 
move is part of a grand political plan, the nervous 
speculation within the chattering class reflects the general 
lack of clarity over Russian's political tandem. 
BEYRLE