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Viewing cable 09MOSCOW1349, RUSSIA: BURY HITLER, NOT STALIN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1349 2009-05-26 12:46 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO2721
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1349/01 1461246
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261246Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3473
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001349 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: BURY HITLER, NOT STALIN 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: On May 19, the Kremlin announced that it 
had formed a "Commission to Oppose Historical Falsification," 
to address any attempts to "cast doubt on our people's 
victory in World War II."  This decision followed a May 7 
proposal in the State Duma to introduce amendments 
criminalizing denial of the Soviet victory over the Nazis, as 
well as "rehabilitation of Nazism."  Proponents of the 
legislation painted it as the equivalent of laws found in 
many Western countries criminalizing Holocaust denial. 
However, others questioned the need for the legislation, and 
called the proposal a veiled attempt to intimidate former 
Soviet neighbors away from any statements or actions 
deploring Soviet occupation of their country at the end of 
World War II.  Human rights leaders accused the GOR of 
exploiting patriotic sentiment to link the concepts of 
national strength and autocratic rule, which could facilitate 
crackdowns on civil society.  Liberal and moderate 
commentators viewed both the legislation and the Commission 
as potential steps backward from Medvedev's recent promising 
moves towards increasing GOR tolerance of dissent.  End 
Summary. 
 
Nazism is bad, OK? 
------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) In the wake of his May 9 Victory Day video blog 
statements against "historical revisionism," President 
Medvedev on May 19 formed a "Commission to Oppose Historical 
Falsification," to combat any attempts to "cast doubt on our 
people's victory in World War II."  The Commission, expected 
to meet twice a year, will draw on GOR bodies for its 
membership, including the Ministry of Defense and the FSB. 
This decision followed a May 7 proposal in the State Duma to 
introduce amendments criminalizing denial of the Soviet 
victory over the Nazis, as well as "rehabilitation of 
Nazism."  The amendments would impose a 300,000 ruble fine or 
three years in prison as punishment, increasing to 500,000 
rubles or five years in prison if the offender is a public 
servant or works for a media outlet.  The proposal would also 
apply to foreigners, if they commit the offense on Russian 
territory.  United Russia Deputy Valeriy Ryazanskiy told the 
daily Vedomosti May 6 that the Supreme Court had already 
approved the amendment. 
 
3. (SBU) Proponents of the Commission and of the legislation, 
such as United Russia Deputy and Emergency Ministry head 
Sergey Shoygu, painted it as the equivalent of laws found in 
many Western countries criminalizing Holocaust denial. 
Announcing the proposal in April, First Deputy of the Duma 
Committee for CIS Affairs Konstantin Zatulin told Radio 
Liberty that "we had to return to measures to allow us to 
struggle against the attempts to rehabilitate Nazis and their 
collaborators."  However, in January, Medvedev had already 
made clear the Kremlin's intention to tie this issue to the 
controversy over the region's Soviet past, telling a state 
council formed for the 65-year anniversary of the World War 
II victory that Russia could not accept "distortion of the 
undeniable and decisive contribution that the Red Army and 
Soviet Union brought in liberating Europe from fascism."  On 
May 20, Kremlin sources admitted to the moderate daily 
Kommersant that "geopolitical" concerns were behind both the 
Commission and the legislation, given the propensity of "some 
former Soviet republics" to downplay the Soviet role in 
defeating Nazism.  As drafted, the proposed law would apply 
not only to individual citizens, organizations, parties, 
movements, or commercial structures, but also to 
state/government structures and states, giving Estonia, 
Latvia, and Ukraine as examples. 
 
"Serving foreign policy interests" 
---------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Given these statements, and given the explicit 
application of the law to foreign citizens and governments, a 
number of critics called the proposal a thinly veiled attempt 
to intimidate former Soviet neighbors away from any actions 
designed to deplore Soviet occupation of their country at the 
end of World War II.  In recent years, former Soviet 
Republics have derided Soviet victories in World War II as 
the beginning of occupation, and Russian leaders have 
responded by warning countries with significant Russian 
minorities that they will defend their rights.  The 2007 
controversy surrounding Estonia's decision to move a memorial 
to Soviet soldiers out of the center of Tallinn presaged a 
series of bilateral spats with neighboring countries over 
treatment of Soviet war memorial and grave sites, as well as 
sharper accusations of tolerance for neo-Nazism and fascist 
movements.  Deputy head of the State Duma Committee on Social 
and Religious Organizations Sergey Markov, a member of the 
Commission, complained to Kommersant on May 20 that 
neighboring countries such as Ukraine, Latvia, and Estonia 
 
MOSCOW 00001349  002 OF 003 
 
 
"give Nazis awards and medals," while Ukraine exaggerated the 
scale of the "holodmor" famine (which Ukraine claims was a 
deliberate policy of mass killing by Stalin).  Polish 
attempts to examine a massacre of Polish officers by Soviet 
secret police during World War II have also given GOR 
authorities heartburn, and led to a diplomatic impasse over 
the Polish request for further information.  Even the liberal 
Russian News Service editor Sergey Dorenko told us, by way of 
criticizing NATO enlargement, that "20 years ago Nazis didn't 
march in the Baltics, and now they do." 
 
5. (SBU) The proposed legislation may subject visitors to 
Russia to arrest if they have previously committed the 
offense outside of Russia.  In such a scenario, it would be 
possible even for heads of state to face imprisonment upon 
arriving in Russia for a diplomatic visit.  Following 
logically from this, the Commission has also mentioned the 
possibility of breaking diplomatic ties with the government 
of any country deemed to have offended Russia in this area. 
 
6. (SBU) A number of commentators have questioned the logic 
and motivation of the legislation and the Commission. 
Gazeta.ru quoted lawyer Andrey Knyazev expressing skepticism 
that the law could be enforced, as it would be difficult to 
prove that someone had violated it.  Historian Aleksandr 
Dyukov told Vedomosti that the law was pointless, since the 
Nuremburg trials had already established the scale of the 
Nazis' crimes, and that very few people disagreed.  Moderate 
commentator Fyodor Lukyanov wrote that the proposed law is 
"simply a populist move," designed to score political points 
and to "serve the foreign policy interests of Russia" by 
putting pressure on its neighbors.  Indeed, many doubted the 
legality of the portion of the proposal calling for the 
prosecution of foreigners for acts or statements made outside 
of Russia.  Even the pro-Russian Ukrainian opposition found 
this idea strange; Rada Deputy from the Party of Regions 
Valeriy Kovalev told grani.ru, "There is international law. 
There are corresponding agreements between states. 
Evidently, this measure is not quite proper legally." 
 
"This is really about Stalin" 
----------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Journalist and Human Rights Council member Svetlana 
Sorokina told us May 19, "Governments never miss a chance to 
exploit public patriotism, especially in this country, 
especially around the time of Victory Day."  However, 
according to Sorokina, the GOR's recent activity goes beyond 
simple jingoism.  "They may say they are worried about people 
rehabilitating Hitler," she said, "but this is really about 
rehabilitating Stalin."  A number of commentators have noted 
that among Putin's early acts as President in 2000 was to 
change the Russian anthem back to the Soviet one, and to 
place Stalin's name at the top of a list of World War II 
heroes.  Opposition figures made their suspicions of the law 
explicit, with representatives of both Yabloko and Right 
Cause suggesting that the legislation should also criminalize 
the rehabilitation of Stalinism. 
 
8. (SBU)  In contrast to much of the former Communist world, 
in Russia the Soviet past is a source of pride as well as 
pain.  A walk through Moscow's streets, or a ride through its 
Metro system, reveals a preponderance of hammers-and-sickles, 
statues of Lenin, and Communist-era murals praising Soviet 
workers -- as well as the unity and fellowship of Soviet 
republics.  Oborona activist Oleg Kozlovskiy asked 
rhetorically in a May 19 conversation, "Imagine walking 
around Berlin and still seeing swastikas everywhere." 
However, for most Russians any comparison between Hitler's 
killings and those of Stalin is anathema.  Sorokina, a 
consistent critic of GOR human rights policies, said that a 
majority of Russians are sensitive to international criticism 
of Soviet excesses, and during our conversation she herself 
downplayed Stalin's anti-Russian crimes. 
 
9. (SBU) In this environment, our human rights contacts and 
other commentators believe that the law could ease the path 
for the GOR to tighten restrictions on civil society. Irina 
Karatsuba of Moscow State University wrote that "this is an 
attempt to shut the mouth" of independent experts, 
historians, journalists, activists, and groups like 
'Memorial' who "keep the memory of past repressions alive." 
Oleg Orlov of Memorial agreed that the Commission was an 
attempt "to halt any objective view of what really happened 
in Russia's past."  Moscow Helsinki Group Director Lyudmila 
Alekseyeva told us May 20, "if the Commission were really 
focused on historical accuracy, it would have some 
historians.  There is not one real historian in the group, 
only politicians and the FSB."  She also noted that Zatulin, 
the author of the draft law, made a name for himself by 
crushing dissident groups in the 1970s.  Nikita Sokolov, an 
 
MOSCOW 00001349  003 OF 003 
 
 
editor with the liberal daily New Times, echoed this 
thinking, calling the decision to include the FSB and other 
intelligence agencies "perplexing," and adding, "One can 
easily guess where they would look for falsifications." 
Several editorials noted that the proposed legislation 
appears to conveniently ignore Russian's own homegrown 
neo-Nazis and skinheads, pointing out that historians would 
not ignore the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939, which allowed 
both Russia and Germany to roll into Eastern Europe. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10. (SBU) Medvedev's recent liberal gestures, such as his 
interview with the opposition paper Novaya Gazeta and his 
reconstitution of the Presidential Council on Human Rights, 
bouyed hopes among some liberals of a coming thaw in GOR 
policy.  However, Medvedev's decision to form the Commission 
is a reminder of the conservative, nationalistic attitude 
toward Russia's near abroad and its Soviet past that still 
prevails throughout Russian society, from the Presidential 
level down to the average citizen.  The legislation thus far 
has not moved forward in the State Duma, and the Commission's 
role remains unclear beyond "coordination" of an undefined 
"process."  Nonetheless, we will closely monitor this 
potentially troubling trend in GOR policy. 
BEYRLE