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Viewing cable 09MOSCOW1345, A RUSSIAN MARSHALL PLAN FOR AFGHANISTAN?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1345 2009-05-26 11:35 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO2625
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1345/01 1461135
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261135Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3456
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001345 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EAID SNAR AF RS
SUBJECT: A RUSSIAN MARSHALL PLAN FOR AFGHANISTAN? 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: A recent conference on Russian-Afghan 
relations organized by a Russian NGO provided Moscow an 
opportunity to demonstrate its concern over the situation in 
Afghanistan without committing to provide additional 
assistance to the country.  The event brought together 
Russian officials and business representatives with visiting 
Afghans for events that focused on attracting Russian 
involvement in the Afghan economy, including rebuilding 
infrastructure.  High-level GOR officials gave general 
comments that included a few oblique criticisms of the U.S. 
and NATO, while the conference organizer, a Russian 
nationalist and critic of the U.S., called for Russia to 
offer Afghanistan a Marshall Plan to stabilize the country as 
part of a larger strategy to develop Central Asia.  We are 
skeptical that the conference will yield greater Russian 
private sector investment in Afghanistan, or presages a 
significant up-tick in assistance; however, the high-level 
GOR attendance at the event does underscore the fact that 
Afghanistan factors higher in MFA and Kremlin priorities.  In 
Moscow's rendering, Russia remains an indispensable partner 
to the U.S. in stabilizing Afghanistan.  End summary. 
 
High-Level GOR Participation 
---------------------------- 
 
2. (U) The May 15-16 Russia-Afghanistan Forum, organized by 
the NGO the Institute of Demography, Migration and Regional 
Development (IDMRD), brought Afghan officials to Moscow for a 
series of events intended to enhance the Russian role in 
Afghanistan, with a focus on the economy.  This included a 
meeting between Russian Federation Council members and Afghan 
parliamentarians, who called upon Russia to get more involved 
in the reconstruction of their country's Soviet-era 
infrastructure.  The organizers had some GOR assistance in 
putting the event together, and sponsorship from a number of 
Russian companies, including Gazprom and Rostechnologiy. 
 
3. (U) GOR Deputy Chairman Igor Sechin, Security Council 
Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, and Director of the Federal 
Service for Drug Control (FSKN) Viktor Ivanov all spoke 
briefly at the May 14 opening of the conference, ensuring a 
high degree of attention by the Russian media to this 
non-official event.  Sechin highlighted Russian food aid 
provided to Afghanistan through the Ministry of Emergency 
Situations, which was projected to include 25 tons of flour 
delivered in 2009.  Patrushev welcomed Afghan participation 
in regional counter-narcotics efforts, and said the GOR 
favored establishing a regional counter-narcotics center in 
Afghanistan.  Ivanov, a frequent critic of NATO for what he 
argues is a failure to stop Afghan narcotics trafficking, 
drew a correlation between the increasing number of foreign 
troops in Afghanistan and the increase in the country's drug 
production.  Afghan Vice President Abdul Khalili, the senior 
Afghan official at the forum, claimed significant success by 
his government in combating narcotics, stating that 24 of 34 
Afghan provinces were not involved in drug production. 
 
Focus on Economy and Infrastructure 
----------------------------------- 
 
4. (U) Discussion of potential Russian investment in 
Afghanistan, and involvement in rebuilding the country's 
infrastructure, were significant aspects of the forum, 
although there appeared to be little in the way of concrete 
results.  A session attended by Afghan federal and regional 
government officials, and representatives of Afghan and 
Russian companies, spent much time highlighting the work done 
on Afghan infrastructure during the Soviet period. 
Conference organizer and IDMRD Chairman Yuri Krupnov claimed 
that this legacy presented Russia a unique opportunity to 
contribute to stabilizing Afghanistan, and called upon Russia 
to develop a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan.  In the end, 
however, he admitted that the discussions had been 
"cautious," and Russian firms had not committed to working in 
Afghanistan. 
 
An Odd Spokesman for Russia-Afghan Relations 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
5. (U) Throughout the conference, Krupnov returned to 
arguments he has made in a number of articles and interviews 
given during the past year, some of which were critical of 
U.S policies.  A Russian nationalist with a checkered past, 
Krupnov has said that Russia must provide an alternative to 
the "bankrupt U.S. doctrine of exporting democracy" by 
"exporting development" to Afghanistan and Central Asia. 
This ties in to Krupnov's vision of Russia helping to 
establish a "New Middle East," a mega-region stretching from 
the Persian Gulf through South and Central Asia to Siberia. 
The linchpin to accomplishing this goal is the peaceful 
 
MOSCOW 00001345  002 OF 002 
 
 
development of Afghanistan, which necessitates the GOR to 
develop a Marshall Plan for the country.  According to 
Krupnov, what prevents Russia from accomplishing this is the 
U.S., which is pursuing the "disintegration and 
subordination" of Afghanistan. 
 
6. (U) Krupnov presented a vision of Russia-Afghan relations 
thoroughly detached from reality, in which the Afghan people 
have no hostility toward Russia and look fondly upon the 
dams, roads, and other infrastructure built by the Soviets. 
In Krupnov's rendering, the U.S. and NATO have built only 
military bases since arriving in the country.  He argued that 
the real reason NATO is in Afghanistan is to provide a 
rationale for the alliance's existence, and create a 
"strategic bridgehead" in Eurasia.  In contrast, Soviet 
troops went to Afghanistan to provide security for the 
country's "economic, scientific, educational and humanitarian 
development." 
 
7. (U) Krupnov is an agronomist by training who worked as a 
teacher and within the Soviet and Russian education 
bureaucracies before joining the staff of the Russian Duma in 
2002.  He attempted to found his own political party, the 
Development Party, in 2006, but it was denied registration by 
the GOR.  Krupnov spent 2007 to 2008 working in the 
Khabarovsk city government before becoming Chairman of IDMRD, 
an organization that appears largely of his invention.  He 
has written a number of books and articles related, some 
loosely, to Russian developmental and demographic issues. 
Krupnov is a self-promoter, who's image gazes thoughtfully 
from his personal website, www.krupnov.ru. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (SBU) While Krupnov's comments during the conference were 
relatively tame compared to the criticism he has previously 
leveled at the U.S. and NATO, his extreme opinions appear to 
have some traction within official circles in Moscow, judging 
by the high-level GOR attendance at his conference.  It is 
worth noting, however, that while we observed MFA officials 
involved in Afghan policy in the audience, none spoke or 
appeared to have an official role in the event.  We are 
skeptical that this forum will excite increased Russian 
investment, or presages a Marshall Plan for Kabul - economic 
realities do not bear this out.  However, the senior GOR 
attendance at the event does reflect Afghanistan's rising 
importance to the MFA and Kremlin.  Interest in expanding 
cooperation with the U.S. in defeating the Taliban, as 
evidenced during Medvedev's April 3 meeting with the 
President, coexists with policy pot-shots at NATO and U.S. 
failure to stabilize the region.  In Moscow's mind at least, 
Russia remains the indispensable partner. 
BEYRLE